Akrasia and self-control

Wall, D. (2009) Akrasia and self-control. Philosophical Explorations. 12(1), pp. 69-78. 1386-9795.

Information

Information

Abstract:

According to Gary Watson (1977) if we choose not to implement a judgment about what it is best to do then we must have changed that judgment. On those grounds he rejects an otherwise plausible account of akrasia, or weakness of will, that explains it in terms of the relative strengths of the agent s desires to act against and in accordance with their evaluative judgment. However, Watson seems to assume what I call a ‘principle of closure of evaluation’, a principle that I argue can fail. The possibility of such failure of closure of evaluation means that Watson’s argument can be resisted, allowing us to maintain this plausible account of akrasia.

Uncontrolled Keywords:

Akrasia, Davidson, D., desires, evaluation, Mele, A., practical rationality, weakness of will, self-control

Subjects:

B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics > BJ1468.5 Akrasia. Will

Creators:

Wall, D.

Publisher:

Taylor & Francis

Faculties, Divisions and Institutes:

University Faculties, Divisions and Research Centres - OLD > School of Social Sciences (to 2016)
Faculties > Faculty of Health & Society > Applied Social Studies & Sociology

Date:

March 2009

Date Type:

Publication

Page Range:

pp. 69-78

Journal or Publication Title:

Philosophical Explorations

Volume:

Number:

Language:

English

DOI:

10.1080/13869790802627256

ISSN:

1386-9795

Status:

Published / Disseminated

Refereed:

Yes

References:

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