Are there passive desires?

Wall, D. (2009) Are there passive desires? Dialectica. 63(2), pp. 133-155. 0012-2017.

Information

Information

Abstract:

What is the relation between desire and action? According to a traditional, widespread and influential view I call ‘The Motivational Necessity of Desire’ (MN) having a desire that p entails being disposed to act in ways you believe will bring about p. But what about desires like a desire that the committee chooses you without your needing to do anything, or a desire that your child passes her exams on her own? Such ‘self-passive’ desires are often given as a counter example to MN. If MN is true then self-passive desires seem absurd: if someone has a self-passive desire she will be disposed to act, thereby preventing her from getting what she desires. But it seems we can reasonably, and often do, have such desires. However, I argue that self-passive desires are not, in fact, counter-examples to MN: close consideration of the content of these desires, the contexts in which we ascribe them, and what is claimed by MN shows that they are not a problem for that view. I also argue that strengthened versions of the examples are unsuccessful, and I offer a diagnosis of why these kinds of case are commonly thought to raise a challenge to MN.

Subjects:

B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy > BD418.3 Philosophy of mind

Creators:

Wall, D.

Publisher:

Blackwell

Faculties, Divisions and Institutes:

University Faculties, Divisions and Research Centres - OLD > School of Social Sciences (to 2016)

Date:

2009

Date Type:

Publication

Page Range:

pp. 133-155

Journal or Publication Title:

Dialectica

Volume:

Number:

Language:

English

ISSN:

0012-2017

Status:

Published / Disseminated

Refereed:

Yes

References:

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