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Article

Title: How appropriate is it to characterise Western universities as institutionally racist?

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Version: Submitted version

Official URL: http://ijigst.cgpublisher.com/product/pub.269/prod.10
http://nectar.northampton.ac.uk/5650/
How appropriate is it to Characterise Western universities as institutionally racist?

The question being explored here has its origins in the murder of a young man in the United Kingdom. Stephen Lawrence was killed on April 22nd, 1993 as he waited at a bus stop in London with his friend, Duwayne Brooks. What prompted a group of White youths to attack him was the colour of Stephen’s skin. Stephen was stabbed to death because he was black (Macpherson, 1999).

Racist incidents are not a new phenomenon in British society. ‘Violence has been an enduring feature of the white British reaction to the presence of ‘blacks’, ‘Pakis’, and Jews who have settled on this island’ (Bowling, 1999, 54). Racist murders are rarer, but it should not be assumed that the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence was unprecedented. The Institute of Race Relations estimate that there have been over one hundred deaths from racial violence in the twenty years since his death (Burnett, 2013).

Although the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence is by no means unique, it is the case which has received the greatest media attention and resonated most with people across ethnic boundaries (Cottle, 2004). This is due in no small measure to Stephen’s parents, Doreen and Neville Lawrence, who showed extraordinary resilience in seeking justice for their son and mounted a campaign to that end. While they faced innumerable obstacles, including a flawed police investigation that prevented any of Stephen’s murderers from being successfully prosecuted until 2011, their patience and persistence did eventually pay off. They persuaded the incoming Labour government in July 1997 to set up a judicial inquiry into the police investigation of their son’s murder.

The inquiry was conducted by a former judge of the High Court, Sir William Macpherson of Cluny. The public hearings began on March 24th, 1998 and the final report, henceforth referred to as the Macpherson report, was published on February 24th, 1999. The main findings are crisply summarised:

The conclusions to be drawn from all the evidence in connection with the investigation of Stephen Lawrence’s racist murder are clear. There is no doubt that there were fundamental errors. The investigation was marred by a combination of professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers. A flawed MPS review failed to expose these inadequacies. The second investigation could not salvage the faults of the first investigation (Macpherson, 1999, 46.1).

Acknowledging institutional racism

Chapter 6, entitled Racism, was the longest chapter in the report. It addressed what Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, who presented the report to Parliament on February 24th, 1999, acknowledged to be “the central and most important issue for the inquiry” (Hansard, 1999, quoted in Pilkington, 2011, 2). Remarkably, the chapter concluded that institutional racism was rife in British society. Although the primary focus of the inquiry was on the police, the report suggested that all major organisations in British society are characterised by institutional racism.

Racism, institutional or otherwise, is not the prerogative of the Police service. It is clear that other agencies including for example those dealing with ... education also suffer from the disease’ (Macpherson, 1999, 6.54).
This was an extraordinary admission since “for 30 years British officialdom had consistently denied that it had any meaning when applied to Britain” (Parekh, 2000, 72).

The only other judicial inquiry set up under the Police Acts was Lord Scarman’s into the 1981 Brixton disorders. The latter entailed confrontations on the streets between young Black men and the police in South London. In his report, Lord Scarman expressly rejected in his final conclusion the suggestion that the police and other organisations in British society are characterised by institutional racism: “Institutional racism does not exist in Britain” (Scarman, 1981, 9.1). The definition of institutional racism underpinning this conclusion is outlined earlier in the report: in Britain, he argues, the police and other organisations do not “knowingly, as a matter of policy, discriminate against black people” (Scarman, 1981, 2.22). Scarman acknowledged, however, that “racial dis-advantage and its nasty associate racial discrimination have not yet been eliminated” (Scarman, 1981, 9.1) and “that practices may be adopted ... which are unwittingly discriminatory” (Scarman, 1981, 2.22).

The Macpherson report builds on these suggestions. It agrees with the earlier report that there is no evidence that the policies of the police and other organisations are racist but rejects what for Scarman is a corollary, notably that they are not characterised by institutional racism. For Macpherson, the concept of institutional racism does not imply that the policies of organisations are racist. The term is instead defined in the following terms.

Institutional racism is...the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes, and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people (Macpherson, 1999, 6.34).

The report was received with approval by Parliament. Tony Blair set the tone during his Prime Minister’s weekly question time:

I am proud that it was this Government who set up the Lawrence inquiry. I am happy to accept its judgement ... The publication of today’s report on the killing of Stephen Lawrence is a very important moment in the life of this country. It is a moment to reflect, to learn and to change. It will certainly lead to new laws, but, more than that, it must lead to new attitudes, to a new era in race relations, and to a more tolerant and inclusive Britain (Hansard, 1999, quoted in Pilkington 2011, 3).

In presenting the report to Parliament, Jack Straw went even further. He expressly accepted the charge of institutional racism laid at the door of “both the Metropolitan Police Service and in other Police Services and other institutions countrywide” and committed the government to implement all the report’s recommendations:

The inquiry’s assessment is clear and sensible. In my view, any long-established, white-dominated organisation is liable to have procedures, practices and a culture that tend to exclude or to disadvantage non-white people. The report makes 70 wide-ranging recommendations, and I welcome them all (Hansard, 1999, quoted in Pilkington, 2011, 3).
What is remarkable about the willingness of the government, and indeed myriad other institutions (see Singh, 2000, 34-35), to admit to the charge of institutional racism is not only the fact that the state had steadfastly refused till February 1999 to have any truck with the concept, but also that the concept had originally been coined by two Black power activists in the United States. A concept created in 1963 by critical race theorists to provide a radical critique of the social system thirty six years later was being employed by a conservative judge in the UK to condemn the way major organisations operated.

**The genealogy of institutional racism**

Racism is a term of very recent origin. It emerged in response to two phenomena: firstly, a growing body of scientific evidence which challenged the nineteenth century doctrine that people can be characterised, on the basis of physical markers, as belonging to a limited number of discrete groups, some of which are inherently superior to others; and secondly, the realisation that Nazism had used this doctrine to define Jews as an alien and inferior race and thus justify genocide (Miles and Brown, 2003). The term, which from the outset carried extremely negative connotations, was coined to refer to the doctrine of race, a set of beliefs which at one time had been scientifically justified but were – from the vantage point of the 1930s and 1940s – considered to be discredited and morally reprehensible.

This use of the term, racism has not gone unchallenged and has indeed been criticised as Eurocentric. This is the position of one contemporary sociologist, who argues that the above use of the term to refer to

an extremist ideology ...is one that has traditionally privileged the social experiences of the Holocaust within the war torn dislocations of Europe during 1939-1945. This means that colonial history of the experiences subsumed under that concept cannot be located in its conceptual horizon (Hesse, 2004, 133).

This is where the concept of institutional racism comes in. In contrast to the widely disseminated notion of racism as a set of aberrant beliefs, institutional racism was initially coined to refer to

a regime of practices, that locate the rationale and coherence of that regime in the colonial relation between white and black (ie non-white), European and non-European, west and non-west; rather than in the nationalist relation between majorities and minorities, or citizens and immigrants (Hesse, 2004, 143).

Institutional racism emerged as a concept during the late 1960s in the context of the struggle of Black people in the USA for social justice. *Black Power* outlined a more radical political analysis and strategy than that of the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King, Jr. Racism was defined in the book as “the predication of decisions and policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group” (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967, 3). For the authors, racism was not aberrant and exceptional but normal and routine. A distinction was made between overt, individual racism and covert, institutional racism. While the first referred to the actions of individuals (the actions of the youths who killed Stephen Lawrence would be an example), the second referred to the practices of organisations which entail racial disadvantage (the stop and search practices of the police would be an example). Institutional racism for these authors “relies on the active and pervasive operation of anti-black attitudes and practices” where a “sense of superior group position prevails” and it is taken for granted that “blacks should be
subordinated to whites ... Institutional racism also ‘has another name: colonialism’ (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967, 5). For like previous colonial regimes, the collective impact of the way large organisations operate is to maintain White privilege. The system as a whole, in short, functions to reproduce what critical race theorists would call ‘White Supremacy’ (Gillborn, 2008, 34-36).

Carmichael and Hamilton’s concept of institutional racism proved highly influential. What impressed a number of American sociologists was the perspicacity of Du Bois, who in 1903 had said that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line” (Du Bois, 1903, 9). Black disadvantage continued to persist and could not be plausibly explained in psychological terms as the outcome of the actions of prejudiced individuals. A radical sociologist wrote: “The processes that maintain domination – control of whites over non-whites – are built into the major institutions” (Blauner, 1972, 9). In this context, another writer in a book first published in 1977 argued that “racism is more effectively analysed as a strategy for the maintenance of privilege than as prejudice” (Wellman, 1993, 60).

The concept crossed the Atlantic in the 1970s and was readily taken up by radical sociologists (e.g. CCCS, 1982). Like their American counterparts, they were impressed by the persistence of racial disadvantage and found it more persuasive to account for this as the outcome of routine institutional processes rather than as a result of the discriminatory actions of prejudiced individuals (Miles and Brown, 2003; Murji, 2007). By the time of the Brixton disorders in 1981, the concept had been taken up widely enough for Lord Scarman to feel obliged to address the question as to whether institutional racism (as he understood it) existed in Britain. His rejection of its applicability, coupled with the critiques subsequently mounted about its analytical utility (Mason, 1982; Williams, 1985; Miles and Brown, 2003) led to the term increasingly becoming marginal in sociological analysis in the UK by the mid 1980s.

For a long time, the Institute of Race Relations (IRR), almost singly, continued to advocate the use of the concept and advocate its centrality for an understanding of racial disadvantage. It is no wonder then that the Institute was rapturous about the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and the subsequent report’s embrace of the concept. Here is the Director of IRR:

Macpherson ... was ... a learning process for the country at large and, in the course of it, the gravitational centre of race relations discourse was shifted from individual prejudice and ethnic need to systematic, institutional racial inequality and injustice (Sivanandan, 2000, quoted in Pilkington, 2011, 6).

It is no wonder in this context that a leading member of IRR considers the state’s championing of the concept, institutional racism and its acceptance by key organisations of its applicability to them as “a major benchmark in race relations” (Bourne, 2001, 7).

The contested nature of racism
Racism, as we saw earlier, was initially defined as a set of beliefs and in its primary usage referred to the doctrine of race. It was this definition that gained international prominence and was disseminated by the United Nations. While in the immediate aftermath of World War 2, such an understanding of racism was widely shared, it has become subsequently evident that the concept is essentially contested. In the wake of the Holocaust, what has become manifest is that people are now much more reluctant to put forward the doctrine of race and make explicit references, at least in the public arena, to the racial inferiority of the Other. There have been two responses to this phenomenon. For some sociologists (Banton, 1985),
declining belief in the doctrine of race indicates that racism is in decline, but for others (Rex, 1970), it points to the need to revise our definition of racism. The latter view has been more widely accepted, with revision taking broadly two different forms (Pilkington 2011).

In one case, it has involved extending the meaning of the term in such a way as to include both beliefs and practices which lead to racial disadvantage and indeed even to cover racial disadvantage itself. This is the approach favoured by those who embrace the concept of institutional racism and believe that this is a central feature of the social system (Macpherson, 1999).

In the other case, racism has continued to refer to beliefs rather than practices or outcomes. Revision has involved extending the meaning of racism in such a way as to include not only the doctrine of race but also other beliefs which legitimate racial inequality. While a discourse which makes explicit reference to race and hierarchy is less prevalent in the post-war period, in its stead has arisen another discourse “whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences”, a discourse “which at first sight does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions” (Balibar, 1991, 21). This discourse performs a similar role to the earlier one in legitimating racial inequality and therefore can be characterised as a form of racism – cultural racism. While this discourse cannot be described as ‘new’ (Barker, 1981) since Muslims have for a long time been subject to this discourse, and while it has not wholly displaced one which focuses on race and hierarchy (Mason, 1995), its proliferation indicates that one can no longer assume that racism takes one form. Before, however, we can conclude that there are different racisms, including scientific and cultural racisms, it behoves us to identify the core characteristics of racism.

Here racism will be defined as

a discourse which involves four features: identifying groups, which reproduce themselves over time, on the basis of physical markers; seeing essential differences between them; associating Others with negative characteristics; and visualising the dissolution of boundaries as undesirable’ (Pilkington, 2003, 189).

Scientific racism in this view focuses on race and hierarchy, while cultural racism focuses on essential cultural differences.

**The contested nature of institutional racism**

Where does this leave the concept of institutional racism? If the concept of racism remains essentially contested, this is even more apparent in the case of institutional racism. For many writers, the concept is analytically valuable in focusing on the way widely shared cultural beliefs and routine organisational practices reproduce racial disadvantage. Rather than assume that racial disadvantage is a result of direct discrimination and that such discrimination, as is commonly assumed, is in turn the product of racial prejudice, the concept of institutional racism opens up the possibility of more complex causal mechanisms at play. While a simple cause and effect pattern may on occasions be operative, with individuals acting out their personal prejudices in overt acts of discrimination which result in racial disadvantage, the notion of institutional racism reminds us “that, to thrive, racism does not require overtly racist individuals, and conceives of it rather as arising through social and cultural processes” (Parekh, 2000, 71).
The source of differential treatment in terms of race may not lie with a few ‘rotten apples’ who let the organisation down, but may be the product of a pervasive occupational culture or taken-for-granted organisational practices which, albeit unintentionally, result in racial disadvantage. Thus the failure of the police investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence was not, for Macpherson, attributable to overt acts of discrimination by individual officers acting out their personal prejudices, but stemmed instead from the occupational culture of the police in which “both negative racial categorisations of black youth and the apparent irrelevance of race to incidents that require its recognition are features” (Holdaway, 1999, quoted in Pilkington, 2011, 8).

We presented Macpherson’s definition of institutional racism above. It is extremely wide ranging covering a range of (conscious and unconscious) beliefs and (intentional and unintentional) practices, which the report believes give rise to racial disadvantage. It is even more wide ranging than is immediately apparent. For it encompasses inaction as well as action. In the same paragraph as the one quoted above, the report goes on:

It [institutional racism] persists because of the failure of the organisation openly and adequately to recognise and address its existence and causes by policy, example and leadership. Without recognition and action to eliminate such racism it can prevail as part of the ethos or culture of the organisation. It is a corrosive disease’ (Macpherson, 1999, 6.34).

The Macpherson report has generated a renewed interest in institutional racism, with the concept again being adopted by some social scientists to explain racial disadvantage (for example Warren, 2007). Indeed, a highly influential report highlighted the importance of institutional racism and went on to identify “various interacting components of institutional racism” (Parekh, 2000:73). Ten components are identified as follows:

Is there evidence of ‘indirect discrimination’ in the services provided for members of minority ethnic groups? Are ‘employment practices’ racially inequitable? Is the ‘occupational culture’ ethnically inclusive? Is the ‘staffing structure’ one in which senior staff are disproportionately White? Is there a ‘lack of positive action’ in involving members of minority ethnic groups in decision-making? Do ‘management and leadership’ consider the task of addressing institutional racism a high priority? How widespread is ‘professional expertise’ in intercultural communication? Is there evidence of relevant high quality ‘training’? How much ‘consultation’ is there with representatives from minority communities? Is there a ‘lack of information’ on the organisation’s impact on minority communities? (Parekh, 2000, 74-75).

While such questions are clearly pertinent for organisations to ask as a first step towards the pursuit of racial equality, it should be noted that they address issues which can and need to be analytically distinguished. Thus they concern, among other things, beliefs which legitimise racial inequality (‘occupational culture’), racially discriminatory practices (‘indirect discrimination’) and patterns of racial disadvantage (‘staffing structure’). It is arguable that characterising all of these as components of institutional racism glosses over important distinctions between beliefs, practices and outcomes, and is not helpful in identifying the complex mechanisms which result in racial disadvantage. While the concept of institutional racism may be a politically useful rallying cry to encourage organisations to reconsider their practices and take positive action to promote racial equality, “we must also be aware of the
dangers of using such terminology very loosely and rhetorically” (Solomos, 1999, quoted in Pilkington, 2011, 9).

‘In the aftermath of the publication of the Scarman report, there was a wide ranging discussion about both the concept of institutional racism, and its various meanings, as well as the way in which it could be applied to specific institutions’ (Solomos, 1999, quoted in Pilkington, 2011, 9).

Commentators pointed out that the concept was not only employed in very different ways by different writers (Mason, 1982; Williams, 1985) but also that, in the case of some writers such as Sivanandan, its meaning shifted without explanation from work to work (Miles and Brown, 2000, 69-70). For critics of the concept, institutional racism represented a form of ‘conceptual inflation’ (Miles and Brown, 2003): the concept of racism loses any specificity and its value as an analytical tool diminishes as important distinctions, such as that between beliefs which legitimise racial inequality (both biological and cultural), racially discriminatory practices (both direct and indirect) and patterns of racial disadvantage, are obscured.

The charges laid at previous usages of the concept have also been laid at the door of Macpherson’s extremely wide ranging usage. Some commentators have identified a very real danger in this usage of “allowing the phrase to mean all things to all accusers” (Barker, 1999). The most scathing critics have gone even further. They have conceptualised the Macpherson version as a blunderbuss concept which glosses over key distinctions (Dennis, 2000) and as “an unsystematic jumble of defining elements: impersonal processes, conscious attitudes and behaviour, and unwitting or unintentional prejudice” (Rattansi, 2007, 134). What is undoubtedly true is that its focus on single institutions undermines Carmichael and Hamilton’s original concern with “the systematic interconnections between discrimination in institutions such as housing, education, policing, and employment which create processes of cumulative disadvantage” (Rattansi. 2007, 136, my emphasis).

It is not altogether surprising that Macpherson’s definition of institutional racism has been criticised, even by those sympathetic towards anti-racism, as imprecise, inflated and incoherent (Singh, 2000).

It was the product of a ‘power game’ between the inquiry and the police ... It was a political necessity for the inquiry to define institutional racism in a way that would convince and be acceptable to the then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, who had publicly opposed it (Murji, 2007: 851).

The final wording of the definition was, as Richard Stone, one of the three advisors to Macpherson, reveals, the outcome of a lengthy process of negotiation:

You look at our definition; it was going to be one line, one sentence, that was it. Then all of us felt that there were certain words that were not in, which is why we had the second paragraph. Then we had to work out how you’re going to typeset it so [that] the second paragraph doesn’t get lost in the first paragraph ... that’s why you’ve actually got two paragraphs looking as if they’re two ... And a typical sort of bartering goes on ... The prime example is that I went to Bill Macpherson one day and said, ‘Bill this unwitting prejudice, very unhappy about unwitting because I think it’s very often witting [racism]. Ah, but he said, you do not understand Richard, this is a
judicial inquiry and we have to rely on precedent. There is only one precedent and that is Scarman. Scarman used the word unwitting and I think that it is very important we put it in so that people can see that we are not ignoring our precedents. And anyway, he said, you asked for racial stereotyping [to be included in the definition] yesterday and you got it’ And that completely undermined my challenge (Stone, quoted in Murji, 2007, 851).

Defining institutional racism
What initially prompted me to write a book, Institutional racism in the academy (2011) were a series of broad inter-related questions. Was/Is it appropriate to characterise public organisations and, in particular, universities as institutionally racist? How, in particular, did universities respond to the charge of institutional racism? How far did a government, which acknowledged in no uncertain terms the prevalence of institutional racism, take steps to counter institutional racism and promote racial equality in public organisations and particularly universities? These questions did not demand that a definitive judgement was made at the outset about the best way to define institutional racism and the utility of the concept. These issues could, as the phenomenologists would put it, be bracketed and Macpherson’s usage adopted. If we took this line, we could decide later whether it was a sensitising concept that helped to illuminate our exploration of higher education or alternatively whether it was a muddled notion that proved to be of little analytical utility. Although I took this approach, nonetheless, I did think it is helpful from the outset to provide a working definition even if the question of its analytical utility perforce needed to be addressed later.

The term alerts us above all to processes in organisations which, however unintentionally, entail disadvantaging members of minority ethnic groups. Clearly there are such processes and existing race relations legislation acknowledges their existence in the act of outlawing indirect racial discrimination.

The question is whether it is helpful to characterise such processes as institutional racism. Earlier I defined racism as a discourse with four characteristics. In line with this, institutional racism will be defined here as referring to “those instances where a racist discourse has become embedded in certain institutional [processes]” (Singh, 2000, 38). It is not sufficient to point to a disparity in experience or outcomes between White people and people from minority ethnic communities (O’Grady et al, 2005). It is necessary to demonstrate that this disparity can be traced back to a racist discourse and thus show how “exclusionary practices arise from, and therefore embody, a racist discourse” (Miles and Brown, 2003, 109-110). Two interlinked processes in particular tend to be highlighted in much of the research: the ‘institutional culture’, which “is racist if it constitutes a climate of assumptions which are hostile to outsider groups, racially or ethnically defined” and ‘routine practices’, which are racist if they entail unfair treatment of members of minority ethnic groups (Fenton et al, 2000, quoted in Pilkington, 2011, 11). We must be careful, however, not to present individuals as cultural ignoramuses whose actions are determined by such processes. While institutional processes constitute structural conditions for the actions of individuals, and thus both constrain and facilitate what is done, individuals are also agents who ultimately are responsible for their actions.

Midshire University and institutional racism
So what did I discover? Did I find it helpful to characterise universities as institutionally racist? Here I only have space to outline my broad conclusions. Readers interested in examining the empirical evidence substantiating my argument are referred to a recent book (Pilkington, 2011) and article (Pilkington, 2013). Contrary to my expectations, I found Macpherson’s concept of institutional racism illuminating and in this sense analytically useful. Employing an ethnographic case study approach, I investigated how a university in the UK fared in terms of the components of institutional racism identified in the Parekh report. A systematic examination of these components highlighted remarkable continuities at Midshire University over a ten year period, with no change of any significance evident in six of these ten components. At the same time, comparison with a police force in the same locality brought out extraordinary similarities between Midshire University and Midshire Police, with the University having comparable or worse scores in the case of six components. Such findings were not anticipated and led me to appreciate the sheer weight of Whiteness of the academy, a phenomenon characteristic, arguably, of all institutions in British society.

So it is appropriate to label Midshire University as institutionally racist? In the discussion of the concept of institutional racism earlier in this article, I argued that Macpherson’s definition of institutional racism is too broad, encompassing not only beliefs (conscious and unconscious) and practices (both intentional and unintentional) but also inaction. The components of institutional racism identified in the Parekh report replicate Macpherson’s ‘conceptual inflation’ (Miles and Brown, 2003) and arguably go even further by including outcomes as well. The concept of institutional racism needs in this view to be more carefully delineated to facilitate analysis. I follow Singh (2000) and Miles and Brown (2003) in arguing that the concept is most helpfully used when it can be demonstrated that a racist discourse is embodied in institutional processes.

I examined Midshire Police in this light and concluded that it was appropriate to label the institution as institutionally racist because a racist discourse was still embodied in the occupational culture and routine practices. I presented interview evidence that racism was still a significant feature of the occupational culture, with Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) officers complaining of everyday witting and unwitting prejudices by White officers. What is more, I found such racism was evident in routine practices such as the use of stop and search powers which were disproportionately employed on individuals from BME communities. In view of this, it is scarcely surprising to discover that the recruitment of BME officers continues to be below the targets set by the Home Office and that those appointed are more likely to resign and less likely to be promoted than White officers (Rollock, 2009).

That this is true of the University is much less evident. While students and staff are clearly not insulated from the racism of the wider society, the responses of both students and staff from minority ethnic communities in both focus groups and interviews reveal nothing like the hostility experienced by police officers from minority ethnic communities. The students generally deny that they experience racism from university staff and the staff do not by any means universally report experiences of racism. They vary considerably in their accounts, with support staff much more likely to report experiences of racism than academic staff.

Although the evidence here is not conclusive, it does question the suggestion that a racist discourse is embodied in the institutional culture. As for routine practices, there is evidence that these are in some cases indirectly discriminatory. This needs to be addressed, but it does not demonstrate, by itself, that a racist discourse is embodied in routine practices. The above considerations suggest to me that there is no clear cut evidence that a racist discourse is
embodied in the institutional culture or routine practices of Midshire University. Accordingly, given the definition of institutional racism that I earlier adopted in the light of suggestions by Singh, and Miles and Brown, it seems to me inappropriate to label the University as institutionally racist.

My reluctance to do so is reinforced by the finding that the University did make significant progress from 1999-2000 and 2006-2007 in meeting the general duty and the specific duties enshrined in the Race Relations (Amendment) Act. While an examination of the components of institutional racism identified in the Parekh report are revealing in identifying significant continuities over time and significant parallels with the Police, we need to recognise the limitations of this approach. The employment of a more circumscribed concept of institutional racism highlights features that otherwise would remain in the dark, notably differences between Midshire University and Midshire Police in the extent to which racism pervades the institutional culture and progressive changes by Midshire University in meeting the requirements of legislation concerned with promoting race equality. While we cannot of course generalise from the experience of one university in the UK to other Western universities, there is in my view a strong case for employing a more circumscribed concept of institutional racism than that employed in the Macpherson and Parekh reports, when investigating whether universities are characterised by institutional racism.

**Bibliography**


