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Title: The license to hate: Peder Jensen’s fascist rhetoric in Anders Breivik’s Manifesto 2013: A European Declaration of Independence

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This article will examine the writings of one of the key voices who influenced Anders Breivik: Peder Jensen. Writing under the pen name Fjordman, Jensen has developed a range of writings, some of which have come to operate at the interface between Islamophobic populism and contemporary fascist terrorism. To explore this interface, this article will analyse the various writings by Jensen / Fjordman that Breivik himself reproduced in his manifesto 2083 A European Declaration of Independence. It will conclude that, while not directly instructing Breivik to carry out an act of terrorism, there is nevertheless a looser connection between Jensen’s rhetoric, which points towards violent action, and the behavior of others such as Breivik. It explores this link through the lens of ‘license’, a methodology developed by Aristotle Kallis. This approach allows the analysis to highlight that, beneath a veneer of more moderate anti-Muslim populism, the discourse Peder Jensen has written under the pen name Fjordman evokes many of the tropes of fascism, including: coded endorsement of ethnic nationalism, misogyny, conspiracy theories, a concern with profound cultural decadence, and a palingenetic discourse that idealizes revolution coming about through war.

The study of terrorism often gravitates around analyzing perpetrator figures, alongside those who actively guide them, and so these direct actors are rightly placed at the center of much academic investigation. Yet when it comes to issues such as motivation, the role of factors seen to have a more indirect impact on a terrorist operation are also important to discuss. In particular, the study of the voices that generate the underpinning ideological cultures, the worldviews, than help to incubate the rationale for terrorist campaigns, are of great importance too. The relationship between terrorists and their views is often under-explored, despite ideology’s crucial importance to the formation of perceived or actual communities of support that underpin the milieus that motivate terrorist perpetrators. What follows in this article is developed from the premise that terrorist violence needs to be made desirable before it can be carried out. Thus, whatever solo-actor or group-actor terrorists may do with a more prevalent ideological position being disseminated more widely, in order to reconfigure it into a set of arguments that explicitly justifies violence, it is crucial to understand the role of cultural frameworks that
give implicit license – a license to hate – that also contributes to violent actions. The discourses that make terrorist violence appear necessary, then, are crucial to map, yet this is also a field riddled with problematic issues.

With this theme of licensing forms of hatred in mind, this article will focus on the ideological writings created by just one of the Islamophobic ideologues found regularly cited within the pages of Anders Breivik’s manifesto, *2083 A European Declaration of Independence*. Peder Jensen, a.k.a. Fjordman. Indeed, crystallizing Breivik’s dedication to the ideas of Fjordman, the final essay by Fjordman reproduced in *2083 A European Declaration of Independence* is itself titled ‘A European Declaration of Independence’, which sets out the need for revolutionary action. For Breivik, the writings by Jensen, were crucial to giving his own terror campaign meaning. Indeed, Breivik singled him out for regular particular praise in his tome, and in total 112,735 words of the manifesto’s entire word count of 772,643 words comprise of articles by Jensen, using the Fjordman pen name. It is specifically these texts that will be analyzed by this article. Thus, this paper seeks to explore in detail the elements of Jensen’s discourse that Breivik found most relevant to rationalizing his actions. It will conclude that these articles conform to a typically fascist discourse that gravitates around tropes of heterophobia, extreme national purification and political revolution emerging from a period of warfare and crisis. Though they do not necessary directly promote terrorist violence of the type that Breivik subsequently carried out, the discourse certainly evokes a paranoid worldview, one that suggests an armed citizenry should overthrow corrupt national and international systems of governance. Other common features of what can be characterized as a fascist discourse also include conspiracies linked to ‘hidden’ historical forces, while also singling out scapegoat community that becomes the focus of emotive heterophobia. Examination of such themes will be crucial to understanding the cultural paradigms from which occasional acts of fascist terrorism, such as Breivik’s, emerge.

Moreover, more nuanced reflections on the issue of the ‘cultures of support’ that underpin terrorist violence of the type enacted by Breivik chimes with a ‘cultural turn’ underway within terrorism studies. This is marked by figures such as Roger Griffin and Mark Juergensmeyer, whose analysis is far less motivated by addressing questions regarding managing security risks, of the type more regularly posed by policy makers, and instead is more concerned with identifying the deep-seated cultural and ideological divers of action taken against those deemed ‘other’ by an extremist perspective. Before moving...
on to an analysis of Jensen’s writings that were reproduced in a central set of writings that clearly interface between the views of an ideologue who came to hold the role as a voice within a ‘community of support’ constructed by a terrorist – it is important to revisit a selection of the recent literature on the topic of fascist ideologies licensing political violence. In particular, the issue of constructions of heterophobia, and the myth of national purity, found within fascist discourses are crucial to identify. Therefore, this opening discussion will establish more fully the common tropes within the types of discourses likely to be cited by a violent actor as, in part, justifying fascist terrorism.

Anti-Islamic Heterophobia and the Fascist Mythology of Cleansing the Nation

Central to the milieus generated at the extreme fringes of all far right cultures is the notion that radical action is needed to purge and purify a national, or similarly ‘imagined’, discrete community. The elimination of the ‘other’, combined with the resurrection of the national community, lies at the core of the fascist project, and is steeped in mythic tropes. Highlighting this point, one leading model for analyzing the political dynamics of interwar fascism, developed by Michael Mann, stresses that fascism is defined by a particular form of Nation-Statism engaged with projects of ‘cleansing’. Therefore, fascism is essentially a type of politics based on a binary juxtaposing radically ‘imagined’ and ‘pure’ national communities that are seen as suffering at the hands of a seemingly alien force, specifically to the point that the imagined community is facing an extreme existential threat. Consequently, fascists see this external, existential threat as needing eradication before the safety of the national community can be secured. Thus, fascist politics is the act of formulating action that will cleanse the nation state. Via writings, party campaigning, or indeed violence, this is a feature that lies at the core of all fascist ideologies, and historically such groups have found broader social support by engaging with commonly held prejudices. For Mann, para-militarism is also a core definitely feature of fascism, though this is a more contentious point. What do we do when it comes to people who promote such ideas, but are, for example, merely sitting at computers when doing so? Arguably one does not have to be engaged in paramilitary activity to be classified as a fascist.

This theme of ‘cleansing’ also raises further questions regarding how the fascist ‘other’ is constructed. While some of the most evocative, historical forms of such fascist scapegoating revolve around a clearly racially-defined ‘other’, such as Nazism’s biological...
construction of Jewishness, more contemporary fascists’ concern with ‘purification’ can no longer be seen through the lens of such straightforward, biological racism. In some ways at least, fascism’s contemporary discourses have become more nuanced, and now even claim to reject the crass biological racism typical of Nazism. Nevertheless, we should remember the notion of ‘race’ at the core of such forms of interwar, fascist racism was always a slippery concept, at once scientific (or at least pseudo-biological), while also developed via a variety of myopic tropes surrounding ideas promoting cultural homogeneity. Thus, interwar racial nationalists offered their adherents socially constructed identities such as ‘the Aryan race’ that claimed to present clear cultural characteristics, especially when juxtaposed with a racially defined colonial, or especially Jewish, ‘other’, but were ultimately imagined cultural creations.

As the postwar era has progressed, especially via the influence of the New Right thinking of figures such as Alain de Benoist and his attempted to invert of ‘racism’ through the discourse of differentialism (which even styles those promoting multiculturalism as the true racists), the notion of ‘fascist racism’ has become ever more nebulous and problematic to define. The turn to a distinct anti-Muslim, or Islamophobic, rhetoric in recent times, one directed far more at the cultural forms found within Islamic communities, has added a further layer of complexity. Nevertheless, as we will see in the case of Jensen’s writings, the modern, fascist evocations of a primarily culturally, rather than a racially, defined ‘other’ will often use such rhetorical mechanisms to legitimize what are ultimately rather conventional, ethno-nationalist prejudices, once again juxtaposing a white community with a non-white ‘other’. The remainder of this article will use the more embracing term of ‘heterophobia’, literally a fear of the ‘other’, to help sidestep some of the terminological problems with ‘race’. Heterophobia offers a more straightforward, generic concept for categorising the variety of prejudices (both racial and cultural) presented by the historical and contemporary fascists, and wider far right milieus, to evoke an anxiety inducing ‘other’, and a ‘war of identities’.

Indeed, this concern with a quest for racial and cultural purity, and the inevitable promotion of heterophobia that gravitates fears around an anxiety-inducing ‘other’, seen as posing an existential threat, is a recurrent feature of contemporary fascist, and wider far right, politics too. For such protagonists, political action revolves around opposition to this ‘other’. So whereas interwar extremists, such as the Nazis, focused their ire on racist constructions of Jews as the binary opposite of the idealized Aryan, the contemporary far right milieus achieve a broadly similar politics by juxtaposing themes of
national purity and heterophobia. However, these contemporary far right milieus they operate within, often now do so by evoking narratives that contrast a selectively ‘liberal’ Europe with an archaic, anachronistic-seeming invasion from crusading Islam. Employing a variety of stereotypes and clichés, which will be explored further below via the emblematic example of Jensen’s writings, this new ‘other’ is presented by contributors to this discourse as having an unsettling, uncanny presence in modern, secularized – though still distinctly culturally Christian, or sometimes Judeo-Christian – Europe. In such texts, it is assumed to be a point of common agreement between the author and the reader that Muslims are out of place, and at least implicitly suggest the ideal of such communities being removed.

This is an assumption has found a wide variety of outlets. Indeed, given the prevalence of such anti-Muslim messages, we can see that the overall ‘culture of support’ for the extremists such as Breivik is both multiple and diverse. This feature also helps explain why we can see a diverse range of figures being cited by Breivik in *2083 A European Declaration of Independence* – which even includes figures such as current British Member of Parliament Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove. While such anti-Muslim milieus can be located in populist media coverage, and the political mainstream too, this discourse finds more radical articulation in the words of neo-populist politicians, who regularly engage in a more radical politics grounded in breaking taboos to gain media attention. Examples of more populist political voices here include figures such as Geert Wilders, a now high-profile Dutch personality who promotes anti-Muslim messages via films such as *Fitna*. Nevertheless, these far right politicians are not fascists. Wilders, for example, clearly lacks the revolutionary drive found within either the interwar fascist movements, or the more extreme fringes of the postwar neo-Nazi movement. It is only outside such political party structures, which are constrained by attempts to achieve a level of public credibility, that one can locate more clearly fascist strains of the anti-Muslim heterophobic discourse.

How do we characterize these differences? This is a complex question. One approach to drawing a distinction between the more socially acceptable messages of far right populism, and the more extremist messages of fascism, is a focus on the arguments such figures develop to achieve political change. Fascism can be identified when we see such discourses employing a revolutionary, or palingenetic, framework for describing the processes of political change. Indeed, following the interventions of Roger Griffin regarding the definition of fascism, we can note that the myth of palingenesis, or societal...
rebirth, lies at the core of fascist political projects.\textsuperscript{16} Such a mythic, revolutionary dynamic frames the present as a liminal era, explicitly rejects extant political structures, and calls for their recasting in fundamentally new forms, in order to create a purified, utopian era for the nation-state. One online space where such palingenetic views have become articulated is the website Gates of Vienna.\textsuperscript{17} This is an online environment where Jensen published his own writings, and is a space that also became crucial to the radicalization of Anders Breivik. Indeed, in 2083: \textit{A European Declaration of Independence} Breivik even stresses that one can see its output as offering a new school of contemporary nationalist thinking, the ‘Vienna School’ (not to be confused with other usages of this term).\textsuperscript{18} So while in more mainstream contexts, the contemporary far right tends to curtail engagement with a revolutionary rhetoric, one finds in such locations a far less guarded style of discourse, and even a new register for fascist heterophobia.

Finally, what are we to make of the connection between fascist texts steeped in heterophobia and the promotion of violence? This is a question addressed by another contributor to this special issue, Aristotle Kallis. Here and elsewhere, Kallis sees this issue in terms of ideologies specifically providing their adherents with a license to entertain extremist perspectives that are otherwise seen as taboo by the surrounding cultural environment.\textsuperscript{19} Whether intentionally or otherwise, they help to raise desires that, at least implicitly, point towards violent activities, while also operating in a manner that removes moral objections towards committing violence in certain circumstances. So the appeal of fascist ideologies, usually only to a susceptible relative few, is their ability to give ‘license’ firstly to hatred before, in certain extreme and contingent conditions, also giving ‘license’ to carry out violence too. In the most extreme circumstances, this may include murder or even genocide. (Indeed, Kallis’s own concern with this question originated with the historical and political milieus that enabled genocides to break out in Europe during the Second World War,\textsuperscript{20} though his approach has a wider application too.)

While the realm of the mass participatory political violence that characterizes genocide is not currently on the agenda in contemporary Europe, there is a trend towards more localized pockets of political violence that are being ‘licensed’ by fascist heterophobia, epitomized by Breivik himself. Although the discourses found on online spaces such as Gates of Vienna are not the only factor for understanding the psychology and motivation for terrorist praxis, the authors of such sites are certainly an important component of the milieu that incubates political violence. As we will see, the discourses
found in such locations are steeped in a heterophobia that offer diagnoses of recent events that evoke a profound sense of crisis in the present, while also projecting fantasies of the future where the notion of the ‘other’ no longer exists as a threat, and so society has been purified. So although they often leave the key question of how precisely to get from one state of affairs to the other to the reader’s imagination, their radicalising function is relatively clear.

With these themes of fascist heterophobia, and its quest for national purity, in mind, we can now address the core research question of this article: how clearly do Peder Jensen’s essays, written under the pen name Fjordman, and which Breivik chose to reprint in his manifesto 2083 A European Declaration of Independence, develop core tropes of a fascist discourse that promotes heterophobia, a license to hate, and a vision of national purity achieved through revolutionary war?

Bat Ye’Or and Eurabia

In total, 37 articles written by Jensen were included in 2083 A European Declaration of Independence, which (including references) make up just over 14.5% of its total word count. The initial two of these essays, interspersed throughout the document, engage with failings in western education, while also critiquing Islamic scholars, and their scientific achievements in particular.21 Moreover, the theme of wealthy Arab Muslims funding projects within European universities is discussed in several places, especially in these early essays.22 Such arguments tend to gravitate around a core point claiming that mainstream education institutions in Europe has been corrupted by such financial influences, and are not to be trusted. With these arguments in mind, the historicising of Jensen’s radical worldview where the mainstream is not to be trusted was developed in the third, and most lengthy, essay of the entire collection, ‘EU’s Eurabia Project (The Eurabia Code) – Documenting EU’s deliberate strategy to Islamise Europe’. The allusion to ‘The Eurabia Code’ in the title is a nod to Dan Brown’s trashy conspiracy thriller The Da Vinci Code, and Jensen sought set out a similar world of hidden forces, although according to him this one was not fictional. Notably, in the two previous essays he has praised figures such as Bat Ye’or, highlighting such writers as independently minded scholars whose work was superior to corrupted university-based academics. Following on from this, Ye’or’s volume Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis is discussed at some length, a perspective embraced wholeheartedly by both Jensen and later Breivik too.
Central to Ye’or’s Eurabian conspiracy theory is the trope of styling the European Union as a corrupt institution working against the interests of European people. More specifically, it presents the EU as engaged in a hidden campaign to destroy national sovereignty in Europe, and, in particular, allowing the continent to be overtaken by global Muslim interests. Essentially, the narrative stresses that France has historically been at the center of the European Union project, and has acted as a Trojan horse for primarily Arab Muslim interests. Indeed, Jensen positively passes on Ye’or’s own stress on France’s history of pro-Arab relations. This, he continues, can be documented from Napoleon onwards (one of Napoleon’s generals is cited as converting to Islam), and so France is presented in Jensen’s assessment of the Eurabia thesis as essentially pro-Muslim. The central, recent figure here promoting such an agenda was Charles de Gaulle. By pursuing his anti-American foreign policy during the Cold War, Jensen stresses that, from 1967, De Gaulle initiated a foreign agenda that placed courting the Arab world at its core. This strategy was further accentuated during the 1973 oil crisis, and this period also saw the formation of key institutions of the Eurabia conspiracy, especially Europe Arab Dialogue.

Subsequently, other groups augmented the work of this organization, such as the European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation. Such groupings fostered informal links between European and ‘Mediterranean’ (for him, code for the Arab world) politicians, which placed the free movement of both goods and people at its heart. This ideal, in turn, led to a new wave of Muslim migration entering Europe, while Europe’s political elite’s role within the dynamic became one of passive acceptance of Islamic dominance. Having been allowed to develop influence in Europe, the situation had now reached a crisis point. As Jensen put this:

The new European civilisation in the making can correctly be termed a “civilisation of dhimmitude.” The word dhimmitude comes from the Koranic word “dhimmi.” It refers to the subjugated, non-Muslim individuals who accept restrictive and humiliating subordination to Islamic power in order to avoid enslavement or death. The entire Muslim world as we know it today is a product of this 1,300 year-old jihad dynamic, whereby once thriving non-Muslim majority civilisations have been reduced to a state of dysfunction and dhimmitude. The dhimmis are inferior beings who endure humiliation and aggression in silence.
This arrangement allows Muslims to enjoy an impunity that increases both their hatred and their feeling of superiority, under the protection of the law. From such polemical statements, Jensen sets out his typically extreme presentation of the existential threat allegedly posed by this all-powerful Islamic force, unleashed by De Gaulle, and all subsequent pro-European political leaders, in a bid to promote a pro-Arab European foreign policy.

The idea that France lies at the center of the Eurabian conspiracy is also solidified through some further, specious analysis of postwar French society. Strikingly, the riots of 2005 are cited as an example of France being held hostage by its new Muslim immigrant population. Indeed, France’s Muslim communities are characterized as growing exponentially, to the point that the country is on the cusp of civil war. The hysteria reaches truly extreme proportions when discussing the issue of France’s nuclear weapons in relation to this topic: ‘Above all who will inherit the hundreds of nuclear warheads? Will these weapons fall into the hands of Jihadist Muslims too?’ Finally, the commentary develops a document often discussed in such conspiracy circles, ‘The Project’, which similar Islamophobic writers, such as Sylvian Besson and Patrick Poole, have also written about online too. In many ways, this document acts in a similar manner to the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion for anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. ‘The Project’ is presented as a hidden ‘blueprint’ of the conspiracy, the tip of the iceberg. Here, ‘The Project’ is a plot being put into action by the Muslim Brotherhood, and places at its core a plan to take control of the world for the benefit of Muslims. This is taken as proof that all Muslims are in some way engaged in such a project. Moreover, according to Jensen, its core points are: to develop a long-term cultural invasion of Europe; place Muslim voices in key institutions of power in Europe; create new networks and alliances to promote the strategy of infiltration; and to use the media an education systems to deceive Europeans as to the true purpose of Muslims in contemporary Europe.

Building on such paranoia, a follow-on essay, ‘The Eurabia Code – 2008 Update’, advances further the rhetoric of Europe at war. Indeed, here Jensen discusses the theme that the European Union represents the formation of an empire, and adds:

It would make sense to remember that all empires in history have been created through war. If the EU is an empire, this means that a war is being waged against somebody. And it is: A cultural and demographic war waged by mass immigration.
against native Europeans. Whereas empires are normally created by waging a war against other peoples, the EU is the first empire in history created by leaders allowing other peoples to wage a war against their own.26

So, what we find neatly expressed in this quote is the typical elision of warfare, battles being fought on a cultural front (hence actual fighting is not visible), and an articulation of corruption so elemental that political leaders are betraying their people to the point of enacting war against them. One implication from such a diagnosis is that mainstream politics is not a viable option any more, and that more radical solutions are needed, issues we will examine later in the article.

Heterophobia: The Construction of Muslim

At the core of the Jensen worldview and the Eurabian conspiracy theory, then, is the idea of Muslims as invaders of Europe – a broadly similar theme to those developed earlier racial fascists, such as Nazis, who saw Jews as incompatible with an authentic Aryan race. Of course, the argument stresses that Islam represents a totalitarian political force, and wants to impose a profoundly anti-liberal form of Sharia Law. Such distortions are replete throughout his articles. Moreover, though Jensen’s essays do not actively steep themselves in a language employing openly pejorative terms of racial abuse to demark European identity, it is noticeable that the construction of the Muslim ‘other’ is still grounded in a language that uses the notion of white identity to evoke the binary opposite of a Muslim identity. Indeed, a later essay, ‘What Do We Fight For’ begins with a discussion on the attacks faced by white people from Muslim migrants which crystallizing this notion:

I have tried to contribute to a new vocabulary by coining the word ‘Caucasophobia’ for anti-white racism, and have suggested the term ‘self-termination’ for organised Western self-loathing and the Western policy of unilaterally dismantling our own culture. Both terms are OK, but if somebody can come up with something better and more catchy, I’m all ears.27

So here as elsewhere a notable language of ‘whiteness’ is employed to construct the community that Jensen seeks to identify himself with. The exclusion of, say, non-Muslim black people from ‘Caucasophobia’ is implicit, and so such a discourse can hardly make
claims to be inclusive of all racial categories when it privileges a Caucasian profiles above all others. Elsewhere too, there is slippage into a discourse on whiteness as a racial concept, though the focus again is eliding non-white threats with Muslims specifically.

To take another example, when discussing the emotive topic of rapes by Muslims on non-Muslims, he typically phrases his comments as follows:

The massive wave of violence and especially rapes in Western cities now is a form of warfare against whites, and it’s about time it is recognised as such.28

Meanwhile, on the issue of non-Muslims becoming engaged in violent action against Muslims, we find he is dismissive of the phenomenon. Moreover, again he reverts to a language of whiteness and non-whiteness as a way to develop his point. For example, in one discussion, surveying some cases of white people in his opinion being treated unfairly by authorities after being attacked or abused by Muslims, he, somewhat contentiously, stresses:

… as throughout the Western world, white-on-non-white violence is exceedingly rare. The vast majority of racism and racist violence comes from non-whites against whites, or between different groups of non-whites.29

So we should be aware of this white / non-white binary operating within his discourse on European as opposed to Muslim identities. The focus of this heterophobic language towards non-whiteness is directly with reference to Muslims as non-whites, as opposed to other non-white identities, but his views are nevertheless ultimately underpinned by a sense of ‘ethno-differentialist’ racism.

Turning to the way in which Jensen’s understanding of how to solve the issues allegedly posed by Muslims is discussed, he is clear regarding how policies across Europe need to be radically revised:

The best way to deal with the Islamic world is to have as little to do with it as possible. We should ban Muslim immigration. This could be done in creative and indirect ways, such as banning immigration from nations with citizens known to be engaged in terrorist activities. We should remove all Muslim non-citizens currently in the West. We should also change our laws to ensure that Muslim citizens who
advocate sharia, preach Jihad, the inequality of ‘infidels’ and of women should have their citizenship revoked and be deported back to their country of origin.  

This again chimes with a long tradition in fascist discourses of imagining the elimination of the ‘other’. Such views, when rarely put into action, typically lead to ethnic cleansing and even genocide, guided by an imagined ideal of achieving racial or ethnic purity for the imagined community. Indeed, when we are considering Jensen’s text through a lens of offering a license to hate, recognizing his need to mark Muslims out as one worthy of such extreme persecution and removal from society, to the point of mass expulsion from the continent, is a crucial component of the discourse to document. Essentially, as with earlier fascists, the fantasy is one whereby a mythic sense of national purity can only be achieved if Muslims are no longer present.

In order to more clearly legitimize this viewpoint, Jensen needs to raise emotive connotations that style the ‘other’ as uniquely threatening. With the contemporary far right discourses that demonize Muslims, the topic of rape has become particularly prevalent, and, as we have already seen, is one that is often utilized by Jensen too. This subject plays at elemental fears that are raised by the subject of sexual crime, implies a level of sexual deviance within the Muslim perpetrators of rapes that is used to generalize about the essence of Islam, and finally raises a trope within fascist politics that presents the dangerous ‘other’ as particularly underhand as it attacks the most vulnerable, in this case innocent women.  

So when developing this notion that Muslims are essentially sexual criminals, the opening paragraph of ‘What Does Muslim Immigration Cost Europe?’ is again worth citing at length to convey the manner in which this extremist rhetoric is deployed:

Do gang rapes boost GDP? Was that an offensive question, you say? Well, according to Sweden’s finance minister Pär Nuder, more immigrants should be allowed into Sweden in order to safeguard the welfare system. However, in reality estimates indicate that immigration costs Sweden at least 40 to 50 billion Swedish kroner every year, probably several hundred billions, and has greatly contributed to bringing the Swedish welfare state to the brink of bankruptcy.

The above anti-Muslim language clearly elides the issue of Muslim immigration with a rise in violent, sexual crime (he goes on to clarify that he is primarily talking about
migrants from ‘Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia’ when he discusses ‘gang rapes’). Jensen also links this threat to failures within the political mainstream, and a crisis for the welfare state. Aside from sexual crimes, the specter of terrorism is also contained within the dynamic here too, again linked to a critique of the welfare state. For example, this particular essay goes on to develop the idea of Muslim migrant communities having a high propensity not only to create black markets that hamper the national economy, but it also states that Muslims have a propensity to draw disproportionately heavily on welfare spending. They then use this as an income stream to fund terrorist activities. Thus, in the course of one essay, we are told that Europe’s welfare states are allowing Muslims to come to Europe, carry out criminal activities including sexual attacks, and even fund a violent political project.

It is important to comment on the starkness of Jensen’s characterizing of all Muslims as essentially the same. There is no opportunity in his framework for Muslims to be understood as anything other than people either engaged in or supporting extremism; Jensen leaves no option for any ambiguity or nuance. The essay ‘Why We Cannot Rely on Moderate Muslims’ most clearly sets out the rationale for seeing all Muslims as a single threat. The underlying trope here is the claim that moderate Muslims are being directed by extremist agendas, yet are hiding this from public view. Jensen cites an argument made by Robert Spencer claiming that Al-Qaeda recommends that Muslims appear as secular in order to blend in with their surroundings. So more secularized, integrated Muslims are not above suspicion. Elsewhere in the essay, he suggests such strategies of fighting a-symmetrical warfare is even encoded within the theology of Islam. He cites the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah as an example where Mohammed signed an agreement that bought him time to regroup and strengthen his support base. For Jensen, this has now become a standard tactic used by Muslims, and, apparently, can be found in the Israel-Palestine conflict too, with Palestinians biding their time until they are strong enough to launch an attack upon Israel. So though ‘moderate Muslims’ may appear to adopt secular attitudes, really they are engaged in the underhand deception of taqiya, justification for taking warfare underground and into civilian spaces. Moreover, the idea that moderates pursuing peaceful coexistence, while others carry out terrorist attacks, is common conspiratorial practice in the Muslim advances being made in Europe. As he puts it:

Every act of terrorism, or Jihad as it really is, is seen as an opportunity to push
even greater demands. Radical Muslims and moderate Muslims are allies, not
adversaries. The radicals bomb, and the moderates issue veiled threats that ‘unless
we get our will, more such attacks will ensue.’ It’s a good cop, bad cop game.

It is true that Jihad is not exclusively about violence, but it is very much
about the constant threat of violence. Just like you don’t need to beat a donkey all
the time to make it go where you want it to, Muslims don’t have to hit non-
Muslims continuously. They bomb or kill every now and then, to make sure that
the infidels are always properly submissive and know who’s boss.35

Elsewhere too, we find more general articulations of the heterophobic fear of
cultural difference and plurality. Indeed, Jensen is very clear that European cultures are
becoming too diverse, and so the correct path to regeneration is for a return to cultural
purity. In opposition to multicultural agendas, he stresses Europeans need to end
the nonsense of ‘celebrating our differences.’ We should be celebrating our
sameness and what binds us together. We should clean up our history books and
school curricula, which have been infected with anti-Western sentiments.36

On this topic, it is also important to highlight the way in which Christianity is also
evoked in order to help construct the Muslim ‘other’ too. Jensen self-identifies as lacking
in religious faith, and so is pro-secularization. However, he is keen to draw a distinction
between Christianity and Judaism, which are ‘European’ religions, and Islam, which is
not. He presents himself as a defender of the first two, as they both allow for separation
between church and state. Islam offers no such separation, and so is styled as a threat to
a secularist such as himself. Moreover, Jensen stresses that, unlike him, multiculturalists
are actually against Christianity and Judaism. As he puts it: ‘The First Commandment of
Multiculturalism is: Thou shalt hate Christianity and Judaism’. Indeed, those promoting
multiculturalism are only interested in promoting Islam, according to Jensen. He also
views as pro-Muslim propaganda any analysis that presents Islam as a part of European
history and identity. So while Christianity and Judaism can claim such a European
heritage, Islam cannot.37

Finally, despite his support for religion, Jensen is ambivalent regarding the political
role of churches in the present, especially if they promote ideas that cut against his stark
anti-Muslim agenda:
Christians need to understand that there can be no peace or understanding with the Islamic world. They want to subdue us, pure and simple. Church leaders of all denominations, Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, must stop stabbing Israel in the back and campaigning for a de facto open borders policy while Muslims are threatening to swamp our lands. Yes, Christianity teaches compassion, but it also teaches identifying evil and standing up to it. At the end of the day, the Church must decide whether, in the defence of civilisation, it wants to be a part of the problem or a part of the solution.  

In sum, religion offers a vital way of constructing a cultural identity for Jensen, though his ideology is not steeped in an actively pro-religious perspective. Moreover, there is even an embrace of Judaism, a feature that marks him out from earlier trends in anti-Semitic fascism. This distancing from Nazism and anti-Semitism is a theme developed elsewhere in these writings too. We can also note that when Nazism is regularly and openly rejected it is because it is a radical form of left-wing politics. Finally, he even suggests that Muslims were responsible for legitimizing the Nazi Holocaust as Muslims had previously carried out the Armenian genocide that had inspired Hitler to carry out his genocide.

Gender and welfare
Within Jensen’s discourse of anti-Muslim heterophobia is a trope that, ostensibly, defends women, or at least non-Muslim women. In these essays, Islam is framed as a religion that oppresses women; thus, destroying the impact of Islam in Europe will benefit the continent’s women. So on one level there is a curious embrace of feminist-style rhetorical strategy here: white Europeans are presented as defenders of modern values, including rights for women, while the Muslim ‘other’ is framed as a threat to the modern, liberated, ‘European’ woman. Yet beneath this framing of the anti-Muslim agenda, one finds a potent, deeply misogynistic tenor within Jensen’s discourse. This is very revealing of his defense of western women’s rights in reality being a superficial attack on Islam as ‘non-European’, and certainly has nothing to do with feminism per se.

Indeed, one finds in his discussions on gender, and welfare more generally, that Jensen is strikingly orthodox in his fascist rhetoric: he not only views masculinity as falling into a state of crisis and decadence, but he also sees a need for restrictions on
European women in the workplace, especially if the ostensible demographic threat posed by high Muslim rates of reproduction is to be countered. Essentially, his central contention is that postwar feminism has been detrimental to European culture. It has empowered women, but opened them up to exploitation too, especially by a new wave of Muslim men. Being dominated is a quality that women have a greater susceptibility to than men, so they are particularly vulnerable to the Muslim male. Indeed, at one point he even suggests that women secretly want to be dominated by Sharia Law ‘because they feel attracted to subservience and subjugation.’ Moreover, feminism has also helped the alleged Muslim invasion of Europe in another way. While European men have accepted the liberation of European women as a result of feminism, this has only weakened the power of European masculinity, leaving Europe vulnerable to attack. As he strikingly frames the issue:

The truth is that any nation is always protected from external aggression by the men. The women can play a supporting role in this, but never more than that. For all the talk about ‘girl power’ and ‘women kicking ass’ which you see on movies these days, if the men of your ‘tribe’ are too weak or demoralised to protect you, you will be enslaved and crushed by the men from other ‘tribes’ before you can say ‘Vagina Monologues’. Which means that if you break down men’s masculinity, their willingness and ability to defend themselves and their families, you destroy the country. That’s exactly what Western women have done for the last forty years.

As elsewhere in these essays by Jensen, the western education system, especially its universities, are blamed for promoting feminism, alongside other forms of political correctness that are crippling European masculinity. Moreover, the broad intellectual movement of feminism is reductively framed as a monolithic, ‘totalitarian’ ideology.

The impact of feminism is also linked to the emergent role of the welfare state in postwar European societies too, and again this is seen negatively. We have already noted that Jensen views the welfare state as a phenomenon that Muslims actively exploit to fund terrorism. But elsewhere too we see that Jensen views the welfare state a temporary phenomenon emerging in order to pick up the various caring roles that were previously carried out by women, needed now women seek employment. Unsurprisingly, perhaps,
Jen
sen also wants to see the welfare state, at least as we currently understand it, abolished. Nevertheless, he also outlines a need to develop new welfare policies that seem to employ aspects of positive eugenics, to ensure that more white European women have children. This includes offering superior-quality state housing to families with three or more children, and encouraging women to have children before the age of 30 before fertility declines.

More fundamentally still, in another essay on this theme, ‘The Fatherless Civilization’, Jensen discusses many of these topics again, yet here stresses that the modern world has created an infantilized culture, one where people return to childhood by being provided for by others. This creates not just a culture obsessed with youth but with adolescent irresponsibility. Many people live in a constant state of rebellion against not just their parents but their nation, their culture and their civilisation.41

Note here that the trope specifically of the nation in decline, a process needing to be overturned, is one of Jensen’s crucial categories for restoring a healthy European order. Indeed, though he sees the issues raised as a pan-European phenomenon, he is a staunch defender of the idea of the nation state, as we will see below. Moreover, he stresses that a new era of masculine authority is needed to combat this impact of feminism and welfare policies across Europe. If not, then the continent faces a crisis as the current situation isn’t sustainable. The absence of fatherhood has created a society full of social pathologies, and the lack of male self-confidence has made us easy prey for our enemies. If the West is to survive, we need to reassert a healthy dose of male authority.42

Thus, male authority has fallen into decline, while empowering women has weakened Europe’s resilience to invasion too. In reply, he suggests strengthening male power in Europe, from the family unit upwards.

Defending National Borders and the Failure of Democracy

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As we can see, then, the tenor of Jensen’s writings is designed to evoke the theme of Europe falling into an era of elemental decline, one that needs radical action in order to reverse such looming crises. In the essay ‘Democracy Not Working’, Jensen again alludes to this, and also begins to offer more detail on his critique of modern European political structures – which, as we have already seen elsewhere, he regards as being corrupted by Muslim influences. His wider criticisms of democracy includes points such as democratic systems tend to place short-term issues ahead of long-term strategic decision-making. However, his core, critical point is again around styling the present as becoming an era of crisis and potential transition. As he puts it, democracies rely on a sense of the demos, that is a body of people with a shared identity, to function. However, in a typical far right critique of globalization breaking down the authority of the nation state, he stresses that:

What we are witnessing now is the gradual breakdown of this demos, starting from the top down. Powerful groups frequently have more in common with the elites in other countries than they have with the average citizen in their own. If you no longer believe in your nation as a real entity with a specific culture, it simply becomes a tool for obtaining power, a stepping stone for your global career. Without a pre-political loyalty, emotional ties or even a pragmatic interest in supporting nation states, the democratic system becomes a vehicle for distributing favors to your friends at home and abroad, for fleecing the voters while in power and hopefully ensuring a lucrative international career along the way. You will have few moral inhibitions against importing voters from abroad for maintaining power or because your business buddies who give you financial support desire it.

Indeed, the interrelated issue of strengthening national borders, and maintaining national cultures, is of crucial importance to Jensen. For example, we also see that he is regularly critical of neo-liberal free market positions that promote economic arguments above all others. He stresses these viewpoints include regular reference to what he dubs ‘the big lie’, namely that immigrants are good for national economies.

Moreover, he stresses that, in the globalized age, the notion of protecting borders has become a testing point for politicians. If they fail in this duty, then the social contract is broken and elected politicians no longer have political legitimacy. As he puts it:
Upholding national borders has become more important in the age of globalisation, not less. We need to reclaim control over our borders and reject any organisation, either the EU, the UN, various human rights groups or others who prevent us from doing this. We must remind our political leaders that we pay national taxes because they are supposed to uphold our national borders. If they can’t do so, the social contract is breached, and we should no longer be required to pay our taxes.44

Again, such assertions setting out the need to protect the nation state in the face of globalizing forces echo with wider patterns in fascist discourses which have historically been focused on decrying international forces that are ostensibly threatening national identity. Furthermore, in the essay ‘What Do We Fight For?’ Jensen evokes the notion of Europe entering into elemental decline by stressing that the continent is moving from a civilization of rationalism, to one dictated by emotion and sentimentality. He even singles out the intellectual trend of deconstruction, associated with the work of Jacques Derrida, as a further marker of the shift to cultural, and especially intellectual, decadence.45

Another such essay setting out the core aims of his political cause, ‘Recommendations for the West – 2’, Jensen similarly stresses that Europeans of the twenty-first century essentially lack ‘cultural confidence’, and are ‘engaged in an internal struggle over the very meaning of Western civilisation’.46 He also summarizes the core points that figures such as himself are fighting for as follows: national sovereignty; the right to protect national cultures and pass this to future generations; and to prevent the nation state from being undermined by ‘Leftist Utopians, unaccountable NGOs, transnational progressives or self-appointed guardians of the truth’.47 So clearly he has a political cause too, but how can we categorize this?

‘Survivalism’, War and Palingenesis

From the above, we can already characterize Jensen’s perspective as a very radical form of far right politics. It promotes an existential conflict based on the theme nationalism in crisis, and Europe as a whole needing to undergo a cultural ‘purification’. Moreover, the ‘other’ that needs to be ‘purged’ to achieve this is Europe’s Muslim communities, though left wing politicians and those promoting multiculturalism come in for regular criticism too. We have also seen that his politics can also be categorized as anti-democratic, misogynistic, and pro-white, and so clearly this is a racist discourse too. But is Jensen
fascist? To fit into such a category, we need to find evidence that he promotes political
revolution.48

Curiously, even over the course of these selected texts, Jensen states that his views
on the mechanisms for achieving the political changes he desires have altered, and
hardened, over time. He stresses that initially he believed a reformist position could
effect results, but has come to the conclusion that more fundamental change is now
required to fend off Europe’s current threats. As he stresses:

When I first started writing as Fjordman I focused on how to ‘fix the system.’ I’ve
gradually come to the conclusion that the system cannot be fixed. Not only does it
have too many enemies; it also contains too many internal contradictions. If we
define the ‘system’ as mass immigration from alien cultures, Globalism,
multiculturalism and suppression of free speech in the name of ‘tolerance,’ then
this is going to collapse. It’s inevitable.49

In response to such a position, the pathway offered by engaging with the political
mainstream is presented as no longer an option for achieving political change. This leads
him to present the need for some radical reassertions of authority by the people. For
example:

How should we respond to the threats our civilisation is facing? First of all,
ordinary citizens should arm themselves immediately since crime and violence is
spreading fast throughout the Western world. Second, we need to reclaim pride in
our heritage, which has been systematically taken away from us in recent
generations, and restore a proper teaching of this in our education system. We
should assume that the mass media and our leaders are not telling us the full truth
about the scale and consequences of Muslim immigration.50

We can ask: do such statements promote terrorist violence? The text here is ambiguous.
Armed citizens and a paranoid outlook are the markers of a turn to terrorism, but clearly
there are limits to what he is saying here too. Jensen is advocating a selective embrace of
such an armed strategy, to defend oneself, not an all out terrorist campaign. This sort of
discourse may be read as a loose endorsement setting out a need for solo-actor or cell
structure political violence, but it is far from clear on this point. This is not the same type
of language as one finds, say, in neo-Nazi terrorist literature such as Louis Beam’s *Leaderless Resistance* or Max Hammer’s *Blood and Honour Field Manual.*

Yet evoking broadly similar themes to such neo-Nazi political extremists, he also labels himself a ‘survivalist’. In the essay ‘The Strategy of Western Survivalists’ Jensen also sets out the reasons underpinning this logic too. He argues:

> The goal of Western survivalists — and that’s what we are — should not be to ‘fix the system,’ but to be mentally and physically prepared for its collapse, and to develop coherent answers to what went wrong and prepare to implement the necessary remedies when the time comes. We need to seize the window of opportunity, and in order to do so, we need to define clearly what we want to achieve.

> What, exactly, is Western civilisation? What went wrong with it, and how can we survive and regenerate as a vulnerable minority in an increasingly hostile world?

So when we find Jensen writing in this sort of register, one clearly detached from reformist agendas and viewing the present through the lens of an elemental transition, his discourse does express the fascist myth of revolution, or palingenesis, as described in Griffin’s work on defining fascist ideologies in particular. Moreover, as part of this mythmaking, although the trope of some form of grand transition to a new era inevitably evokes a fearful scenario, Jensen is also keen to stress that the present crisis is also a momentous opportunity to those radical enough to seize the challenge. Coming closer to the moment of crisis is also coming closer to the emergence of a new era. Indeed, though he styles its powers as immense, he does not project into the future the inevitable triumph of the Eurabian project. Rather, he suggests that we are witnessing the end of what he dubs the ‘Eurabian Union’, and that, just as the Eastern Bloc came to an end following the fall of the Berlin Wall, so multicultural Europe is coming to an end too. Elsewhere too, we find him make a similar elisions between the fall of the USSR and a projected fall of the EU with his use of the term ‘the EUSSR’, used to suggest that the two are akin, and that the EU is doomed in a similar way to the USSR was by the 1980s.

Yet although he views history as being on his side, as we have already seen, this process of transition is also one that will be marked by a new era of warfare, a point he is
keen to warn his readers of. As Jensen states: ‘will dub it the Multicultural World War. Just as WW1 was caused by Imperialism, WW2 by Fascism and the Cold War by Communism, this one will be caused by multiculturalism.’ He continues this evocation of the present as a time when a world war is in the process of breaking out in the essay ‘From the Death of Multiculturalism’. Here he stresses:

A Multicultural society is only temporary. Sooner or later, we will return to a new mono-cultural society. This will happen either through the division of the previously coherent territory into new, mono-cultural enclaves or through the takeover by society as a whole of the most forceful and aggressive of these competing cultures.

My personal view is that the Jihad riots in France in 2005 could be interpreted as the early stages of a civil war, one of several Eurabian civil wars to come.

In other words, form major world conflict a new order will eventually emerge. We can take from such statements, styling the present as a liminal period between two discrete eras, that Jensen’s writings are a discourse operating in a fascist, revolutionary mode. The purging of the Muslim ‘other’ lies at the core of the purpose of this fascist revolution, while the reborn European civilization he foresees would restore a true sense of freedom, alongside masculine virtues, that would eliminate the other pollution he decries too: left-wing, multicultural and feminist values.

Conclusions
To conclude then, Peder Jensen was clearly highly influential on Breivik’s own worldview. Both embraced a new form of Islamophobic fascism, though the actions derived from this belief were different. Jensen chose to blog, while Breivik chose to carry out an act of terrorist violence. Moreover, Breivik found Jensen’s writings useful to him, and in particular saw common ground in identifying an existential threat posed by Muslims, and, as with Jensen, Breivik saw a process on invasion underway that could be styled as the early stages of civil war. Indeed, later in 2083 A European Declaration of Independence Breivik dated this civil war period as breaking out in 1999. So, by the time he carried out his terror campaign, Breivik too seems to have regarded Europe as being in a state of warfare, a theory he developed in part from Jensen’s writings. Moreover, for
Breivik violent action against ‘national traitors’, that is his 77 victims, was deemed valid due to living during this period of wartime.\textsuperscript{56} Yet we should also note that Jensen was not the only influence. As others have highlighted, Breivik also drew on a wider array of contributors too, especially the idea of ‘Cultural Marxism’ proposed by William S. Lind.\textsuperscript{57} This offered a much more detailed and historicized critique of left wing figures than those to be found in Jensen’s texts. So we cannot frame Jensen’s contributions here as the only set of ideas feeding into Breivik’s rationale for action. The relationship is more complex than this, but nevertheless Jensen was central part of Breivik’s intellectual milieu.

So to help characterize Jensen’s role here, we can return to Kallis’ notion of license, and in particular his theme of a license to hate. Kallis stresses that such licenses to hate are important as they create frameworks that allow people justify, and give a rationale to, their heterophobia. In doing so, as with Jensen’s discourse summarized above, they are often steeped in fantasies presenting the ‘other’ as a pollutant, one ideally needing to be cleansed from the polity. The themes discussed here, so prevalent in the selection of Jensen’s essays that Breivik cited in \emph{2083 A European Declaration of Independence}, do not merely present an unarticulated rejection of Muslims as ‘other’. They do much more than this. They go to great lengths to historicise the role Muslims have played within European history, present lengthy analyses styling the nature of the threat, such as via the Eurabia narrative, and evoke a sense of plausibility by setting this discourse within a much wider body of writings that span a range of figures, form the more radical to the more mainstream, from Bat Ye’or to Michael Gove, and from Daniel Pipes to Melanie Phillips. What Jensen achieves via this discourse, then, is a framework for structuring heterophobia, lifting moral objections to developing a hatred of Muslims, and offering broad teleological messages too. His core position stresses that Europe’s flirtation with multiculturalism is a temporary aberration, not a permanent state. It will breed its own tensions and antinomies, and indeed he believes that the Eurabian conspiracy and multiculturalism is already provoking a new world war. He stresses that, while some of the developments here may be very dangerous, such as a Muslim-run France seizing control of nuclear warheads, ultimately the picture is a positive one. Europe will find a way to redeem itself, and will achieve purity once again by overthrowing the invading ‘other’. Moreover, his perspective helps to create a framework where violence towards those deemed responsible for the threats allegedly posed by Muslims – that is both Muslims themselves and politicians deemed to be promoting multiculturalism and the Eurabian conspiracy – becomes more desirable. So these
writings clearly had a radicalizing role to play, and as a consequence of their lengthy citation, consisting of 14.5% of the total word count for *2083 A European Declaration of Independence*, were undoubtedly vital for Breivik’s rationalizations of his actions.

To finish on a word of caution, it is also important to stress that promoting a license to hate is not the same thing as endorsing, or even carrying out, terrorist violence. As a terrorist actor, Anders Breivik did actively reconfigure these words into his own license to kill, and though Jensen may have a moral case to answer, one cannot hold such an ideologue as being legally responsible for the behavior of those who act on such messages. This leaves some open, problematic questions: To what extent are those who promote such licenses to hate destabilizing civil society? How far should states go to develop ways to monitor and limit such extremist fascist discourses, to prevent them from having a similar impact in the future? And what roles does civil society have in challenging these narratives, and is it prepared to deal with their effects?

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3. Immediately following Breivik’s killing spree, many newspapers began reporting on Fjordman, and his true identity was revealed in the press. Typical of this type of media reporting is this article from *The Independent*: ‘Unmasked: the far-right blogger idolised by Breivik’ (6 August 2011, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/unmasked-the-farright-blogger-idolised-by-breivik-2332696.html (accessed on 22 February 2013)).
7. This idea is explored in much detail in Michael Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
8. To give just one example on non-paramilitary fascism emerging in the postwar period, we can cite apolitical music. The cultural fascist dynamics of this phenomenon has been described in some detail in Anton Shekhovtsov, ‘Apoliteic music: Neo-Folk, Martial Industrial and “metapolitical fascism”’, *Patterns of Prejudice* 43, no. 5 (December 2009): 431-457.
9. For a more detailed discussion on the ways in which Nazi racism was constructed and tuned into policy, see: Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, *The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
12. For more detail on this theme, see: Chris Allen, *Islamophobia* (London: Ashgagte, 2010).
For the latest analysis on the European far right more generally, see the valuable collection of essays: Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin, Brian Jenkins eds., *Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational* (London: Routledge, 2012).

For a lengthier discussion on Wilders, also see Sarah L. de Lange and David Art, ‘Fortuyn versus Wilders: An Agency-Based Approach to Radical Right Party Building’, *West European Politics* 34, no. 6 (2011): 1229–1249.


The current address for this site is: [http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.co.uk/](http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.co.uk/) (accessed on 22 February 2013).


Ibid: p. 274.


This discussion begins on ibid: p. 282.

Ibid: 301.

Ibid: 696.

Ibid: 333.

Ibid: 605.

Ibid: 320.

For example, Nazis often presented Jews as paedophiles as sexual threats in propaganda materials. For an example of this trend, see: Steve Hoschstadt, *Sources of the Holocaust* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004): 52–55.

2083: 398.

Ibid: 399.


For a discussion on the use of Christianity to construct a fascist identity within Nazi and Neo-Nazi cultures in Britain, see Paul Jackson, ‘Extremes of Faith and Nation: British Fascism and Christianity’, *Religion Compass* 4, no. 8 (2010): 507–517.

2083: 671.

Ibid: 337.

Ibid: 333.


Ibid: 353.


Ibid: 698.

Ibid: 697.

Ibid: 322.

Ibid.


2083: 694.


2083: 694.
For example, see ibid: 664.

Ibid: 717.

Ibid: 715.

This is most clearly stressed by Breivik on ibid: 793.


Jensen has spoken out in his defence, for example to the German newspaper linked to the New Right, Junge Freiheit. In this interview he typically distanced himself from Breivik, and again stated that he had never met him. Nevertheless his position remained the same, despite Breivik’s actions. As he put it: ‘I did seriously consider quitting as a writer in the immediate aftermath of the terror attacks due to the immense international pressure on my person at that time and because I genuinely felt horrible about being quoted by such a man. Being dragged into the Breivik case against my will is the worst thing that ever happened to me in my life. After coming to my senses and recharging my mental batteries I decided to continue after all. I remain dedicated to the truth. Whatever was true before Breivik is also true after Breivik. If I ever quit as a writer I want this to be my own choice, not something I am forced to do by others.’ The whole interview is available at: http://tundratabloids.com/2012/01/fjordman-interview-in-german-paper-junge-freiheit-europe-is-the-sick-man-of-the-world.html (accessed 22 February 2013).