

Reimagining Civil-Military Relations from a Quadrumvirate Interaction Perspective

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Abstract

The discipline of civil-military relations has produced a wealth of knowledge and theories about the relationship between the military and the state. However, these theories have been criticized for failing to fully account for the complex interaction between these two partners. This manuscript acknowledges the institutional and cultural explanations of extant theories, but highlights their weaknesses. It then advances the recognition of the autonomy and agency of the citizenry in civil-military relations. It identifies the various ways citizens exert agency, including the use of violence, which has not received attention despite the increasing experience from accounts of civil-military relations in Africa. The chapter then reimagines civil-military relations from the lens of a quadrumvirate interaction explanation, which incorporates both institutional and socio-cultural aspects, as well as micro-level realities.

Keywords

Civil-military relations, quadrumvirate interaction theory, agency, military intervention.

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, several countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia have experienced a surge in internal armed violence that are mostly perpetrated by non-state actors (Snyder and Jervis 1999, Earl 2004). A number of factors have contributed to the prevalence of conflict in these states including that non-state armed groups have access to stockpiles of arms and ammunitions with which they carry out attacks and destabilize communities; and the marginalisation of ethnic minority groups which evokes grievances and rebellion, particularly when there is a lack of judicial remedies to address these grievances (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004). Equally, liberation and independence struggles which resulted in loss of political legitimacy, political upheavals, and dwindling state economies created a vacuum filled by violence and conflict (Kaldor 1999: 4–5). The situation created a security gap which plunged many states in Africa into a growing cycle of violence and political and economic instability perpetrated by numerous armed groups (Okumu and Ikelegbe 2010).

State response to the threats of armed groups has often been a military approach to suppress

hostilities and to force a return to peace (José and Rasmussen 1999). The use of the military in this capacity assumes different forms of military internal security operations or military operations other than war. Typical examples include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, military aid to civil authorities in times of conflict and civil disturbances, and to wage a war against organised and transnational criminal armed groups. However, while using the military can force a ceasefire and lead to an enforced peace, this is often temporarily when it is militarised without mediation and support from the police and intelligence agencies (Ferreira and Segura 2000).

In addition to militarisation, the military evokes numerous challenges which can undermine any peace mission. The conduct of soldiers can exacerbate insecurity, particularly where it is poorly regulated, and it becomes complicit in handling conflict situations or a mission. In fact, some argue that the military is hardly neutral in the resolution of internal conflicts (Enloe 1977, 1978), and this can be worsened where personnel abuse or misuse their power with impunity.

Military excesses and abuse of power strain civil-military relations (CMR), which negatively affects the relationship between the military and the citizenry. Historical evidence has shown that African militaries were initially established for colonial exploitation and have yet to reform into assuming a professional military stature (Yaqub and Muhammad 2007, Howe 2001). As such, rather than ensuring national security, such militaries focus on regime protection at the expense of societal integration as they have remained predatory on the citizenry (see Musa 2018: 70–71, Heinecken 2020).

Beyond this, studies indicate that military unprofessionalism and incompatibility of military culture and habitus also results in abuse of power and low societal integration where judicial remedy is lacking (Musa and Heinecken 2022). The lack of judicial remedy for victims of abuse can lead to them allying with armed groups or resorting to violence for protection against state coercion and other armed groups who pose a threat to them. This situation favours the emergence and spinning of the cycle of violence and insecurity, which has implications for CMR since the interaction between these partners evoke further reactions.

As a field of study, CMR is largely unable to fully explain the phenomenon of military abuse, civilian reaction to the abuse, and the effect on security because current theory assumes a dichotomous approach. Until recently, the theories overlooked the causal effect of the citizenry because they lumped the citizenry with civilian political leadership while only theorising on the military and the civilian political leadership. What this means is that the theories do not

account for the agency the citizenry exerts on CMR. Where the citizenry is recognised as an autonomous partner with agency, how they exert agency is not explained. The aim of this article is to fill this void. The article is structured in three parts. Part one reviews the proposition of current theories of CMR, and it highlights the strengths and shortcoming of each theory. Part two advances a quadrumvirate interaction theory as an alternative to fill the gaps identified in the current scholarship. The third part discusses CMR in Nigeria using the quadrumvirate interaction theory to explain the current tensions in CMR and how this affects security.

Part I: Key Theories and their Shortcomings

The aim of this part is to review some key and classic theories of CMR and highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the theories. The discussion is limited to the classic theories of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, and the more recent Agency Theory of Peter Feaver and the Concordance theory of Rebecca Schiff. While other theories exist, the theoretical relevance, wide attention and readership, and the contributions of these theories motivated their revision in this section.

Separation theory

Huntington's theory focusses on military professionalism and the civil control of the military to ensure that it does not pose or become a threat to the state. He proposed the use of subjective civilian control which maximises civil power or the use of objective civil control which maximises military professionalism (Huntington 1957: 80–83). Subjective civilian control minimises the power and professional capacity of the military while maximising the power of political elites. In essence, subjective civilian control discourages political neutrality, and it further reduces the military to a political tool serving the interests of the ruling elites. With subjective civilian control, the military is divisive and capable of furthering the wishes of some groups, particularly the ruling group/class over others. Another setback of subjective control is that minimising the power and capacity of the military exposes the state to external threats because it undermines the ability of the military to defend the state.

Unlike subjective civilian control, objective control aims to militarise and further professionalize the military as a “politically sterile and neutral” agent of the state (Huntington 1957: 83–84). Objective control presupposes political insularity by detaching the military from society and the political decision-making processes. For Huntington, separating the military from the civilian sphere is the key for effective civil control because it allows the military to

focus on training and professional development. He proposed the use of civilian oversight, law and statutes, and the use of incentives such as increase military budget and participating in external missions as the strategies to ensure military professionalism and political insularity (Rukavishnikov and Pugh 2006: 133). Given the focus on professionalism, Huntington (1957: 11–18) outlined three indicators of military professionalism as: the expertise of officership; responsibility to the state; and the corporate character of the military. The indicators differentiate the military from any civilian or professional group, especially because of the expertise in the management of the collective violence of the state.

A professional military is beneficial to the state in many ways, especially because it is equipped to defend the state against external threats. Also, in the event of unpopular agitations when deployed for internal security operations, the degree of its ‘institutionalisation’ and professionalism affects its reaction and relationship with society (see Bellin 2004). As Lutterbeck (2013) argues, this has an impact on CMR, especially because a highly institutionalized and professional military is less likely to engage in acts that can harm society or threaten the political stability of the state. Given this, one sees that Huntington’s separation theory is limited by its inability to explain the interaction of the military with the citizenry, and the agency of the citizenry in CMR. Also, the surge in internal conflicts which has led to an increase in constabulary military missions in society further undermines Huntington’s separation theory (José and Rasmussen 1999: 5).

One would imagine that professionalising the military would render it apolitical and make the officer corps obedient to civil authority as Huntington assumes, however history has shown that this is not often the case. In Nigeria for instance, attempts to professionalize the military did not deter it from severally intervening in politics (Luckham 1971). As such, one would agree with Auma-Osolo (1980: 29) that professionalism “alone would not deter the military from intervening, unless it is accompanied by the military's complete satisfaction with civilian control.” For example, because warriorism is esteemed in Africa, the military is quick to intervene in politics to combat corruption, lack of accountability and transparency, and the failure to provide public goods, especially security (Chick and Mazrui 1971: 281).

Another shortcoming of Huntington’s theory pertains to the universal application of the core separation thesis of the theory, and its assumption of civil supremacy. In states previously ruled by military dictatorship, civil supremacy over the military is difficult to achieve, and is mostly not an institutionalized value (Cilliers 1995: 38, Baker 2007: 116). In part, this is because the

norm of military control and civil supremacy originates from the culture and political history of a state (Born 2006: 151, Finer 1962: 226,240). Even where the military is detached and only represented at the level of policy, it can exert influence over self-serving interests (Nielsen and Snider 2009: 291). This makes Janowitz' (1960: 14) concern about "unanticipated militarism" where civil control is weak or lacking evident. More so, incidences of military praetorianism attest to the fact that the military is not a mere passive actor, and civil control is difficult to achieve where it is not institutionalized as the norm.

Integration theory

As with Huntington, Morris Janowitz also focussed his theory on military professionalism and the changing roles of the military in society. He viewed the military as an organisation with internal rules, clearly defined structures, and certain professional standards which guides and regulate the conduct of personnel and ensures obedience to the rule of law (Janowitz 1960: 420). However, unlike Huntington, Janowitz's theory is fusionist in that it recommends integrating the military into both society and policy decision-making process. When the military shares common cultural, social, and institutional values with society, it reduces the risk of developing a sub-culture and becoming a "state-within-the-state" (Lambert 2009: 42). The benefit is that because of the increase in constabulary role for the military in society, sharing and embracing the values of society reduces the challenges of cultural and value differences between civilians and the military. Another benefit is that it promotes respect for civil institutions and more commitment towards the political goals of the state (Janowitz 1977: 73). However, the theory has certain limitations.

One concern is that integrating the military into the political decision-making processes increases political consciousness, and the feeling of importance given their critical role of security provision, thereby increasing the risk of political intervention. Because "the modern military officer is oriented toward maximising his influence in politics," the problem is worsened when officers become politicised and are dissatisfied with the actions or policy of the civil authority (Perlmutter and Bennett 1980: 3). In states with weak institutions, and those previously ruled by military dictatorship, the problem is enhanced given that civil supremacy is neither institutionalized nor the norm of civil control. As such, integration as Janowitz argues exposes the state to domestic political intervention and the self-serving interests of officers who could justify such actions using the shortcoming of the civil authority (Feaver 2003a: 298).

Although the integration theory identified the increasing constabulary roles of the military, it did not explain how the ensuing society-military interactions affect CMR. It did not explain why various forms of military abuse of civilians is recurrent, the reactions of the citizenry to this, and how they could exert agency in ways that can affect CMR. Historical evidence has shown that integration and sharing common values does not culminate in the respect for civil supremacy and the rule of law, as the culture and values of the military are typically undemocratic (Born 2006: 154, Kohn 1997: 141). Therefore, it is common to experience militarism and military excesses, and the violation of the human rights of the citizenry because constabulary type roles differ from warfighting (Weiss 2012: 462). In states with weak institutions which are unable to address and provide judicial remedy for military abuse and excesses, it undermines the legitimacy of constabulary roles and the relationship of the military with the citizenry. This affects CMR, however, Janowitz overlooked how military culture and professionalism can militarise the state when they conduct constabulary roles. Thus, one sees that both the separation and integration theories are not sufficient to explain CMR, especially in authoritarian states and in states with weak institutions of civil control.

Agency theory

Given the shortcomings, Peter Feaver developed the agency theory which advances beyond professionalism and the civil-military problematic of domestic military intervention in politics (Feaver 2003a: 2). For Feaver, problems of civil control of the military arises when a dysfunctional civil-military gap exists or when the difference in the values, attitude, and opinions of the military and society grows too wide (Feaver 1999: 230, 2003b: 2). Four of these gaps are identified, among which is a cultural gap which entails a disparity of the attitude of the military and civilians. The cultural gaps are especially visible in the areas of loyalty to the state, courage, patriotism, “unity, discipline, and sacrifice, and the civilian life of individuality, hedonism, and self-gain” (Rahbek-Clemmensen et al. 2012: 672). A second gap, demographic or functional gap pertains to the degree of conformity of the military with moral, societal, political, and social imperatives, and the representativeness of the different population groups in the military (Feaver and Kohn 1999, Rahbek-Clemmensen et al. 2012).

The third gap focuses on the difference in policy preference, especially as it concerns how public policy should be executed. Examples here include opinion on non-traditional missions of the military such as conducting internal security operations and the amount of force required for the mission (Feaver and Kohn 1999: 3, Gelpi and Feaver 2002: 779–780). The fourth gap is institutional or knowledge gap. Here, the focus is on the understanding between society and

the military, and how it affects support and decisions on issues involving the military (Feaver and Kohn 1999: 3). As Heineken, Gueli, and Neethling (2005: 128) explain, “questions relating to civil control of the military, the influence of the media and the status of the military reflect the implications of a growing knowledge gap has for civil-military relations.” Certainly, the gaps pose significant problems for CMR and the civil control of the military. A wide gap could result to the danger of military isolation and developing subcultures that could threaten society and political stability. Also, it becomes difficult for society to influence defence policy and problems could arise where the military becomes dissatisfied and attempts to resist policies which affects professionalism and effectiveness or refuse subordinating to civil authority (Feaver, Kohn, and Cohn 2001: 1).

In response to the challenges, Feaver developed the agency theory to explain the day-to-day interactions of the state with the military, and how political leaders can influence civil control of the military to avoid this problematic. The theory considers CMR from a principal-agent perspective, and it holds that both are rational actors whose choices and decisions are predicated on the expected behaviour of each other (Feaver 2003a). Civil control is ensured by the principal (political elite) through a mix of monitoring mechanisms such as intrusive monitoring, parliamentary oversights or through civilians in the defence office. To appropriate compliance from the military (agent), Feaver (2003a: 89–93) proposes the use of rewards and recognition to encourage obedience, and sanctions and punishment including demotion and dismissal for shirking or disobedience. However, as Feaver (2003a: 89) rightly notes, this limits the theory to societies where civil supremacy is the norm of civil control. Also, while the theory focuses extensively on civil control, it did not consider the citizenry as a partner with its own agency in CMR. One theory which acknowledged this is Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory.

Concordance theory

As a theory, concordance was developed to predict the conditions that promote or inhibit military intervention in politics (Schiff 2009: 42–43). The theory departs from extant theories, in that it recognises the citizenry as a third autonomous partner with its own agency in CMR. The theory holds that neither detaching nor integrating the military from society and policy processes deters it from intervening in politics, rather, what is required is cooperation and agreement on shared values (Schiff 1995: 12). In essence, concordance incorporates both institutional conditions, and the cultural and historical peculiarity of a state in determining its CMR. In this way, Schiff argues that irrespective of the form of government, concordance can

be achieved in any state if the three partners cooperate, dialogue, accommodate, share values, and agree on four indicators of concordance.

The first indicator is that all three partners must agree on the social composition of the officer corps in line with the cultural and historical values of the state (Schiff 1995: 13). This is especially important because the officer corps makes up the managerial and top leadership of the armed forces and are responsible for the key decisions on the operational, tactical, and strategic functioning of the military. Where all agree, it reinforces the legitimacy of military missions and its public acceptance, since the three partners collectively decide on their composition. Similarly, as concordance theory is not limited to any particular form of government, the second indicator, the political decision-making process assumes different patterns across different states. The theory holds that the partners must agree on the political decision-making on military policy and the allocation of resources (Schiff 2009: 45). The assumption is that agreement fosters cooperation and compliance, thereby forestalling the risk of military intervention.

The third indicator requires that all need to agree on the best form of recruitment. Schiff (2009: 46) recommends persuasive and non-coercive recruitment into the military as it provides equal opportunity for enlisting the different population groups. However, a possible challenge of unrepresentativeness may arise where a state is unable to attract certain groups into the all-volunteer forces. The final indicator relates to the human and cultural aspects of the armed forces which Schiff describes as the military style. It deals with both internal and external elements of the armed forces in terms of its status, the symbols that distinguishes it from society, how partners think about the military, and how the military relates to them (Schiff 1995: 15–16, 2009: 47). However, as the primary goal of concordance theory is to predict the conditions that promote or inhibit domestic intervention (Schiff 2009: 42–43, 1995: 8,12), it fails to reflect on the everyday implication of military style on the other partners. Where the military presence is pervasive in society, the theory is unable to explain the negative effect that military style has on society, particularly where civilians are treated with impertinence. However, the citizenry are not passive agents and can exert agency in ways that can affect CMR when dissatisfied the conduct and performance of the military.

Although Schiff made important contributions to the CMR literature, concordance theory is limited in both scope and application. The predictive nature of the theory has limited its scope to the traditional focus of military intervention in politics. Schiff acknowledged this when she

stated that concordance “is limited by its causal objective, which is to predict the prevention or occurrence of domestic military intervention” (2009: 42). Thus, concordance theory fails to provide an adequate lens through which to study the interaction of the military with the citizenry and how this affects the delivery of the most important public good of all - security. Also, the predictive nature undermines its reflective capability and ability to explain the complex interactions between the partners, which it oversimplifies and assumes to be a given across different cultures and societies (Ali 2014: 544). Although the strength of this theory is that it recognises the citizenry as an autonomous actor capable of exerting agency, it fails to explain ‘how’ and ‘the ways’ they influence or exert agency. Hence, all the above theories fail to consider the power and influence of the citizenry to respond to the lack of civil control or oversight and the delivery of security. The aim of this article is to add to the debate on CMR.

Part II: The Quadrumvirate Interaction Theory

The discussion in the previous section highlighted the shortcomings of extant theories of CMR, key among which is that the citizenry is largely overlooked. The theories made no attempt to explain the causal role and the agency of the citizenry as the theories took a dichotomous approach which lumped the citizenry with the political sphere. This means that the interaction of the military with the citizenry, how the citizenry experiences the military, the effect on CMR, and the numerous ways the citizenry could influence CMR is still largely undertheorized. As such, studies on this aspect of CMR, experiences of interaction with the military, and reactions to military actions suffer theoretical limitations. Given this, the need to advance CMR beyond the political-military dichotomy, and beyond the traditional focus on predicting or preventing military intervention in politics is necessary. To some extent concordance theory attempted to fill this void, but with limitations, hence, aspects of the theory are used to develop a new quadrumvirate interaction theory.

The quadrumvirate interaction theory of CMR is premised on the interaction between the political leadership, the military, and the citizenry. The theory aims to achieve three objectives. One is to provide a theory of CMR that is both descriptive and predictive in explaining the conditions that promote or inhibit domestic military intervention in politics. The theory achieves this by explaining the complex everyday interaction between the partners in CMR using both micro level issues and macro institutional explanations at policy decision-making level. The second objective is that it identifies the indicators necessary for a healthy state of

CMR and the sources of an unhealthy or strained CMR. The third objective is that the theory identifies the numerous ways the citizenry exercise agency, and the effect on CMR.

Indicators of Agreement

The key for effective civil control and a healthy CMR in any state is for the partners to agree and cooperate on five indicators, and not four as concordance provides. While Schiff (1995: 13) identified four of the indicators as the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and the military style, a fifth indicator is identified here as military approach. Having earlier explained the four indicators, this section proceeds to discuss military approach. Accordingly, military approach is the reflective and interactive aspect of military style. It considers both the human and relational variables that affects the interaction of the military with society. Military approach recognises that the military style, that is the status, symbols, and military culture can affect its conduct and (ab)use of power can have a dysfunctional effect on society. Hence, military approach serves as the spotlight highlighting how military personnel act or behave in terms of their professionalism and the authority they wield.

The military approach indicator highlights the micro-level interactive relations that exists between the military and society and those attributes of the military as a profession and an institution that conflicts with society. As an indicator, it shows the existence of cordial and harmonious relationship between personnel and the citizenry, particularly when deployed in constabulary and internal security missions. The conduct of military personnel when interacting with civilians and responding to their security needs has a profound influence on relations with the military. Where the military does not behave or conduct operations professionally or fails to respect human rights, it can evoke a counter reaction. Hence the military approach is key to understanding CMR, especially in societies where the military is deployed in an internal role.

Quadrumvirate Levels of Interaction


At any given time, the citizenry, the military, and the political leadership are in a discontinuous interaction influenced by the political system, military missions/operations in society, and the role of the military in a state. This interface produces distinct levels of interaction in CMR, of which Sarigil identified the interaction between (1) the military and political leadership, (2) the military and society, and (3) the political leadership and society. However, expanding on the analogy of Sarigil (2011: 267), the interaction occurs as a quadrumvirate, which means four

spheres of interaction with a major level of intersection as the fourth sphere of interaction occur among and between the partners. Given this, CMR comprises of four levels of interaction which involves one major level of intersection and interaction (represented with the number '1'), and three subunits level of interaction (represented with the numbers '2', '3', and '4' in Figure 1).

The interaction at the major level of intersection involves all the partners interfacing to agree and cooperate on certain values. The interaction best describes the cooperation and agreement concordance theory emphasises when Schiff argues that concordance occurs when the three partners enter a cooperative relationship of mutual accommodation, which in turn lessens the likelihood of domestic military intervention in politics. Similarly, although Janowitz did not recognise the citizenry as an autonomous partner in CMR, his proposition of integrating the military into the state and the political decision-making processes also predicates the interaction at this level. However, while an agreement for a cooperative relationship could be reached at this level, there are three subunits of interaction with a causal impact on the relationship which the theories did not explore.

One of the subunits of interaction is the interface between the military institution made up of recruits, privates, and officer corps, and the citizenry (civilians and different civilian and civil society groups). The interaction in this subunit (represented with the number '2' in Figure 1) mostly occurs because of the decisions taken at the major level of intersection. Typical examples include the decision to recruit civilians into the military, the decision to deploy the military in a constabulary role in society and siting a military infrastructure such as an operational base within a community. As these decisions brings the military into a close and frequent interaction with society, the interplay of human and relational variables becomes more visible. Where the military acts professionally, a cordial and harmonious relationship is likely, while a strained relationship can affect CMR at the intersecting level when they are abusive due to a lack of institutionalisation (see Bellin 2004: 145, Lutterbeck 2013: 133).

Figure 1 The Quadrumvirate Interaction in CMR



Source: Sarigil (2011: 267) A Modification of the three intersecting spheres in a polity

The second subunit involves the interface between the political leadership and the citizenry (represented with the number '3' in Figure 1). The relationship in this subunit involves policy and the provision of public goods and services, and the expectation of compliance from the citizenry (Stepan 1978: xii). Where the political leadership enjoys public trust, support and approval, it obtains loyalty and allegiance, and the ability to extend its presence across the state for effective governance (Boudon 2017: 277–278). Given this, the constant supply of public goods and services, especially security and the welfare need of the citizenry affects the relationship in this subunit. Failure to provide this breeds dissent.

In the third subunit (represented with the number '4' in Figure 1), the interaction occurs between the political leadership and the military on issues concerning the day-to-day control over the military, and the roles and functions of the military. One point of note here is that the military is not a passive actor, as such, they could influence policy decisions using several options such as working diligently or shirking (Feaver 2003a: 57–62). The military could exert undue pressure on the political leadership to implement policies that could be self-serving, particularly in states where civil supremacy is not an institutionalized value. Also, in previously military dictatorial states, the military could still have a firm grip on the political leadership, thereby undermining the authority of the political leadership and the ability of the legislature to carry out effective oversight. This creates a situation of an “unequal civilian accommodation” of the military (Stepan 1988: 101). In extreme cases, the fear of military intervention in politics could strain the political leadership from sanctioning unprofessional military actions.

From this, one sees that although the different subunits are distinct, they overlap in real life situations, and are not always mutually exclusive. Important to note also is that each subunit

acts as the source of healthy/strained CMR given that the interaction at each subunit affects the general state of CMR. Where for instance, a relational problem exists in one or more subunit, failing to address this could create a problem that can alter any understanding or cooperation reached at the major level of intersection. The concern is that this can result in dissent or trigger some personnel to seize political power in order ‘to save the situation.’

A Typology of the Exertion of Agency by the Citizenry

Although extant theories do not account for the agency of the citizenry in CMR, the citizenry exerts agency in four different ways, three of which were identified by Verweijen (2015: 191–192) as compliance, contestation, and collaboration. Compliance entails obedience to state policies, demands, instructions, or the agreements reached at the level of intersection. Compliance entails fulfilling a demand that could either be legitimate or illegitimate because the citizenry is law abiding or unwilling to avoid stiffer sanctions for non-complying, given that the military and political leadership are in a higher position of power than the citizenry. Either way, compliance has little effect on CMR given that it does not challenge the existing order. On the contrary, it reinforces the dominance of the other partners, especially the military and it further promotes a lack of transparency and accountability, and impunity for illegitimate actions of the other partners.

A second way the citizenry exerts agency is by contestation through active resistance or non-compliance to policies, demands, actions or practices. Although resistance comprises of numerous actions and strategies by a subordinate group against their domination by a superordinate group (Scott, 1985, p. 290), it does not assume a violent nature in this instance. Typical acts of contestation include strikes, lobbying, protests and demonstrations, and the use of legal redress to contest certain demands, actions, or policies. Others include “negotiation and bargaining; trickery, hiding, and avoidance, irony, the use of rumours” and spreading and propagating untrue or mostly unverified and exaggerated information/news (Verweijen 2015: 195–208, 2018). Given that contestation challenges a demand or policy, it can alter or affect the state of CMR where it gains wide support and momentum and is prolonged.

The citizenry could also exert agency through collaboration as a form of alliance or cooperation with the other partners to achieve certain aims. In essence, collaboration involves a close involvement of either of the other partners with the citizenry to achieve a given aim. This makes collaboration “a more interactive process in which civilians might (also) place demands on the military in order to further their projects, or which concerns jointly developed and/or executed

projects in which civilians actively participate” (Verweijen 2015: 192). Given this, collaboration can achieve both a legitimate or an illegitimate aim, both of which can affect CMR. Legitimate aims indicate a healthy relationship exists while illegitimate aims like cahooting with compromised soldiers to foster unprofessional acts such as overlooking criminal acts can evoke counter reactions that can undermine both peace and CMR.

The fourth strategy involves using confrontation by the citizenry against the demands, actions, or policies of the other partners. While typical confrontation could be moderate contestation or resistance, Scott and Smith (1969: 1) observed that confrontation is more frequently associated with a “radical and revolutionary” connotation that involves the use of threats, force, or/and violence. As such, confrontation could be violent hostility towards the military, a soldier or some units or against a political leadership over their failure provide public goods and services. Other common forms of confrontation include lynching, attacking personnel/political leadership, resisting state control, forming and/or collaborating with armed groups, and violent uprising against the state. The Arab spring especially in Libya where violent uprising led to the overthrow of a civilian government is a typical example here (see Lutterbeck 2013, Lynch 2012).

Confrontation, a form of agency and power expression by citizens, is more likely to force a change in CMR than other forms of agency exertion due to the hostility, aggression, and possible violence it evokes. Hostility such as violence against the military, pulling down military checkpoints and ‘chasing’ away personnel indicates a collective action which reinforces the agency and power of the citizenry. It is common for marginalized, oppressed, or dissatisfied civilian groups or communities to employ these measures against the military in expressing local autonomy (Godoy 2004: 637–639). Confrontation as an expression of agency is therefore, more likely in states where the military is frequently deployed in an internal role, where personnel are often abusive of the civilian population, and when judicial remedy for victims of the abuse appears to be lacking.

Quadrumvirate interaction recognises that the citizenry is not a single, unified whole with shared opinions, actions, and purpose. The citizenry may not always share a collective interest, but they still exert agency regardless of whether they achieve collective agreement or decisions. Dominant voices or positions expressed by a majority or a coercive few can alter CMR. The same applies to the other partners. In the political sphere, political elites are influenced by different political ideologies, as manifest in their political parties and, in some societies, by the

political interests of the ruling elites. The military partner may also have varied opinions, perspectives, and approaches that do not favour consensus, even when the different units of the armed forces share a collective vision.

Part III: CMR in Nigeria and Beyond

Having gained independence in 1960, Nigeria established civil supremacy and institutionalized the separation of the military from political decision-making. However, despite attempts to professionalize the military to be apolitical, the Nigerian military has acted as a predatory praetorian military and has ceased political power for about twenty-nine years. Upon the restoration of civil rule in 1999, amendments to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provided the legal framework that defines the roles and functions of the armed forces, and the pattern of CMR (see Musa 2018). It empowers the civilian President to act as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in a system that ensures the subordination of the military to civil authorities and parliamentary oversight. The military is also detached from the political decision-making processes to ensure that it remains apolitical. Considering the history of Nigerian military intervention in politics, this serves to discourage the military from future attempts, especially because of the wide dissatisfaction of the populace with military rule.

In terms of the role of the military in society, the constitution provides for their use in a constabulary role when the need arises, thereby bringing the military into a close and frequent interaction with the citizenry. Equally important is the requirement for the composition of the officer corps and other ranks of the military to reflect the ethnic diversity of Nigeria. This point is salient given that Nigeria has endured a civil war and the military has remained the key actor combatting the numerous internal conflicts and disturbances in the country (Omede 2012). Thus, the use of the all-volunteer force model provides a fair opportunity for enlisting personnel from across the different ethnicity of the country as this is crucial for building public trust and the legitimacy of military operations. However, with the military presence in society, ‘othering’ civilians is likely considering that military style can evoke negative effects when personnel interact with society. Thus, as the military approach considers both the human and relational variables that affects CMR, an examination of how this plays out along the levels of interaction is necessary. Hence, the utility of the quadrumvirate interaction theory which provides both thick description of CMR and also identifies and predicts the factors that can lead to a domestic intervention in politics.

Given that the military assumes a constabulary role in Nigeria, the four levels of interaction of the quadrumvirate interaction theory are fully active, and the understanding highlighted above indicates the context of the agreement in the major level of intersection. While the agreement at this level could lead to achieving a healthy CMR, the state of the interaction in the subunits level has certain negative consequences. At the subunit of interaction between the military and the citizenry, there is a strained relationship and dissatisfaction with the abuse of power and the violation of the human rights of the citizenry with impunity. Two factors account for the problem. One is the loss of military professionalism along the dimensions of selfless service ethic, corporateness, expertise of officership, and the autonomy of the institution, and the second is the influence of the culture and habitus of the military (Musa 2018). Typical instances includes the extrajudicial killing in some Tarok communities in Plateau State, in Odi, and Zaki Biam, and the everyday excesses that goes unpunished (see Okoli and Orinya 2013).

In the subunit of interaction between the political leadership and the citizenry, there is dissatisfaction with the political leadership over the failure to provide basic public goods and services, and the inability to hold the military accountable for their actions (Gulleng and Hunduh 2018, Gulleng and Musa 2020, Dantani, Wika, and Abdullahi 2017). In recent times, several instances of civilians revolting against the state has been witnessed. One common instance was the forceful occupation of the Plateau State Government House and an attack on the State Governor for failing to suppress the violence and the abuse of the military as it conducts internal security duties in the State (Musa 2018: 162).

Unlike the other two subunits, the military and political leadership enjoy a cooperative relationship as there appears to be no major concerns in the subunit of interaction between them. However, there is a weak implementation of civil control of the military despite the institutional framework that empowers the political leadership to oversee and ensure that the military complies with the rules and professional codes of conduct. A key explanation for this is the fact that the political leadership exercises subjective control which minimises military professionalism, hence, the incessant unprofessional conduct of the military. Again, this points to the shortcoming of subjective control, given that it does not allow the military the opportunity to uphold professionalism. Thus, as military professionalism is not enhanced, the military continues to serve the interests of the ruling class and, in the process, poses significant threats to society which are overlooked without the political will to address the concerns (Para-Mallam and Hoomlong 2013). The point is further stressed by the general reluctance of the President Muhammadu Buhari regime to hold the military service chiefs accountable or dismiss

them despite evidence of monumental corruption on military procurement and worsening insecurity under their watch. Incidentally, when they were eventually relieved, a reward of ambassadorial positions was provided, arguably, as to further smoothen the understanding in this unit of interaction, and keep the personnel away from contemplating a military coup.

Faced with the problems of military abuse, the violation of their human rights and the lack of political will to call the military to order, the citizenry exerts agency in different ways. In some instances, they comply with both legitimate and illegitimate demands to avoid stiffer sanctions for non-complying. As such, it is common to see soldiers administering corporal punishments to civilians instead of forwarding the violation to the appropriate law enforcement authority for prosecution. Also, the citizenry uses contestation through numerous actions such as strikes and protests, demonstrations and through legal redress in courtrooms. However, the latter is least effective as it is time consuming and there is a lack of political will to hold the military accountable. One instance is the case against the military for alleged ethnic cleansing in Tarok communities, which has made little progress as with the Odi and Zaki Biam massacres that have gone unpunished (Odoemene 2012, Ojo 2009).

In addition to subjective control, the citizenry also exerts agency by collaborating with the military to achieve certain aims. Whereas some collaborate to achieve legitimate aims such as providing security tips, there are instances of civilian groups acting in cahoots with the military to overlook their criminal acts or to aid some armed groups to attack communities, especially in times of conflict (Musa 2018). In numerous communities of Plateau, Kaduna, Taraba, Benue and other States where the military conducts internal security duties, there have been incidences of the citizenry exerting agency by revolting against military abuses (Abdullahi, Wika, and Abdul-Qadir 2016: 19, Musa 2018: 131). Some have forced the military out of their communities, while in other instances, some administer justice by retaliating and attacking some soldiers or military units they are dissatisfied with. Clearly, this has effects on CMR and the legitimacy of military missions aimed at ameliorating insecurity, and where these occurrences are not addressed, it could lead to a full-scale crisis and promote domestic intervention.

Beyond Nigeria, a clear pattern of quadrumvirate interaction in the CMR of African countries is also manifest. The constitution of these countries is unambiguous on establishing the principle of civilian supremacy over the military with a civilian head of state/president serving as the commander in chief of the armed forces. This serves as the legislative framework

defining the pattern of civil military relations with civilians maintaining control over the military. Therefore, at the major level of intersection, there is an agreement that the military has a role to play in governance through the provision of public goods and security, and that political elites and citizens may be willing to tolerate this. This is due in part to historical factors, such as the military's role in the country's struggle for independence, and in part to ongoing security concerns, such as the threat posed by armed groups. However, at the subunit level, the interactions between the military, political elites, and citizens can be disharmonious, predatory, and even praetorian. Moreso, as the powers of the military are effectively under civil control, civilian governments, many which are pseudo-democratic use this to maintain a firm grip over the institution, making CMR in such countries largely influenced by the executive branch of government.

In Cameroon for instance, the Constitution of the Republic vests significant powers in the President of the Republic who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and is responsible for appointing and dismissing top military officers. In practice, this has meant that the military in Cameroon has often been closely aligned with the government and is used to maintain the ruling party's hold on power. Given this, the nature of CMR at the major intersection level is complex, multifaceted, and is influenced by a range of political, economic, and social factors. As such, the military is used to suppress dissent, including cracking down on political opposition and protesters. At the same time, there have been efforts to professionalize the military and to increase its accountability to civilian authority. For example, the National Assembly of Cameroon has the power to approve military budgets and to conduct oversight of the military. The military is also subject to the jurisdiction of civilian courts, and military personnel can be prosecuted for crimes committed while on duty, however, critiques note that the military is hardly held accountable for human rights violations and acts of impunity.

At the subunit level of interaction between the military and political elites, there have been instances of cooperation as well as conflict. On the one hand, the ruling party has relied on the military to maintain its hold on power, particularly in the face of opposition protests and unrest. For example, during the protests that followed the disputed 2018 presidential election, the government deployed the military to quell the demonstrations and arrest opposition leaders and the military remains heavily involved in internal security of the state. On the other hand, there have also been instances of conflict between the military and political elites. For example, in 2012, the government arrested several high-ranking military officials, including the former

head of the Presidential Guard, on charges of embezzlement and corruption. This suggests that while the military may be willing to support the ruling party in some circumstances, it is not necessarily subservient to the political elites and may have its own interests and agenda, despite being coup-proofed (Harkness 2022).

Similarly, the subunit level of interaction between the military and citizenry in Cameroon has been characterized by tension and conflict, particularly in the context of the English-speaking separatist movement in the northwest and southwest regions. The government has responded to the separatist insurgency with a heavy-handed military crackdown, which has led to allegations of human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and the displacement of civilians. The military has also been accused of using excessive force to break up protests and demonstrations, including those organized by opposition groups and civil society organizations. This suggests that the military sees the citizenry as a potential threat to its authority and is willing to use force to maintain order.

At the subunit level of interaction between the citizenry and political elites in Cameroon, there has been widespread dissatisfaction with the ruling party and its handling of issues such as corruption, human rights abuses, and economic inequality. This has led to protests and demonstrations, many of which have been met with violent response from the military and other security forces. At the same time, there have been allegations of election rigging and other forms of political manipulation by the ruling party, which has contributed to a sense of disillusionment and mistrust among the citizenry. This suggests that the citizenry views the political elites as corrupt and unresponsive to their needs, and is willing to take to the streets to demand change.

In conclusion, the subunit level of interaction between the military, political elites, and citizenry in Cameroon has been characterized by tension and conflict, as well as cooperation in some instances. These interactions have contributed to a lack of legitimacy for the government, both at home and abroad, and have led to ongoing instability and unrest. Some commentators have noted that in most Francophone West African countries, there is little qualitative difference between military dictatorships and civilian dictatorships, or between military coups (through the use of force) and civilian coups (through electoral fraud or term extension). This lack of distinction has a significant impact on CMR in Africa, as both military and many civilian regimes lack legitimacy. Both types of regimes rely on the military to remain in power, and as a result, the citizenry is seen as an enemy by both because of the agency they

could exert in forcing a change as was evidenced with the Arab renaissance (Lutterbeck 2013, Puddington 2012).

Conclusion

The theories of CMR do not provide a complete picture of CMR, and this has meant that the field has not explained crucial aspects of the interaction between the partners. While the theories have lumped the citizenry with the political leadership, concordance which recognised the citizenry as a partner did not advance beyond the limited scope of predicting military intervention in politics. Also, the predictive nature of concordance, as with other theories undermined its ability to explain the complex interaction between the partners, and how the citizenry exerts agency in CMR.

This article reviewed the classic theories of separation and integration, and the more recent agency and concordance theories, their contributions and shortcomings. Key among this is that the theories were developed with the narrow focus of predicting domestic intervention while failing to account for the agency of the citizenry, and the implication of a strained interaction between the partners on the state of CMR. Given these inadequacies, a quadrumvirate interaction theory was advanced in Part II of this article aims to fill the void found in current theories. The theory integrates both institutional and socio-cultural realities of society and the micro level issues that have critical implications for CMR. It notes that the interaction in CMR occurs as a quadrumvirate made up of one major level of intersection where the partners agree on the pattern of CMR, and three subunits level of interaction where interaction occurs among the partners.

As with concordance, the quadrumvirate interaction theory acknowledges that agreement and a cooperative relationship between the three partners is necessary but not sufficient for a healthy CMR to be achieved. Irrespective of the agreement, the theory notes that military approach has a critical influence on CMR especially because the implication of its effect at the subunits level of interaction could undermine any agreement reached by the partners at the major level of intersection. This is critical especially when the citizenry exert agency in ways that challenges the status quo, such as using confrontation. In this way, the theory has the predictive ability of identifying the sources of strained CMR and the descriptive capacity to provide a thick and detailed account of CMR which considers both institutional, cultural, historical and micro-level issues of society.

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