Race, class and gender

This chapter concerns three key concepts in the cultural history of war. Race, class and gender are often referred to as the "holy trinity" of social and cultural history.[1] If social history is concerned with experience, cultural history is concerned with the meaning of those experiences, and in particular the subjective ways in which people see themselves or are located within broader social categories. In both respects, race, class and gender are fundamental considerations: they help to constitute one another and also relate to alternative analytical categories such as religion or the lifecycle. Over the last half century, the shift away from viewing war solely through the lenses of diplomatic and operational military history, and towards approaches informed by social and cultural history, has therefore involved a creative engagement with these three vital concepts. These new histories included the "new military history", "war and society" and the cultural history of war: while distinctive, there are considerable overlaps and a shared willingness to engage with the methods and insights of neighbouring disciplines.[2]

It should be said that these developments have not always been welcomed within military history. Some have criticised the use of "foreign analytical approaches".[3] Jeremy Black has protested that military history is becoming "demilitarised" and that work on gender in the military can be "spurious". At the same time, however, he argued that military institutions need to be understood in their appropriate context, and that we need to study the society of the time if we are going to understand the combatant.[4] The "soldier" is a historically specific entity and he brings baggage from the society of which he was (and usually will again be) a member.[5] It would be artificial therefore to suggest that there is a fundamental separation between military history and the cultural history of war. Military history is concerned above all with operational effectiveness, but we need to understand the

culture of the time if we are to explain the functioning of military organisations, the motivations and values of those doing the fighting, and even the nature of battle.[6] It is certainly true that much of the work in the "war and society" mould has concerned wartime civil society rather than war itself, but this chapter will survey recent work that has demonstrated how the concepts of race, class and gender have informed our understanding of the military.

The period in question is from the middle of the seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth centuries. This is a vital period of development, both for the military and for the nature of social classification. Both were informed in fundamental ways by the Enlightenment. This international intellectual movement transformed notions of statecraft, military organisation, training, technology and battlefield tactics. The soldier of the Enlightenment, according to Michel Foucault, became something "that can be made": through exhaustive training, strict discipline and a controlled environment; the military transformed civilian recruits into something new.[7] These soldiers became cogs in the military machine, which aimed to fight battles with geometric precision, and would only engage the enemy if the calculus of risk was in their favour. The reality of conflict was of course far messier, and we will see how recent work on the armies of the *ancien régime* presents quite a different picture of the soldier's experience. As the eighteenth century wore on, we see a shift away from the clockwork tactics of the military Enlightenment, as battles were fought on an unprecedented scale and were decided by irrational factors such as chance and individual genius. Armies also experimented with light infantry and *petite guerre* tactics, which placed a greater emphasis upon the common soldier's autonomy and initiative. In the wars of revolution and national liberation, the combatant was a masculine citizen soldier, who identified strongly with the nation and dependants for whom he fought. This chapter will

therefore venture beyond 1800 since it was in the Napoleonic Wars that this new conception of the soldier was fully realised.

These developments in the history of war related to wider currents in culture and society. A survey of race, gender and class is particularly apposite for this period, since the Enlightenment was concerned with establishing new systems of classification. Whereas formerly one's position in God's creation was fixed by traditional understandings of rank, over the course of the eighteenth century individuals were classified according to more objective assessments of their personhood. Individuals were increasingly defined in terms of their race, class and gender and also conceived of themselves in these terms: Dror Wahrman has argued that the century witnessed the birth of the "modern self".[8] These are Western categories, so this survey will primarily focus on Europe and its colonial encounters: conceptions of race in particular had an important influence upon the organisation of militaries and the conduct of war beyond Europe. This survey aims to be an international one although, as a historian of Britain, many of the examples will inevitably be drawn from this context. Military history is in general more transnational in its approach than cultural history, which tends to emphasise the specifics of context. On the other hand, the histories of armies and navies tend to be kept separate within military history, whereas this is not the case in the cultural history of war. This survey will therefore seek to highlight areas in which military and cultural historians can learn from one other.

Race

It is appropriate to start a survey of this period with the related categories of race and nation, since wars were fought at the level of the state to a greater extent than ever before. Max Weber famously argued that the modern state monopolised the legitimate use of violence and

dated this theory to texts such as Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* of 1651.[9] The cost of training and equipping a soldier increased markedly in the seventeenth century, and the sheer size of militaries required a national infrastructure to organise and pay for them. The financial cost of war, borne as it was by taxation levied on civilians, was increasingly justified in terms of national interest rather than the ambitions of dynasties.[10] Soldiers came to be clothed in uniforms, with distinctive and emotive national colours, and armies appealed to the patriotic zeal of potential recruits.[11] In the eighteenth century, war was a national business.

It is possible to overstate the national character of armies. Stephen Conway has recently emphasised the basic commonalities of armies across Europe, which had similar structures, tactics, armaments and even values.[12] Moreover, armies were remarkably heterogeneous in terms of their personnel. Many soldiers fought in the armies of nations that were not their own: Irishmen, for example, served in armies throughout Europe. States paid other states subsidies to fight on their behalf, and regiments were routinely loaned to an ally for the same purpose: this was particularly true of German states, which kept up large armies due to their vulnerable location, and which were famed for professional soldiering. German soldiers often worked alongside or within the British army. In 1744, one observer noted that English and Hanoverian soldiers "get drunk very comfortably together, and talk and sing a vast deal without understanding one syllable of what they say to one another".[13] The Battle of Waterloo is generally regarded as a British victory, sealed by arrival of the Prussians, but the soldiers commanded by Wellington came from Brunswick, Nassau, Hanover and the Netherlands: only around twenty percent of the allied contribution on the day was actually British.[14] As war efforts came to be more closely identified with the nation, however, the use of foreign combatants became increasingly unacceptable. There was a public outcry about the use of Hanoverian and Hessian troops for British home defence during the Seven Years War,

and the brutal "Hessian mercenary" became the *bête noire* of the American Revolutionary War.[15]

Historians have argued that war played a key role in the creation of national identities. Many states were created by war and revolution in the eighteenth century, and the cultural process of nation building was often driven by the logic of conflict. Linda Colley famously argued that the "British" national identity was created by a century of conflict with France. England, Wales and Scotland were part of the state created in 1707, but they did not yet see themselves as British. Colley argued that military, imperial, religious and cultural rivalry with France provided the external "other", which allowed the British to articulate both what they were not and what they had in common.[16] Although war was central to Colley's argument, she did not have much to say about the armed forces themselves, but historians of war have since added this perspective and nuanced her approach. Catriona Kennedy, for example, has explored the army's role as an instrument of national integration. She argued that Irish and Scottish soldiers were more likely to articulate a British identity than their English counterparts, since there was more incentive to do so among people at the margins of the Union.[17]

Militaries commonly promoted a patriotic culture. Many monarchs wore military uniforms in the eighteenth century and participated in military ceremonials such as parades and reviews. The military, in turn, often promoted an ethos of loyalty and service, and marked royal occasions such as birthdays and coronations. Patriotism was central to the culture of the British army and to an even greater extent in the navy, which played a key role in English national identity in particular. Historians have debated the extent to which patriotism was a factor in recruitment, balancing it against other more pragmatic factors. Certainly, patriotism was part of the repertoire of the recruiter, and posters used emotive language to appeal to the zeal of the potential recruit (Figure 1). In the Age of Revolutions,

recruiters often appealed to the citizens' sense of duty, urging them to make the ultimate patriotic sacrifice. Jarosław Czubaty argued that patriotism was the primary motive for recruits to the Polish army between 1806 and 1815, for example.[18]

Emerging notions of national character often related to the supposed warlike qualities that a people possessed. Germans came to be known for their discipline, the French for their *élan* and the British for their steadiness. This was often articulated in terms of the style of warfare that each nation employed. An Irish sergeant in the 43rd Regiment of Light Infantry noted in 1807:

> Nothing on earth can exceed the coolness and intrepidity with which a British column enters into action. Their firm and steady step has often been the theme of foreign admiration; and in the clash and hurra of crossing bayonets, they are known to be unequalled.[19]

Commentators related the performance of nations in war to their physique, in a proto-racial way. Samuel Johnson wondered why the English "do not enough avail themselves of their superior strength of body against the French", and therefore use bayonet tactics more often against their "weaker-bodied" adversaries.[20] These evaluations often related to the types of food consumed by different peoples. The British army had a beef-heavy diet, since they believed that it promoted strength and aggression among their men. Beef-eating was part of the British national identity, since it connoted prosperity and liberty, so soldiers' beef consumption also had a patriotic significance.[21]

Although modern understandings of race would not be fully articulated until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the process of classifying people in these terms began during the Enlightenment. Philosophers such as Adam Smith conceived of civilisation in

stadial terms, charting national development through the stages of hunting, herding, agriculture and commerce. This placed western Europeans at the pinnacle of civilisation and served to justify the colonisation of supposedly less civilised peoples. The history of the slave trade in the eighteenth century was fundamentally linked to the history of war, since many of the wars fought in this period concerned European powers' attempts to establish their imperial dominance, and in particular to secure routes between Europe, Africa and the Americas. The American Revolutionary War was ostensibly fought for the ideals of equality and independence, but this equality did not extend to blacks or native Americans, since citizenship was linked to "whiteness".[22] In Upper Canada too, black and native troops who fought for the Crown in the War of 1812 quickly found themselves marginalised and excluded on racial grounds. Native warriors had been central to the war effort against the Americans, but the British viewed them with ambivalence. On the one hand, they admired their martial qualities and exploited American fears of their "savagery". On the other, they regarded their violence as "animalistic" and looked down on their battle dress of body paint, feathers and earrings.[23]

As well as fighting alongside people from other parts of the world, colonial warfare often pitted Europeans against non-Europeans. This involved asymmetric warfare, as different military methods came into conflict with one another. The European sense of superiority was often challenged as armies schooled in the tactics of the Enlightenment were bested by very different military traditions. For example, Wellington faced a large Maratha army at Assaye on 23 September 1803. He received an intelligence report that "their infantry and guns will astonish you", but chose to dismiss it, assuming an Indian army would soon be repelled. This informed his tactics on the field, as he pressed a frontal attack on their artillery, which responded with fierce fire. His outnumbered force was ultimately victorious, but his misjudgement of his opponents cost him dear as he sustained huge losses.[24]

Notions of race and national character were also linked to understandings of climate in this period. Military commentators often drew a distinction between "cold" and "hot" nations. "Cold" nations included the Russians, Swedes and Germans, who apparently had phlegmatic temperaments and were insensible to danger or suffering. The "hot" French, Spanish and Hungarians by contrast were excitable but undisciplined, and the British were somewhere in the middle.[25] Attitudes towards race were changing, however. In the early eighteenth century, Wahrman argues, peoples were differentiated in terms of their dress more than their bodies: skin colour was a temporary characteristic, since bodies were regarded as being adaptable to their climate. Towards the end of the century, however, skin colour came to be regarded as a permanent characteristic, and races were apparently suited only to their native clime.[26] This shift in attitude helps us to understand the ways in which the military authorities approached colonial warfare and, in particular, the challenge of keeping troops healthy in unfamiliar climates. Postings in the tropics were notorious for the high rates of death to disease, and writings on military medicine emphasised that northern Europeans were temperamentally unsuited to hot climates.[27]

One response to this problem was to ensure that soldiers were ideally only deployed to a theatre when they were already "seasoned", or adapted to their environment. Alternatively, people from the region itself could be brought into the service. European powers commonly relied upon colonists to provide their own defence, against other European armies and native peoples. They had the advantage of already being *in situ* and knowing the terrain, as well as being accustomed to the climate and immune to local diseases. Indigenous peoples were also drawn upon, either as allies – such as Native Americans, as we have seen – or within the structure of the military itself. In India, in particular, large numbers of men were recruited as "sepoys" in the British, French and Portuguese service. These troops wore a variant of the national uniform, were armed and trained to perform as European troops would,

and were commanded by western officers. The vast majority of troops in the British East India Company's army were sepoys, providing the basis for British power on the subcontinent. Recruits were drawn from the existing Indian labour market, and "most of those who enlisted from colonial service could probably lay claim to existing traditions of military service". In the nineteenth century, the military prowess of certain South Asian communities came to be conceived of in racial terms, as they were classified as "martial races".[28]

Africans also served within European militaries. Soldiers and sailors are a common focus for black history, not least because military record-keeping and archiving has meant that these are two occupational groups for which there are sources. In Britain, many black sailors served in the Royal Navy, which recruited all over the globe. Many also served in the British army. During the American War of Independence, the British pledged to free slaves who fought the rebels, and tens of thousands joined up. They were used as troops, as cavalry, as labourers and as guides. The British did not treat them any better than the Americans, however, keeping black troops in segregated camps, meting out brutal punishments, and only actually freeing the men rather than their families. At the conclusion of the war, thousands of black people had to flee, often crossing the border into Canada or travelling to Britain. Peter Fryer noted that these ex-servicemen "exchanged the life of a slave for that of a starving beggar on the London streets". Black men continued to serve in the British army, often performing particular roles. Black musicians were often renowned in this period and the tradition of using black men as military bandsmen started in the seventeenth century, when regiments serving in the West Indies acquired black drummers. Throughout the eighteenth century, black men served as drummers and trumpeters in British regiments. The craze for "Turkish" music in the eighteenth century also led to the employment of Africans in military bands. They dressed in colourful eastern costumes and performed on cymbals, tambourines

and the "jingling johnny", a long pole covered in bells.[29] Although clearly not actually Turkish, these musicians were deemed sufficiently "other" to lend an air of fashionable exoticism to the culture of the eighteenth-century military.

Notions of race and nation were therefore not fully formed in the period 1650 to 1800, since they were in the process of being developed into recognisably "modern" categories. They could, however, have an important impact upon the conduct of war, and upon the experience of those who served. Insights from social and cultural history can therefore inform our approach to the military, but at the same time it is vital that social and cultural historians engage with the military, since the experience of war informed the very categories through which the Enlightenment sought to render the world comprehensible.

Class

Of the three concepts we are exploring here, class is probably the most well-established in historical studies. It was central to the project of social history in the 1960s, which sought to study "history from below" by using methods from the social sciences, drawing in particular upon Marxist theory. While the left-wing tenor of much of this work was sometimes at odds with military history, the development of "war and society" and the new military history owed much to the methods and findings of social history. More recently, cultural history has seen a shift away from historical explanations based upon economic structures, but "class" remains important. Indeed, it is during the eighteenth century that society first came to be classified in terms of three social "classes", and "class" became an important individual and collective identity.

The "class" perspective can tell us a great deal about the life of the common soldier or sailor but, to date, this potential has not been fully realised. Social history had little to say

about him, preferring to focus on challenges to the establishment rather than its personnel. It is important to emphasise, however, that common soldiers were members of the working class: indeed, they were far more typical members of it than the "classic" factory proletariat. Ilya Berkovich has noted that, as a "despised group on the periphery of eighteenth-century societies, common soldiers should have been an optimal subject for cultural study in the current academic climate," which usually seeks to recover lost voices.[30] It is also the case that it is more feasible to do history from below in this area, since historians have much more information about soldiers than most of their contemporaries. The military recorded a great deal of quantitative information about their recruits, including data such as their age, height, place of origin or former occupation. In an era before many countries had a national census, military records such as militia returns can be used to conduct socio-economic studies of the working population.[31] In addition to this, there is qualitative information about life in camp, in barracks or on board ship – often recorded through daily orders – and details of misdemeanours via court martial records. The survival rates and accessibility of this material tend to be favourable, given the archiving practices of the military and the modern state.

In addition to this official source material, soldiers and sailors themselves often wrote. Being posted away from home for long periods, they had an incentive to write that most workers did not, in order to stay in touch with loved ones, to send them money or even just to inform them that they were still alive. There were clearly obstacles in the way of doing so, not least levels of literacy and the cost of writing. Soldiers and sailors tended to be roughly as literate as the wider population from which they were drawn, although the military was "one of the more conducive environments for learning in old-regime Europe".[32] NCOs would often have to be literate in order to do their job, and officers sometimes gave soldiers with a self-improving bent access to their libraries. Writing home cost money or, in the case of postal systems where the recipient paid the postage, placed an awkward burden on their families.

The military, however, realised that contact with home was important for morale and as a cure for "*ennui*", so facilitated it where possible. The 1795 Navy Act enabled British seamen to post letters home for an up-front charge of one penny, and when in port abroad they would send letters back home via passing ships.[33] Armies too began to establish field post offices. Again, letters send by combatants have often been preserved in the archives (especially in cases where the military intercepted and copied them, such as during the Nore mutiny of 1797). Alan Forrest has used the hundreds of surviving letters written by those serving in the armies of the Revolution and Napoleon to reconstruct the lives and perspectives of the common French soldier.[34]

As well as being letter writers, a significant number of common soldiers were memoirists. Berkovich has assembled a bibliography of around 200 autobiographical writings by common soldiers and NCOs from across Europe in the eighteenth century.[35] These writings tended not to be published, unless they were in specific genres like the spiritual autobiography. In Britain this all changed during the Napoleonic Wars: there was a burst of public interest in the life of the common soldier, as scores of soldiers published their memoirs. This was partly due to a rise in the reputation of the common soldier from the Peninsular War onwards, but also due to a sense that the experience of soldiers was significant and unique. Yuval Noah Harari has argued that war came to be seen as "the ultimate experience", a revelatory encounter that was inaccessible to civilians.[36] It also reflected a change in the practice of war, away from the "clockwork" model of the Enlightenment towards styles of warfare that co-opted the perspective and initiative of the common soldier. It is no coincidence that so many of these individualistic narratives emanated from members of the famed 95th Rifles, since the light infantry epitomised this ideal.

As well as helping us to study history from below, a class perspective can help us to think about the nature of hierarchy in the military. Militaries are hierarchical institutions, and society in our period was similarly stratified, so it was common for one to reflect the other. In institutions like the English militia, a system of rising property qualifications ensured that officer commissions mirrored county society, avoiding awkward conflicts of precedence.[37] The widespread practice of promotion by purchase restricted commissions to men from propertied families, where it was a common career choice for younger sons. The bulk of the officer class was drawn from the lesser nobility, be that the English gentry, the Prussian *Junkers* or the French *noblesse d'épée*.[38] The social world of the officer was therefore that of the gentleman. The skills required of the military officer – to ride, to fence, to sketch – were essentially those of the polite gentleman. In countries such as Britain there was no formal military training for officers, perhaps because the "accomplishments" they required were already part of an elite education. Military officers socialised as a class and participated in the arenas of elite sociability, attending balls, races and hunts: Wellington even took his hounds with him to the Peninsula.[39] The persistence of the practice of duelling in the military attests to the importance of genteel honour codes.

In many European militaries, the officer ranks were dominated by the nobility, and the private soldiers were drawn from the working poor, leaving a social gulf in the middle. There were exceptions to this: Austria had relatively egalitarian practices of recruitment and promotion, so men from the middle classes were able to ascend the ranks on merit.[40] Technical services such as the artillery and the engineers tended to be the most meritocratic, whereas the cavalry was generally considered to be the most elite. Even outside of these exceptions, however, the military was an important route to social mobility in this period. Promotion accelerated in times of war, when casualties created vacancies. Soldiers drawn from the very lowest classes of eighteenth-century society had the potential to progress up the

non-commissioned ranks, and to acquire the carriage and accomplishments that would help them to make their way in society. Traditionally, the uniform of a soldier was the marker of a gentleman, but the accessibility of soldiering led to some negative contemporary commentary that soldiers were getting above their proper station.[41]

The existence of a social hierarchy in the military meant that relations between the ranks could take on the character of paternalism and deference, in addition to those dictated by the military chain of command. The practice of proprietory command meant that colonels effectively owned their regiments and ran them as a "business venture".[42] They had considerable latitude over how grants from government were to be spent: some sought to make a profit by skimping on expenditure such as food and uniforms, whereas others supplemented the regimental budget with their personal wealth. John Manners, Marquess of Granby was beloved by his men for his attentiveness to their needs as well as his military prowess. Corporal Todd noted that on the eve of an action, "Lord Granby Wrapt'd himself in his great Coat and Lay down upon the upon the ground amongst us, which greatly Encouraged our men". Todd's diary also recorded a song singing his praises:

> Sound praises of fame in the Name of Granby,
> Great Wonders is done in High Germany,
> Upon the 15th of July the French gave Attack
> Our Left wing replus'd them & soon drove them back.
>
> Chorus ye Sons of Britannia and sing
> Success to Great Granby & Long Live the King…
>
> He ne'er [saw] the Army One day for to want,

If Gold could purchase tho' ever so scant,
Gave us Beer, gave us Brandy and all we desired,
We thank you Lord Granby was all he required.

Chorus ye Sons etc…[43]

Many public houses bear Granby's name to this day, a lasting reminder of his popularity among common soldiers in the mid-eighteenth century. Some soldiers perceived such paternalism in literal terms, bestowing the affectionate title of "father" on an esteemed officer.[44]

Not all soldiers were so content with their lot, nor with their treatment at the hands of their commanders. Recent work on the eighteenth-century military has suggested that soldiers had a firm sense of their rights and were given to challenge their superiors where they felt they had been mistreated. Paralleling work from the history of crime on the civilian courts, this research argues that soldiers used the structures of military justice to their own ends. Their position in the status hierarchy was therefore settled by means of negotiation rather than diktat.[45] This challenges the traditional picture of *ancien régime* armies as despotic institutions, on the model of the tightly disciplined Prussian army of Frederick the Great. Within these armies, unwilling conscripts were apparently drilled into automata, who faced brutal and arbitrary punishments if they attempted to dissent or desert. Instead, the eighteenth-century European soldier is now emerging as a much more well-rounded individual, who was literate, motivated and autonomous. He had much more in common with the "citizen soldiers" of the revolutionary era that followed, than historians tended to assume only a generation ago.

Indeed, the participation of common soldiers in radical politics is noteworthy. We might expect to see this in the armies of revolutionary America or France, but it is also a common phenomenon in counter-revolutionary militaries such as that of Britain. A significant proportion of British radical activists from the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries served in the military.[46] Some were driven to radicalism by their experiences in the military, whether that was the hardships and punishments that they witnessed, the corruption of their superiors, or their frustration at being denied promotion. Barrack-room lawyers often became agitators in civilian life, and the ranks of postwar radical movements were swelled by impoverished ex-servicemen. Labour history has tended not to acknowledge the military connections of so many of its subjects, but it is clear that it has much to learn from the history of the military.

Gender

The history of gender is also well established within historical studies and has significant implications for the history of war. Women had long been invisible in historical writing, whose focus on apparently-masculine spheres such as war served to exclude them. In the 1970s, inspired by second wave feminism and social history's drive to recover lost voices, the new women's history sought to correct this state of affairs. This ethos informed the "war and society" approach, as historians began to explore female involvement in the military and the impact of war upon women. More recently, there has been a shift towards "gender history", as feminist historians have sought to understand the diverse and relational ways in which gender functions in human culture and society.[47] Bound up with this was the emergence of the history of masculinity, which has huge potential to think about the male soldier in terms of his identity, his reputation and even his physical body. This section will explore each of

these histories in turn, in terms of their implications for the history of war. As with race and class, our modern understandings of gender owe much to developments in the long eighteenth century, where they were forged in a period of conflict.

There were many ways in which war had an impact upon women in the period 1650 to 1800. Firstly, women encountered war as civilians. The military was an important presence on the home front, where armies were very visible and naval ports were highly militarised. Even women with no personal connection to the armed forces could follow events closely in the newspaper press or get involved in relief efforts, given that philanthropy was part of the expected role of the respectable woman. Padhraig Higgins has shown how women in Ireland acquired material articles adorned with patriotic and military subjects, including objects such as teapots, jugs and trays that were central to the rituals of female sociability.[48] Women participated in the ceremonial culture of the military, observing reviews and presenting regiments with their colours. Symbolically, women were those who were being defended by the masculine military. Some historians argue that war tends to widen gender distinctions, as women are relegated to the roles of dependants and helpmeets, whereas men become their brave defenders.[49] Women therefore had a role to play in the military's culture of heterosexual gallantry. War often involves a loosening of sexual mores and opportunities for new liaisons, since "sex was one of the recognised pleasures of war".[50] During the American and French Wars, British women's desire for men in red coats was known as "scarlet fever", a phenomenon that sheds light on the role of gender in wartime culture as well as some of the specific social anxieties of the time.[51]

Clearly it was one matter to experience war at a remove; it was quite another to live in a region that was regularly overrun by armies, or in a city that was laid siege. Women frequently had their possessions pillaged or their dwelling appropriated by passing soldiers or were the victims of personal and sexual violence. Courts martial record instances of soldiers

being tried for rape, but it is clear that many more outrages went unpunished and unrecorded.[52] Towards the end of our period, the line between home and the front becomes blurred, as war was fought on an unprecedented scale and made greater demands on the civilian population, who became targets for its violence. David Bell argues that the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were the "first total war".[53] In this context, male and female civilians alike necessarily became part of war's story.

Many women had a direct connection with the military as wives, sweethearts or relatives of serving personnel. Women had to deal with the emotional burden of long separations, often without knowing whether their menfolk were even alive. Letters home were vitally important, and these were often addressed to mothers as the emotional centre of the family, who would then relay news to other family members. Wives and families who relied on the husband's income for survival were placed in a serious predicament during long periods of service, since there were few reliable means of sending money long distance in this period. The first branch of the British military to pay family allowances was the militia in the 1760s: this was symbolically significant, since the militia was represented as family men defending hearth and home.[54] Regular and navy families had to wait decades for similar benefits and in the meantime often relied upon low-paid work and poor relief from the parish. A study of mid-century Helsinki shows how underpaid soldiers and their womenfolk participated in a makeshift economy of theft and peddling in order to support their families.[55]

Other women followed their husbands on campaign. Armies viewed these "camp followers" with ambivalence. On the one hand, they presented a drain on resources and a challenge to logistics and discipline, so regiments limited the number of partners whom they would permit to follow them. On the other, armies needed the practical services that they could provide as cooks, laundresses, nurses and seamstresses and so supported them financially "on the strength" of the regiment. Different nations had distinctive practices here:

the French *vivandière* was different to the British sutler, as she was necessarily the wife of a serving soldier designated a *vivandier*.[56] Life was undoubtedly tough for camp followers, who had to endure long marches and all the hardships and dangers of campaign, and who lived in shanty towns beyond the boundaries of the camp. Women of the elite also accompanied senior officers, a key difference being that they sometimes lodged within the camp in their husbands' elaborate, furnished tents. Women were present on board naval ships too: working women were tolerated aboard only when in port, but officers' families sometimes joined them at sea, challenging our usual perception of ships as exclusively masculine spaces.[57]

The women of the period who experienced war most directly were those who disguised themselves as men in order to serve as soldiers. The "female soldier" was a characteristic figure of the eighteenth century, and the plot of a woman dressing as a soldier to follow her sweetheart recurred on the stage and in popular literature. It is difficult to separate fact and fiction here, not least because figures like the "female marine" Hannah Snell became theatrical celebrities, performing musket drill for paying spectators. Stephen Conway has suggested that it is significant that they were presented as curiosities, "usually only to make a point about the unnaturalness of women acting as warriors, or to chide men for failing to demonstrate the necessary manly virtues".[58] These celebrated cross dressers epitomise the gender fluidity of the eighteenth century and receive a lot of attention today. On the other hand, some historians have cautioned that focusing on this tiny number of exceptional women serves only to detract from the bigger question of women's experience of war.[59]

Where male soldiers are concerned, it is only relatively recently that gender history has had anything to say about them. The history of masculinity started in the 1980s, but early work in this field tended to focus on the "private" aspects of male experience, as a counter to

the foci of traditional history (such as war) and also to the association of men with the "public" sphere within women's history. Some of the first work on military masculinity came from sociology, which explored questions such as bodily discipline, camaraderie and homophobia within military cultures.[60] This work tended to have a contemporary focus, rather than historicising masculinity as a phenomenon. Early historical studies of masculinity focused on the First World War, thinking about the gendered experience of trench warfare, shell shock and dismemberment,[61] but work on other periods was slower to emerge.[62] Where the long eighteenth century was concerned, much of it focused on the latter end of the period, since the masculine citizen soldier was a key figure in the age of revolutions.[63] This idealised figure was partly inspired by classical republicanism, whereby Roman men earned their citizenship through military service and governance of their household. This was repackaged for modern audiences by Machiavelli in Renaissance Florence, by writers such as James Harrington in the British Civil Wars, and by participants in the "standing army debates" at the end of the seventeenth century.[64] This ideology was central to the American Revolution, which celebrated the role of the propertied citizen who was vigilant in defence of the republic and his liberties. It was embodied in the "minuteman", a civilian who could assemble with his gun at short notice to meet the enemy. The citizen soldier was also central to the French Revolution, although it was articulated more in terms of service to the state rather than individual liberties. As the *levée en masse* of 23 August 1793 proclaimed:

> From this moment until that in which the enemy shall have been driven from the territory of the republic, all Frenchmen are permanently requisitioned for service in the armies. The young men shall fight; married men shall forge weapons and transport supplies; the women will make tents and clothes and will serve in the hospitals; the children will make up old linen into lint; the old men will have themselves carried

> into the public squares to rouse the courage of fighting men, to preach the unity of the Republic and hatred of kings.[65]

Citizen soldiering was therefore exclusive in terms of gender (and also age). If military service was a masculine role, and citizenship depended on military service, then this was a key reason why political citizenship came to be defined in terms that were so exclusive to women by the end of the eighteenth century.

Although the masculine citizen soldier was most associated with America and France, he appeared in many other contexts too. In the revolutions of the Caribbean, black slaves articulated their struggle of emancipation from European colonisers in these terms. There was a rich culture of citizen soldiering, with striking similarities, in national liberation movements as diverse as those in Ireland or the Dutch Republic.[66] Paradoxically, citizen soldiering was also to be found in non-revolutionary and anti-revolutionary contexts. In Britain, the reform of the militia in 1757 was promoted in terms of the ordinary male citizen's "natural" desire to defend his wife, children, property and king against foreign invaders. Indeed, military service was presented as a means of reinvigorating civilian men and re-establishing the gender order, which had been cast into doubt following Britain's disastrous start to the Seven Years War. Although the efficacy of part-timers against professional troops might be questioned, in the eighteenth century great store was placed upon the citizen's superior motivation, based upon his stronger emotional identifications than a regular solider, who was only fighting for pay or because he had been ordered to.[67] If the official militia quickly became very similar to the regulars in practice, the Volunteer movement that sprang up across Britain during the American and French Wars was much closer to the citizen soldier ideal. Participants were generally men of property, who spoke the language of liberty and elected their officers. Some

Volunteers were of a distinctly radical bent, conceiving of their citizen army as a counterweight to the power of government and a means for men to earn political rights.

While the citizen soldier was an important feature of the age of revolutions, he arguably tells us more about citizenship than soldiering, and more about politics than war. He was also not typical of earlier periods, when soldiers did not necessarily articulate their masculinity in nationalistic terms. In the mid-eighteenth century, soldiers in the Prussian service did not express their loyalty to "Prussia" but rather to the *Vaterland*. Rather than a fatherland in a modern sense, it connoted their region and culture: the land that they had inherited from their fathers and the home of their kin. Fighting for the *Vaterland* was therefore a gendered identity insofar as they were defending the honour and safety of their families.[68]

Masculinity as an analytical category can shed more light besides on war and on the soldier's experience. War has conventionally been conceived of as a masculine domain but, rather than accepting this as "natural", we should think critically about how and why this connection came about. Prior to the eighteenth century, Leo Braudy has argued that "the positive connotations of 'man' referred almost exclusively to the behaviour (often military) of a man of rank": we have seen how the gentleman and the military man continued to have much in common.[69] Over the course of the Enlightenment, the bases of men's and women's positions in society were justified in new ways, as conceptions of gender hardened and diverged: men's apparent strength, rationality and hardihood were grounded in their very bodies. Soldiering was therefore a naturally masculine vocation, perhaps explaining why the female soldier was such a figure of fascination. Military service was commonly identified with virtuous manhood itself: as Johnson noted, "Every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier, or not having been at sea".[70] On the other hand, it would be mistaken completely to equate soldiering with manliness in this period. According to classical

republican precepts, the regular soldier's dependence and lack of liberty was effeminate, and the addiction of officers to fancy uniforms, polite sociability and formal manners often drew criticism, especially when wars were going badly. The "military macaroni" was a stock figure of British satirical prints, which explored anxieties about the public spirit and virtue of the ruling class (Figure 3).

Although we have noted the many ways in which women did engage with the military, armies and navies were by and large homosocial institutions, and the concept of masculinity sheds light on the relations between men within these organisations. Honour was central to the culture of the military in this period. It linked the values of the individual to those of the group and was even institutionalised within the military's disciplinary apparatus. Courts martial for "conduct unbecoming" were a means of settling honour disputes between individuals, and many military punishments were "honour" punishments, concerned with cleansing the reputation of the offender so that he could be admitted back into the fold. Although duelling was technically illegal, it was central to a culture that valorised masculine honour, bravery and martial prowess. As John Cockburn noted, military men would never give up duelling, "for if they did their fellow Soldiers, both Officers and others, would not keep their company".[71] Masculinity can also help us to understand more affectionate and intimate relations between military men. Camaraderie is a vital part of military culture and modern commentators often view it as the most positive thing revealed by war, to the extent that one would have to experience war truly to know it.[72] Combatants developed strong fraternal bonds in this period: as well as fighting for each other on the battlefield, an immediate group of comrades would share their belongings, mess together and often share a bed. Historians have highlighted the close emotional connections that developed between soldiers in the armies of Napoleonic France, for example.[73] Even if they were not necessarily

sexual in a physical sense, the history of sexuality provides useful insights into these relationships.

The history of the body is another branch of gender studies that has contributed to the history of war. Soldiering is inherently a bodily experience: it concerns the ability of the male body to exert physical violence, to endure pain and suffering, to march long distances, to perform complex mechanical tasks and to move in unison with other bodies. The disciplining of the soldier's body was a key feature of the military revolution. Soldiers were trained to load firearms quickly – which involved successive complex physical operations – and then to fire them in conjunction with their comrades, in order to maximise the concentration of fire. They also learned to march and wheel in unison, so they could to manoeuvre around a battlefield while presenting a line of musketry to the enemy. Instructions were codified in illustrated drill books at the beginning of the seventeenth century, which enabled these bodily techniques quickly to spread across Europe. By the eighteenth century, soldiers spent much of their time drilling: Joseph Mayett recalls that "they drilled us 8 hours per day".[74] In modern war culture, the "boot camp" is a watershed in the life of a soldier, as their induction into the military involves being physically and psychologically re-made.[75] Soldier memoirs recall how this was a transformative experience in a physical sense, as they gained expertise and an upright carriage. This bodily refinement could have implications for social mobility: soldiers gained the type of deportment that a gentleman would have to pay a dancing master to acquire, at a time when one's status in polite society was increasingly established by outward appearance.

The donning of a uniform was physically transformative too. Memoirists often recalled the first time they wore the uniform as a key rite of passage: "I now saw myself a new figure – my head being trimmed to order, and crimped with hot irons; my blood red coat, white small-belows, with black leggings; belted and armed; and with a long leather cue, or

tail, fastened to my pole. A strange metamorphosis, thought I, of myself since the day before."[76] As well as altering their outward appearance, the uniform moulded the body, since tailored coats and leather neck stocks forced the wearer to stand up straight. While it might appear that such apparel limited the mobility – and thence the operational effectiveness – of the soldier, it is important to bear in mind the psychological effect of striking clothes and an impressive bearing. As well as enhancing their soldier's bodies by means of exercise and clothing, armies placed increasing attention upon the diet, health and hygiene of their soldiers.[77] They also sought to optimise the quality of their physical stock at the selection stage. Recruiters ensured that soldiers met the basic physical requirements: they needed good eyesight, fingers to operate the musket, front teeth to rip open the power cartridge, and must not have complaints like flat-footedness that would prevent them from marching. (For this reason, armies have left historians of medicine and disability huge amounts of biometric data about the male working population.)

Finally, they also sought to optimise the height of their recruits. European armies had minimum height requirements, which would only drop in times of war when demand for recruits rose. There were various reasons for this. Men needed to be of a certain height to operate the long-bore musket and armies needed men of broadly equivalent height to deploy volley fire. Tall men were also valued for their ability to throw grenades and push bayonets. The preference for tall men was partly a cultural choice, however, since taller soldiers looked impressive and showed off the uniform to better effect. The tallest men were made grenadiers, who flanked the regiment in their distinctive towering hats at parade. Frederick William of Prussia in particular was notorious for his obsession with tall soldiers, but this preoccupation with height was common across Europe.[78] The attitude towards tall soldiers changed, however: over the course of the nineteenth century the practice of warfare changed and the arrival of accurate rifled weaponry made tall soldiers a liability. Soldiers were then

supposed to be tough rather than supple, compact rather than elegant, and be able to survive in the field and take advantage of cover. These changing attitudes towards the body of the combatant show that the soldier was a historically specific figure.

For this reason and many others, it is therefore important to focus on race, class and gender. These key concepts have informed the history of war in fundamental ways and continue to do so. As we have seen, the cultural history of war should not be seen as a separate endeavour to military history, since key questions such as operational effectiveness, morale, fighting styles and institutional values need to be explained in these terms. The cultural history of war should not therefore be regarded as a complement to military history but should be a means of changing and enhancing it. It is equally the case that cultural history should learn from military history. Cultural history is often criticised for its focus on representations rather than concrete phenomena or experiences, and responses to this have included a renewed focus on material objects, human bodies and physical spaces. But military history has always been a practical field and has never lost sight of the importance of material realities and historical causation.[79] Military sources are also much under-used by social and cultural historians. The cultural history of war should therefore be an opportunity for an alliance rather than a battleground.

Figure captions

Figure 1 Recruiting poster for Colonel Holroyd's Light Dragoons (1780). Courtesy of the Council of the National Army Museum.

Figure 2 Sir William Young, "Tambourin" from sketches of the Buckinghamshire Militia (1793). Courtesy of the Buckinghamshire Military Museum Trust.

Figure 3 Anon., "The military macaroni" (1773). Courtesy of the Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University.

Further Reading

Berkovich, Ilya. *Motivation in War: The Experience of Common Soldiers in Old-Regime Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2017.

Black, Jeremy. *Rethinking Military History,* Abingdon: Routledge, 2004.

Braudy, Leo. *From Chivalry to Terrorism: War and the Changing Nature of Masculinity*, New York: Knopf, 2003.

Bourke, Joanna. *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Carter, Louise. "Scarlet Fever: Female Enthusiasm for Men in Uniform, 1780-1815", in Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack (eds), *Britain's Soldiers: Rethinking War and Society, 1715-1815*, 155-82, Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2014.

Colley, Linda. *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*, New Haven: Yale UP, 1992.

Cordoza, Thomas. "'Habits Appropriate to Her Sex': The Female Military Experience in France During the Age of the Revolution", in Karen Hagemann, Gisela Mettele and Jane Rendall (eds), *Gender, War and Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives, 1775-1830*, 188-205, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010.

Dudink, Stefan. "Masculinity, Effeminacy, Time: Conceptual Change in the Dutch Age of Revolutions", in Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann and John Tosh (eds), *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History*, 77-95, Manchester: Manchester UP, 2004.

Duffy, Christopher. *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.

Fryer, Peter. *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain*, London: Pluto, 1984.

Harari, Yuval Noah. *The Ultimate Experience: Battlefield Revelations and the Making of Modern War Culture, 1450-2000*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2008.

Knouff, Gregory T.. "Masculinity, Race and Citizenship: Soldiers' Memories of the American Revolution", in Karen Hagemann, Gisela Mettele and Jane Rendall (eds), *Gender, War and Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives, 1775-1830*, 325-42, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010.

Lynn, John. *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America*, New York: Basic Books, 2003.

McCormack, Matthew. "Citizenship, Nationhood and Masculinity in the Affair of the Hanoverian Soldier, 1756", *The Historical Journal* 49. No. 4 (2006: 971-93.

McCormack, Matthew. "Dance and Drill: Polite Accomplishments and Military Masculinities in Georgian Britain", *Cultural and Social History* 8, no. 3 (2011): 315-30.

McCormack, Matthew. *Embodying the Militia in Georgian England*, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015.

Mansfield, Nick. "Military Radicals and the Making of Class, 1790-1860", in Catriona Kennedy and Matthew McCormack (eds), *Soldiering in Britain and Ireland, 1750-1850*, 57-75, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2013.

Martin, Brian Jones. "Military Mates: From Revolutionary Fraternity to Napoleonic Intimacy in the Memoirs of Sergeant Faucher", *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies* 41, no. 4 (2018): 543-44.

Morgan, David. "Theater of War: Combat, the Military and Masculinities" in Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman (eds), *Theorizing Masculinities*, 165-82, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994.

Roy, Kaushik and Rand, Gavin (eds). *Culture, Conflict and the Military in Colonial South Asia*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2018.

Tatum III, William P.. "Challenging the New Military History: The Case of Eighteenth-Century British Army Studies", *History Compass* (2006)1-13.

Wilson, Peter H. "German Women and War, 1500-1800", *War in History* 3 (1996): 127-60.

---

[1] John Lynn, "The Embattled Future of Academic Military History," *Journal of Military History* 61 (1997): 777-89, 780.

[2] Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History* (Palgrave: Houndmills, 2006), chs 3 & 13.

[3] William P. Tatum III, "Challenging the New Military History: The Case of Eighteenth-Century British Army Studies," *History Compass* (2006): 1-13, 6.

[4] Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), pp. 4, 50.

[5] Peter H. Wilson, "Defining Military Culture," *Journal of Military History* 72 (2008), 11-41, 31.

[6] On the latter, see John Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America* (Basic Books, 2003).

[7] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1975), trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 135.

[8] Dror Wahrman, *The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-Century England* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2004).

[9] Max Weber, "The Profession and Vocation of Politics" (1919), in *Politics Writings*, ed. by Peter Lassman and Ronald Spiers (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994), pp. 309-70.

[10] Leo Braudy, *From Chivalry to Terrorism: War and the Changing Nature of Masculinity* (New York: Knopf, 2003), p. 246.

[11] Christopher Duffy, *The Military in the Age of Reason* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 105.

[12] Stephen Conway, "The Eighteenth-Century British Army as a European Institution," in Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack (eds), *Britain's Soldiers: Rethinking War and Society* (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2014), pp. 17-38.

[13] George Sackville, quoted in Mark Wishon, *German Forces and the British Army: Interactions and Perceptions, 1742-1815* (Palgrave: Houndmills, 2013), p. 93.

[14] Wishon, *German Forces*, p. 14.

[15] Matthew McCormack, "Citizenship, Nationhood and Masculinity in the Affair of the Hanoverian Soldier, 1756," *The Historical Journal* 49:4 (2006): 971-93.

[16] Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1992).

[17] Catriona Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: Military and Civilian Experience in Britain and Ireland* (Palgrave: Houndmills, 2013), p. 85.

[18] Jarosław Czubaty, "Glory, Honour and Patriotism: Military Careers in the Duchy of Warsaw, 1806-1815," in Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall (eds), *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2009), pp. 59-76 (p. 67).

[19] Anon., *Memoirs of a Sergeant: The 43rd Light Infantry During the Peninsular War* (Stroud: Nonsuch, 2005), pp. 25-26.

[20] James Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson* (1791), ed. George Birkbeck Hill and L. F. Pavell, 6 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), V, p. 229.

[21] Gavin Daly, *The British Soldier in the Peninsular War: Encounters with Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2013), p. 100.

[22] Gregory T. Knouff, "Masculinity, Race and Citizenship: Soldiers' Memories of the American Revolution," in Karen Hagemann, Gisela Mettele and Jane Rendall (eds), *Gender, War and Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives, 1775-1830* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010), pp. 325-42.

[23] Cecilia Morgan, "Gender, Loyalty and Virtue in a Colonial Context: The War of 1812 and its Aftermath in Upper Canada," in Hagemann, Mettele and Rendall, *Gender, War and Politics*, pp. 307-24 (p. 313).

[24] Lawrence James, *The Iron Duke: A Military Biography of Wellington* (London: Pimlico, 2002), p. 90.

[25] Duffy, *Military Experience*, p. 18.

[26] Wahrman, *Making of the Modern Self*, pp. 86-93.

[27] Everard Home, *Practical Observations on the Treatment of Ulcers on the Legs, Considered as a Branch of Military Surgery* (London, 1797).

[28] Kaushik Roy and Gavin Rand, "Introduction" in idem. (eds), *Culture, Conflict and the Military in Colonial South Asia* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 1-21 (p. 2).

[29] Peter Fryer, *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain* (London: Pluto, 1984), pp. 191, 81-83.

[30] Ilya Berkovich, *Motivation in War: The Experience of Common Soldiers in Old-Regime Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2017), p. 4.

[31] For example: Ian Beckett, "Buckinghamshire Militia Lists for 1759: A Social Analysis," *Records of Buckinghamshire*, 20:3 (1977); 461-69.

[32] Berkovich, *Motivation in War*, p. 40.

[33] Helen Watt with Anne Hawkins, *Letters of Seamen in the Wars with France, 1793-1815* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2016), pp. 11, 14.

[34] Alan Forrest, *Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire* (London: Hambledon, 2002).

[35] Berkovich, *Motivation in War*, pp. 232-47.

[36] Yuval Noah Harari, *The Ultimate Experience: Battlefield Revelations and the Making of Modern War Culture, 1450-2000* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2008).

[37] Matthew McCormack, *Embodying the Militia in Georgian England* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015), p. 125.

[38] Duffy, *Military Experience*, p. 41.

[39] J. A. Cookson, "Regimental Worlds: Interpreting the Experience of British Soldiers during the Napoleonic Wars," in Forrest et al (eds), *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians*, pp. 23-42 (p. 35).

[40] Duffy, *Military Experience*, p. 43.

[41] "On the Militia," *The Yearly Chronicle for M,DCC,LXI* (1762), p. 230.

[42] J. R. Western, *The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century: The Story of a Political Issue 1660-1802* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 369-70.

[43] Andrew Cormack and Alan Jones (eds), *The Journal of Corporal William Todd, 1745-1762* (Sutton: Stroud, 2001), pp. 165, 171-2.

[44] Cookson, "Regimental Worlds," p. 25.

[45] Berkovich, *Motivation in War*; Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002); William P. Tatum III, "'The Soldiers Murmured Much on Account of this Usage': Military Justice and Negotiated Authority in the Eighteenth-Century British Army," in Linch & McCormack (eds), *Britain's Soldiers*, pp. 95-113.

[46] Nick Mansfield, "Military Radicals and the Making of Class, 1790-1860," in Catriona Kennedy and Matthew McCormack (eds), *Soldiering in Britain and Ireland, 1750-1850* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 57-75.

[47] Laura Lee Downs, *Writing Gender History* (London: Hodder, 2004).

[48] Padhraig Higgins, *A Nation of Politicians: Gender, Patriotism and Political Culture in Late Eighteenth-Century Ireland* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), pp. 101-02.

[49] Stephen Conway, *War, State and Society in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006), p. 120.

[50] Daly, *British Soldier*, p. 188.

[51] Louise Carter, "Scarlet Fever: Female Enthusiasm for Men in Uniform, 1780-1815," in Linch and McCormack (eds), *Britain's Soldiers*, pp. 155-79.

[52] Corporal Todd records a soldier being hanged for "ravishing a woman" when stationed at Cherbourg in August 1758: Cormack and Jones (eds), *Journal of Corporal William Todd*, p. 76.

[53] David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007).

[54] McCormack, *Embodying the Militia*, p. 28.

[55] Petri Talvitie, "Black Markets and Desertion: Soldiers' Criminality in Helsinki, 1748-1757," *Sjuttonhundratal: Nordic Yearbook of Eighteenth-Century Studies* (2014), 45-68.

[56] Thomas Cordoza, "'Habits Appropriate to Her Sex': The Female Military Experience in France During the Age of the Revolution," in Hagemann et al (eds), *Gender, War and Politics*, pp. 188-205 (p. 190).

[57] Watt, *Letters of Seamen*, pp. 52-54.

[58] Conway, *War, State and Society*, p. 119.

[59] As argued by Peter Wilson, "German Women and War, 1500-1800," *War in History* 3 (1996): 127-60.

[60] This work is surveyed in David Morgan, "Theater of War: Combat, the Military and Masculinities" in Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman (eds), *Theorizing Masculinities* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), pp. 165-182.

[61] For example: Joanna Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[62] Paul Higate (ed.), *Military Masculinities: Identity and the State* (London: Praeger, 2003); Braudy, *From Chivalry to Terrorism*; Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann and John Tosh (eds), *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2004).

[63] Much of this work came out of the international network "Nations, Borders and Identities" and its Palgrave book series "War, Culture and Society, 1750-1850".

[64] J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975).

[65] Quoted in Mark Rapport, *The Napoleonic Wars: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013), p. 56.

[66] Higgins, *Nation of Politicians*; Stefan Dudink, "Masculinity, Effeminacy, Time: Conceptual Change in the Dutch Age of Revolutions," in Dudink et al (eds), *Masculinities in Politics and War*, pp. 77-95.

[67] McCormack, *Embodying the Militia*, pp. 24-25.

[68] Katrin Möbius and Sascha Möbius, *Prussian Army Soldiers in the Seven Years' War: The Psychology of War* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), ch. 4

[69] Braudy, *Chivalry to Terrorism*, p. 5.

[70] Boswell, *Life of Johnson*, vol. III p. 265.

[71] John Cockburn, *The History and Examination of Duels* (1720), p. 229.

[72] Harari, *Ultimate Experience*, p. 70.

[73] Forrest, *Napoleon's Men*, chapter 6; Brian Jones Martin, "Military Mates: From Revolutionary Fraternity to Napoleonic Intimacy in the Memoirs of Sergeant Faucher," *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies* 41:4 (2018): 543-44.

[74] Ann Kussmaul (ed.), *The Autobiography of Joseph Mayett of Quainton (1783-1839)* (Cambridge: Buckinghamshire Records Society, 1986), p. 30.

[75] Harari, *Ultimate Experience*, p. 169.

[76] Thomas Jackson, *Narrative of the Eventful Life of Thomas Jackson* (Birmingham, 1847), p. 76.

[77] Erica Charters, *Disease, War and the Imperial State: The Welfare of the British Armed Forces during the Seven Years War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).

[78] Matthew McCormack, "Tall Histories: Height and Georgian Masculinities," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 26 (2016): 79-101 (93).

[79] It is instructive to compare passages on musket drill in Duffy's *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (p. 98) with recent work on the histories of the body and material culture.