



**Peace Education as means of Conflict Resolution in Intractable
Clan Conflict Context: An Exploratory Case Study of the National
Reconciliation Process in Somalia from the Perspectives of UK-
Somali Diaspora**

Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Northampton

The year 2020

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Acknowledgements

This study would not have been completed without the continuous support of a number of people in different parts of the world.

My forever encouraging, loving, and always enthusiastic late mother Amina Ali: I will always miss your big smile and screams of joy whenever a remarkable moment was achieved (Allah Yarhamak).

I am grateful to the endless and unwavering support and motivation from my Director of Studies and first supervisor, Dr Jane Murray, my second supervisor Dr Emel Thomas, and my previous second supervisor Professor Philip Garner.

I would like to thank all the people who have supported me throughout this journey, including those who participated in this study. I am grateful for sharing their experiences and stories with me.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my dear wife, Fatima Omar, for her moral support, resilience, and encouragement. I would like to thank all my family and relatives, brothers and sisters, friends, my children, and my beloved father for their motivation and prayers.

A very special amount of gratitude goes out to my friends Dr Lucy Atkinson, Dr Agom David, and my dear brother and a friend Abdulaziz, for their endless support and motivation throughout this journey.

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List of acronyms

PE	Peace Education
AU	African Union
DFID	the UK Department for International Development
EU	European Union
WWII	World War II
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
INGOs	International Nongovernment Organisations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ME	Ministry of Education
PEP	Peace Education Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
USAID Development	United States Agency for International Development

Abstract

This thesis is based on research that investigated the role of peace education in conflict resolution in a clan-based conflict context. An exploratory case study was conducted by focusing on the perspectives of the Somali diaspora in the UK. Data was collected from two groups of participants through in-depth semi-structured interviews with nine Somali teachers and eight traditional peacemakers who are based in the UK.

Thematic analysis was conducted in this study. The findings reveal that the absence of a unified national curriculum and the use of different curricula with various political and ideological underpinnings have exacerbated the intractable nature of the Somali conflict and have complicated the prospect of national reconciliation, as well as the efforts to build a nation-state for a unified Somalia. This thesis also uncovered theoretical and practical barriers to peace education implementation in Somalia including, the absence of a unified national curriculum, decentralisation of the education system, as well as lack of tailored teacher training on behaviour management and student-centred approaches to learning and the use of corporal punishment practices as a means of behaviour management.

Findings indicate that peace education educators in Somalia lack tailored training on how to deliver peace education contents in a clan conflict context and the complex nature of politicised historical narratives. The analyses indicate that peace education contents needs to be localised and incorporate the local Somali values and norms so that it achieves wider legitimacy in eyes of the Somali people. Based on the findings, the thesis includes recommendations for a greater cooperation between the Somali federal government and member states, NGOs, civil society groups, educators, and the international community to achieve the potential of peace education in creating an

enabling environment for peace to flourish. Although the scope of this study is limited in terms participants only living in the UK, the geographic distance gave the participants more time for reflection and a greater access to varied perspectives living in the diaspora. The participants have provided deeper insights into the Somali conflict, which have potential to inform policy and practice regarding peace education implementation in Somalia.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The focus of this thesis is on UK Somali Diaspora Perspectives on Peace Education and the National Reconciliation Process in Somalia. Since the collapse of the central government of Somalia in 1991, the country had experienced various violent conflicts underpinned by different political, economic, and ideological factors. These factors have led Somalia to be referred as the most-failed state in the world (Menkhaus, 2010). The international community intervened in Somalia militarily as well as through humanitarian and development means to help Somalia regain political and economic stability. One of the means of resolving the protracted conflict was the delivery of an education programme - peace education - to create a culture of peace (Kester, 2012). This thesis examines the role of peace education in the peace and reconciliation process through the perspectives of teachers and traditional Somali peacemakers (Nabadoons).

This chapter provides background information on the role of peace education in the reconciliation process; it defines key concepts such as peace education and reconciliation and provides the overall structure of the thesis. The focus of this research is also discussed and justified, and the overall aim and overarching research questions are identified. Finally, the thesis organisation is presented.

1.1 Overview of the thesis

The concept of 'peace' and how to build it and make it sustainable has been a "subject of intense debate" and central to international relations and peace education studies (Bar-Tal, 2007; Selby, 2013, p. 58). Globally, factors that contribute to violent conflict are becoming ever more complex and difficult to resolve due to changing dynamics and actors as well as the nature of intractability (Bar-Tal, 2007). For instance, the

recent conflicts such as those in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Somalia have political, economic, and ideological dimensions in the name of religion, sectarianism, and tribalism and most are supported by external states for their political and economic interests (Byman, 2018; Mishali-Ram, 2018). Although circumstances and the root causes of these violent conflicts vary from one context to another, one of the main factors that underpins and adds to its intractability is the fact they were all mainly fuelled and prolonged by a belief of particular ideology that rejects the 'other' because of the race, ethnicity, and tribal lineages (Bar-Tal, 2013; Abdi, 1998). Some of these perceptions and beliefs were influenced and maintained by societal beliefs of the ethos of conflicts, such as collective memories (Bar-Tal, 2007) and de-legitimisation of the opponent and positive collective self-image (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2014) leading to social exclusion (Lake and Morgan, 2010, p.271).

Despite the increased global effort and attention led by the United Nations, Africa still seems to be home to most of the intractable conflicts, although the circumstances (factors) that triggered these conflicts vary from one to another. There were civil wars such as the Nigeria-Biafra war (1967-1970), Congo (1960-1964), Angola (1975-2002), and Somalia (1990-1996) (James, 1990; Cunningham, 2010; Mona, 2012; Lodge, 2018).

Although causes of these conflicts vary, it is argued that most of them were triggered factors that were associated with neopatrimonialism-based systems of governance (Richards 1996) as well as what Jackson (2006, p. 103) refers to as "the politics of elite survival". In addition, other causes of violent conflicts in Africa are linked to issues relating to social and economic inequalities, bad governance, economic stagnation; as well as politicised historical narratives and the marginalisation of certain groups and tribes from political participation (Stewart, Holdstock, and Jarquin, 2002; Annan, 2014).

The dynamics and nature of conflicts in Africa are rapidly changing and becoming more challenging to resolve through the '(neo) liberal' peacebuilding interventions.

In Nigeria for example, a terrorist group called Boko Haram oppose any social and political activities linked to Western society including secular education (Faseke, 2013) Walker, 2018). There is also the continuous failings of the government's efforts to restore peace in Nigeria which have been blamed in part on the lack of inclusion of all conflict stakeholders.

Another factor is that hindered reconciliation efforts in Africa was the universalisation of solutions from the international community through liberal peace (Mac Ginty, 2008). The main criticism of the liberal model of peacebuilding approaches is the lack of emphasis on local ownership and local context (Taylor, 2007; Richmond and Mitchell, 2011) Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016). Robert (2011, p.13) shares the same criticisms of liberal peace referring to it as "*a hegemony through dispossession* since its rationale is the accumulation of ideological conformity by means of disrupting the local to dispossess people of their 'illiberal' ways."

Intractable conflicts that are ideology-driven can be more challenging to resolve because of its diversity of stakeholders and the complex emotional narratives that underpin them (Bar-Tal, 2013). For example, much like the Arab-Israeli conflict and Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Somalia conflict has instances of an intractable conflict that has a central ideological dimension such as religion and issue of legitimacy (Lake and Morgan, 2010, p.271; Harper, 2012). Still, in Somalia, the conflict is said to be due to its diversity of stakeholders internally and externally, beyond clannism as a fuelling factor (Harper, 2012). Intractable conflicts are mainly influenced by radical ideologies that are fuelled by twisted ideology whether from interpretation of a religion or political

philosophy. Conflicts such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Iraq indicate that conflicts of this nature cannot be resolved only by force, but require a different approach, and a different paradigm to find lasting resolution (Moulton, 2009; Carvin, 2012).

One of the initiatives promoted by the United Nations includes peace education. This study explores the views of selected Somali diaspora members in the UK regarding whether such initiatives and programmes can be incorporated into the education system of post-conflict countries as one of the means of conflict resolution and reconciliation processes. Existing evidence shows that many attempts were made to resolve the Somali conflict through different peace initiatives, including holding reconciliation conferences mainly outside of Somalia (Elmi, 2016). However, local traditional peacemakers were excluded from taking full leadership during the reconciliation processes (Abdullahi, 2017).

Several studies have examined the root causes of the Somali conflicts from socio-economic and political perspectives (Abdi, 1998; Abdullahi, 2017; Abdullahi, 2014; Menkhaus, 2007). Conflict in Somalia has been waging for nearly three decades. Failures of peace education delivery have been attributed to the fact that it only promoted Western values and principles, side-lining the local structures and home-grown means and mechanisms of conflict resolution such as the 'Xeer' (Somali legal traditional system) (Oksamytna, 2011). The findings from these studies also shed light on why genuine peace was not achieved in Somalia; it was partly attributed due to lack of in-depth knowledge from the international community of the Somali conflict and the local understandings of peace from the Somali perspective.

1.2 Research aims and Research questions

The aim of this study was to investigate the perspectives of teachers and Nabadoons within the UK Somali diaspora concerning Peace Education and the National Reconciliation Process in Somalia. The study's focus was not to look in-depth at areas of difference between participants but to seek areas of commonality.

The investigation was guided by the research question below:

- What is the role of peace education as a means of conflict resolution for the intractable clan conflict and the reconciliation process in Somalia?

In exploring the overarching question, the following questions were explored:

1. What factors contributed to the failure of the reconciliation process in Somalia?
2. To what extent does culture play a role in teaching peace in Somali schools?
3. How do Nabadoons and teachers define the concept of peace in their context?
4. What are the challenges for peace education implementation in the Somali curriculum?

For this study, stakeholders were identified as traditional Somali peacemakers (Nabadoons) as well as Somali teachers who live in the United Kingdom. The Nabadoons are strategically selected to include participants from most of the Somali regions and special consideration was given to take into consideration of the clan diversity to provide an inclusive picture of the Somali conflict. It is important to note that this study is not claiming to have included all of the various clans as this would have been impossible given the limited time of the study, place and resources.

In the Somali culture, traditional peacemakers are considered to enjoy social and political legitimacy, they have knowledge about the historical clan narratives and local conflict triggers as well as local mechanisms of conflict resolution in times of war and conflict (Stremlau, 2016) between, clans, communities or with families (Abdullahi, 2017). After the collapse of the central government in 1991, traditional elders became more active in the process of the government foundation and state-building. They exert social and political influence on Somali politics, culture and informal education (Ilmi, 2015) This is not to argue that they represent all Nabdoons' perspectives, but have similar experience in traditional conflict resolution. The advantage of focusing on Nabadoons in the UK is that they have more access and freedom to speak openly about the root causes of the Somali conflict without fear of retribution, this geographic distance gave them more time for reflection, and a greater access to varied perspectives living in the diaspora. However, it should not be implied that speaking to Nabadoons in the UK is equivalent to speaking to them in Somalia as their lived experiences are different based on their geographical places and context.

These two groups from the UK-Somali Diaspora were selected purposively, due to their experience (Patton, 2015) and knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation as well as their ability to provide thick descriptions on issues relating to education and conflict resolution in the Somali context (Geertz, 1973). Data collection was primarily achieved through the vehicle of in-depth semi-structured interviews (Wengraf, 2001).

Due to the insecurity and instability in Somalia, the UK was selected as the setting for the data collection. The UK is home to the largest Somali diaspora in Europe (Liberatore, 2018). The originality of this research lies in the emphasis on this particular context.

This study contributes to knowledge in the field of peace education, conflict and peace studies by exploring the role of peace education in a clan conflict context.

The summary of the key contribution this study makes to knowledge are as follows.

The study has:

- Provided a more in-depth perspective on two distinct groups of the Somali diaspora in the UK about the role of peace education in the Somali reconciliation process.
- Expanded our understanding of the term 'peace' as merely an absence of direct violence but as the absence of clannism and justice in the Somali conflict context.
- Identified the practical and theoretical barriers of peace education implementation nationwide and provided practical recommendations to potential stakeholders to address the key issues such as unifying the national curriculum on a consensus-based approach, compromise and reconciliation.
- Extended a deeper understanding of the factors that underpin and fuel the Somali conflict by identifying that imported curricula have contributed the various political ideologies and interests of some of the stakeholders of the intractable conflict.
- Constructed a conceptual framework on new contributory factors providing a new perspective of the intractable nature of the Somali conflict.

The conceptual framework that was developed shows the interconnectivity of concepts that emerged from the synthesis of the findings showing the conceptual relationship in relation to the perspectives of two groups of the Somali Diaspora (teachers and traditional peacemakers) in the UK.




Figure 1.1 Contributory factors of intractable conflict in Somalia

This conceptual framework is further explained in chapter 7 Section 7.6.

1.3 The motivation for the study

In 2014, after more than two decades of living in diaspora as a refugee, I paid a visit to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, to see family and friends. During my visit, I had the opportunity to explore how Somalia had changed in general, and in particular how the war affected the education institutions. During a dinner event, one of my nephews challenged me on how many languages I spoke; he informed me that he spoke several languages, including English, Arabic, and Turkish. From my experience at school in

Somalia, Arabic was always one of the main compulsory languages, and English was optional, but Turkish was not on the list. My nephew continued by teaching me some Turkish words, about Turkish language, and the Ottoman history and its achievements. In return, I tested him on his knowledge of Somali history and literature. To my surprise, his answer was “We don’t do Somali history lessons in this school”. I started observing and visiting different private schools and having informal conversations with students and teachers about issues relating to education and development. I became more interested in why private schools were teaching foreign histories but disregarding Somali history and literature. Finally, I met a Swedish aid worker and peace educator who worked for one of the NGOs. One of the programmes the NGO promoted included peace education. The name attracted my attention, and I wondered why projects like this were not getting the attention they deserved. Many people lost their lives in the violent conflict in the belief of defending perceived political, historical narratives which were exploited by warlords and politicians (Abdi, 1998; Bar-Tal, 2013). Therefore, the idea of using education as a means of conflict mitigation was an appealing one for me as someone who recalls what schooling was like in Somalia, as well as my experience of war and living in the diaspora for almost three decades and my work as a community activist added to my interest to explore the role of peace education as a tool for conflict resolution for the Somali conflict.

1.4 Research Focus

Most of the literature on peace education focuses on tractable and intractable interfaith and inter-ethnic or race-related conflicts while none address intractable tribal and clan conflict context such as in the case of Somalia (Harris & Morrison, 2012) Research on peace education has focused mainly on inter-ethnic contexts such as Rwanda and Bosnia (Hilker, 2011; Danesh, 2006) and in an interfaith context of Northern Ireland

(Duffy, 2000). There is limited research and evidence into the effectiveness and impacts of peace education following conflicts in developing nations (Lauritzen, 2013). However, there is a need to establish the role that peace education can play in a clan-based and divisive society such as Somalia.

This exploratory study concentrates on the role of peace education in conflict resolution and reconciliation processes in a clan conflict environment, an area that has not yet been explored, particularly from the perspectives of UK Somali diaspora on the role of peace education in the national reconciliation processes. The originality of this research lies in the fact that it views peace education and peace education programmes in the context of intractable clan-based conflict from the perspectives of two Somali UK diaspora groups. So far peace education has been considered in the context of multiculturalism, integration, and inclusiveness in racial, religious and ethnic-related conflicts (Bjerstedt, 1993; Bar-Tal, 2002; Danesh 2006; Harris, and Morrison, 2012; Rigby, Andrew 2001; Salomon and Nevo 2002 and Bekerman and McGlynn, 2007).

1.5 Defining Key Terms

The following table provides definitions of the key terms; it is significant as it supports the reader's fuller understanding of the research and its context.

New terms	Meanings
Nabadoon	➤ Somali traditional pacemaker, other titles also exist in the Somali language, this was chosen as it is more inclusive and self-explanatory as the first syllable 'Nabad' means peace and the second 'doon' searcher. (Said, 2018).
Xeer	➤ Somali traditional legal system.
<i>Al-Shabaab</i>	➤ Meaning the youth in Arabic, Al-Qaida affiliated group (Murphy, 2011).
<i>Informal education</i>	➤ Teaching that takes place outside of a structured curriculum, in areas such as communities and homes (Leask, 2009).
<i>Nabad:</i>	➤ Means peace in the Somali language (Bakonyi, Cohen and Bedard, 2015).
Oday	➤ Somali word for an elder.
<i>Diya</i>	➤ Compensation in the form of money or livestock paid to the victim or the family of the victim (Besteman, 2014).
Federalism	➤ Derived from the Latin word foedus, which means treaty and obligation that is the beginning for two or more political entities to merge (Møller 2010, 40).
Xalay Dhalay	➤ Somali phrase meaning "he was born yesterday." It means unconditional forgiveness of what happened in the past, the phrase is mainly used in the reconciliation gatherings and meetings (Ibrahim, 2008a).

Table 1.1 Defining Key Terms

1.6 The concept of peace education

The concept of peace education and its meaning is conceptually disputed as different definitions are associated with the term. (Reardon, 1988; Fountain, 1999; Bajaj, 2008). Peace education is associated with numerous divergent meanings for different people in a different context (Salomon, 2011) and its objectives, contents, practices, and philosophy differ substantially in terms of emphasis and curricula and context (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009).

There are various definitions of peace education, depending on the content and context the programme seeks to address. According to UNICEF, Peace education can be defined as:

The process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth[s] and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level (Fountain, 1999: 1).

It can be argued that UNICEF's definition is more prominent in terms of understanding peace as an inclusive concept (positive peace) rather than seeing it as negative peace, which only highlights the absence of direct violence (war, terrorism, and rioting) (Reardon, 1988). Not only is the meaning of peace education contested but also the practices and values that it promotes. Fisher et al., (2000, p. 146) strongly argues that the central aim of peace education should not focus on "making people be nicer to each other" but also create an enabling environment that promotes a culture of peace through educating children about a 'culture of resistance' through learning the critical

skills to evaluate the distortions and manipulations conflict actors used in the name of ethnicity, ideology, or clan dominance.

Despite differences in definitions of peace education, scholars in the field share the view that peace education aims to “foster changes that will make the world a better, more human place” (Bar-Tal, 2009, p. 28). In this regard, throughout this thesis, UNICEF’s definition of peace education will be utilised.

1.7 The organisation of the thesis

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides brief background information of the Somali conflict and efforts that were made to resolve the conflict; it particularly explores the political and ideological factors that have contributed to the intractable nature of the Somali conflict. It also explains the Western perception of the Somali conflict, as well as policy and educational initiatives and interventions that were offered to mitigate the intractable conflict. Moreover, it explores the role of traditional peacemakers (Nabadoons) in peace-making and examines the effectiveness of conventional mechanisms of conflict resolution and the mitigation of clan conflicts in the local context. It explores peace education in relation to the national context in Somalia, which is the country that was the focus of the study. This chapter outlines the basis, extent, nature, and outcomes of conflict and violence in Somalia from both a socio-political and historical perspective.

Furthermore, the structures of authority and the means for local conflict mitigation are reviewed. The chapter explores the emergence of the private education system in 1991 and the politicisation of education and its impact on the quality of education and issues relating to Somali identity and local values during in the period of colonisation and the followed dictatorship rule led by Mohamed Siyad Bare (1969-1991). Finally, the

chapter concludes by exploring how the politicisation of education partially contributed to the Somali conflict since Somalia gained its independence.

Chapter 3 explores a wide range of historical and contemporary international perspectives in the existing literature relating to the growth of peace education over the past two decades and its applications. It also examines some of the key conceptual models and contemporary trends in peace education. It discusses the ethos of conflict based on both political and religious dimensions and a geographic comparison of peace education, featuring a discussion concerning five empirical cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Kenya, and Northern Ireland. Finally, it highlights the emerging issues from the literature and identifies the gap in the corpus of knowledge that justifies an in-depth study of the issues under investigation.

Chapter 4 discusses and justifies the research strategy (a case study) and the means of data collection (centred on the semi-structured interview). A key feature of this research is the credibility afforded by my own standpoint. This chapter, therefore, clarifies my positionality and stance concerning the research participants. The chapter also explains and justifies research philosophy and methodology used in relation to theories about the nature of knowledge and reality in the context of this study. Moreover, it explains the process and the framework for data analysis. In addition, issues relating to research ethics as well as trustworthiness and authenticity, are also discussed.

Chapter 5 presents the findings that emerged from the case study data. The findings were divided into two sections. The first part presents the themes that relate to the experiences of Nabadoons in terms of conflict resolution and reconciliation processes in the period of Somalia Siyad Bare (1969-1991), and post the Siyad Bare regime.

Events are presented in chronological order tailored with the emerged themes to make sense of the raw data. The second part of the chapter presents findings related to the challenges teachers faced in the process of delivering peace-related programmes in their own words.

Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the observations of the participants about the peace education programmes and the challenges Somali teachers encountered in Somalia. It also interprets the themes that emerged in the analysis of my research questions regarding the role of peace education in the reconciliation process in Somalia. It provides a more in-depth analysis of the failures of the reconciliation process and the need for a new paradigm showcasing the factors that led to the shortcomings of reconciliation processes and the importance of contextualising the means of conflict resolution by distinctively incorporating the local culture and social norms. In this chapter, I synthesised the relevant themes and established connections between themes. This synthesis is new knowledge and a tool in shedding light in the significance of contextual understanding of the concept of 'peace' from the participants' perspectives. The analysis of the themes that emerged from the narratives is a significant contribution to the field of peace education and conflict resolution, as it provides new knowledge and understanding of the UK-Somali diaspora perspectives regarding the processes for peace and reconciliation. Together both chapters account for the experiences of Nabadoons and teachers and are interlinked and showcase key themes and issues that contribute towards agendas for peace and reconciliation.

Chapter 8 reflects on my research journey, highlights the limitations of the study, sheds light on its key contribution to knowledge, and considers the implications of that knowledge and makes recommendations for future research, practice, and publication, based on the study findings. Conclusions from this study are derived from - and

connected to - the research questions and based on these conclusions. Finally, a section on self-reflection will be included in which I reflect critically on my personal experiences while conducting the study.

This thesis is an exploratory study of the perspectives of UK-Somali diaspora members concerning the role of peace education in the Somali conflict reconciliation. This study may help academics and policymakers to design more inclusive peace education programmes and initiatives in a tribal conflict context. Moreover, future peace educators, NGO workers, and policymakers with a particular interest in Somalia might be able to create better strategies in light of the challenges identified in this study.

This chapter presented the overall aim of the thesis and overarching research question, provided the motivation of study, highlighted the focus of the study, defined key terms and concepts, and provided the structure and the organisation of the thesis.

The following chapter provides fuller background information on the Somali conflict and its historical perspective, its underlying causes, and how it was resolved throughout history. It also explores the political and ideological factors that have contributed to the intractable nature of the Somali conflict.

Chapter 2: Background of the study

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a brief historical context of the Somali conflict, including the underpinning political and ideological factors which have contributed to its intractable nature. The chapter explores the drivers and stakeholders of the conflict from different perspectives. It explains the Western perception of the Somali conflict, as well as policy and educational initiatives and interventions that were offered to mitigate the intractable conflict. It explores the role of traditional peacemakers (Nabadoon) in peace-making and examines the effectiveness of traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution and the mitigation of clan conflicts in the local context. This chapter also explores the politicisation and privatisation of education before and after the collapse of the central state education system after the collapse of the central government in 1991 and the emergence of private education providers.

2.2 Factors underpinning the Somali Conflict

Over the past three decades, the nature of the Somali conflict, and its underpinning factors have been continuously changing. It has transformed from a civil war in the 1980s, through total state collapse, clannism and warlordism in the 1990s, to an ideologically driven global conflict in the first decade of the new millennium.

2.2.1 Clan, Warlordism and the Power struggle

Somalia is located in the horn of East Africa and is home to around 10 million people (Elmi, 2010). As shown in figure 2.1 below, Somalia shares a border with Djibouti to the northwest, Kenya to the south, and Ethiopia to the west.



Figure 1 Map of Somalia (UN, 2011, p.2).

Culturally, Somalis share the same language (with some regional dialects) and are predominantly Sunni Muslims, following the traditional Islam of Shafiyah Jurisprudence (Abdullahi, 2014). Ethically, culturally, and linguistically Somalia is referred to as one

of the most homogeneous countries in the African continent (Elmi, 2006). Despite this homogeneity, conflicts over the control of economic resources, clan politics, the lack of a comprehensive power-sharing agreement, as well as emotional historical narratives, have been the main trigger for violent conflicts (Elmi, 2010. Harper, 2012).

Clan plays a key role in the Somali society, there are six main clans: Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Isaaq, the Digil, and Rahanwayn. The first four are predominantly pastoral communities, while the last two mainly depend on agriculture for their livelihood (Metz, 1992).

The clan is a source of protection and social security, a basis for social interactions, and provides a sense of cultural belonging. Members must adhere to local laws known as xeer, the traditional Somali legal system, and contribute financially when a member of the clan is in need. If a member of the clan harms a member of another clan, all members of the clan need to contribute to blood money given to the victim of the crime, this type of support is a community based on patrilineal descent and clan-lineages (Elmi, 2010).

However, clannism is also the primary trigger of intractable conflicts and social division. When clan histories are being passed down to children they are sometimes fantasised, with each clan using its historical narratives of heroism and victimhood, as well as poetry, to promote the clans values and war. These selective historical narratives still create tension leading to stereotyping, prejudice, and distrust of the 'other' clans (Elmi, 2010). Politicians exploit the politicised and emotional narratives of victimhood to bolster their political interests. Samatar (1992) argues that this politicisation of clan identity is the root cause of the political instability in Somalia.

The politicisation of clan identity has been intensified by the injustices and violation of human rights that took place after Somalia gained its independence from Britain as a state in 1960. After an initial period of nation-building, in 1969 the president (Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke) was assassinated, this was followed by a bloodless coup, led by Mohamed Siyad Barre, who took over the leadership, launching a dictatorship influenced by Marxist principles (Ghalib, 1995). Although there was no room for democracy under his leadership, he is remembered for building satisfactory institutions and promoting nation-state initiatives such as the writing up the script for the Somali language, promoting nation-wide literacy projects, as well as banning clannism and empowering cooperative farming projects (Abdi, 1998; Shire, 2011). However, his critics argue that he empowered his clan's interests and barred and oppressed other clans that opposed his rule. For example, his military response of indiscriminate shelling and extrajudicial executions in the North-west and some North-eastern regions in Somalia was criticised as a violation of human rights (Omaar, 1992). Predominantly, it is the later legacy of injustices, nepotism, and clientelism and clan favouritism that dominates and shapes his legacy. (Samatar, 1992; Hashim, 1997). The overthrow of his regime in 1990 led to the destruction of all government institutions, including the educational institutions (Samatar, 1992). After the collapse of the state in 1991, power fell into the hands of warlords fuelled by the politicised historical narratives of injustice, political, and economic marginalisation (Abdi, 1998). As a result, different parts of the country took diverse directions (Shire, 2011).

In the North-west, the Somaliland administration was established, claiming total independence from the rest of Somalia, but it still lacks international recognition (Jhazbay, 2008). Somaliland, with the help of the traditional elders, has achieved the building of functioning institutions and fragile democracy (Rock, 2017). Other similar

administrations followed this desire for self-rule, competing for more resources, control and autonomy from the central government; these administrations (Puntland, Galmudug Jubaland, South West State, and Hirshabelle State) established governance mechanisms, distinctive ministries, and regional flags. According to the findings of this thesis, each region used its localised and politicised versions of Somali history to portray itself as the rightful, legitimate rulers of Somalia, promoting education design and contradictory curricula which look at the other regions “*through politicised lenses and as rivals and evil-wishers*” (Hassan_Interview19_231-235).

For example, Bulhan (2008) claims the Somali war culture as one of the fuelling factors that underpins the Somali conflict, arguing that the ferocity of some of the clan warfare has been so destructive that it looks as if “*each wanted to eliminate the other from the face of the earth*” (Bulhan, 2008, p. 8). From this perspective, it is arguable that this line of thinking shows that all Somalis are violent by nature and justifies external prescription and interventions to improve behaviour.

The following Somali proverb typifies the troublesome nature of the Somali societal conflict:

*Me and my clan against the world;
Me and my family against my clan;
Me and my brother against my family;
Me against my brother. (Farah, 1970).*

This proverb identifies Somalis’ problematic attitudes towards their fellow Somalis and their country and is, therefore, highly revealing for grasping the nature of the Somali conflict. Under the Eurocentric perception of Somali culture, the Somali culture is portrayed as a source of some of the violence (Harper, 2012). Some NGOs and

international communities support prescriptions, such as a non-contextualized peace education programme, as the right remedy for making the Somali people more peaceful and less focused on conflict (Lewis and Winn, 2018).

However, understanding the dynamics of the proverb offers far greater insight than the ready-made “expertise” provided by the Western perspective of peace education and conflict resolution programmes in Somalia. Representatives of the international community who are trying to help the Somali people achieve peaceful resolution rely on such expertise at the expense of local insight and knowledge of the conflict. Somali society was egalitarian in the pre-colonial period, and the root causes of the conflict were known, easily managed, and resolved by traditional peace leaders (Kaplan, 2008). However, Samatar (1992) argues that the top-down rule of colonial imposition and prescriptions of modern Western-style democracy of a winner-takes-all approach only fuelled competition amongst the clans for more power and hegemony. The formation of this hierarchical system ignored the local context and created new dynamics in the Somali conflict, making it more intractable (Kaplan, 2008).

2.3 Traditional elders and means of conflict resolution

Culturally, traditional leaders in Africa play an important role in restoring peace and stability in the continent (Brock-Utne, 2001). For instance, in Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda, clan elders are always invited by their communities for mediation and maintaining peace in the local areas, alongside government institutions. In Liberia, the ethnic group Kpelle assembles regular moots for mediation and solving disputes. Through their peace and mediation processes relating to the conflict in Angola and the genocide in Rwanda, traditional elders were active in ending the endemic conflict and achieving lasting peace. (Brock-Utne, 2001).

The traditional leaders in Somalia are known by different names and titles, including the Oday (elder); Ugaas, Boqor Imam, Islaw, Sultan, Duq, Caaqil, and Nabadoon (Said, 2018). Although there are some differences in their roles in the community depending on the regions they live in, one thing they all have in common is the inner drive to resolve conflicts and to search for peace through dialogue (Kaplan, 2008). The closest meaning and characteristics of searching for peace is Nabadoon- *Nabad*, meaning peace and *doon*- meaning searcher/maker. Throughout this thesis, I will be using the Somali term 'Nabadoon' or 'traditional leaders' to refer to the traditional peacemakers in Somalia.

Traditional leaders enjoy respect and admiration in the Somali community, and they are seen as fair, honest, and credible judges (Said, 2018). According to Menkhaus (2000), the traditional mechanism for conflict management is the most trusted source of justice in Somalia.

From a historical perspective, traditional leaders did not only reconcile the warring clans but were also active in the leadership of Somalia during the pre-colonial era (Kusow, 1994). Some of those leaders included sultanate rulers, such as the Sultanate of the Ajuran tribe in southern Somalia, the Sultanate of Kneaded in central Somalia, and the Sultanate of Majertania in North-east Somalia. In their reigns, they introduced social cohesion by promoting the well-being of the people (Kusow, 1994). Different tribes lived under the sultanate rulers and had not engaged in conflict either amongst themselves or against the rulers. Kusow (1994) adds that the inter-clan conflicts were mediated through a framework based on traditional or customary law, whereby each tribe appointed a member of a council of elders for the mitigation of conflict and participation in the peace process. However, in this peace framework, where representatives of the two sides, together with the rulers, tried to work out a solution,

the ruler also invited other tribes' elders so that they could witness the process, mainly for the purpose of portraying the mediation process as fair and just. Overall, the platform and peaceful environment created by the sultanate rulers meant that the peace process was largely successful (Said, 2018).

The process of peace-making included the gathering of tribal committees from both sides, together with the rulers, to propose a roadmap to ease the tension of tribal conflict and to reach a lasting peace (Said, 2018). In this roadmap, the traditional leaders would hold a preliminary consultation with both sides and other tribal elders to defuse the tension and to urge them to agree on a peaceful outcome resulting in the cessation of any hostility (Elmi, 2010). If necessary, the traditional leaders would deploy arms in the area of the conflict as neutral peacekeepers and, lastly, a dialogue is delivered through oral poems expressing the grievances in detail (Elmi, 2010). Presenting the process of reconciliation would usually take days, and in some cases months, until the final verdict was passed consensually (Oker and Habibullah, 2008). During the clan negotiation process, traditional elders would make decisions based on the evidence available and impose punishment on the perpetrators or order them to pay compensation in the form of Diya (blood-money) (Elmi, 2010). Another cultural practice in traditional conflict management includes inter-clan marriages between rival clans; this practice mitigates the conflict as it creates a maternal link between rival clans and, most importantly, this practice provides women with a unique role in sustaining the peace (Menkhaus, 2000).

The clan defines most aspects of its members' identity and provides security and protection. Clannism, on the other hand, can also trigger bloody conflict sub-divisions (Metz, 1992; Hesse, 2010). It is this that has been the most significant factor of triggering violent conflicts in Somalia. Chapter 6 provides more in-depth insight into

how clannism and the search for hegemony are factors in the intractable nature of the Somali conflict.

The following section provides a historical perspective on the role of traditional leaders in conflict resolution in Somalia.

2.4 The Scramble for Somalia

In 1884, European powers convened in Berlin for the agenda of ‘the scramble of Africa’ or, in other words, dividing the continent amongst themselves and colonising it (Elmi, 2010). In this, and subsequent meetings for the scramble for Africa, Somalia was divided into five: British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, and two Somali territories, the Ogaden region and the Northern Frontier District, which the British transferred both to Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively (Lewis, 1994). Under colonisation, the Somalian sultanate states began falling apart, and new waves of religion-based revolution emerged, led by Sayed Mohammad Abdalla Hassan, who formed his own sultanate-type rule, dubbed the ‘Dervish State’. The Dervish movement lasted 21 years and expanded from central Somalia to the northern parts and the Ogaden region. It was based on the Sufi-school of thought, also known as Tariqa and Jama’a (Lewis, 2017). The Dervish state managed to start on the long and perilous road to independence, which was achieved forty years later, on 1st July 1960, by a young, energetic revolutionary group, the ‘Somali Youth League’ or SYL in Italian Somaliland, while British Somaliland had gained independence five days prior, on 26th June 1960 (Tripod, 1999).

Regarding efforts of peace and reconciliation for the Somali conflict, fourteen peace mediation conferences were held to end the crisis in Somalia, with no success (Harper, 2012). However, the last peace conference in Mbagathi, Kenya in 2004 yielded a

positive outcome and installed a federal system which all sides agreed to, although it is not yet fully functional and relies on international community support both economically and security-wise (Elmi, 2010). Moreover, according to Elmi (2010), one of the main failures of the previous conferences, compared to the last one, was the overlooking of the traditional elders' roles and the latter's success was their underpinning role in the national reconciliation efforts.

2.5 The politicisation of education, Islam, and privatisation

The Somali conflict divided the country into different administrations with their own governance system. These administrations included Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, South West State, Jubaland, and Hirshabelle State, and smaller administrations such as Awdalland and Khatumo. All of them compete for greater autonomy with only Somaliland claiming independence from Somalia. Many of these administrations use foreign curricula fuelling clan-based identities. External countries exploited the political division and historical narratives and supported implementing curricula that support their political goals in the region as well as their development philosophies (Lewis and Winn, 2018).

The majority of the Somali people are semi-nomadic pastoralists and religion plays a vital role in all aspects of Somali society (Elmi, 2010). During the era of colonialism, Somali education was based on oral culture through informal community-based education. The emphasis was mainly on issues relating to Islamic ethics and morals, history on local conflict dynamics, culture and clan genealogy as well as learning about the necessary skills for survival in such harsh territory with meagre resources (Hoehne, 2010). In pre-colonial Somalia, all studies took place in local schools (dugsi), a

community-owned traditional Quranic school. The dugsi had unquestionable legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali people and Quranic teachers were highly respected and valued within Somali society. The dugsi provided Quranic teaching with an emphasis on memorisations of the Holy Quran but not its meanings. Culturally, the memorisation of the Holy Quran at a younger age is still celebrated and considered as a noble thing in the Somali culture (Abdi, 1998). This sense of ownership, shared acceptance, and affordable fees (exempt from the extremely poor and orphans) made the dugsi partially immune from total devastation suffered by modern schools after the collapse of the central state in 1991 (Cassanelli and Abdikadir, 2004).

The colonisation of Somalia by the British in the North-west (1884-1960) and the Italians in the South and North-east (1880-1942) used education as a political and ideological tool to create an environment that supports their political and economic interests in Africa (Rodney, 1974). The Westernised schooling before the independence era did not have much impact on the lives of the Somali people as the available schools were explicitly designed to legitimise and empower the interests of the colonial powers and the Fascists (Cassanelli and Abdikadir, 2004). For instance, the colonised southern part of Somalia believed the locals needed only a minimal education (Abdi, 1998). Religion also was another tool the colonial powers used to transform Somali society; for example, Catholic mission schools provided free education, and free food and clothing (Dawson, 2011), yet the majority of parents did not send their children to these schools because the schools actively promoted values that were seen contrary to Islamic values and local norms as the Catholic schools vigorously promoted conversion to Christianity (Dawson, 2011). From this perspective, the colonial powers used religion as a political tool for indoctrination and this reinforces

the idea that education can be used both as a negative and positive impact on peacebuilding as highlighted by Bush and Saltarelli (2000, p.203):

Education indirectly does more to contribute to the underlying causes of conflict than it does to contribute to peace. This can occur through the reproduction of economic inequality and the bifurcation of wealth/poverty; through the promotion of a version of hegemonic masculinity...segregation; and through magnifying ethnic and religious segregation or intolerance.

It is arguable that using education as a tool to change peoples' attitudes and behaviour was firstly used by the colonial powers in Somalia. From this perspective, Rodney (1974) argues that the underlying aim of colonial education in Africa was to prepare local administrations and staff that continued the colonialists' political and economic interests, specifically, to promote the capitalist economic system. The system created competition amongst the clans in Somalia and led to increased division among clans (Wolhuter, 2014). Arguably, this was the beginning of political clan marginalisation, fuelling politicised clan narratives and loyalties, and dividing Somalis into clan fiefdoms (Samatar, 1992; Menkhaus, 2016).

The Somali nationalist party, the Somali Youth Club (SYL) that led the movement for independence, promoted the modernisation of the education system as a key priority (Abdi, 1998). Modernising the education system after independence was the responsibility of the Italian colony; schools and colleges were established and formalised, with the Italian language being the medium of instruction, as the Somali script was not established until 1972, but the Italian schools also did not provide content that promoted Somali values, culture, and history (Abdi, 1998).

The nomadic communities considered this type of education as an attempt to distort their culture and values, so the local religious leaders delegitimised all Western education as unethical in the context of Islamic values (Cassanelli and Abdikadir, 2004). Instead, the community leaders and religious figures promoted sending children to Koranic schools, known as 'dugsi', to learn traditional teachings of Islamic values and principles, and to memorise the Holy Quran. To this date, even in the context of the Somali diaspora in the UK, parents still follow the tradition of sending children to local mosques to learn to memorise the Holy Quran, indicating how Islamic values have become firmly interlinked with the Somali culture (Tiilikainen, 2003; Cassanelli and Abdikadir, 2004; Harper, 2012).

After independence, nationwide education was promoted, but still, the Somali language script was not yet established so schools used mainly foreign curriculums and Arabic, Italian, and English languages as the mediums for instruction (Abdi, 1998).

In 1969, a military coup led by Mohamed Siad Barre altered the political course and introduced socialism and the scientific revolution (Makhubela, 2010). In this new political paradigm, with military control over all social and economic interactions (Lewis, 1972), education was once more used as a tool to instil values underpinned by Marxist philosophy, disregarding Somali and Islamic values (Adam, 1995). Most of the locals, mainly in rural areas, regarded this education as another attempt to oppress their cultural heritage and values. The suspicion was exacerbated when Latin script rather than Arabic, was used to form the writing up of the first Somali language script, whereas Arabic script had more legitimacy culturally as it is the language of the Holy Quran (Abdi, 1998). The policy of side-lining the religious and traditional leaders and the promotion of Marxist values led to a reduction of the legitimacy of formalising

Western education and strengthened the use of religion as political discourse and ideology (Hansen, 2013).

After the collapse of the central state in 1991, the Somali civil war that followed affected 90% of the schools (Lewis, 2014) and damaged an already collapsing education system. It is arguable that the central government's neglect prior to the civil war was evident in the budget allocation for education, as only 2% of the GDP was spent on education, leading to a brain drain of teachers (Samatar, 1988). The private sector capitalised on the lack of government red tape and bureaucracies and filled the gap providing educational services. Due to extreme poverty in some parts of Somalia and the lack of affordable private schools, only 37% of Somali children reported that they had had formal education (Moyi, 2012). To this day, private schools, including NGOs, dominate the provision of education in Somalia, with conflicting different curricula that are open for exploitation by instilling non-Somali values and development philosophies (Lewis and Winn, 2018).

With the collapse of the government, the schools were no longer under government regulation. The school became "*unaccredited... unmonitored, and non-standardised, reflecting competing ideologies of those who open them*" (Lewis and Winn, 2018, p. 507). According to the Human Rights Watch report (2012), many schools in Somalia became breeding grounds for instilling war values and distorted and twisted interpretations of Islam, with many schools being used to radicalise the Somali children. The report adds that Al-Shabaab exploited the lack of government control of schools and highlights the vulnerability of children to radicalisation, assault, and kidnap on their way to schools (HRW, 2018). In addition, the lack of job opportunities, particularly in rural areas, and clan-marginalisation are contributory factors as to why children became vulnerable to radicalisation. Al-Shabaab capitalised on this

opportunity by providing children with incentives and a sense of belonging (Menkhaus, 2010).

As highlighted above, the current educational challenges are complex and most of these administrations used various external curricula with their own ideological and geopolitical interests. Although the central government made progress in the formation of a National Curriculum, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the contents of the new proposed curriculum. However, tensions still exist within historical narratives, subjects relating to citizenship and national identity, and most importantly when finding political solutions for conflicts between the central government and regional administrations, all of which could hinder the nationalisation of the curriculum.

This chapter has set the context for this thesis and provided background information on issues related to the role of traditional Somali leaders in the peacebuilding and reconciliation process before and after the collapse of the central state in 1991. It also explored background information regarding the politicisation of education (before independence), during the rule of the Siyad Bare (1969-1991), and after the collapse of the state by various external actors and the challenges of establishing a National Curriculum for the politically divided administrations in the country.

The following chapter explores the existing literature about peace education, focusing on the conceptual models and themes that are linked with the definition of peace education, as well as identifying the gaps in the literature regarding the Somali context.

Chapter 3: Selected literature review

3.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews literature that is concerned with contemporary peace education issues and key themes and explores how they play out on the international stage. It examines the conceptual models of peace education. It also highlights the emerging issues from the literature and identifies the gap in the corpus of knowledge that justifies an in-depth study of the issues under investigation.

This literature explores some of the key concepts of peace education programmes and the contributions they made in different conflict contexts and what lessons can be learned in the Somali context.

Globally, violent conflict is on the increase (Snyder, 2017). Recent conflicts such as those in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Somalia have political, economic, and ideological dimensions in the names of religion, sectarianism, and tribalism. Although circumstances and the root causes of these violent conflicts vary, it can be argued that they are partly fuelled, dominated, and maintained by societal beliefs of the ethos of conflicts, such as collective memories (Bar-Tal, 2007) and supporting-conflict ethos via methods like de-legitimisation of the opponent and positive collective self-image (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2014), leading to social exclusion (Lake and Morgan, 2010, p.271).

Global conflict had changed characteristics since the 1950s when the conflict between the superpowers (the US and USSR) and the development of nuclear weapons seemed to threaten the survival of humanity at the height of the Cold War (Geller, 1990). More recent violent conflicts have different drivers and are usually fuelled by ideology or an ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007). Conflicts that are driven by ideology

can last for decades; the Arab-Israeli conflict is an example of an intractable conflict that has a central ideological dimension (Lake and Morgan, 2010, p.271). Somalia is another example of a conflict that has ideological underpinnings revolving around the role of religion and the issue of legitimacy (Harper, 2012).

Intractable conflicts are more complex to resolve than tractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2007). One of the key factors that make them challenging to resolve is the various complex actors that fuel the conflict and status quo (Bar-Tal, 2013). It is therefore essential to understand and identify the root causes of each conflict so that we can find the real issues that trigger the conflict (Harris and Morrison, 2012). As part of this endeavour, peace education may play a role in mitigating violent conflict before it becomes intractable, as well as helping with any reconciliation process (Harris and Morrison, 2012). The following section of this chapter describes in detail the meaning of peace education.

3.2 Conceptualisation of Education

Globally, the fundamental aim of schooling remains contested. Various publications and conferences, whether by academics or policymakers, vigorously emphasise the same issues of access to education, the benefits of gaining a formal education, its contribution to higher financial stability, the wellbeing of the individual, and the resulting economic growth for the society in general. Yet while these are valid goals and concerns, there are global debates regarding the role and the function of education in society, in particular societies that are in conflict or in a post-conflict context. In this regard peace education has developed a distinctive perspective of knowledge within the fields of education. In contrast with the long tradition in Western education, which has its origins in Plato and Aristotle, of definite and distinct disciplines of knowledge

that make up the divisions of curricula (Herman, 2014). Peace education has constantly maintained the significance of critiquing the separate 'silo' perspective of knowledge and promotes comprehending knowledge as holistic and interdisciplinary (Page, 2008).

For example, Haavelsruud (1996), analysed these aspects of knowledge and constructed a typology on various aspects of knowledge as either reforming, reinforcing, or transcending and argued that categorising and sorting people into distinct groups based on a system of preference (gender, race, and class) suppress social change, progress and achievements of peaceful societies.

In forming its own separate interdisciplinary perspective of knowledge, peace education naturally draws from various fields such as history, political science, psychology, sociology and economics. These concepts can be incorporated into the goals of peace education (Groff, 2002). Peace education can be interpreted as knowledge whose creditability is accomplished in its applied dimension. This suggests that peace education should not be seen as detached and the objective realm of knowledge as held by some traditional education philosophers.

The methods and the process of learning and teaching peace education have also been at the centre of debate. The learning model of peace education is based on the assumptions of human nature; learners play an active role in taking part in the learning experience, they also learn by reflecting on case studies in this regard, the learning process is activity-based rather than learning by repetitive conditioning and rote memorisation. The process of learning takes place through interaction and practical engagement as well as through the process of reflection and abstraction (Maxwell *et al.*, 2004).

The goals of peace education differ according to context and place. The emphasis, however, is towards social transformation and the creation of a world culture of peace. Regarding this, it is understood that the process and objectives are a dynamic and ongoing development in overcoming conflict and violence. Therefore, peace educators regard peace education as an essential aspect of education in multicultural societies globally.

Issues that peace education places emphasis on are related to structural inequality. Peace education aims to nurture a sense of transformation to construct new social and political structures that advance peace, human rights, and social justice (Bajaj, 2015). In this sense, postcolonial thinking can be associated with the goals of critical peace education. This supports the belief that modernity and colonialism are partially to blame for the structural inequalities seen in Somalia. Therefore, it is vital to recognise how structural and political realities affect our understanding of peace and pedagogies. Both postcolonial and critical peace education call for the contextualisation of solutions and the incorporation of local culture in order to gain legitimacy and win societal acceptance of the values of peace education.

3.3 Definition of peace education

The term peace education embodies a multitude of concepts which makes it difficult to give a fixed universal meaning (Haarvelsrud, 2008). There is little consensus about what peace education means and this is partly due to a lack of a universal theoretical framework and what concepts should (and should not) be included in peace education (Salomon and Kupermintz, 2002; Buckland, 2006 ;Harris and Morrison, 2012). Reardon (1988, p.19) asserts that 'there are as yet no clear and precise limits to, nor standards for, what is to be included in peace education.'

The definition of peace education depends on how the concept of 'peace' is defined (Harris and Morrison, 2012). There are various definitions of peace education, depending on the content and context any given programme seeks to address (Calleja and Perucca, 1999). The United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF, 2013) defines peace education as 'a process geared towards promoting values, skills, and even attitudes essential to bring about change in behaviour among the adult population, youth and the children to avert conflict and violence'. The process may be both structural and overt, to support the creation of conducive conditions to peace and resolve conflict at all levels (Momodu, 2015). Throughout the present study, UNICEF's definition of peace education is utilised because of its comprehensive nature.

The multi-diversity of peace education educators and their experiences in different conflicts contribute to their construction of the meaning of peace and what particular education can be used to foster a culture of peace (Reardon, 1988). Different scholars and practitioners have framed peace education in a variety of ways and contexts (Harris and Morrison, 2012; Lauritzen, 2013). Programmes such as disarmament education during the Cold War, education for mutual understanding in Northern Ireland, and education about the atomic bomb and its destructive potential are all examples of peace education programmes (Porter, 2003).

3.4 Educating for reconciliation

The term reconciliation can be defined as a voluntary process of addressing and healing the fractured relationships resulting from a conflict (Smith, 2005). This thesis utilises this definition as it is consistent with the ultimate goals of peace education: to establish a culture of peace (Kester, 2012). The ultimate goal of peace education is to establish a culture of peace where every individual adopts a sense of universal values

that lead to mutual understanding and reconciliation (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Kester, 2012). This section will review the literature concerning peace education as a tool for reconciliation.

Violent conflict creates psychologically wounded and traumatised populations. Therefore, to make a future of violence less likely, it is imperative to bolster the healing process (Staub et al., 2007). For people who value peaceful resolution of conflicts and other concerned educators, a fundamental issue is the ability of peace education to facilitate a change in the socio-psychological infrastructure that fuels the continuation of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Depending on any conflict's setting, conflict resolution discourse analyses the suitability of potential strategies of reconciliation. It creates more space for various dialogue techniques through the tactics that are guided by a problem-solving philosophy (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008). It is argued that there is established trust between warring groups when education programmes are instigated (Redekop, 2007). However, for reconciliation to achieve its intended objectives, a transformation must occur in the entire community rather than between political leaders alone (Deutsch, 2008). For instance, in Northern Ireland, peace education has been hailed as the successful resolution of one of the most intractable conflicts in the world (Nolan, 2007).

There have been many efforts globally to build peace after intractable conflicts. While some interventions are unsuccessful, others are effective in creating a culture of peace in the concerned societies (Parver and Wolf, 2008), suggesting a need to change the culture of conflict through a shared socio-psychological range (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). There is also a requirement to develop a new repertoire that facilitates the peace-making process and prepares societies' members to live in peace when the peaceful resolution of conflict appears on the societal agenda and turns into a

communal agenda (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). The process of reconciliation in which peace education plays a significant part has the potential to trigger this pivotal societal, psychological change (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009).

Reconciliation concerns the making and restoration of peaceful relationships between groups, communities, and societies that have been affected by violent conflict (Jhazbay, 2008; Strupinskienė, 2017). The process is triggered after the formal resolution is achieved based on acceptance, mutual trust, positive attitudes and consideration of other groups' interests and demands (De Soto, 1999). These are some of the enabling elements of reconciliation for building peaceful relations which are based on mutual interests and respect (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). These vested interests form intergroup relations and serve as a solid ground for cooperative acts and sustainable peace (Theidon, 2006).

For reconciliation to be successful, it must be supported by the majority of the members of the society. This support provides legitimacy for the peace education programmes to be implemented (Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal, 2007). For example, Myanmar was one of the countries in which NGOs such as UNESCO promoted peace education to be used as one of the tools to heal conflict-induced trauma and create a culture of peace (Kester, 2013). However, human rights groups blame the authorities in Myanmar for actively fuelling the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims (Beyrer and Kamarulzaman, 2017). This indicates that peace education projects implemented in the country were not effective in preventing the escalation of armed conflict. The experience of peace education programmes in Myanmar illustrates that schools alone cannot resolve the complex issues of ethnic and ideological armed conflict (UNESCO, 2011; Okechukwu, 2015). A more inclusive and holistic approach that looks at the education system, education structure, contents and processes as well as political ideology is required to

help bring about peace. Cole (2007) argues that the process of reconciliation needs to be inclusive of all members of society at the grassroots level and in institutions. Reconciliation also needs the mobilisation of the masses to support the reconciliation. Peace education requires social transformation, so conflict-affected communities and societies need to be ripe for genuine reconciliation since peace education creates new goals and new views of the rival as well as new historical narratives. Without a readiness to accept reconciliation, it is difficult to implement peace education programmes successfully (Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009).

Finally, reconciliation needs a change in the socio-psychological state of emotions, the ethos of conflict, and collective narratives that triggered and fuelled the violent conflict in the first place. It also requires close collaboration between authorities, civil society groups and all stakeholders of the conflict to have a positive impact on people's lives. These changes are gradual and require planned and active efforts to overcome the barriers to peace and reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Education can be both a source of indoctrination and a source of freedom. 'Education either functions as an instrument to bring about conformity or it becomes the practice of freedom, the means by which men and women ... discover how to participate in the transformation of their world' (Breault, 2003, p.34). This is to say that although educational spaces can be used to nurture values such as violence, war, militarism, tribalism, religious sectarianism, and other antagonisms (Sundar, 2004; Cohen et al., 2016), it can also be used to promote and empower the capacity for peace, justice, nonviolence, dignity, respect for diversity, and the dismantling of structures of violence (Galtung and Höivik, 1971; Miall, 2004; Harris and Morrison, 2012). It is essential,

therefore, that education systems be closely examined and evaluated to determine their potential to exacerbate or ameliorate conflict (Smith and Vaux, 2003).

Reconciliation between warring sides needs specific skills and contextual knowledge of the issues that triggered conflict in the first place. Reardon (1988), who is one of the pioneers of peace education, emphasises that peace education requires ‘the transformation of knowledge about requirements of, the obstacles to, and possibilities for achieving and maintaining peace; training in skills for interpreting the knowledge; and the development of reflective and participatory capacities for applying the knowledge to overcome problems and achieve possibilities’ (Reardon, 1988, p.399). Therefore, peace education requires not only transforming the many aspects of educational practices such as the relationship between educators, learners, relevant systems, and the criteria for measuring the learning outcomes, but also the pedagogy, contents, and structures (Brantmeier and Bajaj, 2013).

3.5 Characteristics of intractable conflicts

This section focuses on the characteristics of intractable conflict such as that which has engulfed Somalia in last quarter of a century, the drivers of such conflicts, and the peace education programmes and barriers to their implementation in conflict-affected societies.

In the context of Somalia, the history of conflict in the country reveals an intriguing paradox that is made up of various factors that not only triggered the armed conflict but also expedited the managing and controlling of the war (Yusuf, 2012; Solomon, 2014). For instance, the use of clannism and clan cleavages to fuel endemic clashes over resources, to mobilise mercenaries, and to form division are the main causes of conflict that have inhibited the reconciliation process in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2010).

Violent conflict in a community or society or between groups erupts when the intentions, goals, and actions are perceived as mutually incompatible, and action follows accordingly (Mitchell, 1981). To resolve violent conflict, it is therefore important to understand in-depth the type of conflict, its actors and stakeholders as well as the underpinning political ideology and ethos of conflict that drives and sustains the status quo in the conflict.

Understanding the political ideology and ethos of conflict helps find a resolution for violent conflicts (Bar-Tal, 1989). The most difficult conflicts are those interlinked with political ideology (Bar-Tal, 2007). This particular type of conflict is referred to as an intractable conflict. Intractable conflicts are ideologically based, have goals that are perceived to be violent, and are zero-sum in nature (Azar, 1990; Bar-Tal, 2007). As a result, conflict drags on for more extended periods and gets harder to resolve (Bar-Tal, 2007).

A good example is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is argued that some of the factors that exacerbate the conflict are the various actors and stakeholders who have different political and ideological agendas actively fuelling the conflict and benefiting from the continuation of the status quo (Salomon, 2004). In addition, Bar-Tal (2007) points out that collective memories, the ethos of conflict, and emotional orientations to be some of the drivers that maintain the continuation of intractable or protracted conflict (Fisher, 1997). The collective memory of conflict develops a description of the history and narrative to be told to members of society (Cairns and Roe, 2003). The ethos of conflict provides the political and ideological orientation, which is dominant in a society, and these dominant orientations direct the future of society (Bar-Tal, 2000a; Wertsch, 2002). Rather than proving an objective account of reality, the narratives about the 'other' are selective, distorted and biased so that they satisfy the needs of a specific

group or community in society (Salomon, 2004). This collective narrative provides a strong rationale for all parts in the conflict to claim to be the legitimate victim in the conflict and therefore portray the rival as the aggressor (Rotberg, 2006).

3.6 Challenges of peace education in intractable conflicts

Numerous challenges face the implementation of peace education programmes in conflict-ridden societies. Collective narratives and these challenges pose a serious threat to the likelihood of peace education having a positive impact on the conflict. The following sections discuss some of these challenges in detail in the context of intractable conflict.

3.6.1 Collective narratives and historical memories

Beyond political opposition, other challenges hinder the implementation of peace in conflict-ridden countries: collective narratives, historical memories and more (Salomon and Cairns, 2011). Collective narratives are among the most notable phenomena in situations of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000b). In these situations, the emotional orientation is spread through societal channels of communication directly or indirectly appearing to be dominant in public discourse. Bar-Tal (2000b) highlights that messages of fear, hate, and anger can then be infused into cultural products – plays, poems, books, and films – evolving into the culture of conflict, which will be difficult to change. Leaders in societies capitalise on these emotions and use them to justify their policies and decisions (Ross, 1998). Young people are the most vulnerable to indoctrination in this context as they are receiving distorted information through the media, cultural products, and other channels of societal communication (Berman, 2000). When this occurs, by the time children have become adults, most share the same attitude, views, emotions, and beliefs (Berman, 2000). It is essential to point out

that the education system in this context contributes to a culture of conflict through instructional materials and textbooks (Uwazie, 2003).

A good example of this is the biased history curriculum taught in schools in Rwanda before the genocide of 1994 (Staub, 2006). It is argued that some of the historical narratives featured in the genocide propaganda in the early 1990s played a fundamental role in instilling ethnic division and fear in the Hutu population (Mamdani, 2001). It can be argued that factors such as the collective emotional orientation of fear, together with the teacher-centred pedagogy, helped to mobilise a large number of students to take part in the genocide (Hilker, 2011).

In conflict, each side considers itself to be the victim and uses its collective narrative of the conflict to justify its claims about the 'other' as being the perpetrator. Each group has its collective memory, and these memories play a vital role in the group's sense of identity, purpose, and belief in its moral standing (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009; Brown, 2009). From this perspective, it can be argued that these historical memories which are collectively held by the group fuel the conflict as it provides the bases for prejudices and stereotypes against their adversaries. Short term peace education programmes of intergroup courses may not be effective at adequately addressing collective memories, narratives, and positive self-image (self-presentation as a victim) as well use of political and cultural negative labels and stereotypes to delegitimise the adversary (Bar-Tal, 1989). These challenges call for specific, tailored solutions for each problem and not the universal one-size-fits-all solution that peace education prescribes for all conflicts and contexts (Bajaj, 2008; Zembylas and Charalambous, 2015). Therefore, for peace education to help bring viable peace, there must be a genuine reconciliation so that society can reflect on its past rationally, examine the underpinning causes of the conflict and go through the process of reconciliation (Zembylas, 2007). The process of

reconciliation needs to be inclusive of all members of society at grassroots levels and through institutions.

3.7 Conceptual models of peace education

A need arises for a framework for peace education that is suited to inter-clan conflict in regions like Somalia. Outwardly, different forces influence each conflict. Therefore, an approach that integrates the attitudes, concepts, and values of the community can ensure better outcomes. There are various models and themes of peace education which have evolved in different contexts around the world. This reflects the growth of social movements and progressive education in the last five decades (Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace, 2008). All these aspects contribute to the development of a culture of peace (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009).

3.7.1 Concepts and values of peace education

Since all conflicts are dynamic and have different characteristics, the idea that a one-size-fits-all peace education programme heals all conflict can be seen as a myth (Bajaj and Brantmeier, 2011). Depending on the conflict context, peace education programmes should be incorporated locally to accommodate various characteristics, concepts, values and goals (Harris, 2004). Consequently, 'the nature of peace education goals and objectives are dictated by the issues that preoccupy a specific society' (Bar-Tal, 2002, p.28). According to Bar-Tal and Rosen (2009), there are five major themes in the indirect peace education model; these themes support the establishment of a new culture of peace conducive to peace and reconciliation processes through the construction of new attitudes, skills, beliefs, and emotions. Bar-Tal and Rosen (2009) propose the following themes: reflective thinking, tolerance, ethno-empathy, human rights, and conflict resolution. These themes help develop an

enabling environment for peace and reconciliation through the encouragement of openness, scepticism, criticism, the sensitivity of human rights, knowledge, and empathy. This approach assumes that fostering humanistic and democratic values serves as an essential platform for peace education in conflict-affected countries (Bajaj, 2008).

3.7.2 Reflective thinking

Several authors have suggested that critical reflection of available alternatives is often crucial, especially in the case of intractable conflicts (Bajaj, 2008; Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Reflective thinking involves questioning dominant societal beliefs, prevailing assumptions, and ideologies about issues that underlie the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Reflective thinking facilitates learning from the experience through reflection and deeply evaluating and analysing the available options for decision making (Fetherston and Kelly, (2007). This requires specific skills for analysing the contested issues. Therefore, one of the conditions for reflective thinking requires open-mindedness about issues without prejudice and partisanship (Breault, 2003). Reflective thinking provides the public with the ability to evaluate social and political issues and the root causes of the conflict. This type of thinking helps students to critically assess the underlying issues that fuel a violent conflict that their society is engaged in (Fetherston and Kelly, 2007).

3.7.2.1 Tolerance

The second theme of the indirect model of peace education is tolerance. Tolerance involves the ability and openness to allow, bear, and hear messages that are critical of the views of one's opponent and it requires acceptance and recognition of the rights of all communities and groups to exercise their beliefs, attitudes, and their will (Fountain,

1999). According to Sullivan et al. (1981), tolerance can be divided into two categories: political tolerance and social understanding. Political tolerance refers to the ability to put up with the views or actions that one opposes; it requires restraint in the face of criticism, and it implies restraint when confronted with disliked practices or groups (Mendus, 1989). Social understanding refers to the ability to accept other diverse groups and their representatives (Gibson and Claassen, 2010). In addition, social tolerance is about controlling and preventing the stereotypes and prejudices towards other groups, which can lead to political intolerance (Gibson and Claassen, 2010). Therefore, both social and political tolerance is vital in promoting open dialogue over controversial issues that would otherwise carry the fear of sanctions or social stigma. With regards to the role of peace education, Iram (2006) has the view that tolerance can be learned and practised in society. He argues that being tolerant means being able to have an open-minded and thoughtful dialogue about contested issues and eliminate prejudices, biased views, and attitudes (Iram, 2006). Some people blame Islam for contributing to violent global conflicts (Klepper, 2014). Others argue that misconstrued interpretations of the Quran for political gain are to blame (Mythen et al., 2009). Kaleem and Ahmed (2010) point out that the Quran promotes freedom of religion and tolerance, stressing that there are more than 100 verses in the Quran that relate to tolerance, forgiveness, and freedom of choice in religion. However, the aspects of Islamic values that promote coexistence, tolerance, and freedom do not often get the full attention of the Western media (Mythen et al., 2009). Instead, they mainly focus on discourses and interpretations of Islamic figures in different contexts and times who proclaim hate and divisiveness to strengthen their own stances and bolster their own legitimacy in their communities (Dowd, 2016).

Moreover, intolerance towards 'others' is influenced by one's way of life and a belief in superiority to other groups. Peace education challenges these societal beliefs and facilitates debates in societies engaged in violent conflict (Africa, 2011). Therefore, one important tool for developing tolerance is to reduce the perceptions and the sources of fear and anger that can promote hate towards others (Iram, 2006).

3.7.2.2 *Ethno-empathy*

Another theme of peace education is ethno-empathy, the ability of a person to experience what another person feels and thinks and to understand the emotional state the person is experiencing (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Hoffman (2000) theorises that empathy is associated with two interconnected parts. Cognitive empathy leads to cognitive awareness of other people's feelings, thoughts, and intentions. On the other hand, affective empathy is the delegated or vicarious affective acknowledgement of another person. Ethno-empathy is the ability to experience vicariously what the other feels, enabling one to see others as equal human beings (Salomon, 2011). One encouraging way of promoting empathy is to support 'perspective talking' which refers to seeing the world through the eyes of the other person's emotions, feelings, and behaviour in a particular situation (Hoffman, 2000).

3.7.2.3 *Human rights*

Specifying what it means to be human is the guiding principle of peace education. To that end, it is essential to perceive schools as foundations in building peace across different learning communities (Morah, 2000). However, the creation of a human rights culture has been considered challenging in developing countries, particularly tribal societies such as Somalia (Kupermintz and Salomon, 2005). The initial point in this discussion should be on emphasising that teaching human rights in the context of

peace education is dissimilar to teaching other subjects (Novelli and Cardozo, 2008). In a tribal culture, learning about human rights is challenged to the most substantial degree as some tribes claim a higher social status, with more political and historical legitimacy than other minority clans in Somalia (Morah, 2000; Lewis, 2002). Professionals in the field, therefore, consider that the concept of human rights cannot be easily implemented in such societies (Green and Little, 2009).

The concept of human rights is one of the contested concepts of peace education programmes. Peace education has been criticised for promoting an educational curriculum embedded with a Western and Eurocentric view of the world (Ignatieff, 2003), thus belittling the role of local cultures and local norms leading to a reduced sense of local ownership (Cooper, 2007).

In the Somali context, according to the findings, human rights are perceived to have a political dimension and some hidden agenda by external countries. The inclusion of human rights is vital in peace education is vital in understanding the rights of all citizens. For example, the right to human rights education (HRE) is detailed in Rights the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human (UDHR) which emphasises " the dignity of worth of the human person "and "the equal rights of men and women" According to Article 26 of UDHR, the aim of education should include "the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" including the promotion of "understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations, racial or religious groups" as well as the "the maintenance of peace". Furthermore, human dignity is a principle that is currently accepted to entail the fundamental innate worth of a person (Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace, 2008). However, peace education has not been emphasised in the practices of many communities, governments, and other stakeholders (Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace, 2008). The intent of human dignity is to remove any barriers

that limit the full potential of people and provide awareness of their rights (Reardon, 2010). The promotion of these values is aimed at mitigating hostilities and stereotypes between warring groups (Harris and Morrison, 2012). Nation-states have therefore an obligation to ratify and promote such education to contribute to the peaceful co-existence of societies and communities in the wider world.

However, teaching human rights education has been extremely challenging in conflict-ridden countries due to the controversies existing between Western and Eastern ideologies and philosophies applied to social and political life (Davies, 2004). The major argument behind the inconsistent application of human rights pedagogy is that it may represent a strong political orientation (Bajaj, 2008). These political dimensions create tension and suspicion that these programmes are intended to promote Western political and economic interests, ideas and a Eurocentric view in terms of imposing Western culture and norms (Novelli and Cardozo, 2008).

3.7.2.4 Conflict resolution

The systematic complexity of clashes in conflict-torn regions such as Somalia necessitates the study of conflict resolution (Samatar, 2001). Redefining cosmopolitan values and clarifying the role of conflict resolution in the uncertain Somali conflict is important to policymakers. There is an abundance of literature concerning peace education in post-war societies and contexts (Salomon, 2004; Bajaj, 2008; Bekerman and Zembylas, 2011b). This is especially the case when conflict resolution and citizenship education are part of peace education. For instance, the peace education literature discusses integrated learning that positively impacted on the acceptance of differences in culture, religion and other cross-cultural relationships in the US (Gross and Davies, 2015). It was also found to have encouraged forgiveness, promoted out-

of-group friendship, inspired cultural understanding and tolerance, lessened prejudiced views, and positively affected the Irish cultural identity of the citizens of Northern Ireland (McGlynn, 2009).

Essentially, conflicts are the result of competing interests such as for land, power, territory, independence, and language (Salomon, 2002, p.32). Saloman (2002) notes that educational failure in affirming multiculturalism sponsors conflicts as it undermines integration and the acceptance of competing views. The emphasis is about controlling the other sides competing opinions and views instead of participation (Al-Haj, 1998). He further argues that dominant cultures usually tend to welcome some expression of a minority populations' differences and the uniqueness of their customs as long as those groups show loyalty and do not challenge hegemonic traditions. This means that the concept of acceptance is superficial. Naturally, education is grounded in the idea of introducing groups to each other and ensuring the principles of justice and equality.

In addition, contestation and violence are worsened by the assumption of winners and losers in each conflict which means that players are not motivated to overcome hostility and create a contact for better collaboration (Gross and Davies,2015). In this approach, national identity is assumed to be homogenous, and any challenge is viewed as an obstacle to national harmony. Third, power relations deepen negative contestation and conflict as it increases differences and inequality between groups in social and economic settings (Al-Haj, 1998). Traditional schooling systems and curricula usually reflect dominant cultures and their power relations (Gross and Davies, 2015). Davies (2014), suggesting that hegemonic groups in dominated systems derive interests that promote the preservation of the status quo from schooling systems that encourage negative contestations and suppress positive change. The curriculum, they add, mirrors and reinforces the dominant culture and promotes prejudice against

minority customs and opinions. The fourth factor concerns the neglect of the role played by religion in conflicts (Davies, 2014).

Conflict resolution aims to construct a worldview, that is, the emotions, values, attitudes, skills, motivations, beliefs, and patterns of behaviour that the societies members occupy as a whole (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Harris states (2004), conflict resolution can provide a basis for understanding the complexities of conflict and the application of communication skills in assisting individuals in managing peaceful relationships. According to Lauritzen (2013), the basic human skills taught in conflict resolution include emotional awareness, anger management, impulse control, problem-solving, assertiveness, and self-control. Conflict resolution is mainly related to mediation skills (Lauritzen, 2013). Additionally, conflict resolution is an important aspect of peace education because of the inculcation of non-violent behaviour (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Approaches such as mediation and collaborative problem solving are imperative in improving the quality of human relationships and develop constructive, fair and practical solutions for all parties in the situation (Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace, 2008). According to Bretherton et al. (2002), there is a need for a deeper understanding of the term peace that takes the local meaning into account as this would help understand the needs of the conflict stakeholders. The skills of conflict resolution can be seen as one of the most important aspects of peace education (Harris, 2004). Conflict resolution is about resolving and transforming conflict and is another important theme of peace education (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Various factors can cause conflict within the immediate setting such as challenging behaviours, misunderstanding, incompatibility of ideas, desire for revenge, and power struggles within intergroup situations, to name just a few (Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace, 2008). The efficacy of conflict transformation is notable because it involves

constructing change initiatives which surpass the resolution of a particular problem (Lederach, 2015).

All the proposed models of peace education are significant for the framework of peace and each has the ability to contribute to a culture of peace in the post-conflict era. Salomon and Cairns (2011) also point out that these models have the potential to help students to act with tolerance and to adopt skills to resolve conflicts.

3.8 Pedagogy of peace education

Educating for peace has been considered a holistic process represented by various aspects and objectives pertaining to the recognition that individuals are taught to appreciate the values of peace, social justice, and cooperation. The dynamics of the topic have been extensively explored in the literature (Green and Little, 2009). Pedagogy of peace education is focused on developing human beings' social consciousness and capacity to reason (Andrzejewski et al., 2009). In order to attain similar goals, educators rely on various critical and reflective approaches to deliver peace education. It has been suggested that such learning processes should be centred around the individual needs and expectations of the student (Bekalo et al., 2003). It is important to note that the contribution of each individual student is significant in advancing the purposes of the entire educational process. This means that educators favour extensively different opportunities for interaction and active engagement among diverse groups of students. Open and honest communication is at the core of peace education pedagogy (Reardon and Snauwaert, 2015).

It appears that peace education pedagogy can be implemented in a wide range of subjects and areas of teaching. At the same time, specific themes can be integrated into other subject domains which helps learners achieve a better understanding of the

holistic process of peace education (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). One of the key pedagogical principles of peace education is associated with holism that emphasises the linkages between all issues. From this pedagogical perspective, all the issues taught to students are multifaceted and dynamic by nature. As a result, individuals are provided with a distinct opportunity to comprehend the complexity of various relationships, which means that their critical capacity is challenged constantly (Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace, 2008; Cremin, 2016).

Another formal principle of peace education pedagogy is identified as values formation. Such an approach implies that all knowledge conveyed to students manifests specific values which can be identified as transparency, integrity, compassion, and teamwork (Dunkwu, 2015). Peace educators are focused on teaching similar values in an extensive range of educational interventions (Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace, 2008). Moreover, a dialogue is considered an informal but useful pedagogical approach to peace education as it creates the preconditions for a more fruitful relationship between teachers and learners. In this context, educating and learning from each other represent the core of peace education (Kupermintz and Salomon, 2005). In turn, such an approach opens new horizons for the critical empowerment of students in the long term (Green and Little, 2009). It is apparent that learners constantly try to develop and maintain their critical consciousness which can help them reconcile unfavourable realities into a culture of long-lasting peace. For example, the use of corporal punishment is commonly used in many parts of the world, mainly in Africa and Asia. There is vast evidence that shows this practice might sometimes provide a quick short-term deterrent, it has little effect on any a long- term behavioural change and can lead to the creation of culture of war and violence as it justifies the use of force as a

legitimate tool in behavioural management. The practice also has a detrimental psychological, physical, and emotional impact on children's lives (UNICEF, 2001).

In the context of Somalia, the government lacks the institutional capacity to inspect and regulate the contents and quality of education taught in the school (Harper, 2012). There are no national policies safeguarding children's rights against corporal punishment (Green and Little, 2009). These challenges suggest the difficulties of peace education implementation in Somalia (Milton and Barakat, 2016).

3.9 Contemporary trends

Peace education utilises teaching and learning, which not only pays attention to dismantling all forms of violence but also crafting structures that build and sustain a just and equitable peace in the world (Galtung, 1990). Since World War II, the field of peace education has emerged as a global field of scholarship and practice (Lauritzen, 2013). As a discipline, peace education is not institutionalised as 'there is no one standard field but a variety of subfields loosely held together by a few common purposes' (Reardon, 2000, p.398). There is a strong relationship between the field of peace education and peace study (Harris and Morrison, 2012). Both areas emphasise the importance of analysing the nature of violence in all its forms. For example, for comprehensive peace to be accomplished, it is vital that both 'negative peace' (the eradication of direct and physical violence) as well as 'positive peace' (the termination of structural and cultural violence) are addressed (Galtung, 1990).

Furthermore, there are various forms of violence. For instance, direct violence can be demonstrated by torture, rape, war, and militarism. Whereas, indirect violence is exemplified by structural and cultural forms of violence, which in Somali include colonialism, racism, and tribalism/clannism. The atrocities are exclusions that are

culturally condoned, which then confers a privilege to some based on tribal lineage and identity while degrading others on the same basis (Samatar, 2001). Peace education seeks to dismantle conflicts by understanding and helping to educate students on how to analyse the root causes of different forms of violence in societies (Harris, 2012).

However, peace education is not confined to this analysis; it also aims to create new models of institutional structures through curricula, pedagogy, dialogue-based sessions, and various perspectives on historical narratives (Reardon, 2000; Bekerman and Zemlyas, 2011; Brantmeier, 2011). An analysis of the early literature relating to peace education, including authors such as Reardon (2000), Staub (2002), Page (2008), and Harris and Morrison (2012), showed that the vast majority of printed scholarly articles regarding peace education emphasised the local and international trends from Western perspectives (Reardon, 2000; Harris and Morrison, 2012).

In recent years, more critical approaches to the field of peace education have been on the rise. These critical approaches have produced theories and understandings from multi-disciplinary frameworks while emphasising marginalised voices and histories to contribute to peace education theory and practice from broader perspectives and broader geographical coverage (Bajaj, 2008). These new critical perspectives strengthened peace education scholarship from regions like Israel-Palestine, South Africa, and Cyprus, to name a few (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Moreover, Brantmeier and Bajaj (2013) argue that these critical perspectives offer researchers the contextual and conceptual resources for comprehending the structural impediments to peace. Instead of supporting the status quo reproduction, the critical perspectives in peace education intend to empower students as transformative agents of change who are capable of critically analysing power dynamics and intersectional ties such as race, religion, class, gender, and other forms of stratification (Bajaj, 2013).

There are several fundamental underlying principles that distinguish critical peace education from regular peace education. Firstly, although all peace educators draw from the analysis of violence, critical peace educators tend to focus on how different social relations should inform both peace education and conforming social action (Haavelsrud, 2008). Secondly, critical peace education puts more emphasis on local conceptions and local realities of peace, highlighting marginalised voices by using community-based research, oral histories, narratives, and locally produced curricula. Thirdly, the analysis of critical education may be drawn from the theory of social reproduction (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990) which considers schools as potential places of transformation and marginalisation as well as viewing multiple spaces within and outside state-run schools as channels for liberation and social change (Bajaj, 2015).

The field of peace education has taken a new direction. The scope of peace education has broadened and become more inclusive of areas such as citizenship studies, human rights education, multicultural education, and social justice education (Bajaj, 2008). Human rights education has also become the framework for the right to education, approaches to teacher training, and the reform of textbooks (Zembylas, 2011a; Al-Daraweesh and Snauwaert, 2015). Together, these different multidisciplinary and geographical trends have shifted peace education into a new and broader direction.

Various scholars have presented the need to evaluate the past understanding of peace to build a new and better comprehension for the future (Bekerman and Zembylas, 2011b; Williams and Cummings, 2015). Few studies, though, have managed to address the efficacy of peace education in inter-ethnic groups (Schimmel, 2009). Some of the valuable literature that addresses the concept of peace education is written in

languages that make it difficult for practitioners and policymakers to access (Tomlinson and Benefield, 2005). Furthermore, the places of publications of some of the literature might cause various studies to be irrelevant to some scholars (Tomlinson and Benefield, 2005). Bekerman (2007, p.24) also identifies the need for creating recognition, familiarity, and acceptance of rapprochement or cultural differences by establishing harmonised categories of peace education.

The field of peace education is increasingly gaining recognition within national and global organisations which provide courses, conferences and seminars that enhance public awareness concerning war and peace (Harris and Morrison, 2012). Salomon and Cairns (2011) insist literature should be broader to bolster the existing knowledge within peace education. The different perspectives of peace also require unique forms of peace education in order to identify strategies that could successfully solve the conflict (Salomon and Cairns, 2011). The literature review also incorporated some countries such as Sierra Leone that have been underrepresented in most of the peace education literature (Bekerman and McGlynn, 2007). Brantmeier (2013, p.255) notes that it is essential to provide a critical approach to peace education to provide some clarity into the power constructs that perpetuate violence.

This includes the use of theory to strengthen the effect of peace education in the long run (Ashton, 2007). Peace education is open to many different political interpretations, making the whole field difficult to treat in a scholarly manner (Brock-Utne, 2000).

The following sections will explore the experiences of four countries as a way to contextualise the present study.

3.10 Geographic comparison of peace education

This section analyses a series of peace education policies and programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya, Rwanda, and Northern Ireland to establish the effectiveness of the initiatives. Learning about the peace education strategies applied in these nations can show how the environmental and economic factors contribute to peace education in different contexts (Lauritzen, 2013). Taking these into account allows for a comparison of the effectiveness of particular education programmes and explores their relatability and transferability to other similar conflicts around the world which would provide a clearer depiction of the role of peace education in conflict nations such as Somalia. First, there was the idea of equality in the Rwandese education system as well as teacher-centred skills (Hilker, 2011). Second, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was the Education for Peace Programme that fostered a culture of peace based on unity and diversity (Clarke-Habibi, 2005). Third, the peace education programmes in Kenya are not treated as standalone projects, but rather, they are integrated into all subjects with a view to promoting national cohesion (Lauritzen, 2013). Lastly, in Northern Ireland, there is Integrated Peace Education, which focuses on bringing together all cultures in an environment of openness and understanding (Pickett, 2008). The following sections will explore the experiences of five diverse countries who have implemented peace education strategies.

3.10.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Many of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not accept the principles that the constitutional democracy presented after the war (Sara Clarke-Habibi, 2018).

The lack of acceptance was mainly attributed to the sharp divisions between ethnic groups and the authoritarian nature of the government (Danesh, 2008). The teaching

methods, education systems, syllabus, and the school environment contributed significantly to the creation of stereotypes along ethnic lines as well as inculcating racial intolerance and exclusion (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). This was so severe that school-aged children were separated based on their national groups with one portion going in the morning while the other attended similar classes in the afternoon. As a result, children and adolescents, as well as the adult population, continued to experience lingering memories of the war along with the fear and frustrations of generalisations based on ethnic grounds (Clarke-Habibi, 2005).

Peace education was recognised as an essential part of the peace process in the country for the first time in the Bonn Conference (Clarke-Habibi, 2005). The Bonn Conference was a council meeting held in December 1997 to discuss the role of political institutions and the international community in the peace process in Bosnia (Clarke-Habibi, 2005). It was in the resulting article that provisions were made for education as the key to achieving understanding and reconciliation between the religious and ethnic groups. Interestingly, the government of the country was not the first to take responsibility for the education reforms, but rather, the international community was (Clarke-Habibi, 2005). In 2002, peace education was made a priority by the international community which assigned the responsibility for education reforms to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

There has been a transformative result for peace in the country among interpersonal, intercommunity, and inter-institutional relations that can be attributed to education (Clarke-Habibi 2005). According to Gross and Davies (2015), the integrative nature of peace education in schools, as well as the community at large, has been essential in contributing to the healing process in warring societies, which eases the path for peace, reconciliation, and cohesion. This has been made possible with the use of conceptual

elements from the theory of peace where there has been the successful systematic introduction of the principles and practices of education for peace into the operation of various schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Danesh, 2008).

3.10.2 Rwanda

During their genocide, Rwanda attracted international attention and the need for reconstruction and the crafting of national cohesion through commissions was apparent. The genocide was the mass slaughter of the Tutsi tribe in Rwanda by the Hutus, the majority community, in a span of 100 days in 1994 (Staub, 2006). Presently, the government strives to combat any ideological perceptions that are aligned towards disrupting the national cohesion (Bar-Tal and Rosen 2009). According to Mafeza (2013), this is the primary reason for the over-emphasis on education as the critical tool to prevent any disintegration among the Rwandans and to foster unity and reconciliation. For instance, the point mentioned above is substantiated by Lauritzen (2013) who observed that any peace-building policy should emulate that of Rwanda, who five years after the genocide scrapped the tribal and regional limitations of access to education, a critical aspect of increasing Rwanda's social cohesion. This is because the lack of access to education for all citizens was noted as one of the principal causes of the genocide. This was also the case before the war with the system being marred by discrimination, injustice, and a criterion where only those in power had access to opportunities (Lauritzen, 2013).

3.10.3 Kenya

The government of Kenya recognises the role of peace as an important aspect of socio-economic development. This is the main emphasis of the national anthem as well as the goal of national education, both of which endeavour to promote respect for diversity, national unity, peace, sustainable development, and international

consciousness (Chiriswa and Thinguri, 2015). In Kenya, the main approaches to peace education are through conflict resolution programmes which assist in tracking the causes of the dispute as well as the unfulfilled needs to transform relationships and perceptions with the intention of avoiding a possible reoccurrence (Wosyanju and Ayieko, 2014).

The aftermath of a controversial general election in 2007 damaged the peace and stability of the country as well as its conflict resolution mechanisms (Khadiagala, 2009). The conflict was between ethnic warring groups, both armed and unarmed, which resulted in loss of life and the destruction of property (Kungu, Omuri, and Kipsang, 2015). With the assistance of the international community, the country applied a series of mediation programmes that culminated in the national accord and achievement of peace (Khadiagala, 2009). Presently, the spreading of peace messages is accompanied by the engagement in peace theory as the means to fight conflict (Lauritzen, 2013).

3.10.4 Northern Ireland

The political aspirations of the Unionists and the Nationalists, as well as the labels of the Protestants and Catholics, were the central cause of the conflict in Ireland which also suggests that the conflict was a political, economic, and religious dispute (Smith, 1999). The perpetuation of old grievances, the deepening of the community divisions, and the deterioration of the economy were some of the leading causes of the conflict (Barnes, 2005). However, Barnes (2005) notes that the main cause of this dispute was the myriad of misunderstandings between the Catholics and Protestants. All this was subject to change after the referendum for cooperation, partnership, and healing of those hurt following 30 years of destruction and murder in the country. The peace-building process in the country constituted a mandate for every citizen from the private,

statutory, political, and community sectors to cooperate and take responsibility for creating a peaceful and stable society that saw the need for diversity (Gross and Davies, 2015).

3.10.5 Sierra Leone

In 1991, civil war broke out in Sierra Leone and lasted for more than a decade (Keen, 2003). The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group responsible for some of the worst atrocities during the conflict, and the national army abducted children from the villages they attacked (Betancourt et al., 2008). The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MOEST) and other stakeholders monitored and coordinated the delivery of education services in Sierra Leone. However, the war and the resulting loss of infrastructure compromised the delivery of educational services. This has resulted in the provision of education programmes by various actors to deliver emergency services for the past two decades (Bretherton et al., 2003). Wessells (2005) suggests that peace education is a crucial element in Sierra Leone to prevent the engagement of youths in terrorism and violence and for the reintegration of former child soldiers. The issue of juvenile justice has had new prominence in Sierra Leone amid the subject of children's responsibility for their actions during the war around the administration of transitional justice (Shepler, 2005). This allows child soldiers who were below 18 years old during the war to be forgiven for their atrocities (Shepler, 2005).

Within the geographical comparison made above, a key feature of each country's approach is some notion of reconciliation. Therefore, the following section reviews the factors that enable the reconciliation process.

3.11 Conclusion

The selected literature reveals that the field of peace education is a complex and moving landscape; to begin with, there is no agreed definition of peace education. As pointed out above, the literature review has shown the multidimensionality and the diversity of the objectives of peace education programmes. Different peace education scholars have looked at peace education from varying perspectives and in various contexts with scholarly constructions and interpretations of reality based on specific contexts, times, and places. Western scholars, such as Reardon (1998), Staub (2002), and Page (2008), place more emphasis on anti-war, women's rights, environmental sustainability, and protection. On the other hand, scholars from the Southern Hemisphere focus on concepts such as consciousness and structural violence (Freire, 1970), while other scholars from Israel (Bar-Tal, 2002, Salomon and Nevo, 2005) focus mainly on issues regarding national antagonism and ethnic and racial conflicts as well as identity and racial issues.

These diverse perspectives and contexts explain the lack of one universal definition of peace education. This multifariousness also highlights that there is no universal 'quick, one-size-fits-all' peace education approach for tractable and intractable conflicts in different parts of the world. Instead, peace education's values, goals, and contents are 'progressive dynamic, transformative and holistic' (Bar-Tal, 2002, p.29). However, the impact of peace education in healing the wounds and the scars of conflict-ridden communities depends on its 'ripeness' for peace and reconciliation and addressing all forms of violence (Harris and Morrison, 2012).

As mentioned, the ultimate objective of peace education is to establish the foundations of a culture of peace. By creating and maintaining peaceful relationships between

groups and communities globally, it should be possible to build a culture of peace that will last (Harris and Morrison, 2012). However, in order to be successful, such reconciliation must be adequately supported by the majority of social members. In this way, the impact of a similar measure would be substantial in creating precise conditions for a meaningful change.

This chapter has provided a discussion of the characteristics of intractable conflict. Before providing viable solutions to increase the importance of peace education in the context of Somalia, it has become central to focus on the direct sources or roots of violent conflict (Reardon, 2010). The drivers behind such conflict can provide significant implications to initiate appropriate peace education practices in Somalia (Cremin, 2016). From this perspective, I provided substantial evidence of the political ideology and ethos of conflict. In fact, it was revealed that some of the most challenging conflicts were directly linked with political ideology, and thus it has been considered difficult to resolve them with conventional approaches and strategies (Novelli and Cardozo, 2008). Therefore, a review of the literature has emphasised throughout the chapter that adopting a holistic approach towards peace education and human rights education was essential in addressing persistent inconsistencies associated with peace education pedagogy in conflict-ridden societies (Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace, 2008).

The next section refers to the challenges of peace education in intractable conflict, such as the one present in Somalia. It has been argued that various collective narratives and historical memories provide substantial information relating to the specific culture of conflict and the difficulties associated with overcoming persistent fear and the violation of basic human rights (Green and Little, 2009). It appears that the society explored in this study needs to reflect critically upon its past conflict history

in order to find a proper solution to the problems underlying their intractable conflict. In addition, I discussed conceptual models of peace education as part of the overall goal to enhance the discourse on peace and human rights in the context of Somalia (Momodu, 2015). One of the conclusions presented in this section is that the adoption of a flexible approach to integrating the attitudes, norms, and values of the Somalian community can lead to optimal outcomes in time.

I have considered the importance of exploring specific concepts and values of peace education (Dowd, 2016). Some of the issues illustrated in the chapter relate to tolerance, reflective thinking patterns, openness, flexibility, and a readiness to discuss the implications of peace and human rights both regionally and globally. Likewise, conflict resolution skills have been emphasised as crucial to achieving the goals of peace education. By constructing appropriate worldviews, stakeholders in the field can initiate a relevant dialogue focused on peace and reconciliation (Paulson, 2011).

Another section included in the chapter is associated with the exploration of various contemporary trends. The fact that a substantial number of individuals live in conflict-affected countries presents significant concerns for peace educators. Thus, a thorough understanding of existing contemporary trends can prompt educators to introduce strategies that are optimally suited to the complex political and social context of Somalia (Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace, 2008; Horner, 2013). In this way, the ultimate objective of introducing peace education opportunities in Somalia refers to the idea of establishing new and effective means of institutional structures. Including multidisciplinary frameworks appears useful in this context, and thus, scholars in the field hope to achieve a better understanding of the political, cultural, and social landscape of Somalia (Samatar, 2001). The recognition that the field of peace

education has taken a new direction since the 1990s is important in planning future research on the subject.

This chapter also focused on examining the geographic comparison of peace education trends. This allowed for the inclusion of a more systemic and comprehensive account of peace education pedagogy across countries. Some of the countries explored in this context related to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kenya, Northern Ireland, and Sierra Leone (Davies, 2004). It is apparent that the selected countries provided substantial information on how potential peace education opportunities could impact conflict-ridden societies such as Somalia (Hall, 1990). It can be concluded that the investigation of peace education in Muslim countries is rather challenging and complex due to the interplay of various internal and external factors (Harris and Morrison, 2012).

The fact that no agreed and consistent definition of peace education has been provided by scholars is indicative of the difficulties associated with the exploration of the subject. Therefore, it has become important to examine the implications of peace education from multiple perspectives that would allow a more constructive and objective view of this type of pedagogy (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). Irrespective of the challenges related to the phenomenon of peace education, particularly in the Somali context, it is essential to uncover the strategies needed to emphasise how the discourse on peace education is crucial to conflict-affected societies (Dupuy, 2009). This chapter provided an in-depth discussion of peace education and human rights education. In this way, individuals can be stimulated to initiate research on their own in order to find substantial evidence of the application of peace education pedagogy in Muslim countries (Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace, 2008). It has been recognised that Western ideals and principles of peace education completely differ from the assumptions provided by

Eastern scholars (Green and Little, 2009). Thus, it would be viable to focus on such differences and work in cooperation to resolve some of the most pressing challenges associated with peace education in Somalia. In this respect, there is a need to establish the role that peace education can play in a clan-based and divisive society such as Somalia.

The following chapter provides more comprehensive information about the research methodology, justifies the means of data collection, and explains the framework for data analysis.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter opens by restating—the aim of this study, the overarching research question and the sub-questions, in order to set the research design in context. I then discuss my positionality in the study before considering theories about the nature of knowledge and reality in the context of this study. I will then follow on by explaining and justifying the research philosophy and methodology used for the study. I also introduce the methods of data collection and analysis that were used for this research and explain the process of participant selection as well as the limitations of the approach adopted. In addition, issues relating to trustworthiness and authenticity are discussed.

4.2 Research aim, research questions, and research problem

Research Aim

The aim of the study was to investigate UK Somali Diaspora Perspectives on Peace Education and the National Reconciliation Process in Somalia.

Research Questions

The investigation was guided by the research question below:

- What is the role of peace education as a means of conflict resolution for the intractable clan conflict and the reconciliation process in Somalia?

In exploring the overarching question, the following questions were explored:

1. What factors contributed to the failure of the reconciliation process in Somalia?
2. To what extent does culture play a role in teaching peace in Somali schools?

3. How do Nabadoons and teachers define the concept of peace in their context?
4. What are the challenges for peace education implementation in the Somali curriculum?

4.2.1 Research problem

The value of this research lies, first, in the involvement of actual stakeholders in the peace education agenda and reconciliation processes in Somalia, through a thorough exploration of their views about the role of peace education in the reconciliation process and conflict resolution in Somalia. The research question is approached from the perspectives of the people who have participated in the peace education programmes in Somalia.

As a tribal society deeply entrenched in its views and cultural practices, Somalis are sceptical about foreign intervention and initiatives in all its aspects, regardless of whether such intervention takes a geographical, intellectual, or other form (Menkhaus, 2010; Harper, 2012; Aden, 2017)). They have therefore resisted to fully implement any ready-made, one-size-fits-all conflict mitigation models and programmes such as peace education (Zeilig, 2016; Aden, 2017). Somalis tend to look to their elders, tribal leaders, and intellectuals to search for solutions that suit their values, beliefs, customs, and traditions. However, they have never had complete ownership of the intellectual foundation on which peace education programmes and conflict resolutions are constructed. The failure was partly as a result of a limited understanding of the role of Somali culture, tradition, and local means of conflict resolution (Lewis and Winn, 2018). There is, therefore, a need for knowledge which is the product of their culture and values.

Thirdly, there is a knowledge gap regarding the influence of peace education on conflict resolution and reconciliation. Despite increasing scholarly interest in the field and a

growing recognition of peace education at local, national, and global levels (Harris and Morrison, 2012), there is a need for a broader range of literature of various contexts to bolster existing knowledge about peace education (Salomon and Cairns, 2011). Various scholars emphasise the need to evaluate past understandings of peace and peace education programmes to build a new and better understanding in the future (Bekerman and Zembylas, 2011; Williams and Cummings, 2015).

Furthermore, there is insufficient knowledge about the topic of peace education and its influence on conflict resolution in a protracted clan-conflict context as few studies have addressed the efficacy of peace education within a single ethnic group (Salomon, 2004; Bekerman and Zembylas, 2011b). Much has been written about the role played by education in terms of citizenship, diversity, and conflict resolution in the industrialised world (Calleja and Perucca, 1999; Harris and Morrison, 2012). However, research on peace education has focused mainly on inter-ethnic contexts such as Rwanda and Bosnia (Hilker, 2011; Danesh, 2006) and in the inter-faith context of Northern Ireland (Duffy, 2000). The usual conceptualisation of peace education, therefore, focuses on multiculturalism, integration and inclusiveness in racial, religious, and ethnic conflicts (Harris and Morrison, 2012; Danesh, 2006; Bar-Tal, 2002; Rigby and Andrew, 2001).

To my knowledge, no study has focused on a clan-based conflict in a clan-based society such as Somalia (Harper, 2012). In this regard, the available literature in the field often lacks contextual specificity which makes it difficult for practitioners and policymakers to apply it. Indeed, such literature may be irrelevant to the Somali context and the experiences of the Somali people. A study of the Somali context from the perspectives of the UK Somali diaspora (Nabadoons and teachers) and their experiences of the Somali people in this multifaceted tribal conflict is therefore critical.

This explorative study contributes the voices of potential stakeholders of the Somali peacemaking actors through in-depth interviews with Somalis living in the UK .

These actors themselves participated to varying degrees in peace education programmes and hence are in a position to offer their insight into the role of peace education in the reconciliation process. The originality of this research lies in the emphasis on this particular context.

4.2.2 Positionality

An understanding of social processes involves getting inside the world of those who are generating and deeply involved in the context and doing this remains challenging to social scientists (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). Understanding the Somali conflict in depth from particular potential stakeholders requires immersion inside the world of potential stakeholders and to interpret their constructions of the role of peace education in conflict resolution in a clan-conflict context.

A key feature of this research is the credibility afforded by my own standpoint. It is, therefore, essential to present my background and stance in relation to the research participants.

I was born in Somalia and moved to the UK as a teenage refugee fleeing from civil war. I am a Somali-British citizen. I have worked with the Somali community in Britain as an interpreter, youth worker, peace activist, and community organiser, as well as being a director of a humanitarian organisation. These interactions and experiences have given me insider knowledge of the Somali community's issues and concerns regarding the conflict in Somalia and the reconciliation process (Griffiths, 1998). I cannot suspend my beliefs and act as a neutral agent when exploring the perspectives of my fellow Somalis since, as one of them, I share their beliefs, values, customs, and

language. This insider knowledge and experience enabled me to understand and interpret their statements in this context (van Manen, 1990).

From my experience, the insider positionality gave me greater access and valuable insights and awareness of cultural sensitivity and sensitive narratives, but it is essential to point out that my insider stance did not mean automatic access to the truth. Instead, I had to continually negotiate terms with the research participants and adapt to the shifting nature of insider-outsider status. This changing stance in qualitative studies was reflected in the studies of many researchers (Chavez, 2008; Cui, 2015; Hmmed, 2018). Similar to the experience of these researchers, my status constantly changed throughout the research process, and can be characterised as what Dwyer and Buckle (2009) term “the space between”. The space I occupied was neither that of a complete insider nor that of a complete outsider (Griffiths, 1998). As an insider, I was thoroughly immersed in the social issues of my community and shared their experiences of living in the diaspora, both as a former refugee and a naturalised British citizen. This experience made me uniquely positioned to understand my community’s search for peace (Blaikie, 2007). Because of this insider knowledge, I have been able to easily access participants’ views and was able to “ask more meaningful questions”, “read non-verbal cues”, and, critically, “project a more truthful, authentic understanding” of the participants’ perspectives (Merriam *et al.*, 2001, p.411). This insider position, however, also necessitated caution, as I was not a mere participant, but an instrument for collecting data that assisted in achieving the objectives of the study (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009). Where I stand vis-à-vis participants, thus determines my positionality (Merriam *et al.*, 2001).

Throughout my data collection, I felt that factors such as my educational and professional background, my youthful appearance, as well as having spent most of my

life in the UK led the Nabadoons to perceive me as an outsider referring to me as a 'fish and chips boy' (Hassan_Interview19_229-229), (a metaphor Somalis use to describe young people who were either born in the UK or grew up in the UK from a young age and have limited knowledge of the Somali culture and traditions). For example, throughout my data collection process, the traditional elders perceived me as somewhat of an outsider, or not indigenous enough, by referring me as "Rear galbeed" meaning a 'Westerner' in the Somali language. This construction was due to my arrival in the UK as a teenager and receiving my formal education under the British education system. Because of these perceptions, most of the Nabadoons assumed that I lacked 'adequate knowledge' of the Somali culture and local means of conflict resolution, these perceptions became more marked as I became more involved in the project.

From this standpoint, my research experience suggests that being of Somali origin alone does not provide a full mandate to claim full insider status. In this regard, the complexity of the Somali diaspora, with various tribal affiliations and heterogeneous sub-cultures, arguably meant that my insider perspective could only be regarded as "relative" (Aguilar, 1981).

4.3 The constructivist paradigm

Researching social issues is complex, as it involves studying the attitudes and behaviours of social actors who are actively involved in producing and sustaining the phenomenon under study (Lune and Berg, 2016). There is, therefore, a debate about the nature of social "reality" (Given, 2008). The positivist worldview insists on the existence of an objective "reality" totally independent of the human mind and human experiences (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). Positivists thus superimpose natural science philosophies and methodologies onto social and human sciences, arguing that

social science is no different from natural science in relation to its ontological stance – that is, the nature of “reality” (Given, 2008; van Manen, 1990). Conversely, from an interpretive, idealist standpoint, social “reality” – or rather “realities” – are dependent on our human minds and is constructed through social interactions, involving *multiple* social contexts, experiences, and processes (Given, 2008; Grbich, 2007).

There is an overlapping debate about how human researchers are able to know about that social “reality”, or “realities” (Schwandt, 2000). As far as Somalia’s tribal conflict and the influence of peace education on reconciliation are concerned, there is no single objective, fixed “reality” that can be measured. There is a complex web of realities (conflict, tribes, peace programmes, peacemakers) produced by, and therefore dependent on, the social interactions and experiences of Somali people (Nidumolu and Subramani, 2001). This Somali context has produced and sustained the reality of the intractable tribal conflict which has been resistant to peace-making and conflict resolution efforts. Since peace education programmes have also been produced and sustained by different processes and different social interactions, we can only talk about multiple realities (van Manen, 1990; Patton, 2015).

To understand the complexity of the context and its realities, I needed a philosophical approach that recognises the multiplicity of social interactions and of the constructions that produced those multiple realities. Only a constructivist perspective could offer such a solid philosophical underpinning for my research design and methods.

4.4 Constructed realities

Constructivism is essentially a relativist ontology since it contends that social “reality” is dependent on multiple social contexts, experiences, and processes, as well as shared meanings of social actors (Schwandt, 2000; Wendt, 1999; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Schwandt, 2000). Each context, each social process, and each social interaction

can produce its own “reality”, but may also interpret that reality differently (Salomon, 2004; Ndumolu and Subramani, 2001). This suggests that “social reality” is subjective since all the processes and interactions that construct and re-construct it are subjective by nature (Bruner, 1991). Constructivism is therefore culturally relativist as it emphasises the influence of the environment on cultural diversity, social processes, and social interactions (Wendt, 1999).

This perspective is evidently antithetically opposed to positivism, which approaches social reality as a unitary physical phenomenon that can be factually proved independently of social processes and interactions. However, this physicalist and factualist ontology of “reality” assert objectivity that is not there – it is not a given that human facts themselves exist independently of social interactions and processes. What we consider facts are themselves the product of our mind and our social processes and interactions. Schmitz (1967 p.5), succinctly emphasises this point:

All facts are from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. They are, therefore, always-interpreted facts, either fact looked at as detached from their context by an artificial abstraction or facts considered in their particular setting. In either case, they carry their interpretational inner and outer horizons.

Facts are always subjectively situated within the “particular setting” that produced them, regardless of how they appear to us (Ndumolu and Subramani, 2001). Having defined the social reality of Somalia’s peace education and the Somali conflict as primarily constructed by subjective social processes and interactions of Somalis, I now turn my attention to how we can generate knowledge about this reality, and what kind of knowledge we can expect.

4.5 Constructed knowledge

Adopting an epistemological stance depends mostly on how one defines the social “reality” or “realities” under investigation. As I discussed above, I do not consider that there is single meaningful “reality” (in relation to Somali conflict and peace education) outside the social interactions and processes of Somali society. I assume that everything from peace discourse, peace education programmes, and reconciliation efforts are produced by that context (Hansen, 2003). Therefore, knowledge is also constructed by those processes (Grbich, 2007). The Western constructions of education assume the primacy of government institutions, including standardised education. In this respect, educational reforms could be pushed from the top-down without regards to the local context (Bajaj and Brantmeier, 2011). Paradoxically, much of the expertise (knowledge) and proposed solutions for the Somali conflict have been mainly the product of social interactions and processes outside Somalia and imposed on the Somali context with no attention to the situatedness of knowledge (Ndumolu and Subramani, 2001). This is because of the false belief that knowledge is always universal, objective, and context-free (Krauss, 2005). It is thus unsurprising that so many international interventions through peace education and conflict resolution programmes have failed.

It is because of my belief in multiple realities that I have been motivated to research the Somali conflict and peace education from an epistemological perspective that appropriately accounts both for subjective social constructions and for the interpretations that have produced and sustained the objects of my research.

4.6 The interpretive approach

The interpretive agenda of this research is essentially constructivist, in that it attempts to understand the active ways in which social actors co-construct meanings about their

world (Given, 2008; Andrews, 2012). Everyone participates actively in this process of comprehending the social world and develops specific meanings based on their experiences (Schwandt, 2000). Our knowledge of the world depends on how we make sense of social matters, and how we construe the web of our social interactions. Knowledge is therefore constructed and subjective, not innate and independent (Given, 2008; van Manen, 1990).

At the heart of this interpretive, constructivist epistemology is the recognition that social agents and structures are mutually codetermined, and that all these factors mutually constitute society (Wendt, 1999). Thus, social beings are embedded in their various social communities as human agents who actively create, reproduce, and change culture through their daily practices (Schwandt, 2000). In this process knowledge is constructed as shared understanding (Andrews, 2012).

Rooted in these theoretical perspectives, this research recognises that knowledge should be constructed from the social structures and social actors that have produced the conflict in Somalia – that is, my attempt to produce knowledge is no more than the interpretations of those actors and their social interactions. As such, this research gives agency to the Somali teachers and Nabadoons who participated in the study. As part of the research, I took an insider positionality, although this stance kept shifting. This interpretive, constructivist epistemology is also time- and context-dependent (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Therefore, it is ethically essential to acknowledge that the knowledge acquired is local and situated within this setting (Ndumolu and Subramani, 2001; Wendt, 1999). Indeed, the ideographic nature of the interpretive stance is not a limitation but a strength for this research as it provides a more in-depth insight of the stakeholders different perspectives. It would be ethically wrong to assume that knowledge produced by certain social processes and interactions in particular places

can cure social ills produced in totally different social contexts. Nor would it be right to impose knowledge produced in different times on a contemporary problem. Such actions would strip social actors of their agency and, in this context, the social actors are the research participants (Andrews, 2012).

This choice of interpretivism over positivism is not to deny the potential of universal knowledge; it is instead to affirm the particularity of all processes of knowledge production. Indeed, both knowledge and the interactive processes of its production can have universal aspects – after all, we are all human. Knowledge is provisional, it is weakened when we default to that universality. Similarly, since other social research scientists have different views on both reality and knowledge, they seek to transcend epistemological dichotomies by employing mixed methods, such as blending qualitative and quantitative designs and methods. Their stance is less dogmatic and much more focused on the most effective ways to explain or understand particular social phenomena and seek stakeholders' deep-level views and using quantitative data would not have given me the necessary depth (Maxwell, 2013).

I studied a small, hitherto unexplored population of teachers and Nabadoons who have played an influential role in peace education and conflict resolution in Somalia and who could not be accessed without direct contact. While the interpretive constructivist philosophy has played an essential role in shaping my worldview, my decision to employ a qualitative, interpretive approach was also pragmatic, as it helped me deal with such questions as what is going on in my country regarding peace education and reconciliation processes? Who is well-positioned to know about the topic? I thus considered which methods would enable the collection of sufficient data to produce credible knowledge and what kind of data could fully answer my research questions. Only qualitative interviews could enable full exploration of these topics. The social

realities I wanted to research are complicated: while all Somali people are stakeholders in peace education and reconciliation, only Nabadoons and teachers who have participated in peace education programmes and conflict resolution in both formal and informal settings, where they have made significant contributions to these processes, were included in this study. Consequently, knowledge issues related to peace and education in such context resides in such stakeholders.

However, the two groups are not homogeneous since these people operate in different spheres and contexts and, therefore, have produced and interpreted peace education programmes and reconciliation “realities” differently. Their views are vital as the two groups have had first-hand experience of traditional means of conflict resolution as well as teaching peace programmes in schools. These groups are also hard to reach since most peace programmes are implemented in Somalia. Pragmatically, I could, for security reasons, only collect data from those who live in the UK. Furthermore, ethically, it was unlikely that the ethics board would have allowed me to travel due to security concerns. Therefore, only qualitative interviewing of stakeholders living in the UK would be able to offer an in-depth understanding of peace education and conflict resolution in Somalia. Since, to my knowledge, no other studies have focused on these groups, it was essential to use a flexible research design to explore their views.

4.7 Research Design

This section highlights the details of the research design that was adopted to address the research issues, the means of data collection, selection of participants, and the framework for analysis.

4.7.1 Exploratory case study

I have adopted an exploratory case study approach to explore the views and perspectives of UK Somali Diaspora, especially traditional Somali peacemakers

(Nabadoons) and teachers, on peace education and the national reconciliation process in Somalia. A case study approach is a valid research approach that is increasingly adopted by social researchers interested in exploring and understanding multi-faceted and complex issues in a specific context (Creswell, and Poth, 2017). It is used in a range of types of research, including positivist, interpretive, and mixed methods, and, therefore, has different applications: exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory designs (Yin, 2013). Since the context being studied in this research is relatively new, a causal relationship cannot be established, so it would be inappropriate to employ an explanatory design (Yin, 2013). Case studies are used in particular by social scientists who are attracted by the idea of in-depth exploration of a particular group or issue (Yin, 2013) and seek to generate theory from data (Bassey, 1999). Yin (2009, p.18) defines the case study as an empirical inquiry that: “[...] investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and *within its real-life context*, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. The suitability of the case study approach for the current research lies in its emphasis on the *natural setting*, as the focus is on understanding the issue being studied “*within its real-life context*”. This means that the particularity of the setting is of utmost importance. The context of peace education and its connection to conflict resolution in particular requires an in-depth exploration that captures the essence of its natural setting (Yin, 2013). In addition, as qualitative inductive research, the aim is to build theory from the data, which is facilitated by using a case study strategy (Bassey, 1999).

Moreover, the research focuses on the process of peace education as a tool for reconciliation and conflict resolution within Somalia, and the research question seeks to understand that process. Therefore, a case study approach is most the effective tool for addressing research questions about the process. In addition, the focus of this

research was on contemporary phenomena which is a further reason why an exploratory case study approach was the most suitable.

However, some questions remain whether the case study strategy can generate reliable and valid knowledge. According to positivist arguments, the findings of any scientific study need to be generalisable. On these terms, critics argue that a case study fails the broader scientific test of generalisability (Taber, 2000). Nevertheless, my research involved a full and holistic exploration of the issues related to this *particular setting* – that is, generalisability was not the aim. This particularity is critical to understanding the role of peace education in conflict resolution and reconciliation because peace education is multidimensional, and peace education programmes are context-based (Bar-Tal, 2002).

Viewed from this perspective, it is evident that a one-size-fits-all solution cannot fit all the world's intractable conflicts. The peace education programmes and conflict resolution interventions that worked for Rwanda or Kenya cannot be applied directly to the Somali setting. Each programme has its values and solutions which are specifically tailored to a specific social problem in a particular society (Hilker, 2011). Therefore, the aim is to provide a "thick description" of the phenomenon under consideration through an in-depth exploration of research participants' perspectives (Geertz, 1973). In this way, the understanding of this *particular setting* can enhance peace education knowledge and may be transferred to other intractable conflict situations with similar characteristics, as well as to some broader contexts (Patton, 2015). As for generalisation, it is accumulating knowledge through repeated case studies that may make it possible to generalise context-specific findings (Yin, 2013). Since each *particular case* offers critical insight – through a full exploration of the successes and failures of particular programmes and their application – into a particular conflict and

its possible solutions, an explorative study focusing on tribal conflict is evidently worthwhile. This, therefore, was the rationale for choosing the case study approach.

Other qualitative research strategies – action research and historical research strategies – have proved similarly effective for qualitative/interpretive researchers, and could have been employed to study Somali peace education. However, action research involves an in-depth analysis of contemporary problems which are iterative in nature and involve collecting data, analysing it, and regularly revisiting the problem until a solution is achieved (Reason and Bradbury, 2001). The purpose of this research was to construct understanding, not to solve a clearly defined practical problem or to evaluate the effectiveness of a peace education programme (Harris and Morrison, 2012). Similarly, adopting historical research as a strategy was not suitable for this study as historical research normally examines non-contemporary phenomena (Yin, 2013), which is not the case here. The case study approach is, therefore, the most appropriate in generating valid theory from the data collected among the Somalia diaspora.

The limitations of the case study approach include the difficulty of generalising the findings of one case study (Baxter and Jack, 2008). This study attempted to shed a light of perspectives of stakeholders in a particular setting and context (Yin, 2003) thereby adding rich knowledge to the field of peace education and conflict resolution studies. Yin (2003) argues that generalisation arrives through repeated case studies, as more studies are carried out on similar characteristics.

The following section provides details about the process of participant selection.

4.8 Selecting participants

Two groups of Somalia diaspora in the UK were interviewed, both traditional Somali peacemakers – Nabadoons and teachers. The Nabadoons have had years of experience in the resolution of clan-based conflicts in Somalia since they play a significant role in the process. Conversely, teachers that were included in the study also had an in-depth knowledge of peace education programmes and experience in delivering them. These two groups were selected for their critical insights into peace education and the reconciliation process in Somalia (Sargeant, 2012).

Finding participants who had been directly involved in peace education programmes and reconciliation issues was a complex task which required the use of a combination of snowball sampling and purposive sampling techniques (Suri, 2011). First, I employed my expert judgement, based both on my knowledge of the academic literature and on my personal knowledge, to choose certain Nabadoons and teachers who could best answer my research questions. Secondly, I used snowball sampling techniques to locate Nabadoons in the UK (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). Snowball sampling is defined as a “non-probability sample”, whereby the researcher establishes “initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these to establish contacts with others” (Bryman 2008, p.184). I utilised it mainly to seek information on Nabadoons in my community and I then followed up on only those whose names were “mentioned over and over again” (Patton, 2015, p.237). In this context, the use of snowball sampling was appropriate as finding Nabadoons in the UK was only possible through community networking and close engagement and cooperation.

Finally, after receiving the key information about participants’ whereabouts and the cities where they lived in the UK, I contacted them via email or phone. Once they had

accepted my request for an interview, I made a judgement about their suitability for inclusion on the basis of their experiences in Somali conflict resolution and peace education programmes (Patton, 2015). In this respect, I applied purposive sampling to select participants with specific expertise in traditional means of conflict resolution and reconciliation as well those with specific professions in education services in the Somali context (Tongco, 2007). Purposive sampling is a non-random technique which is used to select participants based on the quality of information they possess in relation to the phenomenon being studied (Tongco, 2007). The literature review (Chapter 3) highlighted the multidimensionality and diversity of the stakeholders involved in peace education programmes (Harris and Morrison, 2012). They therefore focus on specific and carefully selected participants' who can provide in-depth discovery of the issue under investigation (Patton, 2012; Grbich, 2007).

In total, I interviewed 19 participants, of whom nine were teachers and eight were Nabadoons. Each interview lasted between 45-70min. The interviews were conducted between November 2016 to February 2018 in varied settings including London, Bristol, Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow, Milton Keynes, and Northampton. Participants lived in these cities and towns. A small town such Northampton has a smaller population when compared to cities and revealing more specific details of locations, such as communities centres, might lead to the identification of the few known Nabadoons in Northampton. In this regard, the specific locations of interviews were concealed to protect the participants' identity.

The following section explains the criteria used to select participants and elaborates on the rationale for the two groups chosen to take part in the study.

4.8.1 Criteria for selecting participants

Within the framework of the sampling techniques, the following criteria were used to select participants:

Participants were involved in teaching peace education programmes in Somalia.

Participants were involved in resolving either cultural, tribal, or political conflict through traditional conflict resolution methods.

4.8.2 Teachers

The first group that participated in this study consisted of 9 Somali teachers - 8 male and 1 female. I tried to get more female teachers, but it was a difficult task because of the cultural sensitivities. The female participant provided a rich perspective on the impact of education in mitigating violent conflict, in particular, the effect of conflict on women and vulnerable groups. Teachers were vital stakeholders in this study because of their experiences and perspectives on the role that peace education plays in the Somali reconciliation process. Since peace education is holistic and multidisciplinary (Harris and Morrison, 2003), I have included teachers who taught any topics associated with peace education, including human rights, conflict resolution, communication skills, problem-solving skills, and democracy education (UNESCO, 2011; Pherali and Gerratt, 2014).

Teachers play a key role in the implementation of peace education. Studies have found that the attitude of teachers has a significant influence on students' internalisation and understanding of peace values (Zembylas *et al.*, 2012; Yahya *et al.*, 2012). Therefore, I wanted to find out teachers' experiences of "teaching to be peaceful" (MacGrath, 2013, p.13), as well as the challenges they faced while teaching peace education programmes in Somalia. From this group, I interviewed 9 teachers. Although questions were inclusive of peace education and conflict resolution, their perspectives have shed

more light on how the Somali education system has changed over the years as education has become decentralised and privatised (Dawson, 2011), following the collapse of the central government in Somalia, an issue that will be further examined in-depth in the findings chapter which follows.

4.8.3 Traditional peacemakers (Nabadoons)

The second group consisted of eight Nabadoons. They were chosen because of their in-depth knowledge of the local mechanism of conflict resolution (Hammond, 2013). Somali society still retains traditional cultural structures (Abdullahi, 2017). Nabadoons enjoy social and political legitimacy and also have knowledge about local mechanisms of conflict mitigation and resolution (Stremlau, 2016). Nabadoons are all older men representing their clans, communities or families in times of war and conflict (Abdullahi, 2017). They exert social and political influence on Somali politics, culture, and informal education (Ilmi, 2015).

Furthermore, genuine Nabadoons are regarded as having excellent communication and problem-solving skills, as well as strong knowledge of traditional local means of conflict resolution. They are characterised by honesty, fairness, truthfulness, and fair ruling (Menkhaus, 2000). Nevertheless, not all Nabadoons share these noble characteristics. As Chapter 6 discusses this issue in-depth, the civil war, corruption, and strong clan allegiances have damaged some of Nabadoons' reputation and legitimacy. Some were seen to work to promote the interests of wealthy, politically well-connected members of society, rather than those of ordinary people (Gettleman, 2017).

Peacefully resolving conflict is associated with the peace education philosophy (Harris and Morrison, 2012; Andrzejewski *et al.*, 2009). In addition, many studies have explored the significance of traditional Somali peacemaking practices and how they

were effective in resolving local conflicts (Menkhaus, 2000; Hansen, 2003; Elmi and Barise, 2006; Mac Ginty, 2008). Hence, I deemed it suitable to include them in my research because of their understanding of the contextual structural violence (Galtung and Høivik, 1971) and cultural violence (Galtung, 1990) that exist in Somalia.

4.9 The rationale for conducting the study in the UK

The target population in this study was the Somali diaspora in the UK, of whom there are over 125,000 (Gembus, 2018). Between 1991 and 2001, the increase in the number of migrant Somalis living in Britain was among the largest of any group. The increase was primarily due to those fleeing violent conflict (Osman, 2017). Somalis in the diaspora maintain a close relationship with their country of origin and play a significant role in politics and development (Valentine et al., 2009). Shaffer et al., 2018). Most members of the Somali parliament have dual nationalities, mainly from Europe and North America (Liberatore, 2018).

The Somali diaspora also has economic significance for Somali development. Indeed, the annual remittances sent back to Somalia by the diaspora is the most significant contributor to Somali GDP (Rock, 2017). Moreover, most major businesses, social enterprises, and private schools in Somalia are either owned or run by Somalis who live in Western Europe and North America (Rock, 2017). Therefore, their experiences are vital to understanding the beneficial role of peace education in conflict resolution and reconciliation processes.

I considered travelling to Somalia to collect data. However, after making various contacts through members of my community, I found some key informants residing in the UK who had taken part in conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives and interventions such as peace education. In addition, security issues and costs were the key factors that discouraged me from undertaking a field trip to Somalia.

4.10 Trustworthiness and authenticity

Although research studies have traditionally been rated on the basis of reliability and validity, in this particular context, it is more appropriate to assess qualitative research in terms of trustworthiness and authenticity (Maxwell, 2013). Lincoln and Guba (2005) argue that the trustworthiness of research should be assessed in terms of credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability. The following section highlights the steps I used to strengthen the study's credibility.

In this study about the UK Somali diaspora's subjective constructions of the potential role of peace education programmes in reconciliation processes, it is important to control for potential biases that may be present in the process of design, implementation, and research analysis. Credibility is a criterion for assessing how accurate and believable research findings are. This criterion is a central component of research design (Maxwell, 2013). To enhance the credibility of data, firstly, I triangulated data sources from two very different groups of people (teachers and Nabadoons) to verify data from the semi-structured interviews (Lincoln and Guba, 2005). Therefore, by utilising data source triangulation as a tool, I ensured that the findings are credible and trustworthy (Shenton, 2004). Four of the participants who were interviewed left the UK before they had the chance to check the transcript. To overcome this issue, I held a meeting with a group of four (two individuals with an extensive experience of the reconciliation process in Somalia and two Somali teachers) to discuss and make sense of the analysis together. The focus here was to confirm the meaning and conceptualisation of the themes in relation to the research question, to consider their perspectives, and of what required more clarification and modification (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). This process further helped validate the findings within the study in the sense of it enhancing the credibility of the data analysis.

4.10.1 Dependability

This study concerns the in-depth perspectives of a small number of participants from the Somali diaspora in the UK. The emphasis was to gain a thick description of their experiences as teachers of peace education programmes and as traditional peacemakers (Geertz, 1994). The emphasis was not on replicating data findings, in the rational sense, but on ensuring that findings were consistent and dependable, which required eliminating inconsistencies and demonstrating that the coding schemes and categories were used consistently (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). It was, therefore, essential to keep a record of all procedures and maintain an audit trail to offer “transparency of method” through a detailed account of how the data was analysed and interpreted (Marshall and Rossman, 2014).

4.10.2 Confirmability

In general, qualitative research does not claim to be objective. Researchers bring their own subjective values and meanings to their endeavours (Maxwell, 2013). From this perspective, it can be argued that all research is carried out from a specific “standpoint”. However, subjectivity should not be seen as a problem to be avoided but as a resource that can be developed in ways that enhance and deepen social research (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). Therefore, it is important to highlight that the findings of this study were the result of the research that was undertaken, not of my own biases and subjectivity. However, this research should be evaluated on the basis of the criteria of authenticity (Guba and Lincoln, 1989), trustworthiness (Eisner, 1991) and credibility (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The reflexive nature of this exploratory qualitative research (with an emphasis on conducting, recording, storing, and transcribing interviews as well as notes and reflection memos) ensures the trustworthiness, credibility, and authenticity of this research. It is important to stress that my role, in essence, was that of a “passionate participant”, thereby enabling multi-voice reconstruction and

interpreting participants' perspectives on issues related to peace education and conflict resolution (Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Morrow, 2005).

4.10.3 Transferability

This study explored the perspectives of UK Somali diaspora with deep experiences of clan-based conflicts as well as educational interventions in conflict resolution. In this regard, the findings of this study are transferable to other conflict situations under similar conditions (Patton, 2015). I address the issue of transferability by providing a thick description of the stakeholders and their context (Geertz, 1973). As I have stressed, my goal was not to generate generalisable findings, there are many different peace education programmes and reconciliation processes and all vary across places and contexts (Bar-Tal, 2002). My findings shed light on the role peace education played in the reconciliation process from a particular stakeholder's context and place, thus contributing knowledge to the rich pool of knowledge of peace education.

4.11 Pilot study

I started the data collection with a pilot study involving a small number of carefully selected participants (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981; Bryman 2008; Patton, 2015). The participants consisted of four individuals, two traditional Somali peacemakers and two teachers. These participants were of a different population from those included in the main study but have similar experiences and expertise in the field of education, conflict resolution, and reconciliation processes. This pilot study helped me gain a better idea of the views of the participants and helped in developing more tailored interview questions for a more detailed description of the phenomena under investigation.

I then started to address some of the issues raised in the pilot study. For example, I simplified some of the questions and eliminated repetition. The pilot study helped me

improve my interview plan, increased my confidence, and improved my interview skills. It was a valuable experience.

Selecting participants was challenging. The first challenge was locating participants - Nabadoons and teachers – who taught or lectured on peace education programmes in Somalia. However, with my community's support, I adopted snowball sampling to find several important individuals who have made significant contributions to the richness of the data I have collected. Subsequently, I selected my participants using purposive sampling after ensuring that they were the appropriate participants with specific knowledge and experience.

The snowballing method used was not used to derive sample solely from a single clan or region but ensured that all clan voices were heard. As highlighted in Chapter two, Somali people are a clan-based society and due to the protracted conflict, clan politics and narratives are mainly based on clan interests implicitly or explicitly (Harper, 2012). To overcome this clan-bias, I ensured that all participants originated from all different regions in Somalia so they could provide a richer and more in-depth insight into issues relating to the Somali conflict and the role of peace education programmes as a means of conflict resolution.

In addition, other ethical issues emerged in the pilot study. I sought to adhere to the UoN Code of Ethics and Conduct and BERA (2011) *Revised Guidelines for Educational Research*. I have addressed issues such as voluntary informed consent, openness and disclosure, right to withdraw privacy, and disclosure in order to safeguard the wellbeing of the participants. There was still some uncertainty in terms of how the data will be used. Although these issues were clearly stated in the information sheet sent to participants, some of the participants asked for more clarification on the purpose of the study and how the data will be used, as well as

whether their identity will be available to the public. Some participants – Nabadoons in particular – questioned the relevance of their participation since their contributions will be anonymous. Nabadoons are public figures in Somali culture and some prefer to have their contributions acknowledged, as in other non-academic interviews (Silverman, 2016). Understandably, some Nabadoons wanted to use the interviews as an opportunity to express their views and provide recommendations on issues relating to peace and reconciliation in Somalia. I overcame this issue by summarizing the guidelines set by the university's ethics committee and explained it before the interviews started in the Somali language constantly checking that they understand their rights of withdrawal.

Moreover, in this regard, my insider position as Somali-British was helpful in this context as I understood the underpinnings and social constructions of the Nabadoons and the rationale behind the request for their names to be published, while also understanding the ethical requirements of British university guidelines. In Somali culture, the oral dialogue is regarded as their dominant form of cultural expression (Lewis, 1993; Harper, 2012). This discovery has implications and lessons for future researchers in similar contexts. My experience in data collection suggests that researchers sending information sheets and consent forms alone should not assume that participants read it and understood fully the aim of the study and issues relating to confidentiality. To overcome this, I explained that the purpose of the study was academic research and that I was obliged to follow certain strict academic research guidelines. It was clear that some of the Nabadoons had not understood the information sheet sent out via email. Therefore, I reminded them about their right to withdraw at any time without explanation. I also briefed them about the aims and objectives of the research, its nature and focus (the role of peace education in the reconciliation process in Somalia), and how their participation was appreciated.

Moreover, discussing the dynamics of the violence in the Somali conflict and its root causes were controversial and sensitive in the context of Somali tribal politics, so I had to approach such issues with caution and explain the focus of the study clearly. Culturally speaking, Somali elders are known for their storytelling and long narratives (Lewis, 1993). For instance, it was more challenging to find a balance between maintaining a degree of control and allowing the participants to speak freely throughout the interviews. However, I explained to them time limitation and other restrictions related to the scope of my research, resources available to me, and my ethical commitment to answer my research question. Nevertheless, their in-depth perspectives on the root causes of Somalia's tribal conflict and their understanding of traditional Somali means of conflict resolution has been significant in unpacking key issues under study. Therefore, interviewing Nabadoons was more challenging than interviewing teachers.

These complex issues needed a particular approach to deal with the sensitivity of the topic under discussion, of which I was fully aware because of my insider stance and as the researcher (Merriam et al., 2001). I explained the importance of this study in understanding the role of peace education programmes in conflict resolution in Somalia from the perspective of the Nabadoons and teachers. I was grateful for their contribution and their input played a vital role in shedding light on these complex issues.

The purpose of the pilot study was to gain "genuine access to the views" (Bryman, 2008, p.322) of the participants, and to develop more tailored interview questions that could help generate a fuller and more detailed description of the phenomena under investigation. Moreover, based on the pilot interviews, further interview questions were

developed which enabled me to elicit more in-depth information from participants in the interviews that followed.

Several points emerged from the pilot study. Firstly, participants proved highly communicative and eager to provide their perspectives and experiences of peace education in Somalia. Indeed, at times, I struggled to maintain a balance between controlling the conversation and letting them talk freely. Somalis are known for their love of oral dialogue as is considered one of the dominant forms of cultural expression (Harper, 2012). Therefore, I have taken steps to strike a balance between control and freedom in terms of the length of time interviewees were given to answer questions.

I found interviewing Nabadoons more challenging as a process than interviewing teachers. Nabadoons consider themselves as a source of guidance, wisdom, and knowledge about traditional peacemaking methods. They not only provided a thorough description of how local methods of conflict resolution work in Somalia but were also determined to use their high social status to offer long, detailed responses to each question, even sometimes trying to challenge my knowledge about Somali culture. For example, one interviewee questioned the relevance of my research strategy, arguing that it was best I conducted the study in Somalia and especially in rural parts of Somalia so I could be exposed to culture and gain a better understanding of how conflict is resolved locally, *“you are just fish and chips boy [laugh] and if you really want to understand how ‘xeer’ works, you should travel home and stay in rural side, so you get better understanding of Somali society and its ways of conflict resolution* (Hassan_Interview19_229-231). The interviewee also added with Somali humour that I am just a “fish and chips boy”, a metaphor used to describe young people, who were either born in the UK or grew up there from an early age, who also have limited knowledge Somali culture and traditions. As highlighted in section 4.2, this also shows

how my perceived positionality as an insider was not fixed but shifted throughout the research process. In this respect, it can be argued that the attitude of the older Nabadoons towards younger researchers who examine issues about Somali culture and politics can be challenging. Although the comments of the Nabadoons might be interpreted as an attempt to belittle my role as a researcher to an outsider, I did not feel demotivated or upset because I understood the cultural context.

Moreover, in response to the criticism of my choice of strategy, I was able to explain politely that the focus of my research was to explore the issue from a different perspective, namely, the Somali diaspora in the UK and that living with participants in rural areas in Somalia was costly and risky due to the insecurity and safety concerns for researchers.

Nevertheless, this incident was an indicator of what to expect in the following interviews. Therefore, I conducted further background research into cultural methods of conflict mitigation, which made me more confident, knowledgeable, and well-informed about the issues that might emerge in the interviews that followed. In addition, I changed some of the interview questions to make them more understandable to participants.

4.12 Data collection

Data collection is a vital part to conducting research. O’Leary (2004, p. 150) states “Collecting credible data is a tough task, and it is worth remembering that one method of data collection is not inherently better than another, therefore the suitability of which data collection method depends on what research question is being explored and the depth of answers that are required” (O’Leary 2004). According to Kvale (1983, p. 174), an interview is regarded as one of the most important methods of data collection in qualitative social studies (Holstien and Gubrium, 2004). The purpose of an interview as a method of data collection is *“to gather descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with respect to interpretation of the meaning of the described phenomena”* (Kvale 1996, p.174). In this regard, I have used semi-structured interviews as a means of data collection to gain in-depth knowledge from participants.

4.12.1 Participants

Nineteen participants, ten of them were teachers and nine were nabadoons. Only one female teacher participated in the study. The two groups were selected purposively (Patton, 2015) to gain a fuller description of the phenomenon (Geertz, 1994), meanings of their different experiences in the context of the traditional Somali means of conflict resolution, as well as the teachers’ experiences and challenges in delivering peace education programmes in a tribal society, such as is the case in Somalia (Lewis, 1993).

Most of the Somali teachers who were included in this study had worked in Somalia teaching peace education programmes and were familiar with concepts mainly associated with peace education, such as human rights and conflict resolution (Harris and Morrison, 2012; Bajaj, 2015). According to UNICEF (2016), in Somalia, fewer than one in five school teachers are women. Culturally, Somalia is a patriarchal society

(Noor Mohammed, 2015) so teachers are considered as “fathers” and are seen as the “*source of all guidance... moreover, knowledge*” (Ismail_Interview14_217-219), equipped with the parents’ consent to ‘fix’ children's behaviour and make them “a better person” (Macalin_Interview3_225-226)”. Similarly, Nabadoons have enjoyed great respect and admiration within the Somali society for centuries for their active role regarding conflict resolution and reconciliation in Somalia (Harper, 2012). In the Somali context, Nabadoons are considered to be the “*backbone of the Somali society*” (Abdiaziz_Interview15_52). The inclusion of Nabadoons in this study was, therefore, vital to understanding the in-depth causes of the Somali conflict, combined with their thorough description (Geertz 1973) and understanding of the word ‘peace’ in the Somali context.

The interviews were carried out in spoken English and Somalian. Sixteen of the interviews were conducted in English, and three interviews were conducted in Somalian at the request of participants due to the language barrier. The interviews were audio-recorded and password protected in a separate hard drive. I translated the interviews from Somali to English and a professional translator checked the accuracy of the translation. The interviews were between 45-70min. The interviews were conducted between November 2016 to February 2018. They were held in London, Bristol, Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow, Milton Keynes, and Northampton. These cities and towns are the places where participants lived and were more convenient for the participants.

The table below provides the characteristics of the participants and all the names used below are pseudonyms.

The Participants' Characteristics

S. no	Participants	Gender	Age Range (Years)	Language the Interview was Conducted in	Profession
1	SHARIF	M	70+	English	Nabadoon
2	YUSUF	M	50-59	Somali to English	Nabadoon
3	BAKAR	M	60-69	English	Nabadoon
4	IBRAHIM	M	60-69	English	Nabadoon
5	SAABIR	M	60-69	English	Nabadoon
6	AHMED	M	60-69	English	Nabadoon
7	FAWSI	M	60-69	Somali to English	Nabadoon
8	ALI	M	50-59	Somali to English	Nabadoon
9	ABUKAR	M	50-59	English	Nabadoon
10	ABDALA	M	70+	English	Teacher
11	MACALIM	M	50-59	English	Teacher
12	AMINA	F	40-49	English	Teacher
13	DAHIR	M	50-59	English	Teacher
14	ISMAIL	M	50-59	English	Teacher
15	ABDIASIS	M	40-49	English	Teacher
16	OSMAN	M	50-59	English	Teacher
17	WARSAME	M	50-59	English	Teacher
18	ZAKARIYA	M	40-49	English	Teacher
19	HASSAN	M	40-49	English	Teacher

Table 4.1 The Participants' Characteristics

4.12.2 Interviews phase 1

Accessing the participants was a continuous challenge and each phase was different and required different attention and approaches. In general, the issues relating to peace and clan conflicts are sensitive topics (MacDougall, and Fudge, 2001). I made use of my community networks and colleagues to help me find Nabadoons contact details and I then contacted them by phone requesting an interview. The process of gaining access was a continuous endeavour of negotiations and reassurances of issues related to anonymity and confidentiality. Sometimes some of the Nabadoons recommended other Nabadoons who they believed could contribute to the study.

The data collection stage of this research was comprised of two phases. In the first phase eight Nabadoons were interviewed, three interviews were conducted in Somali language and the rest in English, the focus here mainly being on issues relating to local types of conflict, the root causes of tribal conflicts, and the role of Nabadoons in conflict resolution, including the changes in this role since Somali independence. After this phase of data collection, the data was analysed and compared with the views of the teachers.

4.12.3 Interviews phase 2

The second phase of the interviews involved nine teachers. All interviews were conducted in English. Here the focus was to understand in-depth the teaching methods applied in schools in Somalia, classroom management, and discipline, as well as their views on the challenges in teaching peace education and their recommendations for future peace education policy and programmes.

4.12.4 The rationale for using semi-structured Interviews

I used semi-structured interviews as the primary method of data collection. I conducted interviews in English but was able to switch to the Somali language at the request of interviewees. Semi-structured interviews are a qualitative method involving pre-determined open questions which have the potential to elicit a rich and full description of the issues under investigation (Geertz, 1994). Furthermore, semi-structured interviews allowed me to clarify issues and probe for further details about participants' perspectives on, and experiences of, peace education (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008).

The semi-structured interview was the most appropriate option as it provided the necessary flexibility when asking different questions to both groups of participants and follow-up issues that needed more clarification (Bryman, 2008). This flexibility would not have been possible if I had adopted a structured interview style where questions

are standardised and fixed making it difficult to probe for further views and relevant information (Gray, 2004).

4.12.5 The nature of semi-structured interviews

The interview is one of the most vital tools in a qualitative study (Kvale, 2007). A qualitative research interview may be described as an “attempt to understand the world from the subject’s point of view, to unfold the meaning of the subject’s experiences, to uncover their lived world” (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015, p.1). For example, a study by Abdullahi (2012) successfully used semi-structured interviews to explore the perceptions of Somali professionals about the work and services offered by Somali Community Organisations (SCOs) in the UK. I wanted to explore in-depth the perspectives of teachers and peacemakers (Nabadoons) in the Somali diaspora in the UK about the effectiveness of peace education in the reconciliation process in Somalia. My aim was to provide a thorough description of the phenomenon and their experience in peace education in their own words (Geertz, 1994).

4.12.6 Limitations of semi-structured interviews

As with any other method, interviews have various limitations as a method of data collection, since, arguably, not all people are equally articulate and cooperative (Rabionet, 2011). In addition, the interview as a technique is not a neutral tool of data gathering (Qu and Dumay, 2011). Participants may take pleasure in expressing their perspectives deeply and articulately. In particular, Lewis (1993, p.35) describes how Somalis “are born talkers”, elaborating that “[e]very elder is expected to be able to hold an audience for hours on end with a speech richly laced by judicious proverbs and quotations from famous poems and sayings”.

With regard to the criticism that interviews lack “neutrality”, this study aims to reveal subjective perspectives, especially the meanings of participants’ experiences in peace

education and reconciliation processes in Somalia. The aim of the study is not to test theories. As interpretive research, using the interview as a method of data collection corresponded to my particular ontological and epistemological beliefs. Therefore, by conducting interviews, I was able to capture data and present the complexity and the context of the phenomenon under investigation (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). Further information on interview questions and probes used can be found in the Interview Guide Appendix 4.

4.12.7 Power dynamics in interviews

This section presents instances of my research experiences and provides practical examples of power dynamics during the process of data collection.

Power takes place in various relationships (Lukes, 1974; Foucault 1978). Power in discourse is continually negotiated between the researcher and participants (Kvale, 2006). According to Fairclough (1989), power is defined as powerful participants constraining and controlling the process of the interview and contributions of weaker participants. Lukes (1974) states that power in interview can be determined by various factors such as socioeconomic status, professional background, and ethnic identity. He adds that power shifts during the interview. For example, one can influence and coerce another individual in a way that opposes the individual's interest, and this coercion can be achieved covertly and overtly. Therefore, a greater understanding of cultural sensitivity and issues relating to emotional narratives and how they affect the process of qualitative data collection is vital for the enhancement of the research process as well as accomplishing greater verisimilitude (Blee 1998; Gilbert 2001; Gubrium and Holstein, 2002)

For instance, during the interview, one of the research participants prompted that there was "no point in recording... just take notes" (Warsame_Interview17_10-11)", the statement and the sluggishness in the participant's voice suggesting a sense of reluctance to continue. I explained that recording the interview would help me with the transcription, I quickly provided reassurances that I would share the transcript and analysis to provide the opportunity to check the accuracy and the interpretation of the analysis. This episode of the interview showed the power the interviewee exerted to have ceased the interview session. Throughout the data collection process, I endeavoured to improve the rapport by discussing how significant their contribution is to my study.

As interviewer, I had the power of setting the agenda, I asked the questions, and I put forth the issues and topics to which the interviewee would have to respond. Some of the questions were sometimes about unpleasant matters of war, grievances, and emotions and narratives, and by asking these difficult questions to reflect on past experiences and memories, I was employing a considerable amount of power (Lukes, 1974).

However, participants also enjoy a large amount of power during the interview. The fact that I was interested in exploring their views and asking questions suggested that I did not know but wanted to know - provided the interviewee with a considerable amount of power (Blee, 1998). In this regard, as Kleinman and Copp (1993, p.3) point out, "the success of our work depends on participants."

During an interview with one of the Nabadoons, I used the term the Nabadoon as a sign of respect, but the interviewee said he was a Sultan (different regions in Somalia use different titles for Nabadoons). He preferred the title Sultan as it gave him a sense

of a greater social status (Ahmed, 2002). I apologised and quickly began referring to him by the preferred title of Sultan. Here my insider stance and my knowledge of local culture helped as I did not challenge or ask the rationale for his choice of word, something that would be difficult for an outsider to understand without further research. Throughout the interview, the interviewee would emphasise the phrase Sultan whenever he wanted to refer to traditional Somali peacemakers, underlining his power to affect the way I used the term. In this respect, not only had he expressed his preference towards the word but also asserted a condition with which I had to comply to gain his participation. In this way, the interviewee determined the term I used, affecting the tone of my questions in the interview.

In the beginning, I found it difficult to manage power relations between participants and myself during the interview, especially the Nabadoons because of their higher status in the Somali society. Nabadoons can be over-communicative and were sometimes in control during the interview process. For example, in one of the interviews, a Nabadoon insisted his full name to be published as evidence of his participation. After explaining the ethical guidelines I had to follow and the reasons why his real name is concealed, the interviewee consented to continue, though his facial expression and his short answers suggested that he would not have participated if he had known his real name was to be concealed for his protection. To avoid any misunderstanding, I avoided challenging their authority in their field of expertise such as the xeer and Somalia culture. I also showed them more respect and gratitude towards their input and their contributions and I explained how important their perspectives and views were to this study.

I also noticed that participants were willing to provide more in-depth analysis when I asked questions such as “what were the root-causes of the Somali conflict? What do

you think the solutions are for the conflict? How can Nabadoons help achieve peace in Somalia? What is the role of peace education in the Somali peace and reconciliation process? What are the challenges for peace education implementation nation-wide? Probing interview questions and linking them to Somali context, not only helped to mitigate the interviewees tension and uncertainty, which might have built up, but also gave the participants a sense of responsibility to contribute by describing challenges of peace education and conflict resolution in Somalia to me.

According to Karnieli-Miller *et al.* (2009, p.286), “true participation comes through respect and dignity and acknowledgement of one’s equal rights to contribute knowledge during the interview.” This was my belief throughout and I even started referring to older Nabadoons as *adeer* (uncle) sometimes as a sign of respect and humility. This strategy worked for me as it provided the Nabadoons with a sense of belonging to the project and a sense of responsibility to educate me more about the history of conflict and their perspectives on resolutions.

4.13 Data analysis

I adopted a thematic analysis approach due to its flexibility in analysing qualitative data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is not connected to any particular form of the prior theoretical framework such as is the case in grounded theory (Clarke, 2005). From this perspective, my data analysis was flexible, allowing new emergent issues to be incorporated into the analysis (Maxwell, 2013). I undertook some analysis during the process of data collection, since “[w]e should never collect data without substantial analysis going on” (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996, p.2). In this regard, I was constantly thinking about and reflecting on the emerging themes from participants’ narratives and experiences of peace education and the violent conflict in Somalia. During this

process, I was able to identify some emerging themes and started to follow up on them, incorporating them into the following interviews.

To unpack the collected data (Gibbs, 2002) my initial reading of the data focused on the bigger picture. Therefore, I started the initial coding process to capture the holistic meaning of the interviews and to make sense of the textual data by clarifying “who is saying what and in what context” (Barbour, 2008, p.217). After the open coding process, I became more selective, focusing on identifying the emerging sub-themes derived from the interviews. Then I coded the meaning of the derived sub-themes to create the themes ensuring their relevance to my research questions. The final stage was to identify similarities and differences between themes (Grbich, 2007) in the interests of delineating the relationships between the themes (Elliot and Timulak, 2005). I did member checking by taking the analysis back to research participants to ask them to check how well my interpretations fit with their perspectives and lived experiences (Jones, *et al.*,2000). This procedure of quality checking was also ethical as participants felt empowered and had a stronger voice in how they were presented in the context (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). The table below shows the process of thematic analysis.

Phase	Description of the process
Phase 1: Familiarising yourself with your data	I immersed myself in the data familiarisation, in both the depth and breadth of the contents, making a note of initial ideas. I then started the processes of transcribing the interviews.
Phase 2: Generating initial codes	I coded interesting parts of the data in an orderly fashion throughout the whole data set, organising data relevant to each code.
Phase 3: Searching for themes	After the initial coding, I collated codes into potential themes, assembling all data pertinent to each potential theme.
Phase 4: Reviewing themes	I checked if the emergent themes worked in line with the coded excerpts and the entire data set.
Phase 5: Define themes	I made the final refinements of the emergent themes focusing on identifying the core of what each theme is about and (if sub-theme) how they interact and relate to each other and the overarching theme.
Phase 6: Producing the report	A set of themes emerged, I wrote up all the thematic analyses and tried to tell the story of my data in a logical and coherent way.

Table 4.2 Framework for thematic analysis

4.13.1 Framework for thematic analysis

My initial reading of the data focused on the bigger picture so as to capture the holistic meaning of the interviews. Afterwards, I was more selective, focusing on emerging *meaning units* (Wertz, 1983). Next, I coded the meaning to create categories for understanding similarities and differences between units (Grbich, 2007). Coding can be defined as a form of data simplification (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996, p.2). It involves reducing and organising substantial bodies of data into more manageable units in order to make sense of the textual data, as well as clarifying “who is saying what and in what context” (Barbour, 2008, p.217).

At each stage of the analysis, I constantly audited each step, archived each phase, and approached the process in a systematic, organised manner to ensure that information can be easily located (Elliot and Timulak, 2005). All interviews were recorded, and transcribed verbatim, then intertwined with my notes which I marked clearly so as to differentiate them from participants' statements. I used the iterative "back and forth process" (Teddle and Tashakkori, 2009, p.251) in order to acquire insights and meaning-making, as well as "working with the data, organising it, breaking it into manageable units, synthesising it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you tell others" (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982).

Although I conducted an inductive analysis, I did not follow a particular interpretative perspective but rather adopted a "do-it-yourself" approach (Maxwell, 2013; Thomas, 2006). In this regard, I rejected universal and dominant metanarratives which "define a single correct understanding of something" (Maxwell, 2013, p.6). In other words, I rejected a ready-made approach that clearly defines the logical sequences of different stages and, instead, favoured a flexible approach, recognising the multiple constructions of reality that are enunciated by participants and interpreted by myself (Grbich, 2007). Therefore, the focus was on reporting the subjective constructions of the participants.

Lastly, I organised those categories into themes and sub-themes in the interests of delineating "the relationships between the categories" (Elliot and Timulak, 2005, p.55). When the meaning of the data was clear, I interpreted the findings in light of previous theorisations of the topic in the wider literature. Finally, I checked the completed research results and analysis with the participants themselves in order to verify the consistency of the meaning of the qualitative results (Doyle, 2007). According to

Lincoln and Guba, (1985), using member checking enhances the credibility and rigour in qualitative studies. There is a debate on the appropriateness of member checking as a method of a quality check in qualitative research with some authors questioning its relevance as a validation technique (Sandelowski, 1993; Barbour, 2001). However, the guidelines provided in the Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Research (COREQ) recognises member checking as a technique of rigour that ensures participants' *"perspectives and meanings are represented and not curtailed by the researchers' own agenda and knowledge"* (Tong et al., 2007, p. 356). Using member checking empowered my participants and provided them with the power to add and remove data. This freedom is even more remarkable given the context and the sensitivity of issues surrounding war and emotional historical narratives. This is also in agreement with the epistemology of constructivism, and my belief of reality in that knowledge is co-constructed (Doyle, 2007).

Three overarching themes have been identified; unifying curriculum, barriers for peace education implementation, and local ownership of the reconciliation process.

The following diagram shows the multidimensionality and interconnections between the absence of the national curriculum and how it was exploited to promote interests and political ideologies of external countries. More explanation of this interconnectivity is provided in Chapter Seven in section six.




Figure 2 Overarching Themes

4.14 Ethical considerations

Since I am dealing with human participants, it is vital I rigorously followed ethical guidelines and considerations. Interviews are seen as an intrusion in the private lives of the research participants involving sensitive questions (Cohen *et al.*, 2007).

Issues relating to ethics arise at different stages in qualitative research (Flick 2007; Kvale, 2007). According to Bryman (2008, p. 118) there are four critical areas that ethical concern might emerge: "whether harm comes to participants; whether there is a lack of consent; whether there is an invasion of privacy; and where deception is involved."

My research proposal was approved by The University of Northampton's ethics committee. I have also adhered to the Code of Ethics and Conduct of British Educational Research Association (BERA) (2011), taking into account the following ethical issues to safeguard the wellbeing of the participants.

It is vital to consider the emotional aspect of participants during and after the data collection. During the interviews, one of the participants seemed to be at risk of emotional harm as he felt emotional after recalling the tragic death of his fellow Nabadoon who died in crossfire during the process of cease-fire negotiations and so to mitigate any emotional harm, I decided to accept his account and narrative in the same form he told the story without probing for in-depth details. I also offered to suspend the interview if he so wished. He responded that the sacrifices of those who died making peace should be remembered. This study attempted to do its part by giving a voice to research participants and to tell their stories in their own words (Goodhand, 2000). Being aware of the shifts in power dynamics and emotions between me and the interviewees was important and by immersing myself into the power

negotiations of data collection process consciously, I gained a fuller and richer picture of the analysis (Blee, 1998). I then reported their perspectives openly and transparently, maintaining all the ethical guidelines of the university. I also thanked him sincerely for his resilience and support. I remained careful and sensitive not to invoke deep emotional expression of distress, explicitly and implicitly, from the interviewees when sharing their experiences (Goodhand, 2000).

4.14.1 Voluntary informed consent

Prior to commencing the research, I received contact details through community networks, as well as my social capital. My role as interpreter and community worker was an advantage. Culturally it is important to speak with Nabadoons first and get their permission and acceptance for the interview then send the information sheet and the consent form. I then sent emails to participants whose contact details I had received, inviting them for an interview. I ensured that the participants were well-informed about the purpose and process of the study by providing an information sheet (Appendix 2). Some of the consent and other information was explained orally as it was seen more culturally appropriate in their context. As Ford et al. (2009, p.5) argues, the process of getting informed consent from participants “must be sensitive to the norms, customs, and sensitivities of the local environment.” I remained aware of issues that might require further elaboration and explained the aim of the study as well as their rights during and after the interview.

4.14.2 Openness and disclosure

The pilot study revealed that a written information sheet alone was inadequate as some participants were still asking me about the purpose of the study and other issues regarding anonymity and confidentiality. This suggested that they had either not read the information sheet or not fully understood it. Therefore, bearing in mind that Somali

culture is largely oral (Gardner and El Bushra, 2004), I read out the information sheet in the Somali language before the interview to ensure that they comprehended the research process, as well as their rights during and after the interview. I clarified how the data would be used and to whom it would be reported. This transparency about the research process increased the trust between the participants and myself. Since a relationship based on trust and respect must be maintained throughout the research process (Seidman, 2013), this procedure helped me acquire a thorough description of the phenomenon under investigation,

4.14.3 Right to withdraw

I made it clear to the participants that they had the full right to withdraw from the study without giving any reason. I reiterated that their participation was voluntary and they were not obliged to take part. Since the study involved certain sensitive topics, such as tribal politics and reconciliation processes, I reassured them that there would be no harmful consequences as a result of their participation in the research. I took harm to mean the possibility of the study inflicting any adverse effects on the research participants (Marshall and Rossman, 2014).

I constantly reminded the participants about the aim of the study. However, issues concerning Somali politics and its underpinning socio-economic factors, as well as socio-emotional aspects of the reconciliation process, are entangled with controversies (Harper, 2012). Therefore, I constantly made judgements about the suitability of the questions I was asking. When I sensed that a participant needed further clarification regarding the purpose of the study or a particular question that was raised, I made sure that he/she was fully informed about the research purpose.

I explained the goals of the study and stressed its importance to Somali society. I highlighted the rationale of the interviews as part of my PhD study. I sensed that the

issues under investigation gave them a positive understanding that, as a researcher, I was aiming to produce something useful for the Somali society. This feeling has helped provide them with a sense of responsibility to make contributions to my research.

4.14.4 Privacy and disclosure

My ethical considerations also included issues of anonymity and confidentiality. Participants were assured that they would remain anonymous throughout and after the study. I ensured that the interviewees' responses were not traceable to them by giving them pseudonyms. The Somali diaspora is closely interconnected, with close tribal, social, and economic relationships. Therefore, even mentioning the time and place of the interview could easily disclose the identity of the potential participants. Thus, to prevent any possible trace, I have not mentioned in the thesis the settings or the community centres in which the interview took place. With these measures in place, I was confident that their identities were sufficiently protected.

In addition, as an insider, I could understand cultural and tribal sensitivities (Unluer 2012). This insider knowledge helped me to evaluate the specific issues that might evoke memories and emotions of the past and harm the participants psychologically. Therefore, I revised some of the questions after the pilot study and made them less controversial and more general so that they would not invoke strong feelings or cause social stigmatisation or fear (Kaiser, 2009). In addition, when I sensed unease, I constantly reminded the participants that their identities would be concealed and protected both during and after the research. For some participants, this strategy gave them a sense of ease and comfort and made them more willing to provide complete and detailed descriptions of the topic (Neale *et al.*, 2005).

4.15 Conclusion

This chapter explained the details of my methodology, the means of data collection, and its philosophical underpinnings. Since no study of peace education from the perspectives of the Somali UK diaspora with the focus of such particular participants has been undertaken before, an exploratory case study was undertaken (Mills *et al.*, 2015) with participants selected purposively to produce knowledge grounded in their experiences of peace education and conflict resolution in their own words (Sandelowski, 2004). The data was collected using the semi-structured interview format. The principal aim of this study was to explore the views of Nabadoons and teachers about their perspectives of peace education in conflict resolution in the Somali conflict context. Generally, there is limited literature regarding the role of peace education in resolving conflicts in clan-based societies (Wessells, 2005). While several studies have focused on the role of peace education in inter-ethnic conflicts, only a few studies address the topic in a clan-based society. Due to the lack of appropriate literature about peace education in a clan-based context, it is difficult for policymakers and practitioners to apply peace education in places like Somali.

The research paradigm adopted is constructivism which views reality as a construct of human interactions with their culture and environment (Seale, 1999). In accordance with this approach, I believe throughout my research that participants' opinions are a product of their human interactions and shared knowledge, which together comprise human beliefs and reality. The context of my research is that the clan-based society of Somalia, the understanding of the concept of peace, is socially constructed. However, I have narrowed this social construct down to the Somali context, exploring the views of the Somali diaspora to determine the application of peace education in Somalia. Nevertheless, the scope of the study extends beyond this immediate context as it can

be transferable for all related clan-based contexts with similar characteristics and thus, contributes to the broader field of peace education.

The groups were selected from the Somali diaspora in the UK (traditional Somali elders and teachers). They were selected due to their knowledge and experiences of the issues under investigation. The process of collecting interviews with Nabadoons was particularly challenging. The UK is home to several traditional peacemakers so tracing them was a complicated, yet fruitful task. Snowball sampling, combined with purposive sampling, proved the most suitable technique, since finding Nabadoons was only possible through community engagement.

The data was collected using semi-structured interviews which were conducted in two phases. The first phase covered the traditional peacemakers and concentrated on issues related to local forms of conflict, causes of tribal conflicts, and Nabadoons' role in conflict resolution. The second phase of interviews covered the teachers, examining in depth the teaching methods applied in Somali schools, classroom discipline and management, and their assessment of peace education in resolving tribal conflicts in Somalia. In addition, challenges faced in teaching peace education, as well as teachers' recommendations for future peace education policy and programmes, were also included in the interview sessions. The use of the semi-structured interviews provided in-depth perspectives of issues under investigation.

Throughout the data collection and analysis, my role as a researcher was both that of an insider and an outsider. As an insider, I was thoroughly aware of the social issues of my community and shared their experiences of living in the Somali diaspora in the UK, thus granting me a unique position in the research. Conversely, during our conversations, I realised that my educational and professional background also gave me a marked advantage as an outsider. Although I was part of the researched as

Somali diaspora and teacher, my limited knowledge in the subculture regarding traditional conflict resolution in Somalia added to the participants' perception of me as an outsider. As Asselin (2003) suggests, I gathered the data with my “eyes open” continuously learning from participants’ experience of the phenomenon under study. Taken all together, being part of the researched gave me certain amount of legitimacy (Adler & Adler, 1987) and also enhanced the depth and breadth of understanding the complex issues relating to clan identity, clan politics, peace, and reconciliation and local means of conflict resolution that may not have been accessible to a non-Somali researcher (Kanuha, 2000).

The following chapter presents findings obtained from the semi-structured interviews conducted with the research participants.

Chapter 5: Presentation of findings

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the semi-structured interviews described in Chapter 4. The findings in this chapter are presented uncritically and provide the reader with a sense of the scope of the complexity of the issues under investigation, as well as to provide different perspectives of the participants' views without interpreting their views. In order to help readability and consistency, the presentation of this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part presents the themes that relate to the perspectives of Nabadoons in terms of conflict resolution and the reconciliation process in the period of Somalia Siyad Bare (1969-1991), and post-Siyad Barre regime. Here, I present the events in a chronological order tailored with the emergent themes to help make sense of the raw data in the following chapter.

This part of the chapter reveals the challenges of the Nabadoons in participating in the reconciliation process. The main themes derived from interviews included in this part include 'legitimacy of the Nabadoons', 'protracted tribal conflict', 'challenges of the reconciliation process', 'ownership of reconciliation process', 'absence of unifying national curriculum', 'change of conflict dynamics', and 'traditional means of conflict resolution, culture, national identity and power-sharing'.

The second part of the chapter presents the perspectives of teachers on challenges they faced in the process of delivering peace-related programmes, in particular, peace education programmes in the Somali context.

The main themes derived from interviews in relation to teachers' perspectives included 'the emergence of private schools', 'challenges of teaching about peace', 'lack of

tailored teacher training', 'cultural perception of the role of the teacher', and 'classroom discipline strategy'.

The third part of the chapter presents the factors that contributed to the failures of peace education programmes from the perspective of the participants.

The main themes derived from interviews in relation to barriers of peace education in Somalia included 'Lack of a long term strategy', 'lack of training for peace education programme (PEP)', 'corporal punishment as means of behaviour correction', and 'outside cultural influence.'

There are three overarching themes that are unifying curriculum, barriers for peace education implementation, and local ownership of the reconciliation process, as well as thirty sub-themes.

5.2 PART ONE: Delegitimising traditional pacemakers

The theme 'Delegitimising traditional peacemakers' recurred throughout the interviews. 17 out of the 19 participants mentioned that the Somali Central Government worked diligently to discredit the Nabadoons traditional peace-making efforts in Somalia. Therefore, 'delegitimising traditional peacemakers' was a theme that emerged from their data, informed by the sub-themes 'discrediting the Nabadoons as backward nomads', 'denial for recognition', 'diminishing role in peace-making efforts', and 'making their rulings and judgments invalid'. *A variety of perspectives were expressed by participants regarding the government's treatment of the Nabadoons (traditional Somali peacemakers). Dahir stated, "The government clearly knew that if they empowered the local traditional elders, it would lose power in the eyes of the citizens (Dahir_Interview13_73-74)".* In addition, Ismail explained that:

...the government wanted to build a modern governance system where the law is above all, as well as building a judiciary system which is external from the involvement of traditional leaders, this makes sense in democratic society, but in a tribal society where tribe is like a religion, I think the government lost a huge opportunity to include them as stakeholders in the justice system but instead, traditional were alienated and [were] branded as backward nomads who didn't know anything about the modern way of governance (Ismail_Interview14_129-135).

Therefore, as a result of this alienation, Dahir adds that the *“traditional peacemakers’ popularity and legitimacy has somehow declined”* (Dahir_Interview13_65-67). To this date, the struggle to integrate modern and traditional governance remains one of the biggest obstacles to peace and stability in Somalia (Abdullahi, 2017). However, Osman defended the central government’s rationale for disempowering Nabadoons:

The government always feared the involvement of traditional elders in the judiciary system as Somalis are a tribal society and all the Nabadoons represent their tribes and again times were different, and the senior executives of the government were busy building a fair system free from nepotism, which is a big issue in the Somali culture (Osman_Interview16_139-142).

5.3 The return of legitimacy

This section shows how the Nabadoons’ role became vital in the reconciliation process. The data indicates that the importance of Nabadoons in conflict resolution became significant after the collapse of the central government in 1991 in their efforts to mitigate the violent conflict. Sub-themes that informed the theme ‘the return of legitimacy’ were

'trust in the method of conflict resolution', 'knowledge in local means of conflict resolution' and 'Particular knowledge in the reconciliation process.' Abukar states:

'Suddenly, the situation has completely changed from a police state to warlord state, there was no longer police or government paid military on the street, every warlord was self-proclaimed to be the legitimate leader and crushed his rivals, and this was the start of tribal division in Somalia.' (Abukar_Interview 11_215-220).

Commenting about the emergence of the role of the Nabadoons, Zakariya reflects:

I remember when the heavy shelling was taking in 1991, my father used to call out where are the Nabadoons; the bloodshed must be stopped, this was the first I heard the term Nabadoon, as it was more popular in the rural part of Somalia (Zakariya_Interview18_93-95).

Warsame also recalls that *"the international community was busy with issues, and the cold war was coming to an end, and a lot of attention was put on the Iraq invasion of Kuwait"* (Warsame_Interview17_164-166). There was reluctance from the international community to intervene militarily and diplomatically in the first months of the conflict. Reflecting on this period Amina said:

All eyes were now on the Nabadoons to intervene and stop the bloodshed, and many sacrificed their lives in the process, they managed to halt the bloodshed and negotiate for a cease-fire, since then, their presence in most of the negotiation conferences became the norm (Amina_Interview12_92-94).

This data indicate that the collapse of the government in Somalia opened an opportunity for Nabadoons to be more involved in all aspects of the Somali political economy.

5.4 Corruption and credibility of Nabadoons

For the participants, the absence of law and order meant that there was a need for legitimate authority to legitimise business transactions such as land trade and properties. A set of sub-themes derived from interviews indicated the theme ‘corruption affecting Nabadoons’ *credibility*. These were ‘receiving bribes’, ‘accepting the status quo’, ‘business broker’ and ‘exploitation of Nabadoons’ social status. Ismail criticised the changing attitude and behaviour of Nabadoons:

I can say most of the Nabadoons became part of the system, they adapted to the system, and in doing so, they become involved in the dirty business of war and corruption. In terms of politics, they became stakeholders of the political dynamics and political framework [source of political legitimacy]. In terms of economics and terms of business making, they became the negotiators, the judges, and they also became the middleman, especially when people traded properties and other valuable things (Ismail_Interview14_146-152).

Similarly, Dahir adds, “because of their [Nabadoons’] involvement in business and also in being a middleman in terms of buying and selling properties, their involvement in peace efforts has reduced” (Dahir_Interview13_68-69)”. Nevertheless, according to Abdiaziz, there is uncertainty in the final official status of Nabadoons from the government’s perspective and fears that their cultural legitimacy might be questioned again, and he states:

We [Nabadoons] were somehow not sure how any new government would treat us, what our role would be? Should we be outlawed again? [laughing] we in are a poor country, you must put food on the table, I know some Nabadoons who were not really serious about resolving the root causes of conflict but rather managing the conflict, and you know there is a difference between the two, it was clear that they preferred the status quo simply because they were benefiting from the ongoing conflict (Abdiaziz_Interview15_42-48).

However, another argument which has been consistently made when asked about the reduced effectiveness of the Nabadoons over the years, 15 out of the 19 participants pointed out that the Nabadoons' legitimacy has weakened and that they were no longer viewed as being neutral about the conflict. As Abukar explains:

When you make a judgment or ruling as a Nabadoon, you must rule by the 'Xeer' (Somali legal traditional system), and this means you follow the traditional guidelines which include, fairness, justice, impartiality and most important, you must be God-fearing in your decision making; but unfortunately, some Nabadoons actively promote the interests of their tribesmen and speak in the name of their tribe, not in the name of justice and fairness which were the characteristics of real Nabadoons (Abukar_Interview 11_230-235).

Ali describes the characteristics and qualities of genuine Nabadoons:

Real Nabadoons always looked after respect, not bringing a bad reputation for his tribe and for his family even if the decision is against his tribe. However, unfortunately, the Nabadoons today are only after for money and corruption, and they would do anything. So I think corruption has changed their mind-set and has

changed the way, the genuine ways of conflict resolution (Ali_Interview8_297-300).

5.4.1 Nepotism in the political culture

The next theme, 'Nepotism in the political culture' is presented below and explains how Nabadoons became part of the emerging business enterprise.

A set of sub-themes derived from interviews indicated the theme 'Nepotism in the political culture'. These were 'hiring clan members', 'discrimination on other minority clans' 'promoting sub-clan interest' and 'clan-based favouritism'. Abukar also acknowledged that corruption and nepotism destroyed the reputation of the Nabadoons:

Before we gained independence, Nabadoons used to be self-sufficient and could sustain themselves. Because tribes, businessmen within the community and other peace-loving people, always provided the sustenance to them so that they could get busy resolving conflicts. In the absence of this local mechanism support, they became a part of the business entrepreneurs as they added their heavy commission on land and house trade. As a result, some become economically powerful, and the rest are busy catching up [laughing] (Abukar_Interview 11_215-220).

5.4.2 Changing of conflict dynamics

This section presents the theme 'changings conflict dynamics' to explain how the changing conflict dynamics and allegiances have impacted the Nabadoons' legitimacy and effectiveness in conflict resolution.

Participants suggested that the nature of Somali conflict has been continuously shifting. The theme 'Changing conflict dynamics' is comprised of the sub-themes '*increasing external political stakeholders*', '*new dimension of ideological conflict*', and '*competing for foreign interests*'. Apart from the corruption and nepotism through tribal lineage, accounted for as a different theme, all participants acknowledged that the conflict is now beyond the tribal elders' sphere as it is more interlinked with external stakeholders, as Ismail states:

We still have a big role to play, remember, we helped this government and the previous, as you know there is not such one-man-one-vote system availed in Somalia, so we are the only legitimate group in the society that holds that power, but it is not fair that we get asked to solve issues that are beyond our capacity, we are part of the civil servants, not the executive team (Ismail_Interview14_155-159).

In addition, Dahir supports the view that political changes on the ground require different conflict resolution strategies and cooperation:

As you know, the conflict has changed from a tribal conflict to ideological conflict. So in this case, you could say that the Nabadoons were not effective because their job was only to mediate between tribes and since the tribal conflict has somehow diminished and people all became part of business groups and business enterprises there are also fewer tribes that were fighting because of the tribal feud. But I can tell you that Somali issue needs the correct approach and tailored solutions, some groups have grievances, we [Nabadoons] can listen to their grievances and only make recommendations, but only the government has the power to execute our recommendations. (Dahir_Interview13_78-85).

Furthermore, Abdiaziz complains about a lack of care and protection from the government's side and acknowledges that some of the types of conflict are beyond their scope and capacity of conflict resolution:

We are the backbone of the Somali society, but some of the political issues are beyond and are too complex, and politicians show attention only when it is in their best interest, we are like a ball [laughing], we get kicked everywhere by politicians, they need us because it is our job to put them in the federal parliament you see! But when they are in power, their phones are off [laughing], and we get no attention anymore, most of my friends were killed by Al-Shabaab [hard-line Islamist group] in a gun battle, and some were killed in their own homes, the government does not give us the protections we need (Abdiaziz_Interview15_52-58).

5.4.3 Protracted tribal conflict

This section elaborates the changing nature of the conflict from tribal to ideologically oriented conflict.

A number of sub-themes emerged to suggest the theme 'Protracted tribal conflict'. This comprised of the sub-themes 'various internal and external stakeholders', 'shift of political views', 'failed state', 'difficult identifying the real stakeholders', 'intractable conflict', 'complex clan issues' and 'politicised historical narratives'. Sixteen out of the nineteen participants suggested that some of the factors that contributed to the reduction in effectiveness of the Nabadoons, in terms of resolving conflicts, can be associated with the ever-increasing number of stakeholders and spoilers of the peace processes. Zakariya points out, *"these different internal and external stakeholders*

made the conflict resolution much harder in the Somali context” (Zakariya_interview18_29-31).

In addition, Amina refers to external political actors as spoilers of peace in Somalia:

I think peace is interested in the people who are suffering and in need of protection, not people who are benefiting from lack of peace, we need to ask who prefers Somalia to stay fragile and weak. The answer is clear, start with neighbouring countries, the Middle East and the West and list goes on because Somalia locates on a strategic place, Ethiopia needs access to ports as they are land-locked and the Middle East are like spoilers because they don't want to see Turkey having political and economic hegemony in Somalia. Just see what they are doing in Baraba port and Puntland port deal, so as elders, we can suggest to name and shame the spoilers, but some of the problems are that these countries contribute to the national budget through subsidies, so it is difficult to point the finger at them (Amina_Interview12_179-186).

Furthermore, Hassan points out that “tribal issues are complex and require deep reconciliation and a new fresh approach” (Hassan_Interview19-53-54). This fresh approach includes searching for tools with the culture that can be used to mitigate conflict effectively.

5.4.4 Principles of conflict mediation

This section discusses the theme ‘principles of conflict mediation’. Participants identified a number of sub-themes, which contributed to the theme ‘Principles of conflict mediation’: ‘Neutrality’, ‘Partiality’ and ‘Justice’. The importance of neutrality of the Nabadoons in tribal conflict mitigation resolution has been echoed in several occasions during data collection. For example, Hassan states:

Nabadoons used to be neutral, impartial, and fair in making judgments. But unfortunately, when it comes to mediating between their own tribe and another tribe, I have seen myself some tribal elders abusing this trust and this neutrality as they constantly line with the views of their tribesmen subjectively despite the fact that that the evidence is against the perpetrators of the crime (Hassan_Interview19_19-23).

Zakariya also adds;

You must be fair when it comes to decision making, historically, the characteristics of an effective Nabadoon was one that examines the root causes of the conflict and follows the 'xeer' principles between the warring clans, but things have changed, principles of neutrality have been ignored, and Nabadoons are constantly under pressure to take side or lose status within the clan (Zakariya_Interview_212-217).

Similarly, Abdiaziz states:

Nowadays if you don't follow what the politicians and the business individuals of the tribe want, you will be changed instantly and replaced with Mr Yes Nabadoon from the clan and most of the Nabadoons today can be put into that category (Abdiaziz_Interview15_182-184).

In addition, Warsame adds:

I don't speak on behalf of all Nabadoons, but I can tell you that all our fingers are same height so as Nabadoons, we cannot generalise from one individual's perspective, we [Nabadoons] are trying to bring solution to the most complex clan conflicts in the world, but I agree that mistakes were made, but you have to look

into why some corruption takes place, you may sympathise the difficult social situation we are experiencing (Warsame_Interview17_224-228).

Hassan explains why some Nabadoons may be involved in corruption:

Nabadoons are part of the tribe, so even if they are neutral on some occasions, they cannot be perfect. To be honest, they are in a difficult situation; it is a dilemma. For example, if your uncle commits a crime against another tribe, it's common sense that you support your uncle although you are a peace lover or peace seeker; you cannot say no, or you cannot reject your relatives demands, because simply they are your line of defence tomorrow, but I agree that this behaviour is not consistent with our Islamic values, in reality in times of war, it is difficult to be objective and neutral (Hassan_ Interview19_26-33).

Here, Hassan highlights the pressure that Nabadoons face when making decisions and judgments during the reconciliation process.

5.4.5 Poverty affects neutrality in mediation

This section explains how the Nabadoons neutrality has been affected by difficult circumstances and poverty in Somalia. The theme 'Poverty affects neutrality in mediation' emerged in the data. Fifteen out of the nineteen participants identified sub-themes which contributed to this theme, including 'poverty', 'unemployment', and 'losing social status', as factors that had an impact on the judgments and rulings by Nabadoons. Ahmed states:

We live in a poor country, we are financially dependent on each other, the power lies with the business community, I know that some elders receive cash in support for political support, but if the government provided them [Nabadoons] with some

income, maybe, they [Nabadoons] could be more impartial and neutral in the some of the judgment when it comes to resolving conflicts (Ahmed_Interview1_213-217).

Ahmed then compares the justice system in Somalia to the UK:

Here in the UK, the courts are totally independent of the government, they have the power to overrule a decision made by the government, that is impossible in Somalia, when I first claimed for asylum, the home office rejected my claim, and the court of appeal overruled the home office, I did not understand until I learned how the system worked in the UK (Ahmed_Interview1_219-223).

Similarly, Abdiaziz adds, *“there is no way a judge can make a fair ruling if he is not independent, he has to be financially independent, you know there is extreme poverty in the country so you can easily be exploited”* (Abdiaziz_Interview15_195-197).

Likewise, Hassan states, *“courts need to be free from control, and they have to make their decisions without any pressure, but in Somalia, that is a dream anytime soon”* (Hassan_Interview19_221-222).

5.4.6 Politicising Reconciliation

Sixteen out of the nineteen participants identified sub-themes, which contributed to this theme ‘politicising reconciliation’. These included *‘the buzzword’*, *‘forgiveness’* and *‘social healing’*. All participants indicated how the term ‘reconciliation’ is politicised in the Somali context. Hassan has the view that the term:

Reconciliation is a beautiful word and if you don't say this... you are not seen as somebody who is peaceful. So you have always to keep saying that we need

reconciliation, everybody uses this reconciliation [term] just to justify their political agenda (Hassan_Interview19_152-156).

In addition, Ismail argues, *“if we [Somali people] aren’t really serious about reconciliation, it means that reconciliation will only be words and we will never put it into action (Ismail_Interview14_162-163)”*.

Similarly, Dahir underlines:

If we have the political will to make final agreement on the thorny issues such the properties that were looted and victims of the war, we can come together and solve it in the same way our ancestors used to do, but it looks that some are still busy grabbing more land and resource and claim to be theirs, you can see we are not ready yet (Dahir_Interview13_89-92).

5.4.7 Ripeness for genuine reconciliation

This section presents findings regarding the theme ‘ripeness for genuine reconciliation’ where participants reveal the barriers for genuine reconciliation.

Participants identified a number of sub-themes, which contributed to the theme ‘ripeness for genuine reconciliation’ including ‘benefitting from the status quo’, ‘lack of clarity on power-sharing’, ‘fear of losing clans dominance’, ‘fear of justice’, and how much ‘compromise’ both parts are prepared to make. Ismail points out:

Our leaders are not ready for genuine reconciliation, the ordinary people want peace unconditionally, but our political leaders either don’t know what they are doing or are deliberately misleading the public, complicating the reconciliation efforts. A good example is how some of the regional member states are reluctant to play their role in completing the Somali federal constitution, just a week ago,

member states declined to attend the meeting to discuss the constitutional review (Ismail_Interview14_100-105).

Similarly, Hassan throws the blame on the regional member states arguing:

There is no way we can achieve peace in Somalia as long as we have regional member states dictating their agendas on the central government. These member state leaders portray the government as the barrier for their economic development, and they are there to defend their rights and are playing with their emotions (Hassan_Interview19_97-101).

In addition, Saabir points out that some misuse the concept of reconciliation *“this word reconciliation is becoming...kind of a buzzword in the Somali political spheres, every... politician uses [it] to justify that they are people of peace; that they are peaceful people”* (Saabir_Interview10_176-178). According to Hassan *“reconciliation needs a lot before you bring people on the table, you need people to be ready for real reconciliation”* (Hassan_Interview19_209-211). Hassan adds, *“Somalis are tired of conflict, but every time we see peace taking shape, some of the political leaders provoke emotions of hate and revenge; people are ready to forgive each other for the sake of Allah”* (Hassan_Interview19_117-119).

In addition, Yusuf highlights one the reasons behind the failures of the reconciliation in Somalia as being *“reconciliations failed because some people consistently benefited from the status quo... so they will drag on the reconciliation process, the reconciliation conferences because some people are benefiting from the process”* (Yusuf_Interview7_114-117).

5.4.8 Forgiveness key for reconciliation

The next theme, 'forgiveness key for reconciliation' focuses on the recurring theme regarding the reconciliation process. This section reveals the obstacles to forgiving the perpetrator and the emotional aspect in the context of the Somali conflict.

Almost all the participants identified sub-themes which contributed to this theme, including; '*involvement of all clan in the conflict*,' '*grievance*,' '*Islamic values*,' and '*compensation*'. Fifteen of the nineteen participants stated that the main issue is the lack of a roadmap for reconciliation. Zakariya raises that, "*there have to be some clear guidelines and there have to be some clear principles, some real aims, and real objectives of how to achieve peace* (Zakariya_Interview18_83-85)". Similarly, Hassan points out:

There are no clear goals for reconciliation; what are we resolving? There is no tribe that did not commit crimes in Somalia! We need to forget the past and focus on the future! We can't bring the past back! The only way forward is to genuinely forgive each other about the past wrongdoings and concentrate on not going back to the civil war (Hassan_ Interview19_152-156).

Dahir also believes:

It is difficult to solve issues to do with emotions, every tribe thinks that their path for political and economic development was blocked by another rival tribe and these emotions are cleverly exploited by politicians, so unless we are ready to open the Pandora box of grievances, it is better than the Sheikhs [Muslim scholars] continuing to get involved and focus on the benefit of forgiveness and get on with the future (Dahir_Interview13_22-26).

Ali adds:

We don't want only temporary peace that only means that there is no gunshot going on. We need a very deep peace, which is based on forgiveness, which is based on real reconciliation, and I think that's what we need to achieve (Ali_Interview_357-360).

In addition, Abukar expresses that forgiveness is a noble thing but can be difficult in some situations:

Our religion tells us the benefits of forgiveness, the Quran constantly praises those who forgive and restore relations but in my experience of conflict mediation, forgiving someone who murdered a member of your family is not an easy thing, or someone who is financially better after looting your property, it is really a long and difficult process (Abukar_Interview 11_119-123).

Similarly, Warsame shares the view that that reconciliation process is a difficult task. He makes a recommendation to make the process more successful:

There must be a reason to forgive, it is not easy to forgive your adversary, but through my experience, when both parts are reminded the nobleness and the reward of forgiveness from a religious viewpoint, that is why I argue that that religious figures must be involved too, Somalis have a lot of respect for the 'diin' [religion], and it must play a role in the reconciliation (Warsame_Interview17_173-177).

Osman further elaborates this point:

“The Western model of mediation focuses mainly on the individual, and the process is confidential and neutral, but the approach of Somali process of mediation in a communal process and the process is transparent, nothing is confidential, as elders, we are deeply involved in the negotiation, and we try and have win-win outcome for all parties, but I admit it is not an easy job but the more we say about the benefits of forgiveness and how the Quran praises those who forgive, the more the individual’s heart softness and tries to forgives wholeheartedly (Osman_Interview16_170-176)”.

In addition, Abduaziz acknowledges the importance of community support. He recalls:

In my experience, victims are ready to forgive if they get relief and recognition from the community, and for use as Somalis. Anyone who forgives for the sake of God is seen as someone with courage because revenge is a bad thing, as you also know, our beloved Prophet (SAW) said those who forgive their adversaries, God will advance their status (Abdiaziz_Interview15_173-177).

Furthermore, Osman also admits that the process of mediation is complex and needs flexibility and wisdom:

Compensating the victim in combination with healing process of forgiveness and community recognition may be one of the promising approach for reconciliation process, we [Nabadoons] do everything to tackle the problem, if compensation is needed, we negotiate and there is different Diya between tribes, so it is not fixed, compensation helps in the healing process but apologising for what you have done in a humble way and asking for forgives is important too. Each case is different, some victims ask for harsh punishment [on the perpetrator] and reject Diya, so we tend to wait until the dust settles, and emotions calm down,

otherwise, there may be bias in our judgement, we use our wisdom and experience and the fact that many elders are involved helps too, because I have my limitation, and in that case, another elder in the group can fill that gap, so it is a teamwork (Osman_Interview16_162-176)".

In addition, Abukar points out:

I think that's more important than just a skill-based driven education. For example, we need to teach the local means of conflict resolution, these things are important because local means of the conflict resolution were successful as we [Nabadoons] placed preventative measures to curb violent conflict to perpetuate by intermarrying from the rival clan the civil war brought destruction and opportunity for others; unfortunately many lost their lives and relatives, I lost six members of my family, but as a Somali elder, I tell this story because nothing would bring my family back, all we can do is to make sure it doesn't happen again (Abukar_Interview 11_145-152).

Similarly, Ali explains:

When the warring groups have intermarriage, it means that there is a new bond between the two groups, and it becomes very hard for another conflict to start. Because nobody wants to go and hurt his own relatives ... they become a part of your family (Ali_Interview8_328-332).

This section has shown the complexity of the mediation process in a tribal context.

5.4.9 Justice first approach

The next section presents the theme 'Justice first approach' and reveals the perspectives of the participants on whether justice should be served first through the judiciary system or follow the path for reconciliation.

Participants identified a number of sub-themes, which contributed to the theme 'Justice first approach'. These were 'economic grievances', 'land disputes', 'return of goods' and 'unlawful property ownership'. Here, participants argued that justice needs to be served before any move towards any compromises in the reconciliation process can occur. For example, Warsame has the view:

Many people's properties and farms are still in the hands of individuals who claim that they are legal owners, but we all know that this is not the case, it is impossible to ask for forgiveness in the middle of these claims, so the government needs to get these disputes cleared then we [Nabadoons] can initiate the process of reconciliation and be successful, but most importantly we have to own the process in its entirety, the international community support but we have to lead the process (Warsame_Interview17_156-162)".

Similarly, Amina shares the view:

Somalis need justice done, many people were killed wrongfully and taken from their properties, there are still Somalis in the diaspora who are still too traumatised to go back to Mogadishu, after 25 years of the civil war, there are many allegations, emotional narratives as well psychological emotions, and to be honest with you, I travel regularly to Somalia and the focus and the discussion there is more about business and enterprises than tribal issues. Rarely do you see people talking about the past grievances; it is more common to come across

these discussions in the Somali diaspora here in the UK (Amina_Interview12_202-207).

In addition, Zakariya adds that some groups in Somalia have:

Lots of political and economic grievances and although religion advises forgiveness, it is very bitter to forgive your enemy, but it is possible, but the perpetrator must ask for forgiveness and promise not to do it again and most importantly must return all the properties that they have looted, you cannot live in my family's house and ask for forgiveness, it is a joke! That is why I think the government should play their role in this matter and clear out the disputed lands and properties looted in the period of the civil war (Zakariya_Interview18_218-233).

5.4.10 Lack of complete ownership of the reconciliation process

This section reveals one of the recurring themes regarding ownership of the reconciliation process.

A set of sub-themes were derived from interviews indicated the theme 'lacking complete ownership of the reconciliation process'. These were '*local solutions*', '*traditional methods of conflict*', '*taking the lead for reconciliation*', and '*bottom-up approach*', '*Somali-led approach and under the tree approach*'. Some of the recurring accounts in relation to a reconciliation was the need for the process of reconciliation to be entirely Somali led. For instance, Saabir argues that "*a real and genuine reconciliation has to come from the people. There is no point in bringing warlords to a conference, and also you have to remember this, reconciliation cannot just take place overnight. It's a process; it takes a long time (Saabir_Interview10_181-184)*". Similarly, all participants argued that reconciliation failed as a result of lacking Somali ownership

of the process of reconciliation. Ibrahim states, *'lack of complete ownership of the Somali political foundation, and these initiatives were basically imposed upon Somalis as a result of examples from other neighbouring countries which had similar conflict dynamics but not consistent with Somali culture'* (Ibrahim_Interview2_123-126). Ibrahim underlines a lack of understanding of the Somali political culture to be a factor of failure stating *"the West had no complete understanding of the role of the Somali culture in mitigating and in solving this complex issue of tribal inter-ethnic conflict in Somalia"* (Ibrahim_Interview2_129-131).

One of the repeated themes that emerged from the interviews is the importance of owning the process of the conflict resolution process. Abdiaziz strongly argued:

Look at all those reconciliations, all those conferences; who was in charge? The Americans were in charge, sometimes the Arabs funded this reconciliation process and remembered Ethiopians sometimes were also the spoiler. They were not one effective reconciliation effort or conference that took place in Somalia. There may be one but not many. Therefore, I don't know how we can get peace when others are trying to bring peace for us. If we want peace, we need to talk peace openly and honestly as well (Abdiaziz_Interview15_77-82).

In addition, Ibrahim blames the universalised solutions for the Somali problem arguing for a contextual approach:

These interventions were something that can be characterised as one-size-fits-all initiatives, and these were initiatives or models that did not work within the Somali context, and I think these interventions were mainly ones that were not interlinked with the Somali culture or Somali understanding of the political

dynamics, and in my opinion, it's partly that's why they failed” (Ibraihm_Interview2_100-104).

Ali shares the belief that “*we as Somalis can only solve our own issues. We need to realise that no one from outside will bring solutions to us; we need to trust ourselves*” (Ali_Interview8_117-119).

Many of the participants expressed their dislike of external stakeholders leading the process of the reconciliation:

The West keeps making mistakes, and we keep paying the price, we are grateful for the all the support [that] the international community has given us, but we need to ask difficult questions, why peace is not achieved with all the military and financial support? Because they [the International community] have no clue what kind of governance or peace we want, they come with their power-point slides and breach us [Nabadoons] about conflict resolution and reconciliation models which cannot work in Somalia, peace models are not copy-and-paste every conflict is different (Fawsi_Interview9_382-388).

5.4.11 Fair power-sharing as key for reconciliation

The theme ‘Fair power-sharing agreement key for reconciliation’ is one of the most significant themes regarding the reconciliation process.

Participants identified a number of sub-themes which contributed to the theme ‘power-sharing agreement key for reconciliation’. These were ‘agreeing on who gets what’, ‘collective decision-making’, ‘protecting minority tribes’ and ‘federalism. Fifteen out of nineteen participants highlighted that a fair power-sharing agreement among political stakeholders is the prerequisite for a successful reconciliation. As Abduaziz states:

If we really want a complete peace, we must remove the barriers for peace, this includes the uncertainty on power-sharing issue, and as you know, it is all about power, tribe is a just tool to be used to gain more power and influence over other tribes, it is a fact, so why can't talk about real issues on the table, the government should take the lead for this; otherwise we will use this buzzword of reconciliation for a long time (Abdiaziz_Interview15_188-193).

Ismail shares a similar view:

Agreeing on who gets what in the constitution is important for the success of the reconciliation, because constitution is a contract, a social contract and it creates such certainty and stability for all the stakeholders and actors, the main reason for war is to gain more and resources, so we if we agree on how to share the resources we remove the incentives for conflict, you hear politicians promising to complete the federal constitution, but it can only be completed when we decide how we as tribes and clans divide power and on what basis, and I don't see this happening as there is currently war in the northern part of Somalia (Ismail_Interview14_165-166).

However, Amina argues:

Power-sharing is not an easy subject in the Somali context, and it needs the political will of all leaders, the country is divided into regional states, and more regions want to be autonomous, thinking that the bases of power-sharing would be based on the geographical control of regions, so there is a race to grab more land before any political settlement. The other problem is that those who are in the parliament were selected by their own tribes to represent them in the

parliament, so they are accountable to their own tribes, not the Somali people as some often claim in the media (Amina_Interview12_182-187).

This section identified the significance of power-sharing and collective decision-making as processes to resolve conflict. It also highlighted the misuse of the term 'reconciliation' in the Somali context.

5.5 Local conceptions of peace

This part of the chapter reveals the conceptions and understandings of the term 'peace' from the context of the research participants: Somali traditional peacemakers and teachers. A set of sub-themes were derived from interviews involved the theme 'local conceptions of peace' and those were 'Inclusive peace', *'peace with job opportunities'*, *'peace that brings prosperity'*, *'tribalism free peace'*, *'peace with good governance'* and *'peace as the absence of poverty'*. Fifteen out of the nineteen participants said in their experience of peace-related projects that they had seen the positive impacts of peace education programmes in empowering some of the youth to make use of the skills they learned to gain employment. Ibrahim states, *"in my opinion...peace programmes helped a lot of people out of poverty because they got jobs as a result of the skills they gained from these programmes (Ibrahim_Interview2_166-168)"*.

Similarly, Saabir shares the view these peace programmes *"...were also teaching skills on how to get a better job of mechanical skills and technical skills because these were what was needed at the time (Saabir_Interview10_156-158)"*. In addition, Yusuf states that *"I understand [peace] as lack of poverty, lack of fear, justice, fairness, equality, human security (Yusuf_Interview7_273-275)*. Likewise, Amina points out:

Extreme poverty makes you blind, you don't know what is important when you are feeling hungry and when your children are starving, you don't remember peace, because peace is more enjoyable when your stomach is full, so the government needs to prioritise to fight poverty and empower programmes and initiatives that foster development (Amina_Interview 12_107-111).

Ismail adds:

The conflict produced many millionaires, through ethical and unethical means and those with the money are the main political stakeholders in Somalia, not the politicians. In fact, politicians represent these businessmen, not the people, and the majority of people are easily exploited because of their social circumstances. So I think it makes sense to create development opportunity and business connections between tribes, and this reduces the incentive for shed blood (Ismail_Interview14_33-39).

5.5.1 Peace as social justice

A set of sub-themes derived from interviews indicated the theme 'peace as social justice'. These were 'fair power-sharing', 'equal distribution of the resources', 'clan privileges', and 'distribution of wealth' fifteen of the nineteen participants understand peace as in inclusive concept rather than just an absence of physical war. Saabir states:

For me, peace is...a complete package. It's not only one thing. Peace is when you feel at peace. When you feel at peace, then there is no war... there is justice...there is fairness... the schools are open; that people have no bad feelings towards each other. That's the peace that we Somalis want (Saabir_Interview10_306-309).

Amina adds:

Peace and reconciliation go together, peace is not sustainable without reconciliation and justice, if we need an everlasting peace, we need to work on our justice system, clear out the land disputes, then start reconciliation process and women have to be included in the justice system, not just men [laughing] (Amina_Interview12_81-84).

In addition, Zakariye explains:

Social justice in tribal society is difficult to get because some tribes believe that they are more privileged than other clans, so they prefer the same situation to continue; people like you and me who are well educated should confront these people about these political and philosophical questions. The issue of tribe and clan is not going anywhere; we should get busy with managing the situation and helping the government to make progress in terms of development, then people will get busy with making money (Zakariya_Interview18_186-191)".

13 out of the 19 participants share the view that reconciliation should be prioritised first and then gradually move on to issues related to justice. Warsame shares the view that:

Peace must bring healing first, and then social justice, we ask the difficult questions of what caused this conflict and why it took this long to come up with a solution. In my opinion, peace in Somalia will never be sustainable, as long as the violation of Somali rights continues, or unless we accept the other minority tribes as equals not as second-class citizens and create a system that welcomes a free and fair path to power, otherwise we will go back to square one, we are tired! (Warsame_Interview17_215-220).

Dahir criticises the reconciliation process:

Some of the so-called reconciliation conferences failed because of the tribal discriminatory political framework for power-sharing; you must ask why most of Al-Shabaab are members from the minority clans, they are there because they believe that they have no chance to gain from the status quo. We must change structurally and concentrate on creating justice and equal framework that works for all Somalis regardless of which tribe they are associated with, or they [minority and politically marginalised tribes] will always have a reason for joining radical groups, and warlords know very well how to play the tribal card and exploit tribal politics in order to achieve their aim (Dahir_Interview13_49-56).

These perspectives indicate that most of the participants see social justice as a prerequisite for peace in Somalia.

5.5.2 Peace as absence of tribalism

In this section, other participants argued that tribalism was the key influencer of conflict, and its absence in all aspects of Somali political and social dynamics is vital in achieving lasting peace in Somalia.

A set of sub-themes derived from interviews indicating this theme were 'peace cannot last while tribalism exists', 'Peace and tribalism cannot co-exist in the long run', 'accepting the minority clans as equals', 'eradicating clannism', and 'enabling reconciliation'. Sixteen out of the nineteen participants blamed tribalism as an influence in the Somali conflict and argue that basing power-sharing on the basis of a tribal system is a recipe for disaster. Warsame states:

I think... peace for me is...fairness for all Somalis, just for everybody...equal political participation for everybody. And also respect everybody regardless of their tribe and fairness and justice and reconciliation. And that is the kind of peace we want. We don't want only the peace that's temporary, that only means that there is no gunshot going on. We need a peace that's very deep, which is based on forgiveness, which is based on real reconciliation, and I think that's what we need to achieve (Warsame_Interview17_148-153).

Osman has a similar description of peace in the context of Somali tribal society:

Peace is when you feel that you belong to a community as an equal partner, in Somalia, unfortunately only the Laandheer [long-branch/dominant tribes] eat the biggest share of the cake, and this system is fuelling disaster in the Somali political landscape, we the educated elites don't like to be labelled as tribalism, and we tend not to oppose it, behind doors we support it the system when our tribe is in power, and we lose power, we claim it as backward and racist system (Osman_Interview16_72-77)".

Ismail highlights:

Peace needs respecting and accepting the other not marginalising the other, and the latter is what is happening in Somalia, the political power-sharing is not equal for all clans but some major clans always the largest share of power, the political framework is discriminatory for example only major tribal representatives can hold the executive jobs such as president and prime minister, I think this grievance was exploited by Al-Shabaab because most of their members join these radical groups for higher social status and recognition (Ismail_Interview14_112-118).

In addition, Amina shares the view that:

The belief in tribal superiority and not accepting your fellow Somali as an equal partner is a major obstacle to peace in Somalia, but I think all these... tribal superiority was fuelled by colonial powers, they favoured those clans that welcomed them, and they marginalised those who were against the colonial rule, and the effect of these policies are still available in the Somali political culture. So I think the West, especially the British and the Italian polices, are partially responsible for perpetual protracted violence in Somalia (Amina_Interview 12_145-150).

The following section presents findings on the role of education in eliminating tribalism from the perspectives of the participants.

5.5.3 Eliminating tribalism and prejudice through education

Participants identified a number of sub-themes, which contributed to the theme 'eliminating tribalism and prejudice through education'. Those were 'historical, emotional narratives', 'politicised the role of the tribe', 'correct purpose of the clan', 'misusing the role of the clan', 'social mobility on the bases of merits, not clan membership', and 'all equal before Allah'. All the participants acknowledged that education has a role to play in eradicating tribalism. Ahmed argues "tribalism is the issue, not the tribes...you cannot change your tribe ...judging people on the bases of how they look is unethical we are all equal before Allah (Ahmed_Interview1_43-45)".

Additionally, Ismail maintains:

Truth-telling and reflecting on history is important, this is good for social healing too, we need to learn from the past and warn against the consequence of tribal war, war is destructive, but some people were made to believe that is necessary,

but I say war should be the last thing we think about, our culture is rich in many ways that we can solve conflicts, let's make use of them (Ismail_Interview14_45-49).

Equally, Amina points out:

Schools play a role of course, but the question is what schools can improve peace and what schools make the prospect of peace more difficult? The contents we teach in our schools are based on the Somali values, for schools to make positive contributions, we need to work on a...contextualised curriculum which is nationalised not only in one region of Somalia, and we are far from that stage now...because of other important priorities for the government (Amina_Interview 12_63-68).

Similarly, Abdala supports Amina's view on nationalising peace related programmes to have a bigger impact saying "*I think these programmes from my experience and from what I have been doing in the last 10 years; it cannot yield any fruits without implementing it nationally and without genuine reconciliation (Abdala_Interview4_220-222)*". Furthermore, Abukar states:

Educations play a role but I think informal education can have more impact because the schools are not ready and the teachers are ready for this do not have the skills and the know-how, and this was my experience, we just did what the project requirement and I don't think it had a big impact in terms of conflict prevention because, but when you teach students about critical skills and debate skills, this helps them analyse things rationally (Abukar_Interview 11_101-106).

Yusuf acknowledges the importance of students gaining critical skills to enable them to identify the limitations of debates and claims put forward by politicians and he states:

What we know from history is that only people who benefit [the status quo] are only the people with the money... the people who are steering the car... their friends, and close family friends... always benefit from this, not the usual ordinary person who belongs to the tribe (Yusuf_Interview7_94-98)".

5.5.4 Delegitimising tribalism through Islamic teachings

This section of the findings present the participants' perspectives on the role of Islamic teachings in fighting tribalism and clannism.

A set of sub-themes derived from interviews indicated the theme 'delegitimising tribalism through Islamic teachings'. Those were '*all equal before Allah*', '*clan and clannism*', '*the purpose of the tribe*', and '*How Islam addressed the issue of tribalism*'. All the participants acknowledged that tribal marginalisation is one of the significant barriers for peace in Somalia. Abukar suggests:

If we want reconciliation, we need to fix these historical narratives, and the violation of human rights of the minority communities and I think the most effective method is a continuous awareness programme as well as active government engagement and civil society groups to correct these wrong historical narratives but most importantly, the religious Sheikhs should play a more important role; religious Sheikhs have more legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali people (Abukar_Interview 11_111-116).

Likewise, Warsame highlights:

Every clan has his historical narratives, poems and heroic stories, and every clan believes that they are unique ones and rightful leaders, some clans even claim that the descendants of the prophet just to get more attention a privilege, you can see how Somalis live and breathe religion, the premises of every argument is associated with Islam and the more Quran, and the hadith you use the more legitimate your word and argument is so, so you can see that people constantly use religion and tribal politics for political purpose (Warsame_Interview17_38-42).

In this regard, Dahir argues:

Religion should play a role in all aspect in the Somali society, no one accepts another clan's values, and history or higher social status and superiority but all tribes and clans agree and accept the Quran, and religious sayings are more legitimate, and its ruling is unquestionable for these reasons I think Islamic values should be incorporated in the curriculum so people will endorse it (Dahir_Interview13_93-97).

In addition, Zakariye acknowledges the contribution of Nabadoons but criticises some of the cultural values they helped create through history:

I understand the positive role of Nabadoons in conflict resolution, but you have to understand there are also practices that are against human rights, the Xeer (the customary law) is not practised equally against all tribes, for example, the low-caste community are degraded, traditionally, they had no right to blood compensation and traditionally in the old days, they were not even allowed to own a cattle or horses, so these practices are violation of human right and also from

an Islamic perspective is wrong that is why religious people need to fix these issues (Zakariya_Interview18_117-122).

In addition, Fawzi appeals for inclusive peace stating “*we need peace in Somalia that... does not look only into laying down the arms... But also peace programme which supports reconciliation... unity and cohesion (Fawzi_Interview9_312-314).*

This part of the chapter has presented various issues related to Nabadoons’ experiences and the challenges they encountered during the process of reconciliation and in trying to find a solution for the protracted tribal conflict in Somalia.

5.6 PART TWO: Politicisation of education provision

This section presents the role private schools played in the education provision in the time since the collapse of the central state in Somalia.

The second set of sub-themes derived from interviews indicated the theme ‘the emergence of private schools’. Those were ‘collapse of government institutions’, ‘decentralisation of education’, ‘change in political ideology’, ‘lack of national curriculum’, ‘lack of guidelines’, and ‘political Islam’. The collapse of the central government in 1991 afforded businesses the opportunity to many entrepreneurs. Abukar states:

The civil war brought destruction and opportunity for others. Unfortunately many lost their lives and relatives, I lost six members of my family, but as a Somali elder, I tell this story because nothing would bring my family back, all we can do is to make sure it doesn’t happen again, on the other hand, the war gave many the opportunity in the free market we only have seen in the economics, no government intervention, no restriction, no price control, schools were one the

public sector that fell in the hands of the businessmen, and they made money
(Abukar_Interview11_243-248).

Fawzi believes that *“these educational organisations exploit people; they make money out of this situation, out of this status quo”* (Fawzi_Interview9_330-331). He adds:

They don't want the government to intervene, and they bribe the government. Whenever they want the government to intervene in the education system; they bribe them, they give them money to keep them away from the system. So it's a way of manipulation, and the young children are paying the price for this
(Fawzi_Interview9_335-339).

Furthermore, Fawzi expresses the following about privately owned schools:

Were mainly privately owned, and they were driven by profit-making. So they didn't actually care about the quality of the education, and they didn't actually care about the contents or the structure of the education system as long as they provided a service (Fawzi_Interview9_126-129).

5.6.1 Lacking government regulation and vulnerability

This section looks at the theme ‘lacking government regulation and vulnerability’ in revealing the role of the teaching in terms of behaviour management and child protection. Participants identified a number of sub-themes which contributed to the theme as being ‘indoctrination’, ‘lack of protection for children’, ‘harsh school discipline strategy’. Since there are no government guidelines and regulation, Zakariye argued:

The effectiveness of private schools in the context of Somalia is measured by the fees that parents are paying, the more fees school charge, and the more people think it is a quality school. It has just become the norm that you have to pay for

education in Somalia. In fact, people think that free education is a bad thing and business people know this and exploit the feelings of parents (Zakariya_Interview18_137-141).

Conversely, Dahir argues that the rise of private schools was a good thing in a way:

Imagine if there were no private schools providing education, who else would provide it? Every government that comes to power understands priorities such as security threats from radical groups, the government needs to look at security from different perspectives, if you keep on arresting and fighting terrorist organisations and without even looking at how they got radicalised and where they get these distorted views from, I am one of the people who believe that our unregulated education after the civil unrest created a different mind-set which does not support nation-state in Somalia (Dahir_Interview13_152-158).

Hassan adds that *“they [government] cannot solve all these issues, there is a security problem in Somalia, the resources are not enough, and I understand they have to prioritise” (Hassan_ Interview19_203-205).*

Similarly, Saabir raises several important questions; *“what is wrong with our Islamic schools; why are there so many people graduating from Madrassas and then ending up exploding themselves? If these people are coming out of schools, obviously there is a problem in the school” (Saabir_Interview10_209-211).*

In addition, Ali explains that *“because some of these schools ...are often there to make money, and they want curriculum which is already ready so that they can just teach their children and this, unfortunately, is a situation which I think contributed to the conflict” (Ali_Interview8_246-249).* Saabir draws attention to the role of teachers on the

standard of education saying “*if you don't regulate education, the teacher can teach anything they want to the children* (Saabir_Interview10_223-224)”. These perspectives show that the lack of regulation regarding education, especially in the curricula and contents, may have played a role in fuelling the Somali conflict.

5.6.2 Lack of a unified curriculum

Participants identified a number of sub-themes which contributed to the theme which were; ‘*combined subjects*’, ‘*personalised syllabuses*’, ‘*contextualised programmes*’ and ‘*belonging*’. All participants suggested that the lack of a unified national curricula makes it difficult to increase education standards. Zakariye recalls:

Before the civil war, the education system was centralised, we all had a balanced standard education, whether you were in the capital or other regions of Somalia, the government made sure that all parts of Somalia followed the same guidelines and same courses and the government used to carry the national test to ensure that all the students were meeting the standards, but the opposite has happened after the collapse of the government. In 1991, education became a private commodity, and the quality and standards got worse (Zakariya_Interview18_54-60).

Osman makes a similar point, although he has a different opinion on private schools:

The system of education was standardised, and all students knew well when the national exam was taking place, the war destroyed all institutions, schools turned into refugee camps for the internally displaced. The private sector quickly filled the gap, and in my opinion, they did a good job because they provided services that were needed and which the government was not ready to do (Osman_Interview16_25-29).

However, Warsame disagrees:

The idea that all the private schools were bad is not correct, I taught in Somalia after the civil war, our school was brilliant, we made use of what we had, yes we had difficulties because everyone was traumatised, but the problem was the schools that used to get some funding or subsidised by other NGOs and other countries. I saw schools that were promoting cultural and political views of other countries, I don't want to point the finger to any country, but you do your homework (Warsame_Interview17_105-110).

Other participants named other countries who had some interest in Somalia. Abukar argues:

After the government collapsed, a lot of international NGOs such UNESCO and UNICEF and many more came to help and arguably provided objective basic education, but countries like Saudi Arabia funded schools that only promoted their view of the world and their interpretations of Islam. I saw children that had more knowledge in Saudi history and kings than Somali history. Don't get me wrong, children should learn other histories, but clearly, you can see some countries exploited this, and we saw the result in what was happening in the last quarter of a century in Somali (Abukar_Interview 11_131-137).

5.6.3 Fear of losing Somali national identity and values

The theme 'fear of losing Somali national identity and values' is presented in this section.

A set of sub-themes derived from interviews indicated the theme 'fear of losing Somali national identity and values'. Those were 'teaching foreign histories', 'promoting other

values and cultures', 'foreign languages as the language of instructions', and 'globalisation'. Fifteen out of nineteen participants shared the opinion that some of the NGO-funded schools were responsibly instilling a politicised and one-sided worldview of the world through twisted interpretations of Islam. According to Dahir:

Some schools promoted Wahhabism which is a radical version of Islamic [interpretation], is nothing to do with our culture and Sufi a version of Islam, this gave birth to Alitahad and later Al-Shabaab [both Islamist fundamentalist groups] which is as you know responsible for all the attacks against the government and AMISOM so surely these schools and madrasas were somehow responsible for the conflict (Dahir_Interview13_161-165).

In addition, Warsame shares similar views about identity and Somali values being lost:

I don't mind people being taught other people's history and geography, but not at the expense of the Somali culture and Somali history and geography. What I have a problem with that schools are bringing up another education system from another country as a full package, which includes their history and all that. The only explanation I can give is that people are deliberately being misled and the Somali culture is being lost, and the identity of the Somali is going into a crisis (Warsame_Interview17_97-102).

Furthermore, Macalin highlights that "you have children who are taught in different settings with different history being taught, that is a big concern in Somalia at the moment" (Macalin_Interview3 114-117). Ibrahim suggests, "One needs to look beyond politics, beyond tribalism, and look at the kind of education system we have in Somalia (Ibrahim_Interview2_152-153)".

5.6.4 Political ideology

A set of sub-themes derived from interviews indicated the theme 'political ideology' and those were 'instilling a set of ethical ideals', 'promoting certain foreign principles and values', 'different worldviews through education', 'politicised contextual education', and 'regional Proxy war'. Sixteen out of the nineteen participants argued that NGO religious schools produced political groups and elites that are politically associated with foreign countries. Macalin explains:

Brainwashing means that when I give you the information in a convincing way and I clean up your head and put things that I want to put in... that's exactly what's happening. So we need to stop that, and we need to make sure that we need to go forward. And if we don't do that, then we have a society that has bigger problems which they cannot solve on their own for the long term to come (Macalin Interview3_306-311).

Zakariye adds:

The impact is clear, we have people in the parliament who are politically and ideologically associated with the Gulf countries, every time, there is an election, different Gulf countries support different individuals, some of these individuals used to run private schools and educational NGOs, some groups and some of these elites were the product of these schools (Zakariya_Interview18_159-163). Ismail adds that some countries want to "divide the minds and hearts of the Somali people" (Ismail_Interview14_212-213).

The condemnation of NGO funded schools was not only blamed on the Gulf countries but also more moderate Islamic countries and non-Muslim countries as Macalin points out:

Education is ideology itself because if I educate you and make you understand the world in a certain way, it means I am actually changing how you see the world. And unfortunately, when you have a Turkish lesson, Turkish history, a Turkish version of the world to a student, it means you have people who understand only from a Turkish perspective (Macalin_Interview 3_287-291).

Bakar also states, “*We have a war of ideology*” (Bakar_ Interview 5_158-159).

In addition, Macalin criticises:

These privately run schools who lure students because its free education or making promises must be stopped, I have observed that most of those countries who have interest in Somalia are either running a military training centre or schools in Somalia because education is powerful and transforms students to be nationalists or follow other political ideologies and views, that is partly why our politicians do not understand each other, and our school culture and behaviour management make our schools more vulnerary (Macalin_Interview3_70-75).

5.6.5 Lack of teacher accountability

This section presents one of the important themes that emerged from interviews in relation to how society views the role of the teacher. Participants identified a number of sub-themes which were ‘cultural perception of the teacher’, ‘*lack of child protection laws*’, ‘*lack of government supervision*’, and ‘*lack of tailored training*’. Fifteen out of nineteen participants described the perception of the Somali society towards the role of the teacher in safeguarding the child’s safety and protection. Macalin associates this with the unregulated schools and not holding the teacher accountable with the contents they taught in classrooms. In regards to the lack of teacher accountability, he states:

Our education system is not regulated; our teachers are not trained to teach properly in schools. Nobody knows or checks the quality of teaching, and there are no government training because the government is constantly at war with Al-Shabaab. So there is no teacher held accountable; we also have a problem of teacher dominance in schools (Macalin_Interview3_56-60).

Fawsi elaborates this point further and explains:

When you look at the education system, the power of the teacher in the school, a teacher which culturally is seen as a father in the school. A teacher who has not been given proper training. A teacher, who can do anything in the classroom with this [harsh discipline] technique to bring order in the class, can brainwash a child so easily if the government do not intervene (Fawsi_Interview9_350-354).

Ismail adds:

Teachers traditionally enjoy the support and the consent of the parents to discipline children of the families; your teacher is telling you how to see the world in his own eyes, in his own way, the way he sees it; it means he is not teaching you, he is training you. In our culture, the teacher is the source of all guidance, the source of knowledge and his knowledge cannot be disrupted and cannot be rejected (Ismail_Interview14_215-219).

In addition, Abdala adds the importance of providing relevant training to teachers. He explains:

I can teach children to love their neighbour or to hate their neighbour. So what is important is that the teachers who are teaching these children should be trained

and should be provided with all the skills that can help these issues of peace-making in Somalia (Abdala_Interview_244-246).

Furthermore, Abdala adds that schools can be used “*to nurture values of peace... it can also be used to nurture values of war [and] values of tribalism (Abdala_Interview_241-242)*”.

5.6.6 Discipline and Corrective measures

A set of sub-themes derived from interviews indicated the theme ‘*discipline and corrective measures*’. Those were; ‘correcting student behaviour’, ‘obedience’, ‘lack of child protection laws’, ‘parental acceptance of harsh disciplining’ and ‘legitimising violence as means of problem-solving’. Fourteen out of nineteen participants indicated the harsh discipline strategies that teachers used to manage students as a factor that have facilitated student indoctrination. According to Macalin:

There are many things we normalise in our culture including threatening, shouting, threatening and beating up students with a stick or belt and the crazy part is that parents have no issue with this, in fact, the more strict the teacher is, the more respect he gets from parents and society, it is like as a society we kind of accepted using force as normal. I think these long years of conflict-affected us, we must talk about these things, we tend to talk about the reconciliation process, the process starts at school, and we as teachers behave (Macalin_Interview3_215-220).

In addition, Yusuf adds that some Quranic teachers have nicknames that represent how strict they are saying “*teachers have nicknames in the Somali culture...we call them Macalim Basbaas, which means the spicy teacher. So these names were associated with the teacher, which basically show how severe the teacher's attitude*

was towards students (Yusuf_Interview7_155-159)". Macalin recalls experiencing harsh disciplining at school and states:

I experienced more beatings in Dugsi [local madrassas for Quran learning] more than in high school, my parents always sided with the teacher, because they believed the teacher was trying to discipline me and making me a better person, I think this so corrective measure has contributed to our culture of violence (Macalin_Interview3_223-226)".

Moreover, Warsame shares a similar experience of harsh discipline in a school:

I used to hate to go Dugsi in the morning, the teachers used to beat us up, we had to be obedient, it was seen as normal, parents agreed with the teachers all the time because there is this belief that the teacher is helping you make progress in life, and therefore no one questions his authority. But this is crazy if we teach our children that the teacher is always right, then teachers with radical views can easily indoctrinate children because we told the children to accept everything that teachers teach as legitimate and correct (Warsame_Interview17_118-123).

He adds: *"We need to change many things in our school culture and practises if we want to teach peace and reconciliation subjects in schools (Warsame_Interview17_125-126)".*

The third part of this chapter presents the factors that contributed to the failures of peace education programmes from the perspective of the participants.

5.7 PART THREE: Implementation barriers to peace education programmes

This part of the chapter presents findings on the factors that have contributed to the failures in the implementation of peace education programmes in Somalia from the perspectives of the participants. The focus here is the perspectives of the teachers (the second group of this study participants) who participated in delivering peace related programmes including; peace education, conflict resolution, human rights education, and communication skills in Somalia.

Participants identified a number of sub-themes, which contributed to the theme 'Implementation barriers on peace education programmes in Somalia' as being 'lack of understanding of peace education', 'cultural values', 'cultural challenges', 'lack of teaching training' and 'short-term programmes'. 14 out of the 19 participants acknowledged the challenges in peace education programme implementation. Macalin starts by clarifying the different names used to describe peace education programmes:

We don't call it peace education in Somalia, we call it other things, we had programmes like peace programme...training young people...teaching them skills such as communication skills and very important skills, it was very good because the children who learned from the school benefited a lot from it at the end (Macalin_Interview3_146-154).

Similarly, Saabir points out; *"we tend to call it Human Rights programmes. We had centres in North Somalia that provided peace and consultation programmes, peace training, and also citizenship training and cohesion (Saabir_Interview10_303-305)".*

Furthermore, Macalin recalls:

I was one of the teachers who had the opportunity to deliver these programmes. In 1994, in Mogadishu, one of the most famous projects Elman, the programmes were providing functional skills, a lot of young people who came to the capital mainly as internally displaced or child soldiers benefitted hugely from and started small-scale enterprises in the market (Macalin_Interview3_156-159).

In addition, despite the success of some peace education programmes such as Elman's (Fidow, 2015), Bakar argues, "*one or two projects cannot sometimes solve all problems because we are still fragile [state] in Somalia (Bakar_Interview_115-116)*". He also adds that the contents of peace education programmes need local ideas and to "*not use something that comes from outside, topped down policy. So we need bottom-up, get all those factors; job creation, good education, but justice is coming, a long process; it's not black and white*" (Abukar_Interview11_237-240).

5.7.1 Lacking long term strategy for peace education programmes

A set of sub-themes derived from interviews indicated the theme 'the effectiveness of peace education programmes'. These were '*short-term programmes*', '*lack of long-term vision*' and '*lacking contextualisation*'. Thirteen out of the nineteen participants attributed the failure of peace programmes in Somalia to the short duration of the courses. Macalin argued; "*these kind of [peace education] programmes must be effective, and it has to be permanent (Macalim_Interview3_290-291)*". In addition, Abdala believes that the short-term aim of these peace education projects was:

One of the setbacks for peace education programmes or reconciliation programmes. Because people need to understand that these programmes are not only important in the short term but also in the long term, in terms of fighting

terrorism and fighting corruption and all the other things that we have in Somalia
(Abdala_Interview4_202-205).

Abdala adds that people's perception of education is mainly to gain a degree and enhancing career opportunities. *"People do not usually assume that peace education is important because sometimes people see education only from the perspective of achieving a degree and getting a job* (Abdala_Interview_197-199)".

Bjerstedt (1993) highlighted the significance of peace education for a divided society in the long run and argued that peace education programmes help prepare students to be capable of resolving conflicts through dialogue and critically search for alternative solutions.

5.7.2 Lack of training for PEP

The theme 'lack of training for PEP' presents the perspectives of the participants in regard to providing training to teachers. Participants identified a number of sub-themes, which contributed to the theme 'lack of training for PEP' which were *'tailored training', 'training on the psychological impact of war', 'contextualising peace' and 'specific skills and experience'*. Thirteen out of the nineteen participants raised the lack of appropriate training as a factor that contributed to failures in peace education programmes in Somalia. Ibrahim argues that peace education programmes *"partially have failed as a result of the lack of full training to the teachers who were providing these programmes. They don't have adequate skills, resources, or contents that they need to promote these programmes successfully* (Macalin_Interview2_180-182)". In addition, Osman highlights the importance of tailored teacher training and long-term commitments to make peace education programmes successful:

If you are teaching peace, first of all, you must have the knowledge, and the concepts of peace education and knowledge of the local culture and the grievances and animosity in the society and you must have long-term commitment; unfortunately NGOs were more interested in ticking boxes rather than providing real education; there is no point short-term courses, this is a process that takes a long time and resources (Osman_Interview16_204-209).

Similarly, Ali adds that:

Education is a very broad term, and it has lots of philosophies, remember the Somali culture had its own informal education. The previous Somali government played an important role as well; they tried to build policies in safeguarding and also preventing [tribal] discrimination (Ali_Interview8_154-158).

In addition, Ahmed puts forward that “*peace must start from you as a person (Ahmed_Interview1_173-273)*”. From these perspectives, the lack of tailored teacher training was one of the factors that led to the failure of the peace education programme.

5.7.3 Corporal punishment as a means of behavioural correction

This section highlights areas where the training that was suggested was contrary to the values of what peace education promotes. A set of sub-themes were derived from interviews that indicated the theme ‘corporal punishment as a means of behavioural correction’ and those were ‘*teacher power cultural unquestionable*’, ‘*the best interest of the child*’, ‘*beating and slapping*’, ‘*teacher is like a father*’, ‘*behaviour is important*’ and ‘*fear of consequences*’. Fourteen out of nineteen participants identified corporal punishment as a factor that hindered the success of Peace education programmes. For example, Zakariye illustrates:

They need classroom management training and use other strategies to manage student behaviour, you cannot use corporal punishment in the classroom and at the same time teach students not use force as mean of resolving conflict, beating children in the classroom or outside the classroom is wrong, counter-productive, and inhumane. Some teachers use harsh punishment in schools in Somalia, it is no secret in Somalia, because most of the Somali parents believe that a good teacher must be very strict and most importantly feared, we need to take the issue of effective training seriously, there is something called the hidden curriculum, children watch the behaviour of their teachers, and in this situation, they learn that violence is one of the ways to tackle a problem (Zakariya_Interview18_70-74).

Similarly, Ibrahim makes a similar point that “*methods that have been used in terms of how you discipline in schools because you can't teach peace in schools and at the same time use a method that's contrary to the teachings and values of peace education*” (Ibrahim_Interview2_213-217). In addition, Hassan proposes that teachers should be provided with appropriate training and states:

They need to be trained in classroom management and use other strategies to manage student behaviour, you can't use corporal punishment in classroom and at the same time teach students not use force as mean of resolving conflict, beating children in classroom or outside classroom wrong, counter-productive and inhumane, some of the teachers in school used harsh punishment we need to look at the issue of training seriously (Hassan_Interview19_195-200).

Moreover, Macalin adds:

Peace programmes are good in terms of learning the consequences of war, but the teacher has responsibility to care and provide guidance and accept challenges, I only have one teacher who was my favourite in school, he never punished anyone, he showed us respect, and we felt at ease to talk to him and ask him about other things outside of the classroom, he was open-minded and kind, this is the sort of interaction and trust that we need to make our school a peacebuilding setting (Macalin_Interview3_162-167).

Hassan adds that the government should consider schools as part of national security as it can produce dangerous mind:

Children are very vulnerable in Somalia, they are scared of the consequences if they try and challenge the teacher, so they have to accept everything that they are told and, and sometimes this can include to carry out acts of terror, that is why the government needs to consider schools as part national security agenda (Hassan_Interview19_195-200).

5.7.4 Outside cultural influence

This section presents the theme ‘outside cultural influence’ revealing the views of the participants about the role of the NGOs and countries working in the education sector in Somalia. The sub-themes derived from the interviews in relation to this theme were ‘promoting western values and cultural norms’, ‘human rights’, ‘top-down conflict resolution’ and ‘insisting on teaching donors’ history’. Fourteen out of the nineteen participants raised some concerns in regard to peace education being used as a tool to infuse Western culture and norms. Macalin believes that “*these programmes of peace education programmes must be based on our culture and way of life; not to try to change us*” (Macalim3 Interview_365-367). However, some of the initiatives that

were promoted by other NGOs were programmes that in good faith were intended to bring peace. Fawzi believes:

Education plays a role of course because you need to teach children about real history, what happened, what caused the conflict... and when you teach children about critical skills, you are giving them a skill of life; you are teaching them the skills to analyse ... what is going on in the country is most of it a politicised situation...not actually a tribe hating [another] tribe. But in fact, it is the warlord creating tension against another tribe so he can take advantage of the system, that's why good education is important (Fawzi_Interview9_229-235).

Another criticism that was consistently made was the inclusion of human rights programmes as the overarching concept regarding peace education. Macalin argues that:

Human rights is a very contested subject, it is an abused term, very political, the West uses it when they see it in their favour, but the West also tortures and does many things against human rights. In the Somali context, there is no respect for human rights, there are tribal rights, and if you don't belong to a tribe that is strong you are more likely to die poor and, marginalised, if we need to resolve our issues, we need understand others and shared values and examine what caused the difference in the first place (Macalin_Inerview3_165-270).

Likewise, Amina argues that the contents of peace education must be contextual to be more effective:

Any programme that is intended to solve all problems and conflicts in all countries is a myth; conflicts are different from one another, their causes are different, so

there is no one peace education programme that can solve all conflicts, if that were the case we wouldn't be in the mess that the world is in today (Amina_Interview12_157-160)".

In addition, Ismail reflects on his experience in his involvement in teaching peace programme in one of the schools in Mogadishu:

It is difficult to talk about the past, I asked my class to discuss the root causes of the conflict, but the children started reflecting on their emotions and started blaming the lack of responsible adults. I remember them saying that they are just children, and adults should take the responsibility, in this kind of situation, I was not prepared to answer neither did I have the skills and training, but I am now well-educated, and I always think about it (Ismail_Interview14_225-230).

Ismail continues by adding:

Talking about human rights is not the right approach, teaching real methods such as critical skills and debate skills are important because our people are oral, so it is important to teach in schools on how to debate about ideas and values and how to criticise ideas without attacking the individual, but most important for Somalis is to get a genuine peace (Ismail_Interview14_237-241)".

Concerning the concepts of peace education, Ibrahim argues "*all these concepts [human rights and conflict resolution and peace education] have been politicised and have been misused and have been used in a way that only favoured the invaders (Ibrahim_Interview2_287-290)".*

5.8 Conclusion

This section summarises the themes and the sub-themes emerged from the interviews. This chapter has presented the results obtained from the semi-structured interviews conducted with the research participants (Nabadoons and teachers). The data revealed a number of potential issues that were both identified and discussed during interviews.

Participants highlighted two major areas where the Nabadoons' role has been discredited which were the peace and reconciliation process, and the judicial system. According to the participants, these two areas needed a consensus from both government and grassroots civil society groups. Most of the participants highlighted the importance of including the 'Xeer' (Somali traditional means of conflict resolution) on the bases of traditional and cultural expertise in the local means of conflict resolution.

Furthermore, the treatment of children in schools is also a matter of concern as expressed by most participants due to a lack in the supervision of teachers', the harsh treatment of children, and the absence of a law that protects children from corporal punishment. Some participants expressed that the education provision in Somalia is completely driven by the private sector. Therefore, the schools effectiveness is not measured in the extent of the teaching quality and curriculum but rather the fees and the status of the managing umbrella organisations.

Some participants stated that the government should introduce a unified curriculum to overhaul the education sector, though some participants expressed that there is ongoing progress regarding the introduction of an examination board and unifying the curriculum. They further added that the content taught at schools was driven by foreign

countries' curricula which diminishes the Somali culture and the national social studies. Some participants went further, blaming external countries for instilling radical views in the education sector and producing radical groups such as Al-Ittihad, and Al-Shabab. Participants expressed the need for an inclusive curriculum to promote peace at the school and in higher education.

Participants further identified the importance of tailored training programmes for teachers to improve communication skills and problem-solving skills. Such programmes had been previously provided by the Elman (UN implementing partner NGO), but these programmes were short-term and have never been repeated despite requests from the wider community. Most of the participants had expressed concerns over the implementation of such programmes by the international organisations as they required Peace Education Programmes (PEP) to be based on Somali social values and their faith.

Some of the participants also stated that organising awareness programmes based on Islamic teachings and values are good tools in the elimination of tribalism and radicalism.

The following two chapters provide thematic discussion to make sense of the issues raised by the research participants and most importantly interpret the themes and the patterns that emerged from the data in line with my research questions and the broader literature.

Chapter 6: The role of Nabadoons in the reconciliation process and challenges to genuine reconciliation

6.1 Introduction

This study aimed to investigate the UK Somali Diaspora Perspectives on peace education and the national reconciliation process in Somalia.

This chapter interprets the themes that emerged in the analysis in relation to my research question:

- What is the role of peace education as a means of conflict resolution for the intractable clan conflict and the reconciliation process in Somalia?

In exploring the overarching question, the following questions were explored:

1. What factors contributed to the failure of the reconciliation process in Somalia?
2. To what extent does culture play a role in teaching peace in Somali schools?
3. How do Nabadoons and teachers define the concept of peace in their context?
4. What are the challenges for peace education implementation in the Somali curriculum?

Chapter 6 discusses and focuses on research questions 1 and 2 while the following chapter addresses questions 3 and 4. It is important not to view each research sub-question as a separate and unrelated issue or activity as the listed questions are inextricably interlinked. Grouping the themes into the RQs was too difficult as the participants took the interviews in different directions.

This chapter showcases the importance of contextualising the means of conflict resolution by including information on the local culture and social norms. The previous chapter presented the results from the semi-structured interviews, which were thematically analysed, making use of an iterative “back and forth process” (Teddle and Tashakkori, 2009, p.251). This chapter and chapter 7 interpret and critically discuss these results. Chapter 7 focuses on obstacles to peace education from participants’ perspectives. Together both chapters account for the experiences of Nabadoons and teachers which are both interlinked and showcase key themes and issues that contribute towards agendas for peace and reconciliation. Based on the study’s findings, I argue that the meaning of peace within an individual’s own understanding is of particular importance since each context differs from another. The central message of this chapter emphasises the importance of understanding local values and the norms of Somali society as the key to finding solutions to mitigate the intractable conflict in Somalia.

The focus of this chapter is on the Nabadoons’ perspectives on the changing dynamics of their status in Somali society, as well as their views on the barriers to the reconciliation process in Somalia.

This chapter is organised into five sections. The first section draws our attention to the contribution of the Nabadoons in the reconciliation process and the challenges they encountered, it reveals how the central government delegitimised the efforts of Nabadoons as peace-makers, and how the government’s reserved supremacy and control over issues relating to justice affected the Nabadoons image in Somali society.

The second section focuses on the characteristics of a ‘real Nabadoon’ in the Somali society. The third section explores factors that impacted the characteristics of

Nabadoons in detail and the challenges that affect the prospects for peace in Somalia. The fourth section highlights the barriers to reconciling the warring groups in the changing dynamics of the Somali conflict, it particularly focuses on the theme 'unconditional forgiveness' and discusses the challenges to genuine reconciliation in Somalia. The fifth highlights participants' perspectives of searching for local solutions to the Somali conflict.

The perspectives of these two groups of participants (Nabadoons and teachers) from the UK-Somalia diaspora provide a unique aspect to this study, as both groups enjoy considerable legitimacy within the Somali community in the UK.

Some of the statements made by Nabadoons during the interviews contradicted other Nabadoons' statements. There was not a single cohesive narrative regarding many of the issues such as the reconciliation process, the root causes of the conflict, the role of Nabadoons in the Somali society, the perceived characteristics of a genuine Nabadoon, as well as political participation in the political process. These disagreements were partly influenced by clan politics and politicised historical narratives around issues of legitimacy and political participation.

It is important to note that Nabadoons belong to different clans and come from different regions which means they have different loyalties, they cannot be seen as totally impartial. Although most of the Nabadoons who were interviewed have some similar lived experiences as peace makers, the distance from their home in Somalia and their life and experiences in the diaspora has led to them as being seen as another group, with some referring to them as not being genuine or not "*real Nabadoons*" (Ali_Interview8_297-300). These different lived experiences may have impacted on

their narratives and perspectives on key issues such as the root causes of conflict, issues relating to legitimacy and power-sharing, and process of reconciliation.

6.2 Discrediting the traditional elders

One of the most important findings of this study was the perspectives of Nabadoons in terms of contextualising a means of conflict resolution and placing Nabadoons at the centre of the process of mitigating the Somali conflict. Most of the participants referred to the de-legitimisation of the traditional leaders in the peace process as a “major mistake” by the central government and the international community. They felt sidelined and not included in the process of reconciliation and the search for peace. They also believed the government intentionally discredited Nabadoons as “backward nomads *who did not know anything about the modern way of governance*” (Ismail_Interview14_129-135).

This extract suggests that the exclusion of the Nabadoons from the state and peacebuilding process caused havoc at a pivotal moment, and consequently undermined efforts to find lasting peace in the country.

The discrediting of Nabadoons stemmed from the ideas promoted by the proponents of modernisation theory which believe that a modern society should have separate special institutions and trained bureaucracies as this can lay the foundation for an effective, stable, and responsive government (Latham, 2000). The modernisation theory was not just seen in an academic perspective, but its assumptions dominated US foreign aid and policy towards the developing world. In addition, some of the proponents of modernisation theory envisioned it as the process of making the developing countries to act and think “more like us” (the West) (Levy, 1965). However, some of the participants highlight that discrediting traditional means of conflict

resolution was a strategic mistake with Ismail stating *“I think the government lost a huge opportunity to include them as stakeholders in the justice system”* (Ismail_Interview14_129-135).

As seen from the extract, most of the Nabadoons highlighted that the government lost a ‘huge opportunity’ in capitalising their skills and knowledge of local means of conflict resolution in the pursuit for moderation. Instead choosing to promote modern forms of governance that did not recognise local context and local ways of resolving conflict. For a long time, clan conflicts were resolved by traditional Somali leaders whose roles were not only confined to conflict management and conflict resolution, as they were also active in leadership (Mukhtar, 2003). One of the factors for their support was that their methods of conflict resolution were acceptable to all the clans (Samatar, 1992). Another appealing factor was the easy access to justice, compared to the complicated state courts with their legal jargon, generally in a foreign language. Nabadoons established open and flexible courts under an acacia tree to investigate crimes, to interpret and develop evidence, to reach a consensual decision, and to impose a final judgment (Kusow, 1994). This shows that Nabadoons have a robust conflict resolution mechanism and a trustworthy local justice system to manage and solve conflicts without resorting to the contemporary state functions and judicial systems, such as law enforcement and state courts.

Osman’s narrative shows the government’s suspicion about the involvement of traditional leaders as stakeholders in the justice system, they feared that promoting them would provide further legitimacy and more hegemony than governmental institutions (Osman_Interview16_139-141). The central government feared the emerging parallel systems, with the traditional system running alongside the conventional governance. Therefore, the central government banned the traditional

justice system, arguing that it would be inconsistent with the international legal system (Samatar, 1992). The central government reserved its supremacy and control over all branches of governance, including legislative, judicial, and executive, as well as its role in the mediation of conflict.

6.3 Characteristics of Real Nabadoons

The findings of this study suggest that in Somali society, the perception of Nabadoons as genuine peacemakers has changed due to a number of factors, including corruption and practices of nepotism:

Real Nabadoons always looked for respect, and not bringing a bad reputation for their tribe and... family ... but, unfortunately, the Nabadoons today are only after money and corruption, and they would do anything! So I think corruption has changed their mind-set and has changed ... the genuine ways of conflict resolution (Ali_Interview8_297-300).

Most of the participants also pointed out that the effectiveness of Nabadoons regarding conflict resolution has reduced in recent years due to their involvement in “*business and also in being a middleman in terms of buying and selling properties*” (Dahir_Interview13_68-69). All participants shared the view that some of the Nabadoons were interested in gaining from the status-quo and promoting the interests of the clan members. Some of the participants argued that some of the Nabadoons had no choice but to accept donations and gifts from wealthy members in return for providing legitimacy for their political agenda. Taken together, these perspectives suggest that the values associated with ‘the genuine Nabadoons’ were being questioned and that this influenced the prospect of reconciliation processes. Hassan

points out that most Nabadoons side with their clans “*despite the fact that the evidence is against the perpetrators of the crime*” (Hassan_ Interview19_19-23).

The extract suggests issues such as corruption and nepotism damaged the Nabadoons’ reputation. In addition, nepotism or clan-favouritism were also mentioned as one of the underpinning inequalities relating to employment. However, practices of corruption and nepotism in the Somali context are not new phenomena. According to the UN, Somali has been ranked consistently among the most corrupt countries in the world (Omar, 2018). The findings of this study suggest that corruption practices may have affected the ability of Nabadoons to address the social and political grievances in Somalia.

In addition, most of the participants argued that the corruption and competition amongst the traditional leaders were harming their reputation. The Nabadoons acknowledged their vulnerability to exploitation by wealthy politicians but emphasised that the ‘xeer’ (Somali traditional legal system) could help mitigate conflict between clans. Warsame highlights that clannism is a source of both destruction and unity it can be used to start conflicts or to build bridges between communities. He states that politicians exploit this to promote their political interest. He highlights that the tribe is used as insurance suggesting that if the government provides another mechanism of protecting citizens from harm, then the role of clan in compensating victims in the *form of Diya* [blood money] would not be necessary (Warsame_Interview17_268-272).

Another Nabadoon added that clannism, from its positive perspective, provides a sense of belonging and safety but also warns that, if not managed, this belonging can create prejudiced perceptions of the ‘Other’ as an obstacle to their development.

Hassan points out that some clans in Somalia believe that they have more legitimacy to rule on “*fabricated historical narratives to justify their actions*”, and it is the source of this belief that needs to be addressed (Hassan_Interview19_227-230).

In the absence of the rule of law, Elmi (2010) points out that clannism provided a different social relationship through community support of patrilineal lineage.

However, themes such as “real Nabadoons” or “genuine Nabadoons” implies the existence of other Nabadoons who were not considered legitimate in the eyes of the participants.

Ali makes the case that corruption is the main issue that affected the reputation of the Nabadoons and he highlights that real Nabadoons were interested in justice and were well-respected. They were also fair in their decision-making and their judgments (Ali_Interview8_297-300). This perspective is also shared by Elmi (2010), who argued that the effectiveness of Nabadoons in conflict resolution was hampered by corruption practices and bad governance. These particular Nabadoons were sometimes seen as part of the status quo, not as agents of peace but as actors in the political conflict.

Abdiaziz admits that some Nabadoons prefer managing the conflict rather than helping resolve the root-causes of the conflict. He argues that some Nabadoons benefit from the current system as it makes them the main stakeholders in power, so in his perspective, Nabadoons “*preferred the status quo simply because they were benefiting from the ongoing conflict*” (Abdiaziz_Interview15_42-48).

In addition, the above extract also suggests that there was a sense of diminishing trust in the Nabadoons as representatives of peace, with them being seen as representatives of their clan interests instead. It is crucial to consider what factors

contributed to this negative perception of Nabadoons. One possible explanation lies in the changing nature of the role of the Nabadoons, which was originally focused on clan conflict resolution. However, since the collapse of the institutions in 1991, Nabadoons have been considered to be the source of political legitimacy and have played an essential role in the formation of the new political process (Hammond 2013). Some of the participants raised concerns about their involvement, arguing that some Nabadoons were exploited by the politicians and that this affected their trustworthiness by the community. This direct participation in Somali politics had changed the status of Nabadoons and Somali people had begun to question the credibility of their rulings and legitimacy.

As Zakariye pointed out, genuine Nabadoons were only motivated by their desire to resolve conflict between clans, they followed the guidelines of *xeer* to manage conflicts, and they were independent in their decision making. He adds that Nabadoons are source of legitimacy and as a result they are “*under pressure to take a side or lose status within the clan*” (Zakariya_Interview_212-217).

This narrative suggests the importance of ‘*xeer*’ in Somali society as it is widely used to resolve conflicts of all kinds. For instance, in the case of Somaliland, more than half of clan disputes regarding inter-family disagreements, as well as crimes such as homicides, rapes, and land disputes, are resolved through *xeer* mechanisms (Hammond, 2013).

6.4 Reconciliation, conflict dynamics, and poverty

The previous section challenged the notion of ‘Real Nabadoons’ and revealed how corruption has impacted on their work in the reconciliation process. This section further explains the factors that impacted the characterisation of real Nabadoons.

Most of the participants argued that traditional elders were not empowered either by the state or the international community. They pointed out that the Nabadoons had succeeded in halting the conflict through local means of conflict resolution and that some Nabadoons had sacrificed their lives during the process-making and reconciliation. Zakariye acknowledges that despite their status in the Somali society, Nabadoons are still exploited, lack decision making powers, and their presence in most of the reconciliation “*conferences became the norm*” (Zakariya_Interview18_93-95).

This perspective suggests that the Nabadoons’ efforts in peace-making and reconciliation required more attention and recognition. It also indicates that studying Somali conflict resolution cannot be achieved in totality without an attempt to examine the Nabadoons’ contributions and influence on the peace process. However, the findings of this study suggest that the Nabadoons were the group that benefited the least from the international community’s support, as well as being the least documented regarding their contributions in the quest for enduring peace in the Somali peninsula.

Most Nabadoons pointed out that extreme poverty had impacted the credibility of their judgments and rulings. The extract below suggests that financial independence was key to making a ‘fair ruling’ and some Nabadoons were exploited due to their social and economic status. Abdiaziz states that “*there is extreme poverty in the country so you can easily be exploited*” and this impacted the credibility of their judgments and rulings. It has been suggested that financial independence is key to allow Nabadoons to make a ‘fair ruling’ without fear of repercussions from doing so (Abdiaziz_Interview15_195-197).

This also sheds light on how extreme poverty can impact the credibility of the Nabadoons' decision-making. The key here is to mitigate the financial burden on the Nabadoons to enable them to concentrate on peace and reconciliation. A good example of this is the traditional elders in Somali and how they have been effective in building peace from the bottom up. For instance, in Somaliland - an autonomous region of Somalia - the house of elders, also known as Golaha Guurtida, was effective in demobilising the local militias as well as managing internal conflicts (Balthasar, 2013). One key factor for their success was that they were integrated into the state administration, consequently being on the state payroll (Balthasar, 2013). One of the Nabadoons highlighted how poverty impacts on their priorities and argued that peace is only sustainable when basic needs are met.

Amina argues that social conditions including extreme poverty fuel the Somali conflict and she stresses peace is more sustainable when peoples' standard of living is enhanced. She also highlights the need for the stakeholders, including the government, to *"prioritise to fight poverty and empower programmes and initiatives that foster development"* (Amina_Interview 12_107-111). This comment indicates the complexity of resolving the Somali conflict while highlighting how vulnerable Nabadoons are to exploitation due to their social situations. The following narrative highlights some of the challenges encountered by Nabadoons in the reconciliation process.

Warsame shares Amina's view as it relates to his experience as a Nabadoon. He argues that the conflicts that Nabadoons are asked to resolve are complex and need a deep understanding of the culture and past historical narratives, while some of these issues also require further investigation. Under these circumstances *"we can't keep spending from our savings, this is the government's job, but we still do what we can do"*

manage the conflict but resolving complex need more resources” (Warsame_Interview17_241-244).

Ismail states that the Somali political landscape is complex because of its diverse stakeholders and international backers and because of these it is difficult to resolve violent conflict through traditional means of conflict resolution. All stakeholders including the international community are required to help resolve the root causes that underpin the Somali conflict: *“it is not fair that we get asked to solve issues that are beyond our capacity team”* (Ismail_Interview14_158).

The theme *‘changing conflict dynamics’* recurred throughout the analysis of the data. One of the participants highlighted how the nature of conflict in Somalia has changed from being a clan-based conflict to one that is ideologically driven. Because of this change, it is arguable that Nabadoons are not effective in conflict resolutions of this nature as its drivers are not clan-based (Dahir_Interview13_80-85).

This observation is significant as it highlights a change from a tribal conflict to an ideological conflict. This ideology is derived from *“distorted interpretations of Islam”* for political gains (Dahir_Interview13_78-85). This issue has not been paid enough attention in the existing broader academic literature of the Somali context. Therefore, this discovery may also explain why Nabadoons were unable to reconcile the warring groups in the Somali conflict. The rise of radical groups was beyond their scope of clan conflict resolution. Taking this point into account, the approaches used by the Nabadoons in the traditional sense may not have been the most effective approach, as the conflict is now mainly ‘ideology-driven’ and not clan-driven, as was the case before the rise of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 (Menkhaus, 2017; Harper, 2012). However, it is essential to note that this does not mean that clan conflicts in Somalia

had entirely stopped. Based on the findings of this study, I argue that the dynamics of the Somali conflicts have changed into more ideologically and interest-based, rather than clan-based. These changes call for different means of conflict resolution. The theme also showcases the need for a new paradigm in the reconciliation process, one that recognises the traditional means of conflict resolution as a localised and contextualised peace education programme tailored to the local culture, norms, and values.

Most of the participants pointed out that the Nabadoons' efforts to help bring peace were acknowledged after the collapse of the government institutions that were meant to protect the citizens. One of the participants explained his experience of the aftermath of the destruction of the central government in 1991 and came to know the role of the Nabadoons when the civil war started and they suddenly emerged as peacemakers and achieved to help halt the conflict (*Zakariya_Interview18_93-95*).

This suggests that Somali Nabadoons hold a unique role in Somalian society in terms of promoting peace and nurturing social harmony amongst the tribes. Balthasar (2013) argues that their contribution to peace is unique and plays an integral part in the reconciliation process. For example, at the end of each term of the federal system, an *ad hoc* council of tribal elders is formed for the selection of the national assembly constituents. This council usually consists of 135 members, which itself is based on a power-sharing formula known as 4.5 where the four majority clans obtain equal seats in parliament, while the minority clans are allocated half the number of what it is given to each significant clan. Once the assembly is selected and formed, the commission is dissolved and cannot undertake any further political mandate (Mona, 2012). However, in the 2017 election, the council of the elders was increased to 14,000 Nabadoons to form the basis for future direct elections, or one person one vote (Burke, 2017).

Nevertheless, the findings of this study suggest that the Nabadoons had become absorbed by the current political trends and had, more or less, become political stakeholders in the existing structure. Thus, this had changed their primary role from peace brokers to political brokers and it clearly indicated that traditional leaders had exerted their political power in the national constituency and were enjoying lucrative careers by profiting from the status quo as they *“became stakeholders and the only source political legitimacy” (Ismail_Interview14_146-152).*

This comment sheds light on the work of Nabadoons outside their peace-making roles in the Somali society. This change may also explain why traditional peacemakers had been unsuccessful in finding a final settlement of the thorny issues that constantly fuelled the conflict.

6.5 Barriers to unconditional forgiveness

Most of the participants argued that ‘genuine reconciliation’ could only be achieved if the international community understood the type of peace Somalis wanted to achieve. The themes related to this point that emerged from their narratives included *‘local solutions’, ‘taking the lead for reconciliation’, ‘bottom-up approach’, and ‘Somali-led approach and under the tree approach’.*

Most of the participants acknowledged the difficulties in the reconciliation process, particularly when it came to issues relating to past grievances: *“Peace must bring healing first, and then social justice, we must ask the difficult questions of what caused this conflict and why it took this long to come up with a solution” (Warsame_Interview17_215-217).*

One of the most important themes was “the justice-first approach” which put more emphasis on the rule of law and the return of goods and properties lost during the civil war. The sub-themes used to derive this theme, such as ‘unlawful property ownership’, ‘land disputes’, and the importance of ‘returning of goods’ that were looted after the collapse of the central government of Somalia, raised the important question of the role of the Somali government in the reconciliation. Although this question is beyond the scope of this study, what would be the best reconciliatory approach to achieve what Galtung (1990) called ‘positive peace’ (a peace that addresses the social and economic grievances of the society, mutuality, and building bridges) in a tribal context? Regarding the most effective approach to reconciliation, there were two themes comprising of “unconditional forgiveness about the past”, involving traditional leaders and religious figures, and “prioritising justice through the state courts”. Most of the participants felt that the only way forward was to promote forgiveness and to open a new page of partnership and understanding. Others suggested that the government should work to resolve the disputed land and loss of properties during the civil-war and hold the perpetrators to account before starting the process of healing and forgiveness:

Warsame argues that many people lost their properties and livelihoods during the civil war and that these properties are still in the hands with false claims of ownership, who claim that they are the legal owners (Warsame_Interview17_156-162).

From this perspective, it is arguable that healing past grievances is a more difficult task when there are historical grievances and this shows the complexity of reconciliation, as well as indicating that there are no quick-fix solutions and the process of healing and reconciliation is “*a process [that] takes a long time*” (Saabir_Interview10_181-184). However, these comments highlight the importance of letting Somalis “*own the process in its entirety*”, as well as giving time to heal from the wounds of the clan conflicts

(Warsame_Interview17_156-162). This suggests the need for a new approach regarding the Somali reconciliation process, the basis of which will be determined by the society, although the process might be complicated due to the past grievances. However, the findings suggest that a genuine reconciliation *“cannot just take place overnight”* (Saabir_Interview10_183-184). Nevertheless, this bottom-up approach is likely to *“build a strong foundation for lasting peace in Somalia”* (Saabir_Interview10_181-184).

In addition, most of the participants identified clannism as one of the significant obstacles to peace in Somalia:

“Clannism is basically discrimination in Somalia, if you are one of the minority, don’t get protection if the civil war starts again, that is why we need to teach our children about citizenship and values, not clan politics” (Hassan_Interview19-55-57).

This comment suggests that peace cannot be sustainable as long as some clans discriminate against other clans and refer to them as minorities. Many studies (Samatar 1992; Besteman, 1995) highlight the destructive nature of the clan when it is misused and exploited by politicians to strengthen their power.

Clan power is not static in the Somali context. As is the case in Somali politics, clan dynamics, allegiances, and power balances continuously shift (Harper, 2012), and these changes are influenced by internal and external stakeholders. The actors of these shifting power dynamics are politicians and warlords, who effectively use historical narratives to raise the emotions of the people in their own interests (Samatar, 1992). Therefore, the focus should be on healing wounds and questioning the selective narratives of clannism which politicians use to fulfil their political ambitions, as the following abstract suggests:

“Tribalism is unethical as it discriminates the fellow Somali brethren on the basis of which tribal group he/she belongs to; tribalism is the issue, not the tribes...you cannot change your tribe ... judging people on the basis of how they look is unethical we are all equal before Allah” (Ahmed_Interview1_43-45).

The above indicates how unethical claims can be when they are misused and exploited. In relation to equality, the Somali draft constitution clearly points out that:

‘All citizens, regardless of sex, religion, social or economic status, political opinion, clan, disability, occupation, birth or dialect shall have equal rights and duties before the law’ (Art. 11).

However, the challenge has always been how to interpret and implement the law in the changing nature of clan politics (Zoppi, 2018). Ahmed’s narrative suggests the need to create a sense of collective civic identity and that judging people on the basis of clan-linages and *“how they look is unethical”* (Ahmed_Interview1_43-45). Here, the meaning of civic identity can be best comprehended in regards to traditional concepts of citizenship qualities such as membership, rights, and participation (Bellamy, 2008).

Most of the participants acknowledged the role of education in addressing the consequences of war, and its historical and heroic myths, as it is evident in the following:

“Every clan has its historical narratives, poems and heroic stories, and every clan believes that they are unique ones and rightful leaders, some clans even claim that [they are] the descendants of the prophet [Mohamed S.A.W] just to get more attention and privilege” (Warsame_Interview17_38-42).

From this perspective, there is a *“need to work on ... contextualized curriculum which is nationalised [in] Somalia”* (Amina_Interview 12_63-68). The introduction of this sort of curriculum can have a more significant impact on issues of tribalism. The question is, how is it possible to introduce a national curriculum without an effective national government, which does not govern the whole country and has other security priorities? The findings of this study indicate that for education to have any transformative effect on conflict, it would first need to address the wider elements in the Somali society that reinforce the intractable conflict.

6.5.1 Searching for local solutions for the Somali conflict

Most of the participants argued that “genuine reconciliation” could only be achieved if the international community understood the type of peace that Somalis wanted to achieve. Themes that emerged from the participants’ narratives relating to this point included: *‘local solutions’*, *‘taking the lead for reconciliation’*, *‘bottom-up approach’*, and *‘Somali-led approach and under the tree approach’*. The following statement supports the need to place more emphasis on local means of conflict resolution, via a bottom-up approach: *“A real and genuine reconciliation has to come from the people. There is no point in bringing warlords to a conference...reconciliation cannot just take place overnight. It is a process; it takes a long time”* (Saabir_Interview10_181-184).

As the above narratives suggest, there was a sense that the international community wanted quick solutions to the intractable conflict in Somalia. The narrative also indicates that the process of reconciliation takes time and effort, as well as the inclusion of the genuine stakeholders of the conflict. Most of the participants blamed external stakeholders for the failure of the many attempts to bring peace to Somalia.

Throughout the interviews, the idea that peace efforts were undermined by external actors dominated the conversation. For example, the external stakeholders, who were mainly the UN political office and donors, helped Somalis in the mediation and reconciliation process:

For a long time, reconciliation used to take place abroad, especially in countries such as Kenya and Djibouti. Kenya and Somalia disagree on many things, including the contested issue of the maritime boundary dispute in the Indian Ocean. The Kenyan directly supported some of the warlords and was heavily involved in the import of Khat [stimulant drug], so this process created a new class of members of the same economic interests (Warsame_Interview17_234-238).

This is consistent with the views of Pkalya, Aden, and Masinda (2004), who argued that failures of reconciliations were partly the fault of the international mediation, as the international community failed to harness the local mechanism of conflict resolution, leading some of the conflict stakeholders to benefit from the status quo. The indigenous resolution mechanism was overlooked during the summits, and the international actors had legitimised political actors and warlords over the traditional leaders, which in turn condemned the peace attempts to failure (Maren, 1996; Makhubela, 2010). Abdiaziz points out some of the factors as to why reconciliation efforts were not successful. He says the failure was due to the fact that the process was not Somali led and “...*others are trying to bring peace for us*” rather than peace emerging from the bottom up based on the needs of the Somali people (Abdiaziz_Interview15_77-82).

This perspective matches those observed in the earlier study by Balthasar (2017), who similarly argued that reconciliation had failed because of the lack of a deep

understanding of the social structure, by disregarding the role of the local mechanism of conflict resolution. Ibrahim argued that the West lacked a deeper understanding of the Somali culture as well as the dynamics and “*complex issue of tribal inter-ethnic conflict in Somalia*” (Ibrahim_Interview2_129-131). In this regards, a better understanding of the Somali conflict and its changing dynamics and stakeholders provide a new opportunity for lasting peace.

For example, the first few reconciliation attempts, which were held in Djibouti in 1991, failed mainly due to differences between the groups and the foreign powers who backed these groups, leading to an escalation of the conflict and the emergence of new actors (Balthasar, 2017).

Furthermore, according to Menkhaus (2010a), other attempts that have failed include two major reconciliations and disarmament conferences in Ethiopia in 1993 and 1997, respectively, as well as another in Cairo in 1997. None of these reconciliation conferences produced any concrete results. One of the reasons these reconciliations failed was that some people consistently benefited from the status quo (Harper, 2012). Nevertheless, in addition to the failure to harness the indigenous conflict resolution strategies, a major obstacle was the competing foreign interests, with the most notable countries responsible for the failure of these peace summits being Ethiopia and Egypt, who stood out in their support of the warring factions. In 1997, they even organised parallel reconciliation conferences at the same time (Menkhaus, 2010).

Another significant reconciliation attempt was the Arta peace conference in 2000 (Ochieng, 2004). Despite the increased number of constituencies that participated in the conference, there were some factions who boycotted the conference, mainly from the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), who were supported by

Ethiopia. However, the summit produced the Transitional National Government (TNG), which was based on the 4.5 tribal power-sharing formula. The TNG government was not operational, as the Arta conference focused on meeting the expectations of the foreign powers that had strong interests in Somalia, mainly the EU, Egypt, Italy, Libya, the UN, and the USA. It, therefore, failed in the quest to find lasting peace in Somalia through local and international mechanisms for conflict resolution (Makhubela, 2010b). One of the participants who was present at one of these peace conferences reflected on his experiences and argued that the International community had:

“...no clue what kind of governance or peace we wanted, they come with their power-point slides and preach us [Nabadoons] about conflict resolution and reconciliation models which cannot work in Somalia” (Fawsi_Interview9_386-388).

The statement suggests the process of reconciliation was led by external countries which lacked in-depth knowledge of historical narratives and how war-lords were exploitative in fabricating this narrative for their interests. For example, the last peace conference was held in Eldoret and Mbagathi, Kenya, sponsored by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Although it was deemed to be successful in addressing the critical issues with respect to stability in the Somali peninsula, nonetheless the conference failed to convene the most essential actors, who were regarded as genuine constituencies- the traditional leaders. As a result, the process did not produce tangible results (Abdullahi, 2017). One of the participants explained why all attempts at peace and reconciliation were unsuccessful: *“We as Somalis can only solve our own issues. We need to realise that no one from outside will bring solutions to us”* (Ali_Interview8_117-119).

This perspective highlights the need for localised and contextualised solutions to the Somali conflict. Most of the peace conferences produced strategies that included mitigating the conflict through peacekeeping operations, focusing on cessation of hostility (negative peace) rather than addressing the underlying issues, such as inequality and clan narratives (positive peace) (Galtung, 1996). The strategies did not include religious figures and the Nabadoons as legitimate stakeholders and, as mentioned above, the peacekeeping strategies were not consistent with the local traditions of conflict resolution. Taken together, Williams (2013) observes that, in areas of conflict, a peace-keeping force alone should not be considered as an automatic response to war, but more emphasis should be placed on establishing a political strategy for peace.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the issues relating to the role of Nabadoons before the collapse of the central government as well as after the collapse of the state. Several factors were identified, including external intervention, clannism, and injustices and political grievances.

The next research question asked the informants about the role of culture in education provision. Although culture plays an important role in many aspects in the society, participants highlighted that Somali cultural values, including Somali history, were not taught in most of the private schools with some foreign schools promoting their own history and ideology leading to an identity crises. Most of the participants view this as a way to dominate and influence foreign policy to exploit the natural resources in Somalia, including oil and gas.

The chapter also explored the traditional methods of conflict resolution, the Nabadoons' status in the community, as well as the challenges they have encountered during the process of reconciliation. In addition, it provided background on how the central government delegitimised the role of Nabadoons and how it discredited their use of local methods of conflict resolution. Here, participants emphasised the need for "local solutions" for the Somali conflict.

This section also discussed one of the essential constructions of the participants' understanding of the term 'peace' in the Somali context. The rationale for this bottom-up approach being the assertion that the meaning and interpretations of peace are diverse and dependent on context, time, and place (the contextual meaning of peace is further discussed in the following chapter).

The following chapter discusses the perspectives of the teachers' experiences and observations of peace education programmes and the challenges they encountered in Somalia.

Chapter 7: Barriers to peace education implementation

7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses observations of the participants about the peace education programmes and the challenges Somali teachers encountered in Somalia. It critically discusses concepts and understandings of the term 'peace' from the participants' perspectives and its implications for policymaking for achieving lasting peace. This chapter emphasises the importance of contextualising peace education in a local context and argues for the incorporation of the local culture and values as prerequisites for gaining legitimacy from Somali society. In addition, it identifies the practical challenges of implementing peace education programmes in the Somali context. Although the issues mentioned are interlinked, this chapter mainly focuses on addressing research questions 3, 4, and 5.

This chapter is organised into seven sections; the first section provides an overview of peace education in the Somali context. The second section explores the meaning of peace from the participants' perspectives. In this section, three perspectives of peace are explored: peace as an absence of clannism, peace as an absence of poverty and discrimination, and peace as equal political participation. The third section explores perspectives of the participants on incorporating Islamic values into peace education, which links to the central theme of this study, specifically, contextualising the peace and reconciliation process, in that it provides contextual perspectives of the role of Islam in education and the reconciliation process (Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2017).

Section four focuses on participants' opinions of educational privatisation and its impact on education quality and ideology. Section five emphasises the lack of a unifying national curriculum as one of the barriers to peace education implementation

in all regions of Somalia. Section six discusses participants' views on the impact of unregulated curricula on Somali national identity. Section seven explores the practical barriers to peace education implementation. This is followed by three subsections that list the main barriers to peace education implementation in Somalia.

7.2 An Overview of peace education in the Somali context

After the collapse of the central state in Somalia, the international community intervened militarily to help restore the rule of law after the failure of the central government in 1991. Consequently, International NGOs, as well as UNESCO, have assisted in the reestablishment of educational institutions by providing resources, training on policies and practices, study programmes, content, and extracurricular programmes explicitly designed to aid peace and reconciliation through education (James and Cummings, 2015). One of the initiatives that were promoted included peace education programmes, which sought to promote a culture of peace as well as mitigate violent conflict in schools and outside of schools, inclusive of other educational settings (Bar-Tal, 2009). However, the findings of this study suggest that most of the participants viewed peace education as a “*top-down policy*” (Abukar_Interview11_237), and argued that the Somali conflict is “*not black and white*” (Abukar_Interview11_240). A deeper understanding of the thorny issues that divide the Somali society is needed, with most of the participants of the view that “*any programme that is intended to solve all problems and conflicts in all countries is a myth*” (Amina_Interview12_157-158). One of the criticisms of the peace education programme included concepts such as human rights, which are associated with peace education (Bajaj and Brantmeier, 2011):

Some of the teachers argued that topics such as human rights that are associated with peace education programmes are contested, they point out the topic is political and the “West uses it when they see it in their favour, the West also tortures and does many things against human rights” (Macalin_Interview3_165-270).

This extract suggests the participants’ tension about, and suspicion of, the underpinning values and concepts of peace education. As the following narrative indicates, the participants argued for the inclusion of local culture as a means of conflict resolution for peace education to be more effective: *“all these concepts [human rights] have been politicised and have been misused and...used in a way that only favoured the invaders” (Ibrahim_Interview2_287-290).*

This perspective sums up the participants’ general feeling and perspectives of peace education in the Somali context; chapter 7 further provides a more in-depth discussion of the participants’ perspectives of the role of peace education as a means of conflict resolution.

In this chapter, I found that part of the failure of the implementation of peace education programmes was the lack of an in-depth understanding of the local context, culture, and traditional means of conflict resolution. The Western policies in Somalia in terms of peace and reconciliation has not changed since the collapse of the central state in 1991. According to Elmi, (2010) peacebuilding efforts have failed as a result of a top-down approach to reconciliation, as well as evaluating the peacebuilding process through the twin lenses of liberal peace and discrediting the importance of local meanings of order. This lack of deep understanding of the root causes of the Somali conflict, as well as its changing political stakeholders, leads to the problem becoming more intractable and harder to contain.

7.3 Contextualising the meaning of peace

This section discusses the participants' understanding of the term 'peace'. Participants saw peace from three perspectives: an absence of tribalism, an absence of poverty, and an absence of equal political participation. One of the important findings of this study is the contextual definition of the term 'peace' from the participants' perspectives. Most of the participants believe that the term peace is socially constructed and reject the universalisation of the values linked to peace education programme arguing that the term *"peace is...a complete package; it is not only one thing"* (Saabir_Interview10_306-309).

Here the *'complete package'* means that peace is understood beyond the absence of direct violence. Furthermore, some of the recurrent themes that came out of the analysis included themes such as *'peace as social justice'* and *'peace as the absence of tribalism'*. These emerged themes suggest that the research participants viewed *'peace'* as *'a complete package'* and that this package should include justice, the rule of law, elimination of tribalism, reconciliation and respect for the minority tribes, as well as fair power-sharing. This also suggests that *'peace'* is socially and culturally constructed, which is consistent with Bajaj and Brantmeier (2011a) and Zembylas and Bekerman (2013) who rejected the rigid definition of *'peace'* as well as having fixed standards, content, and structure for peace education programmes. Reardon (1988, p.19) also affirms that "there are as yet no clear and precise limits to, nor standards for, what is to be included in peace education". This suggests that although certain concepts are associated with peace, many of the concepts, such as human rights and conflict resolution, may be seen as promoting "universal utopia" (Reardon (1988, p. 4) or "one version of normalising education" (Gur-Ze'ev, 2001, p. 329), thus producing a homogeneous and distinct form of social structure or form of hegemony in different

aspects of society (Foucault, 1984). These values were established on the fundamentals of modernity and that of the nation-state, which does not take into account the local context (Zembylas and Bekerman, 2013). Amina, who was the sole female participant of this study, recounted how peace and reconciliation are interlinked, highlighting that peace agreements cannot be sustainable without healing the wounds of the sustained during the violent conflict and establishing equal opportunity regardless of clan and gender. She points out the need for reform in the justice system and resolve property and land disputes. She also emphasised the need to need to include women into “[the] *justice system, not just men* [laughing]” (Amina_Interview12_81-84). Her sarcastic smile and facial expression demonstrate her dislike of male dominance regarding the decision-making process in the justice department.

Amina’s argument that peace cannot be sustainable without equal opportunity suggests that the meaning of peace is socially constructed. The meaning of ‘peace’ as showcased in the literature review is conceptually contested (as demonstrated in the Somali context of the current research), as it means different things to different people in different social, geographical, and cultural contexts (Galtung, 1996; Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009).

Warsame emphasises the need for inclusive and fair political inclusion of all clans as equal partners but not treating minority clans “*as second-class citizens*”, he adds that establishing a free and fair path to power can help bring peace to be sustainable (Warsame_Interview17_215-220).

As showcased in the literature review, the conceptualisation of the term peace is explained regarding the dichotomy of negative versus positive: ‘negative peace’ being

referred to as the absence of *direct violence*, central to the idea of 'positive peace', which is associated with the absence of structural violence (Galtung, 1996). Structural violence takes many forms; it can entail any severe social and cultural oppression through, for example, unequal access to education, poverty, lack of freedom of speech, and tribalism in the Somali context (Lee, 2016).

Fawzi points out that disarming clans and ceasefire alone cannot sustain peace in Somalia. He highlights the need to create initiatives and social and educational and peace programmes that help "*supports reconciliation...unity, and cohesion*" (Fawzi_Interview9_312-314). This perspective of peace as '*positive peace*' lies close to the one that was persistently referred to by the participants of this research, all of whom associated the term '*peace*' with the availability of justice, equality, reconciliation and the rule of law, and not merely as an absence of violence (Galtung, 1996).

One of the important findings of this study was the conceptualisation of peace as the absence of tribalism in the context of the Somali conflict. Most of the participants referred to tribalism as the single most substantial barrier to peace in the Somali conflict. Osman adds that the current political system fuels the conflict as it facilitates the dominant clans to "*eat the most significant share of the cake in the Somali political landscape*" (Osman_Interview16_72-77). From this viewpoint, participants associated the lack of peace with the economic inequality stemming from the current clan system, which most of the participants referred to as 'unjust'. Here, most of the participants blamed the highly disputed power-sharing model known as the "4.5 Formula", which is argued to provide more executive powers to the main four clans, known as the Darood, Hawiye, Dir, and the Digil iyo Mirifle, than to the minority clans (Elmi, 2010). As evident in the narrative, the political issues in Somalia are mainly associated with power-

struggles as clans fight for control of resources and who will have “*the biggest share of the cake*” (Osman_Interview16_72-77).

Although it is commonly stated that minorities are discriminated against in Somalia, other recent studies (Gundel, 2009; Hammond, 2013; Webersik *et al.*, 2018) suggest that some of the minority clans, in particular, ‘Reer Hamar’ (one of the minority clans in Somalia) are not subject to the systematic, targeted violence that they used to be under the rule of the war-lords. This occurred mainly in southern Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu. However, it is fair to suggest that the minority clans still face discrimination and marginalisation at the hands of the dominant clans. A good example is the killing and burning alive of an individual from one of the minority clans over intermarriage with one of the dominant tribes; the perpetrators were said to have been given protection and impunity by the officials in the government (Abdullahi, 2018). One of the participants highlighted the existence of discrimination among the clans and blamed this partly on European *colonists*:

“Each clan thinks they are the best in governance, some minority clans are implicitly not allowed to hold the highest office, when European colonists arrived, they gave more power and education to certain tribes and gave them training abroad on how to run government, those are the ones that still claim to own the highest seat of the government” (Hassan_Interview19_247-251).

This suggests that although tribal discrimination is evident, it is arguable that it is not systematic, which was one of the reasons participants blamed the current power-sharing system known as ‘the 4.5’. This has the characteristics of what Howard (2006) referred to as the ‘dynamics of dominance’ (how dominance and cruel conditions are upheld in societies), for example, the viability of this formula as a form of conflict

resolution and as a power-sharing formula is highly contentious. The findings of this study agree that the inequality in the current power-sharing system might be fuelling the conflict since the minority's political rights and participation were suppressed (Webersik *et al.*, 2018), an example of which could be seen from the recurring theme of political grievance:

“...the political framework is discriminatory for example, only major tribal representatives can hold the executive jobs such as the presidency and prime ministry, I think this was exploited by Al-Shabaab because most of their members join these radical groups for higher social status and recognition” (Ismail_Interview14_112-118).

This perspective is consistent with the literature that associated the rise of Al-Shabaab with political grievances. This research found that the number of members of minority tribes joining the radical group Al-Shabaab had increased as a result of political and social grievances. This was apparent from participants' statements that most of those joining the group did so in their pursuit of *“higher social status and recognition”* (Ismail_Interview14_117-118).

This perspective was shared by Menkhaus (2016), who pointed out that Al-Shabab has capitalised on this opportunity by manipulating the narrative of the clan exploitation, marginalisation and grievances. The Somali political spectrum is dominated by clan loyalties (Menkhaus, 2016). As the following narrative indicates, it can also be argued that Somalis tend to conceal the idea that their political allegiances are influenced by tribal narratives; some of the participants acknowledged promoting their clan agendas in private meetings while avoiding clan narratives in public spheres for fear of being labelled with tribal ideology and clan-based discrimination:

“We the educated elites do not like to be labelled [with] tribalism, but, we tend not [to] oppose it, behind doors we support...when our tribe is in power, and [when] we lose power, we claim it as a backward and a racist system” (Osman_Interview16_72-77).

This acknowledgement sheds light on the complex issue of identity and belongings (Brown, 2009) as well as the cultural violence that fuelled the conflict (Galtung, 1996). This narrative also suggests that education can play a role in changing the tribal and clan narratives that have been misused by many politicians in their own interest.

As pointed out in the literature review, clan politics have also been exacerbated by the external political stakeholders. The following themes indicate that this can be traced back to the era of colonisation, as the recurring themes, such as ‘external stakeholders’ ‘top-down governance’ as well as ‘colonisers’ and ‘spoilers’, show the suspicion of, and resistance to, outside intervention. As the following quotation suggests, the colonisers used to divide and rule tactics to empower some clans to be dominant and have political hegemony over other clans. In return, those clans who supported the colonial agenda received special support and senior positions in the government and continued to run the country on the colonisers’ behalf. From this perspective, the clan political inequality and power-sharing can be blamed partially on the colonisers’ policies. Britain and Italy are particularly responsible for their role in helping to create the unfair political power-sharing system that Somalia inherited. Amina sheds light on how the politicised clan narrative was first established in Somalia, she argues that colonial powers were partially to claim for “*tribal superiority*” by empowering certain clans, in her view, the colonisers side-lined clans that oppose their rule and legitimacy and this colonial construction and claim of more legitimacy over others continue to fuel the “*protracted violence in Somalia*” (Amina_Interview 12_145-150).

Similarly, these perspectives broadly support the findings of other studies (Besteman, 1995, Grant, 2012; Abdullahi, 2017) that link the legacy of colonialism and clan favouritism in the Somali conflict. For example, Besteman (1995) states that the British colonisers referred to the people from north Somalia as 'natives', suggesting a higher political status than their Somali brethren in other regions of Somalia. On the other hand, the Italians also used terms such as 'liberty' for the people of Bantu origin; this term suggests a categorisation of this group as slave workers. It is further argued that the Italian colonisers were mainly interested in exploiting cheap labour for their farmland to increase the production of plantations for export purposes (Besteman, 2012). Taken together, consistent with the findings of that of Besteman (2012), Grant (2012) and Abdullahi (2017), this study found that the divide-and-rule-tactics and the creation of a clan hierarchy and favouritism used by colonial powers in Somalia contributed to the competition for power and control, and this led to some clans to claim political legitimacy over other clans. As a result of these policies, some clans felt marginalised and deliberately side-lined because of politicised historical narratives laid down by the dominant clans in the form of legitimising myths of clan superiority through a 'dynamic of dominance' (Howard, 2006). To this day, uncertainty remains in Somali society about deciding on the most appropriate and viable method of governance and power-sharing (Lahai, 2019). From this perspective, it can be concluded that lack of clarity on the thorny issue of power-sharing can be partially blamed on the British and Italian colonisers in Somalia because of their policies of favouritism towards certain clans in Somalia. This historical background and emotions may explain why most of the participants interpreted the term peace from a different perspective.

As highlighted above, the term peace is conceptually contested as it means different things to different people in different social and cultural settings. In the Somali context,

peace does not mean merely an 'absence of violence' (Galtung, 1996), but also the absence of tribalism, absence of poverty, and the rule of law. This means that justice and equal distribution of power and wealth among all the Somali clans can be regarded as prerequisites to achieving "real peace" and reconciliation.

As discussed, the issue of clannism has been regarded as a divisive factor as well as one of the root causes of the conflict. The participants in this study identified that the deconstruction of cultural violence and local understanding of the peace may help to build a sustainable peace which is tailored to local context (Galtung, 1996; Zembylas, 2013).

Participants also defined peace as an absence of poverty and discrimination. Most participants viewed the term peace as an inclusive concept, one that took into account the physical, structural, and emotional aspects of violence. The following comment clearly relates to the local understanding of peace in the Somali context: *"I understand [peace] as lack of poverty, lack of fear, justice, fairness, equality [and] human security"* (Yusuf_Interview7_273-275).

This suggests that in the Somali context, peace is not just seen as an absence of physical violence, but also one that addresses the structural phenomenon of clannism, which has become:

"Like religion in Somali politics. It is difficult to achieve this inclusive peace unless we accept the other minority tribes as equals not as second-class citizens and create a system that welcomes a free and fair path to power" (Warsame_Interview17_215-22).

This narrative adds to the criticism of the political power-sharing formula, 'the 4.5', as this structure tends to provide more political representation to the four main tribes in the executive power, and this form of governance has consistently been referred to as a form of "*discriminatory political framework for power-sharing*" in Somalia (Dahir_Interview13_49-56), one that fuels the politicised historical narratives to justify more power than the marginalised clans. Furthermore, the participants' perspectives were consistent with other studies (Menkhaus, 2017; Elmi, 2014) that highlight the grievance of the minorities and the difficulties they face on a daily basis and, most importantly, how to balance and incorporate a traditional and modern form of governance into the Somali context.

The concern is not to introduce a new form of governance and policies but to implement the existing traditional system which has been used to govern Somalia since national independence. For instance, the central government established policies and laws preventing clannism and nepotism or promoting one clan, arguing that clannism was a destructive tool in society (Samatar, 1992). Under these premises, the central government avoided legitimising the customary law on the basis that it would damage the nation-state agenda and promote nepotism and favouritism in the employment sector (Samatar, 1992; Harper, 2012). The emphasis was creating a homogeneous society that would not be identified by clan allegiances but, rather, based on nationalistic values, principles, and cooperation (Anderson, 2006). However, critics argued that, although these policies were established in good faith, some individuals who shared the same tribal-lineage as the president abused the system by promoting clan interests of the governing authority and, as a result, this led to the collapse of the promised nation-state agenda (Samatar, 1992).

Another perspective of peace is the absence of an equal political participation framework for power-sharing amongst clans in Somalia. Most of the participants in this study pointed out that issues such as political participation based on the clan formula are known as 4.5 were fuelling the emotional narratives of political grievances and social injustice. Here, the participants pointed out that the problem stemmed from politicising the issue of the clan for the wrong reasons. Some participants point out the main factor that is fuelling the Somali conflict is the clannism reminding us that *“we are all equal before Allah”* (Ahmed_Interview1_43-45).

The recurring theme of *“all equal before Allah”* reminds us that we should have equal rights and equal political representation. This study argues that the inclusion of religious figures (the Nabadoons) in the reconciliation process can help to heal the wounds of the historical injustices and grievances since they *“have more legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali people”* (Abukar_Interview 11_111-116).

This recurring concept indicates the overall respect that Somali people have for Islam. This view is in agreement with a number of studies (Holzer, 2008; Harper, 2012; Menkhaus, 2013), where it is argued that Islamic values and the Somali culture are firmly interlinked. This implies that Islamic values should be taken into consideration when developing social and educational policies in the Somali context.

7.4 Incorporating Islamic values in the education system

In addition, the idea of incorporating Islamic values into the education system was raised frequently throughout the interviews: *“I think Islamic values should be incorporated in the curriculum so people will endorse it”* (Dahir_Interview13_93-97).

This perspective suggests that a peace education programme can be implemented successfully in Somalia provided that it incorporated concepts from the Islamic religion and Somali culture, as the participants argued that this would increase the legitimacy of these programmes. This is in agreement with Harper (2012), who pointed out that since all Somalis believe in the Islamic faith, Islam is seen as a unifying force, in contrast to the complex, divisive nature of clannism in the Somali society. Moreover, Lewis, (1980, p.16) affirms this and states that:

“Above all, Islam adds depth and coherence to those common elements of traditional culture which, over and above their many sectional divisions, unite Somalis and provide the basis for their strong national consciousness.”

From these examples, the findings from this study highlight the role of Islam in the Somalian society, as most of the participants argued that Islamic values should be incorporated into the Somali national curriculum.

However, Islamic values are open to interpretation (Mona, 2018) and, consistent with the findings of this study, these interpretations have sometimes been exploited by politicians to bolster their political ambitions and status in Somali society (Grant, 2012). In addition, 15 out of the 19 participants shared the opinion that a lack of government regulation and control in education may have led to the creation of groups that followed a politicised and one-sided worldview through a twisted interpretation of Islam (*Dahir_Interview13_161-165*).

From this perspective, it is arguable that the education system that was provided in some of the madrasas (Arabic for schools) in Somalia, especially those associated with the Wahabist interpretation of Islam, may have contributed to some extent to some aspects of spreading a distorted view of ‘the other’ in the Somali context. These

schools were criticised for side-lining the Sufi school of thought, as well as instilling war values “not consistent with Somali culture”, as the school culture promotes violence as a legitimate means of conflict resolution. It is important here to differentiate schools and Madrasas in the Somali context: the madrasas, which are known as ‘dugsi’ in the Somali language, are the first schooling most children receive in the early years of education (Cassanelli, and Abdikadir, 2008).

The madrasa schooling is seen as fundamental basic education and plays an important contribution towards instilling Islamic and Somali values. Despite the deeply rooted admiration for madrasas in Somalia, it has fallen under criticism of the West since the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and is consistently accused of producing an ideology that promotes violence (Shay, 2017). However, as highlighted in the literature, madrasas vary in their teachings and context and, therefore, cannot be generalised in all periods and places. For example, before the establishment of the modern education system in Somalia, the madrasas played an essential role in promoting social and religious values. From this perspective, the teachings of these madrasas did not promote radical Islam, which, according to the participants, has *“nothing to do with our culture and the Sufi version of Islam”* (Dahir_Interview13_161-165).

This implies that radical Islam and those associated with terrorism were seen by the participants as contrary to the authentic Islamic values. The Quran emphasises the need to preserve life by all means and promote nonviolent means of conflict resolution, the culture of peace, as well as respect of the ‘other’ (Abu-Nimer, 2001), and these values are in line with what peace educators strive for – promoting peace through non-violent means of conflict resolution and reconciliation.

This study found that a peace education programme incorporated with Islamic values could have more legitimacy in the eyes of the ordinary Somalis. Culturally, Somalis share the same language (with some regional dialects) and are predominantly Sunni Muslims, following the traditional Islam of Shafiyah Jurisprudence (Abdullahi, 2014). Harper's (2012) investigation of the role of religion in the Somali society concluded that the Somali and Islamic values were interlinked and inseparable.

As the verse below states, the Holy Quran offers concepts of reconciliation, compassion, and forgiveness. It emphasises the reward of the believers who strive to forgive and enhance relations after they have been wronged; most importantly it provides incentives of reward for those who forgive their perpetrators and show some courage:

“The recompense for an injury is an injury equal to it (in degree): but if a person forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward is due from Allah...However, indeed if any show patience and forgive, that would truly be an exercise of courageous will and resolution in the conduct of affairs” (Qur'an 42:40.43).

This study argues that peace education in the context of Somali should be incorporated into, and tailored to, the local culture and religion to achieve more legitimacy and more comprehensive public endorsement. The findings of this study suggest that the involvement of Islamic peace related content may provide the *“reason to forgive... when both parts have reminded the nobleness and the reward of forgiveness from a religious viewpoint”* (Warsame_Interview17_173-177). Therefore, those trapped in the intractable conflict may be able to accept to reconcile and forgive. Given the protracted historical and emotional narrative, this study, therefore, suggests the use of Islamic

and cultural contents in peace education and the reconciliation process in the context of the Somali conflict.

As pointed out in the verse above, the Quran acknowledges the difficulty in forgiving the rival. Nevertheless, it praises those who forgive and accept reconciliation and considers this action as ‘an *exercise of courageous will*’ to make peace with the rivals and reconcile genuinely. The recurring term, ‘genuine reconciliation’, has particular importance as it has been used as a: “*buzzword in the Somali political spheres [and] every politician uses [it] to justify that...they are peaceful people*” (Saabir_Interview10_176-178).

Participants’ perspectives on the role of religion indicated that incorporating peace education programmes with local culture and Islamic values would help facilitate the most central goal of peace education – to end conflict and live in harmony with oneself, and with others (Harris and Morrison, 2012), which is in line with Islamic values regarding mitigating conflict and promoting reconciliation. The challenge here lies in the changing narratives and interpretation of what reconciliation means in the Somali context. The findings of this study suggest that, in general, the Somali public were ‘ripe’ for genuine reconciliation, but that the clan politics and narratives were dominant in the Somali political culture. In this sense, it was easy for “*some of the political leaders to provoke emotions of hate and revenge*” to create an environment of fear and hostility and a culture of conflict (Hassan_Interview19_117-119).

As argued above, incorporating local cultural values and religion with the concept of human rights may be seen as a panacea to mitigate the protracted conflict in Somalia. This study emphasises that the incorporation of religion, culture and human rights provides more legitimacy in the eyes of the ordinary Somalis, thus helping to create a

culture of peace and understanding. This synthesis is significant as it raises the importance of integrating local context, local norms, and culture with peace education and values to have more local acceptance and legitimacy. In addition, this discovery paves the way for a new paradigm for a peace education programme, which considers the local context to be at its centre. It also addresses the thorny issue of the imposition of Western values and concepts through education in developing countries (Ardizzone 2001; Seitz, 2004).

7.5 The exploitation of education services

Most of the participants expressed their concerns about the lack of government supervision of education, as well as its poor quality and lack of standardisation. One of the participants explained how the business community benefited from the absence of government red-tape and bureaucracy: *“These educational organisations exploit people; they make money out of this situation, out of this status quo”* (Fawsi_Interview9_330-331).

The collapse of the institutions of the central government in Somalia in 1991 affected all institutions, including educational institutions: 90% of the schools were destroyed in the conflict (Lewis, 2014, p. 47). The less-damaged schools were used as camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing from violent conflict and droughts, famine and loss of livelihoods in other regions of the country (Menkhaus, 2014). As the demand for education increased, Somali business entrepreneurs saw the lack of government intervention and restrictions as an opportunity to invest in education provision (Abukar_Interview11_243-248).

Some of the participants argued that this 'free market' space increased the availability of schools and choice for parents. As the following comment suggests, in the absence of government school league tables and quality reports, the only available criteria for parents to evaluate the quality of schools was the school fees, for nearly most of the education services were provided by the private sector (Ibrahim, 2018). This long absence of government education provision created a sense of normality that *"free education is a bad thing and business people know this and exploit the feelings of parents"* (Zakariya_Interview18_137-141).

A recent study (Ibrahim, 2018) documented the rise of these private organisations as a positive phenomenon in terms of filling the education needs in line with the Sharia perspective. However, another major study, carried out by the Somali based think tank the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, shares the critical view that lack of government oversight, guidelines, and a regulatory framework meant an increase in private schools and universities lacking in quality as well as international recognition (PAM,2018). In addition, another main criticism of private schools was of their emphasis on profit-making, rather than improving the quality of education and welfare of the students:

"Whenever the government intervene in the education system; they bribe them, they give them money to keep them away from the system. So it's a way of manipulation, and the young children are paying the price for this" (Fawsi_Interview9_335-339).

The statement suggests that some private schools exploited the vulnerability of the Somali government in managing and safeguarding the education system. Some participants acknowledged that the government was occupied in the fight against extremist groups and the resources are limited (Hassan_ Interview19_203-205). This

implicitly suggests that private schools should be allowed to run the education sector since the government cannot fully provide education services in other regions autonomous who claim to be independent states.

However, the findings of this study indicate that the unregulated education provided in some schools may have fuelled the conflict implicitly: *“Education is ideology itself because if I educate you and make you understand the world in a certain way”* (Macalin_Interview 3_287-288).

The majority of the participants raised their concerns in relation to the use of religion as a political tool to get to power; they also argued that politicised interpretations of Islam were responsible for perpetuating the violent conflict:

“Some schools promoted Wahhabism, which is a radical version of Islamic [interpretation], is nothing to do with our culture and Sufi version of Islam, this gave birth to Alitahad and later Al-Shabaab [both Islamist fundamentalist groups] which as you know [are] responsible for all the attacks against the government and AMISOM so surely these schools and madrasas were somehow responsible for the conflict” (Dahir_Interview13_161-165).

As pointed out in the previous section, the Islamic religion, in general, is seen as an integral part of Somali society. Nonetheless, as this narrative suggests, Islam is open to different interpretations. It too can be exploited and politicised to work in the interests of a specific group or to promote particular political views. However, it is essential to understand the rationale behind the perceived role of Islam in the reconciliation process. As the comment below illustrates, a possible explanation is that Somalis tend to consider religious principles and values as above all politicised clan narratives which compete for political and economic hegemony. Dahir points out that each clan has its

historical narratives and claims more social status and superiority, he emphasises Somalis all agree that the values and message of justice and fairness and therefore should be used as a basis for rule of law, justice, and reconciliation (Dahir_Interview13_93-97).

This section discussed participants' perspectives on how education services were politicised. Participants raised the upsurge of radical ideology and how it affected children's perspectives of the world. However, it is evident that participants overwhelmingly support using Islamic values and principles of justice and equality as a means to resolve the complex nature of the Somali conflict.

7.6 Unregulated schools and identity

The most recurring themes included issues relating to unregulated private schools and their impact on the Somali identity and the nation-state. Most of the participants raised concerns about the borrowed curriculums: *"You have children who are taught in different settings with different history being taught, that is a big concern in Somalia at the moment"* (Macalin_Interview3 114-117).

Another participant raised an essential point on the geopolitical interest of external countries in Somalia and how some countries were using education as a means of changing public opinion and their political ideology: *"education is powerful and [can] transform students to be nationalists or follow other political ideologies and views, that is partly why our politicians do not understand each other"* (Macalin_Interview3_70-75).

As the observation suggests, participants seemed to be concerned about the increasing number private schools funded and run by foreign countries and

organisations, including NGOs, and how what was taught in history and ideology could influence students' sense of identity and the nation-state. According to Eggins (2004, p.10): *"no text is free of ideology, to use language at all, is to use it to encode particular positions and values"*.

Based on the findings of this study, teaching history lessons, and the languages of certain countries as a compulsory subject, while ignoring the local language, could be seen as an attempt to instil political values consistent with the objectives of the donor country in the context of Somalia. The participants' views of implicit external intervention in education was a recurring theme throughout the interviews: Some of the participants were sceptical the reasons why some schools which were funded by foreign countries were only providing selective history lessons that teach students one perspective of reality and to see the *"the world in a certain way"* (Macalin_Interview 3_287-291).

This narrative further indicates a sense of suspicion and mistrust among the participants that education was exploited to promote other countries political and economic interests in Somalia. *"The only explanation I can give is that people are deliberately being misled and the Somali culture is being lost, and the identity of the Somali [people] is going into a crisis"* (Warsame_Interview17_97-102).

Likewise, the following comment suggests that some participants were afraid to identify these countries: *"I saw schools that were promoting cultural and political views of other countries, I don't want to point the finger to any country, but you do your homework"* (Warsame_Interview17_105-110).

From these perspectives, there is a strong belief among the participants of an external attempt involved by private schools and their international sponsors to indoctrinate

students into believing one correct version of reality. I therefore argue that the education system in Somalia could be another factor to consider when analysing the root causes of the intractable conflict in Somalia. This synthesis further contributes to our understanding of the Somali conflict from a new, different perspective. It is important to note no institution ensures consistency and the maintenance of the quality of standards (PAM, 2018). In addition, participants criticised the lack of government guidelines and supervision and argued that this has led some NGOs and private schools to use borrowed foreign curriculums, content and textbooks which include history lessons about other countries' cultures, as well using foreign languages as the medium of instruction for most of the classes. One of the participants made a connection between politicians' perspectives of the world and the type of schools of thought under which they were educated:

'The impact is clear, we have people in the parliament who are politically and ideologically associated with the Gulf countries, every time, there is an election, different Gulf countries support different individuals, some of these individuals used to run private schools and educational NGOs, some groups and some of these elites were the product of these schools' (Zakariya_Interview18_159-163).

This indicates that the participants believed that there was a relationship between the contents taught in private schools and the geopolitical interests of donor countries, educating students through specific political lenses. It is beyond the scope of this study to determine where this relationship exists. However, an analysis of the themes indicated that the lack of government regulation might have facilitated some of the private schools to promote, directly or indirectly, issues relating to interpretations of certain political ideologies. The extract above suggests that the schools funded by the Gulf countries, Egypt, and lately by the Turkish, may have helped to produce various

individuals and organisations with different political ideologies and allegiances, who were competing to lead the highest political office in the country. The following section explores participants' perspectives of using education as a means of clan discrimination in Somalia.

The figure below provides contributory factors on the cycle of intractable conflict from the education perspectives.




Figure 3 Contributory factors of the intractable conflict in Somalia

The model, as shown in figure 7.1, is based on the findings of the thesis and explains how the unregulated education system in Somalia, along with the use corporal punishment as a method of behaviour correction, contributed to the perpetuation of violence and in the acceptance of violence as a legitimate means of conflict resolution.

Somali education is dominated by the private sector, the findings indicate the most of the schools are run by private individuals, companies and International organisation including NGOs. One thing most of the schools have in common is that most of them use imported curricula from different countries, including Kenya, Ethiopia, Turkey and some Middle Eastern countries, some of the subjects taught include, history and Islam, disregarding the Somali history, and these two concepts have been used as political tools to provide the legitimacy for some of the stakeholders of Somali conflict.

Since there are no government regulations and child protection policies in schools, children and young people are most vulnerable for indoctrination, causing identity crises and dual loyalty in the name of twisted and politicised interpretation of Islam and interests of other countries.

These competing ideological issues contribute to the perpetuation of structural violence, the use of corporal punishment and societal acceptance of teachers as 'father' as well as the teacher-centred approach of teaching makes the student receive information and accepting as the truth. According to the findings, some of the young who have studied in some of these schools ended up promoting acts of terrorism. The synthesis suggests that the unregulated education system in Somalia facilitated the spread of ideological conflicts. This made the conflict even more intractable and very complex to resolve. These synthesis also suggest that root causes of the Somali conflict cannot be merely isolated on the factors relating to clannism and powers

struggle, but it may instead be associated to have stemmed from the unregulated education system in Somalia, this contextual interpretation of the Somali conflict arising from the education is unique to this study as it argues to have contributed to the creation and perpetuation of cultural and structural violence in schools and beyond.

The following section discusses participants' perspectives of the challenges to the peace education programme in Somalia.

7.7 Practical challenges to peace education implementation

Most of the teachers who were interviewed highlighted the practical challenges that they encountered in implementing peace education programmes in the Somali curriculum. The emphasis of this section is that *“one or two projects cannot ... solve all [the] problems [in Somalia]”* (Bakar_Interview_115-116). Most of the participants shared similar views, expressing the need to incorporate local ideas and contextualised peace education programmes in line with the local culture and values and: *“not [to] use something that comes from outside”* pointing out that peace requires a *“long process; it’s not black and white”* (Abukar_Interview11_237-240).

One of the emerged themes from the analysis was the need for tailored training for teachers who deliver peace education programmes. The findings also indicated that this was one of the main factors that led to the failure of the implementation of the peace education in Somalia. In addition, the challenges for peace education implementation varies from context to context. However, consistent with the findings and the critical approach of peace education, the idea that one-size-fits-all peace education programmes could solve all structural and cultural violence in all contexts is a myth (Bajaj and Brantmeier, 2011). This view was shared by most of the participants

who resisted the idea of one educational programme could be seen as a panacea for the deep-rooted clan conflict in Somalia (Amina_Interview12_157-160).

This perspective summarises the central message of this thesis, that each situation and context needs its own in-depth analysis and special considerations. This study has identified some of these challenges in relation to peace education in Somalia, as discussed in the following sections:

7.7.1 Tailored teacher training in peace education

All the teachers who were interviewed stated that lack of training and lack of in-depth knowledge of the concepts and values of peace education were the main barriers to the success of the programmes. Hassan points out that providing tailored training on behaviour management to teachers help create a culture of peace in schools, this is especially significant on the success of the peace education implementation in schools. As *“you can’t use corporal punishment in the classroom and at the same time teach students not [to] use force as a means of resolving conflict”* (Hassan_Interview19_195-200).

The extract identified lack of tailored training and criticised the use of corporal punishment. In addition, the findings also suggest that the lack of government guidelines and supervision for teaching standards may have led to cases of indoctrination. The participants argued that some teachers may even have played a role in indoctrinating children and instilling views that contributed to the culture of violence: *“If you don’t regulate education, the teacher can teach anything they want to children”* (Saabir_Interview10_223-224).

Another participant explained the vulnerability of the students to indoctrination in some of the schools. Fawzi argued that teachers are seen as fathers in the Somali context,

and this perception of teachers can be problematic, misused, and exploited with certain ideological beliefs (Fawsi_Interview9_350-354).

The above perspective suggests that broader government intervention was necessary to protect children's rights, and indicates that the way to prevent possible indoctrination was the provision of tailored training and knowledge about the local values. The contextual and historical narratives of the conflict, as well as the concepts incorporated into peace education, and their limitations. Only then, can be seen to have a positive impact on the lives of the students (Baxter and Ikobwa, 2005).

The idea that the government should play a more significant role in educational provision and quality control was expressed many times throughout the interviews. The participants emphasised the importance of cooperation between the government and schools, working together to help the schools become an enabling environment, and nurturing a culture of peace. The government should hold teachers accountable for misleading students and instilling political views that are contrary to the values of the Somali culture (Macalin_Interview3_56-60).

This perspective is one of many that describes the frustration and confusion of the education providers in Somalia. The findings of this study indicate the need for appropriate teacher training programmes to help to teach using more friendly and discussion-based methods (Brookfield and Preskill, 2012), rather than a top-down method of teaching (Brookfield, 2017) which is associated with the teacher-centred approach. Here “teacher dominance” can be explained in the level of authority and power that the teacher holds in a school setting and the perceived assumption of the role of a “*good teacher*” (Macalin_Interview3_56-60). The teacher-centred method is widely used in Africa; the primary assessment of learning is predominantly done by

testing and examinations (Harber, 2017). A teacher-centred methodology may not be the most appropriate method when teaching peace education; this was rationalised by one participant on that basis that students needed to interact with teachers and critically evaluate the issues and historical narratives that underpinned the conflict: *“it is important to teach in schools on how to debate about ideas and values and how to criticise ideas without attacking the individual”* (Ismail_Interview14_237-241).

As mentioned in the literature, one of the limitations of the teacher-centred approach is that it can lead students to be more passive and obedient, which can lead to brainwashing. Especially in the context of unchecked and unregulated educational settings, such as is the case in Somalia (Tabulawa. 2003). Freire (1970) referred to this as ‘the banking concept’, and he contrasted it with problem-posing education, where the focus is on collaboration and teamwork to resolve issues together. He maintained that education should not only focus on providing information, but that teachers and students learn through action, so both students and teachers learn from each other. Likewise, Bajaj and Brantmeier (2011, p. 221) shared the view that critical approaches in peace education empower students to be agents of transformative change, who are able to: *‘critically analyse power dynamics and intersectionalities among race...language, religion, geography, and other forms of stratification’*.

Teachers who were interviewed in this study highlighted the importance of having the skills and experience to have a significant impact on students’ progress, as well as learning the right skills to identify some of the subjective clan narratives that *“divide the minds and hearts of the Somali people”* (Ismail_Interview14_212-213). This may impact on the way that students view the ‘other’. The perspectives of the participants suggested that providing tailored teacher training on interactive pedagogy and student-

centred approaches was an essential step in achieving the goals and values that peace education programmes endeavour to achieve.

7.7.2 Unification of the national curriculum

The theme *“lack of a unifying curriculum”* was one of the most recurrent themes throughout the analysis, as most of the participants identified the lack of a national curriculum as one of the main barriers to implementing peace education programmes for the entire country.

As the following account suggests, the Somali conflict has affected all aspects of Somali society; different regions and administrators used their own narrative of Somali history or used a borrowed curriculum. The Somali diaspora and the international community mainly funded the schools in Somalia (Hoehne, 2010). One of the participants explained the defragmentation of the Somali curriculum:

Every region has its own curriculum, some borrow it from neighbouring countries, some teach their own history as the legitimate rulers and looking at other regions through politicised lenses and as rivals and evil-wishers, for example, Somaliland curriculum teaches their own politicised historical narrative that justifies their agenda of succession (Hassan_Interview19_231-235).

The above comment indicates concerns regarding using foreign curriculums, arguing that it may be used to promote non-Somali values. The participants called for the establishment of a single, unified national curriculum that encouraged unity and coexistence. Private schools used different curriculums and education systems. Although the Somali government has gradually provided textbooks relating to history and ethics, it is arguable that subjects such as history and ethics were mainly being taught in line with the donor country's political ideology and worldviews. Referring to

history lessons in schools in Somalia, one of the participants reflected on his experience: *“I saw children that had more knowledge in [other countries’] history and kings than the Somali history”* (Abukar_Interview 11_131-137).

These perspectives indicate that the drivers of the Somali conflict were not only driven by tribal and clan differences, but also by external schools of thought and an environment, which politicians, teachers, and civil society groups were exposed to whether they were in education or other public services. Fairclough (2001) argued that language can be exploited by the dominant groups in society in ways that reinforce one reality or view that serves the dominant groups. This view was consistent with the findings of this study in that the unregulated curriculum in the Somali context had contributed to the structural conflict through instilling politically and ideologically driven curricula, thus perpetuating the structural conflict. The findings of this study point out the need to unify the Somali educational curriculum in order to enhance learning opportunities for students throughout the country; a unified national curriculum could help students receive coherent and integrated learning experiences, which could contribute to a culture of peace and reconciliation.

The participants mainly shared the same views about the need for a single unified curriculum. However, there were different views about what contents to include the curriculum, for example, the historical figures and historical events which according to most Nabadoons consider to be mainly politicised and promoted on clan basis.

The following section explores the insights of the participants about the perceived role of the teacher in schools and where they derived their legitimacy.

7.7.3 Behavioural management and strategies

All the teachers interviewed attributed the use of corporal punishment practices as a significant barrier to creating a culture of peace in schools in Somalia.

Most of the participants recall their experience in local Quranic schools. Corporal punishment is seen as major issue, as teachers are entrusted to make the student “*a better person, I think this corrective measure has contributed to our culture of violence*” (Macalin_Interview3_223-226).

As highlighted in the literature review chapter, implementing peace education programmes requires a pedagogy that “*counters the use of force at the expense of alternative solutions*” (Mirra, 2008, p.94). However, the findings of this study revealed that the disciplinary practices used in most of the schools in Somalia could hinder the prospects of the peace process. One of the main obstacles was the use of corporal punishment in schools. According to the participants, the practice was acceptable in Somali society, which can be considered to be part of the cultural violence (Galtung, 1996), thus adding to the challenges to peace education implementation in Somalia. For instance, in the Somali context, teachers are seen as “*fathers*” and “*source of all guidance... [Their] knowledge ...cannot be rejected*”, “*they also have the support respect as well as parents’ legitimacy and consent*” (Ismail_Interview14_215-219) to fix children’s behaviour, even using corporal punishment as a tool of behavioural correction– a practice which is inconsistent with peace education values and human rights principles (Harris and Morrison, 2012; Bajaj, 2015).

Participants of this study related their experiences in their childhood and argued that, although the situation had improved in some schools in urban cities, there were harsh practices and disciplinary techniques that were still used in most schools, mainly in

madrasas. Therefore, there was a need for further training programmes for teachers, as well as social awareness of the effect of corporal punishment on children's long term psychological and emotional development. Consequently, there was a “*need [for] classroom management training and use [of] other strategies to manage student behaviour*” (Zakariya_Interview18_70-71).

Here, most of the participants identified corporal punishment as “*wrong, counter-productive*” and, therefore, unless some changes were to be made in the strategies used for classroom management, it would be difficult to see the benefits of the peace education programme as long as “*teachers are allowed to use corporal punishment in [the] classroom and at the same time teach students not use force as a mean of resolving conflict*” (Zakariya_Interview18_70-74).

As rightly pointed out, the use of corporal punishment was described as “*counter-productive, and inhumane*”, and other studies (Gershoff, 2010; Long, 2018) share the same view on the negative impact on children's wellbeing and development. As the following statement suggests, it may be difficult to terminate this practice in the short term in Somalia for two reasons: the social acceptance of corporal punishment as a justified method for disciplining, particularly in the teaching of religious subjects and the perceived notion that ‘harshness’ and ‘strictness’ are characteristics of a good teacher (Yusuf_Interview7_155-159).

Galtung (1990) asserted that cultural violence is shown when cultural constructions are used to legitimise any form of violence. A participant related his experience as a student in the dugsi (local schools for religious studies) as how Somali society accepted this type of cultural violence: “*my parents always sided with the teacher*

because they believed the teacher was trying to discipline me and make me a better person” (Macalin_Interview3_223-226).

This excerpt suggests that the use of corporal punishment had partially contributed to the culture of violence in schools. As noted in the literature review chapter, many African and Asian countries use some form of corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool to facilitate students’ learning progress and ethical behaviour (Davies, 2004). The findings of this study argue that some of the practices, such as corporal punishment in schools in Somalia, contributed to the protracted conflict as it justified violence as a means of resolving conflict or correcting a behavioural issue. The study argues that some contents of the unregulated private schools *“can easily indoctrinate children”* if left unchecked (Warsame_Interview17_118-123).

In addition, another finding of the study was the perception of parents’ acceptance of corporal punishment as a legitimate means of discipline, which teachers were allowed to enforce as they saw appropriate. It can be argued that the combination of parents’ acceptance of corporal punishment and the use of a teacher-centred approach may have facilitated instilling concepts and values which promoted violence as a legitimate means of conflict resolution.

The emergent findings indicated the challenges to peace education implementation in Somalia, where using violence as a tool is justified as a societal norm, due to the protracted conflict and absence of a functioning national government over the last 27 years. Therefore, as argued by one of the participants: *“we need to change many things in our school culture and practises if we want to teach peace and reconciliation subjects in schools”* (Warsame_Interview17_125-126).

As the narrative suggests, many changes were needed in the schools to create an enabling environment in Somalia to make the message of peace education widely incorporated into the local context. As mentioned in the literature review, the role of the teacher in the classroom or the question of which teaching approach is most appropriate for peace education delivery in Schools is widely contested. The argument for teachers moving from 'Sage on the stage' to 'guide on the side' has been particularly widely discussed concerning peace education delivery (Saulnier 2009; Sriprakash, 2012 and Giroux, 2014).

Some scholars argue that students should not be treated as "fish in water" when they in the process of learning (Bourdieu's, 1989). The findings of this study suggest that teachers require more understanding of which model of teaching is most appropriate when teaching peace values. One of the participants related experience as a teacher in the UK and questioned the adaptability of the same teaching model in the Somali context:

"The way we teach here in [UK] is different from Somalia, here, it is more interactive and open, but I think teachers should have more authority and strict rules to make sure that students learn otherwise, from my experience in teaching secondary in the UK, sometimes, the situation becomes chaotic, so I don't think this easy-going Western approach of teaching is adaptable in Somali context" (Hassan_Interview19_237-241).

The above highlights the importance of understanding the local culture and context. The participatory approach is portrayed as Western-oriented, while the teacher-centred approach, on the other hand, is argued as being a top-down approach and

may not be consistent with peace teaching particularly when augmented with neoliberal logic (Sriprakash 2012; Giroux 2014).

7.7.4 A long-term strategy for peace education

Most of the teachers interviewed emphasised that transforming students through education is *“a process that takes a long time and resources”* (Osman_Interview16_204-209). Therefore, peace education should be planned as long term strategy rather the short term courses and training promoted by international NGOs. These short-term courses were criticised for not having sufficient impact on the learners, and one of the reasons mentioned for this was the short duration of the peace education projects: *“NGOs were more interested in ticking boxes rather than providing real education”* (Osman_Interview16_204-209).

This suggests a lack of trust in the NGOs’ work, as well as the lack of a long-term commitment to understanding in-depth the causes of the Somali problem. Another criticism of peace education was that the content taught in some schools in Somalia lacked *“knowledge of the local culture and the grievances...in the society”* (Osman_Interview16_204-209).

This viewpoint suggests the need to provide tailored, culturally sensitive training for peace education providers on the issues relating to the changing political dynamics and history of the conflict in Somalia. Here, the participants proposed the inclusion of the traditional Somali law, referred to as ‘Xeer’, in the peace education contents. They argued that the Somali culture had a rich oral culture, expressed through poetry throughout history and that the inclusion of the local context would create local ownership, and this would lead to the chance of success for the programmes. One of the participants emphasises that peace education in Somalia lacked local ownership

and the content and the values it promoted were not incorporated in the Somali values, resulting in suspicion of hidden agendas (Ibrahim_Interview2_123-126).

Taken together, the perspectives of the participants suggested that the peace education programme as another discursive practice was intended to be used as a vehicle to impose a Western perspective on how to resolve conflicts through the education system. One of the participants states *“I don't know how we can get peace when others are trying to bring peace for us. If we want peace, we need to talk peace openly and honestly as well”* (Abdiaziz_Interview15_77-82). Ali shared the view that *“we as Somalis can only solve our own issues. We need to realise that no one from outside will bring solutions to us; we need to trust ourselves* (Ali_Interview8_117-119).

The narrative above indicates that creating local ownership and incorporating the Somali culture and values with peace education is key for its effectiveness as a conflict resolution in Somalia: *these [peace education] interventions...were not interlinked with the Somali culture or Somali understanding of the political dynamics, and in my opinion, it's partly that's why they failed”* (Ibraihm_Interview2_100-104). Therefore, taking into account the contextual dynamics in a new setting is crucial for the success of any educational programme and implementation (Phillips and Ochs, 2003).

As previously mentioned the issue of incorporating peace education into the Somali culture has been repeatedly raised. However, there is some progress on the ground, the ongoing peace education programme, Youth as Agents of Peace, initiated by the World Bank focuses on young people and engages more with local people. From these research findings, more needs to be done to include more potential stakeholders. For example, the inclusion of moderate religious figures were said to help de-radicalise the extreme political ideologies, the findings also emphasised the significance of their

inclusion on the peace process because of their local support and legitimacy (World Bank, 2018).

In addition, ongoing educational projects such Bar ama Baro-Learn or Teach which is funded by the United States Aid for International Development (USAID) aims to promote quality education, particularly for out- of- school children teaching skills and socio-emotional skills (USAID, 2019). According to the findings, most of the schools providing education are privately owned. Therefore, the focus on out-of-school children is particularly important as some families cannot afford the soaring school fees.

The following section summarises the main findings and synthesis from the participants.

7.8 Summary of findings

The participants' views revolve around the emerged themes and sub-themes, particularly on delegitimising traditional elders and the consequences of discrediting their roles in the peace process. This was seen as a significant obstacle to the state-building efforts in Somalia. A common view of the participants was that the importance of Nabadoons had been ignored both during reconciliation process and state-building. From participants' perspectives such denial of their role in the peace-making process was regarded as fragmentary agenda that undermined achieving credible and inclusive peace.

In any case, the underlying assumption of the participants in the political process is that there is a lack of engagement and space for the elders from the former central government and as result Nabadoons' popularity and credibility have weakened, and the relationship with the government deteriorated. Although most of participants shared

similar views on many factors, such as blaming external actors for fuelling the conflict, only a few acknowledged that issues relating to political clan historical narratives were also partly to blame. However, some participants have raised concerns on Nabadoons' engagement beyond community service, as they were regarded as promoting tribal interest before national interest and embedding nepotism within the system. Nevertheless, local methods for reconciliation and knowledge of the social structure were underlined by some participants as critical to conflict resolution at the onset of the civil war as expressed by some participants.

Some Nabadoons believe that conflicts and humanitarian crisis in the early 1990s left the southern part of Somalia, including the capital city, under the sway of warlords. In their accounts of the events surrounding the emergence of warlords, they mentioned that warlords had a lesser appetite towards the efforts of Nabadoons, as each warlord proclaimed legitimacy and being the de facto leader in his own enclave. After the long-awaited international support came to save the impoverished communities, the Nabadoons, with the support of the international community, again began the process of reconciliation and peace-making efforts. Nabadoons were invited into the reconciliation conferences of the international led efforts in neighbouring countries. Warlords were also convened in these summits to help rescue the country. Engulfed in an internal war and power-grabbing amongst warlords, both the local efforts of the Nabadoons and the international effort had thus far failed to produce an enduring peace in Somalia

Nevertheless, some of the participants expressed their concern around Nabadoons' involvement in the political process for their own personal interests. Specifically regarding concerns of nepotism, clan favouritism, and corruption. In addition, according to some participants, Nabadoons promoted their vested interests and that

of their tribe before the national interest by selecting members from the clan on basis of wealth and who could offer more financial incentives, not on merit and competence. Therefore, some participants argued that there was a clear shift of Nabadoons' role from peace mediating to business brokers. In addition, they further added that Nabadoons became part of the political system and even expanded their roles to profit from the status quo of conflict in the country. Some participants questioned the credibility and neutrality of Nabadoons.

Favouritism in the political institution was pointed out as a significant issue concerning state-building. This issue came out in discussions of themes regarding Nabadoons' credibility and corruption as well as nepotism, which was deeply embedded in the political structure. Some participants stated that members of parliament who were selected by Nabadoons are the major drivers of favouritism and its advocacy as they safeguard tribal interests in the federal system. Participants linked this act of nepotism to Nabadoons as they pushed MPs for a greater devotion to the services of their constituents (tribes), and as a result, the minority tribes who were less represented in the federal system became marginalised in the government institutions and were subjected to discrimination and exclusion from civil service employment. Some participants suggested that some funds should be allocated to Nabadoons for their sustenance and their families, as they are a potential cause of favouritism, and participants believe that this local support mechanism will reduce the level of nepotism in the political system.

Apart from corruption and nepotism, participants identified increased external stakeholder and foreign interests and new ideological dimension of conflict. External stakeholders, mainly from donor countries, had dominated in the peace process by developing the strategies of the summits and drawing roadmaps for the reconciliation

and state-building, as expressed by participants. These stakeholders were donors and implementers such as Intergovernmental Organisations, whereas foreign interests were defined by the participants as countries which have strong ties with local actors, either politicians or radical groups, to promote their own agendas and with the main aim of destabilising the country. Because of these factors, the conflict dynamics have moved to a more complicated stage where Nabadoons have no choice other than adopting the status quo, and they were unable to solve it.

Participants emphasised the margining dimension of ideological conflict; that is, the shift from tribal to ideological war. One participant said that Al-Shabab has killed some of the Nabadoons and threatened others to death over their role in reconciliation. Therefore, it is apparent that the government should provide protection to the elders if it needs to make use of them for enduring peace.

In the subsequent themes, participants have emphasised principles of mediation required from both international efforts and local efforts to follow in order to broker a lasting peace for Somalia. As tribal feud is to be resolved and wounds caused by protracted conflict are to be addressed, it is imperative that Nabadoons and other international players are neutral and non-judgmental and the resolution process is fair and unbiased, as one participant put it. They also stated that there is confusion about the roles of regional states or the federal states in the peace process, as some of them pursue their own agendas and sign treaties with outside world, particularly with neighbouring countries, and consequently, this undermines the federal government's ability to represent the whole country in dealing with the outside world. In addition, participants' contextual understandings were also diverse as all the participants described peace beyond an absence of violence and more related to justice, reconciliation, and absence of poverty and tribalism.

Participants have also raised concerns on the quality of the education as each profit-making umbrella organisation, which manages several schools, borrowed curricula from foreign countries, and this is taught in schools.

The participants raised concerns about the quality of the education, as well as fears of an identity crisis as a result of borrowed curricula from a number of foreign countries. Some participants went further and blamed external countries for instilling radical views in the education sector, producing groups such as Al-Itihad and Al-Shabab through radical ideologies such as the interpretation of Wahhabism.

All participants emphasised the importance of introducing a unified curriculum to overhaul the education sector but also pointed out the challenges of unifying all the different curricula in all regions of Somalia, especially in Somaliland which wanted to create its own identity and sovereignty. Although some participants stated that there was ongoing progress in introducing an examination board and unifying the curriculum, they further added that the contents that were used in the classroom were still imported from other countries, thus diminishing the Somali culture and national identity.

Participants further identified the importance of tailored training programmes for teachers, communication skills, and the need to incorporate Somali and Islamic values into peace education for broader legitimacy. Participants emphasised that the effectiveness of peace education in its current form disregarded the local context of conflict resolution and unless its contents were localised, it would not have any significant impact on alleviating the Somali conflict.

Participants also believed that some of the Islamic teachings and values were in line with the message of peace education, such as the elimination of tribalism and discrimination, as well as seeking social justice, and these were some of the reasons

why they called for tailoring the peace education programme to the Somali and Islamic values. The following chapter concludes this study and summarises the key contributions to knowledge.

Most of the participants indicated that the lack of a more profound understanding of the contextual understanding of peace had a negative impact on finding an appropriate resolution to the Somali conflict. This discovery has implications for the formation of a new approach which places more emphasis on understanding the local context in-depth to help achieve resolution, especially in a clan context. The study has also identified challenges regarding policymaking and provided perspectives for the most appropriate practices and processes for reconciliation, for example, whether the reconciliation process should focus on the state-led justice and accountability approach through the state courts, or take the healing and forgiving approach, which is based on cultural and local ways of conflict resolution. While this study has not identified which approach is best for reconciling the warring sides, it did partially substantiate the complexity of the reconciliation process in Somalia.

However, analysis of this aspect suggests that the participants also argued for a leading role in helping to achieve the healing process.

7.8.1 Lessons learned from international settings of peace education

The case studies of the four countries mentioned in the literature review shed light on the different experience and perspectives of conflict in a different context and possible solutions. The Bosnian experience of peace education affirms the centrality and significance of teachers as agents of peace as well as understanding meanings of peace curricula in practice. The study in Bosnia suggests that more attention should be given to providing key skills and tailored training and most importantly recognising

teachers not only as peace educators but also as peace learners whose values and experiences contribute to peace in post-conflict contexts (Clarke-Habibi, 2018).

The case of Rwanda also shows the importance of national consensus and linking peace education and national reconciliation goals incorporated in history textbooks. Nevertheless, the decision on what to include in history books should be consensus-based in order to mitigate provoking emotional narratives that fuel future violence (Goldberg, 2019). It also emphasises the significance of using education as a peace-building component (King, 2005). Rwanda's experience of peace education emphasises two main important points: peace education is an essential tool for conflict resolution and should be part of the reconciliation processes. The Rwanda study also highlights the significance of local ownership of teachings and contents to maximise impact (Goldberg, 2019).

In the case of Northern Ireland, the education response to conflict was helpful in the promotion of social cohesion and reconciliation and there is a consensus that the purpose of education should be used to promote respect for diversity and a culture of tolerance (Department of Education of Northern Ireland, 1999). One of the lessons from Northern Ireland's experience is the use of education as a peace-building component alongside searching for a political solution. It is also evident from this perspective that education alone cannot resolve conflicts, but inclusive political participation and fair power-sharing arrangements are essential for long-term peace.

Finally, Sierra Leone's experience of peace education shows the significance of peace education as a holistic approach in the preventions of children's engagement in terrorism and violence (Wessells, 2005).

All these cases have specific lessons to learn from. It is clear that each setting is unique with its contextual dynamics and each country's history of violence varies from one to the other. From this perspective peace education design has to be tailored to help address specific problems and solutions that the locals understand and respect its legitimacy.

Chapter 8: Conclusions and recommendations

This chapter is a reflection on my research. Here I critique the study limitations and evaluate what key contributions this research offers. Additionally, I will offer recommendations regarding future research, practice, and publication, based on the study findings.

This study aimed to explore the views and perspectives of the UK-Somali diaspora about the role of peace education in the peace and reconciliation efforts to resolve the Somali conflict. Due to the insecurity and instability in Somalia, the UK was selected as the setting for the data collection. The UK is home to most of the Somali population in Europe (Abdile and Pirkkalainen, 2011).

The investigation was guided by the research question below:

- What is the role of peace education as a means of conflict resolution for the intractable clan conflict and the reconciliation process in Somalia?

In exploring the overarching question, the following questions were explored:

1. What factors contributed to the failure of the reconciliation process in Somalia?
2. To what extent does culture play a role in teaching peace in Somali schools?
3. How do Nabadoons and teachers define the concept of peace in their context?
4. What are the challenges for peace education implementation in the Somali curriculum?

Two groups from the UK-Somali diaspora were selected, Nabadoons and Somali teachers. Both groups were selected, purposively, due to their experience (Patton, 2015) and their ability to provide thorough descriptions (Geertz, 1973) of the

phenomenon through the vehicle of in-depth semi-structured interviews (Wengraf, 2001). Locating participants, particularly the Nabadoons, was challenging. Traditional elders (Nabadoons) constantly travel to Somalia as they maintain close connections with their homeland where they enjoy social and political legitimacy and engage actively in peace and reconciliation (Abdile and Pirkkalainen, 2011). Equally, finding Somali teachers who worked or were involved in peace education programmes or projects in the UK was a difficult task. However, with the support of the Somali community and my community connections and local networks. I was able to make the first contact and negotiations and then select participants strategically, making use of snowball sampling, in conjunction with purposive sampling (Mitchell and Egudo, 2003). I conducted interviews with nineteen participants (ten teachers and nine Nabadoons). These two groups of participants provided significant contributions to the richness of the data I collected.

The basis of my choice for conducting qualitative research was to produce knowledge grounded in the experiences of the Nabadoons, as well as the teachers, in their own words (Sandelowski, 2004). Peace education in the Somali context is constructed recurrently and understanding the meaning of the term 'peace' is not made or found but, rather, is multidimensional, contextual, pluralistic, and diverse. Participants provided different meanings for 'peace' and various interpretations, suggesting that reality in this context (peace education) is not fixed and shifts over time and place. These beliefs guided my direction of choice regarding methodology, data analysis, and how I interpreted the themes that emerged from this study.

The overarching themes that emerged from this study were: unifying the curriculum, barriers to peace education implementation, and local ownership of the reconciliation process.

Chapter 6 discussed research questions (RQ) 1 and 2, while chapter 7 discussed RQ 3, and 4. Chapter 7 also discussed the emerged themes regarding peace education and the reconciliation process. This discovery is of particular importance for several reasons. It identified factors that led to the failure of the implementation of peace education programmes nationwide. One of the major criticisms of the peace education programme included the westernisation of contents, concepts, as well as values it promotes and its disregard for local and contextual understandings of peace. All participants agree that part of the reconciliation process was attributed to a lack of in-depth knowledge of the root causes of the Somali conflict and its historical narratives. This study has discovered a new contextual meaning of the concept of peace from the Somali diaspora context in the UK: peace as an absence of clannism, peace as an absence of poverty and discrimination, and peace as equal political participation. This significantly advances our more in-depth understanding of peace, beyond what Galtung calls a 'negative peace', which emphasises peace merely as an absence of violence (Galtung, 1996).

8.1 Practical recommendations

8.1.1 For the Somali government; national curriculum and civic identity

The theme "unifying the curriculum" was one of the most recurrent themes throughout the analysis, as most of the participants identified the lack of a national curriculum as one of the main barriers to implementing peace education programmes for the entire country, as well as it being a factor causing radicalisation in schools. The main concern regarding using different curriculums was linked to instilling politicised values that sometimes promoted non-Somali values. Participants also raised concerns that Somali values and language and literature are in crisis, as subjects such as history and ethics were mainly being taught in line with the donor country's foreign policies, political

ideology, and worldviews. *“We need to work on a...contextualised curriculum which is nationalised not only in one region of Somalia”* (Amina_Interview 12_63-68).

There is, therefore, a definite need for the establishment of a single, unified national curriculum that encourages unity and coexistence. Considerably more work will need to be done to determine what content and historical narratives should be part of the new curriculum. More work needs to be done to gather a national consensus on specific conflict-sensitive contents, such as poems, stories, and art drawn from the rich oral culture of the Somali people, so that it can represent the shared values and shared narratives (Olden,1999). The process for constructing this new curriculum has to be consensus-based, involving all stakeholders, most importantly, traditional peacemakers, teachers, peace educators, and religious figures and civil society organisations.

This study has identified one of the challenges of unifying the education curriculum in Somalia is that politicians and warlords often exploit clan politics and feed false historical narratives to profit from the unstable social and economic conditions (Abdiaziz_Interview15_195-197).

There is, therefore, a need for a national consensus on the creation of civic identity as the first step towards nation-building. The basis for this civic-identity should be sourced from the Somali culture and the Islamic faith, not as a political entity but rather as a common base of which common civic-identity can emerge.

8.1.2 For teachers and educators – training on behaviour management

The second overarching theme which emerged from this study was “barriers to implementing peace education programmes”. This study identified the practical obstacles for peace education: the use of corporal punishment, the teacher-centred approach to teaching, and the perception of the teacher as a legitimate and unquestionable source of knowledge. *“You cannot use corporal punishment in the classroom and at the same time teach students not use force as mean of resolving conflict, beating children in the classroom or outside the classroom is wrong, counter-productive, and inhumane”* (Zakariya_Interview18_70-74).

There is, therefore, a definite need to create an awareness campaign to eliminate the societal assumption that provides teachers with the legitimacy to use corporal punishment in schools. In particular, the design of the new curriculum needs to include pedagogy and teaching styles that help create a culture of peace and harmony in schools and one that rejects the use of force as a legitimate means of conflict resolution and, instead, empowers students to be transformative agents of change in Somali society. This can be achieved by provided training on behaviour management strategies to safeguard children.

8.1.3 For the international community and the Somali government

The third overarching theme, “local ownership of the reconciliation process” emphasised the need for “local solutions” in the peace and reconciliation process. Participants called for a bottom-up approach, making use of the ‘xeer’ (Somali traditional legal system) to be incorporated into the national legal system. It also calls for the inclusion of religious figures as stakeholders in the reconciliation process to help promote healing and forgiveness.

The various ongoing projects that are currently running in Somalia, such as 'Bar ama Baro' funded by USAID and UNICEF, are positive signs of co-operation between NGOs and the Somali federal government. However, more needs to be done to incorporate ideas and values derived from Somali culture into the design of citizenship study to provide a sense of local ownership to obtain full support and legitimacy from the locals. The ongoing peace education programme, Youth as Agents of Peace is another project that has had a positive impact on many young people's education and wellbeing by providing training in areas of conflict resolution and peace education. There is a need for NGOs as well as the government to promote and further empower young people to play a more active role in the reconciliation process "[promoting a] *bottom-up approach*, and *"Somali-led approach and under the tree approach"*.

NGOs such as Africa Education Trust is also engaged in supporting the national and the regional educational authorities in the reestablishment of a single unified curriculum and, more importantly, the significance of incorporating messages that help create a culture of peace, coexistence, and human rights (Renders and Knezevic, 2017).

Some of the local universities such as Simad University and University of Hargeisa are also contributing in providing tailored skills of conflict resolution with the main focus on communication skills and local means of conflict resolution to solve problems in a peaceful manner (Pherali and Lewis, 2017).

Although these projects have different structures and contents they were all designed to create an enabling environment for education and peaceful coexistence.

However, the government needs to coordinate all these projects to work together with local NGOs, civil organisations, traditional elders, and religious figures to understand in-depth the factors that contribute to the continuation of the conflict in Somalia.

Involving all the stakeholders could facilitate the resolution of the thorny issue of power-sharing and a resource-sharing framework which treats all Somalis equally, regardless of clan and region.

8.2 Conceptual contributions to peace education and conflict resolution

As far as could be ascertained by a thorough literature search, my study is the first attempt to examine in depth the role of peace education in the reconciliation process in Somalia from the perspectives of the UK-Somali diaspora with the focus on traditional leaders and Somali teachers. The findings of this study have made several contributions to the current literature on peace education and conflict resolution. Firstly, as far as could be ascertained by a thorough literature search, this study provides the first in-depth investigation of the role of peace education in the Somali conflict through the lenses of teachers and traditional peacemakers, known as Nabadoons, living in the UK. Here, Nabadoons provided a comprehensive description (Geertz, 1973) of the structural violence that exists in the Somali political culture and the elements of cultural violence that sustain it (Galtung, 1996).

On the other hand, teachers who were interviewed in this study identified a number of obstacles to peace in general and peace education in particular. Finally, this discovery lays the groundwork for future exploration into whether peace education, in its current form, can still be incorporated into the national curriculum in Somalia in the context of the challenges that were identified in this study. The findings of this study may also contribute to future peace educators in designing and establishing the development of peace education programmes that are more effective in addressing the challenges identified in this study.

8.2.1 Re-contextualisation of an existing understanding of peace in the local context

The analysis of the findings in relation to peace education implementation in Somalia suggests a lack of contextual knowledge to critically examine the local power dynamics and historical narratives, as well as the intersectionalities among clans and other forms of political stratification that exist in Somali society.

The analysis of the findings suggests that the meaning of the term 'peace' is conceptually contested, as its meaning depends on the different social, geographical, and cultural contexts, as well as time and place (Galtung, 1996; Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). The findings highlighted that part of the failure of the reconciliation efforts was due to a lack of in-depth understanding of the Somali perspective regarding the meaning of peace in a local context. This study has argued that a comprehensive understanding of peace taken from the local context could facilitate finding tailored solutions relevant to the complex issues regarding reconciliation, power-sharing, governance, and the rule of law in Somalia. Before this study, the available literature suggested that conflict in the Somali context was mainly understood in the context of clan conflict, piracy, and bad governance. Therefore, the focus was to find solutions to what Galtung (1996) called direct violence through a peacekeeping force. However, the findings of this thesis have provided a more in-depth insight into participants' constructions of peace, and how to achieve it. Furthermore, the emerged themes and syntheses have contributed to a new contextual understanding of what constitutes "inclusive peace" in a clan-based society. It has also added the need to address issues relating to structural violence (violence that is integrated into the way things are done, i.e. unfairness, unequal power-sharing arrangements, exploitation, and violation of human rights), as well as cultural violence (violence which is built into the local culture with social and psychological effects, i.e., acceptance of corporal punishment as a

disciplinary tool, and marginalising minorities on the basis of unjust historical narratives). These discoveries contribute to our understanding of peace from a different perspective and reject the dominant Western understanding of peace, which is based on ‘universalising’ an idealist notion of one single truth and one single reality while downgrading the role of the local context and local means of conflict resolutions (Bajaj and Brantmeier, 2011b; Zembylas and Bekerman, 2013).

8.2.2 The perceived assumption of the role of teachers

One of the challenges identified in this study was the perspective of parents’ towards the use of corporal punishment as a justified means of behaviour correction in schools. The premise of their argument lay in the perceived good intention of teachers to help ‘fix’ students’ behaviour and make them ‘better people’ - an idea which this study believes to have contributed to the culture of violence. This study has also highlighted the impact of the societal assumption that considered teachers as “fathers”, with parental consent to discipline children with corporal punishment. Further research is required to understand more deeply the perspectives of parents and female Somali teachers regarding the impact of corporal punishment on children’s wellbeing, as well as their educational outcome.

Previous studies have concluded that corporal punishment is not only ineffective in terms of correcting behaviour (Durrant and Ensom, 2012; Gershoff and Grogan-Kaylor, 2016) but also destructive (Gershoff, 2013; Gershoff and Grogan-Kaylor, 2016) as it causes immense physical and emotional damage to children, as well as accepting the use of violence as a legitimate method of behaviour correction (Paolucci and Violato, 2004). This study argues that, in the context of Somalia, corporal punishment practices in schools combined with the teacher-centred method of teaching in unregulated school settings may have indoctrinated children in a specific way. One reason is that

“children... are scared of the consequences if they try and challenge the teacher, so they have to accept everything that they are told and, and sometimes this can include to carry out acts of terror” (Hassan_Interview19_195-200).

From these perspectives, it is essential to ask what the likelihood of children being brainwashed in this context is. What is the prospect of indoctrination if the teachers' method is teacher-centred and schools are unregulated by the government, and teachers have the parents' consent to use corporal punishment? Is there a relationship between unregulated schools and the rise of radical groups in Somalia? Has the use of corporal punishment in schools contributed to students' fear of retribution if they challenge the teachers' views of the world? In the absence of government regulation and accountability, what is the effect of the social belief in teachers as fathers and a *“source of all guidance”* on the prospect of instilling wrong values and views?

Although these questions are beyond the scope of this study and may require a different research approach and paradigm to establish the cause-effect (causal) relationship, this study has identified these gaps by synthesising, constructing, and intertwining the emerged themes. Consequently light has been shed on a possible relationship between corporal punishment, the teacher-centred approach in the context of an unregulated setting (such as the case of Somalia), and the rise of radical groups. These concepts and themes reveal new perspectives of the Somali conflict and this revelation lays the foundation for future researchers to explore in-depth the emerged themes to fill the new gap identified in this study - the effect of the unregulated schools and the potential for contributing to a culture of violence in schools and society in general.

This study highlights that teachers played an important role in the transformation of the students' world view, but also that the transformation depends on the values and messages that teacher's pass on to students. In a clan-conflicted society, more care and consideration needs to be given to the teachers' delivery of knowledge, as this can either produce a culture of peace or culture of violence embedded in the education system (Page, 2008). Therefore, well-trained teachers with in-depth experience and knowledge of the local context and local historical narratives are of particular importance to help create a culture of peace. The significance of this study is that it is the first study of its kind which has linked corporal punishment and the use of the teacher-centred approach in an unregulated setting, such as is the case in Somali schools, to the sustenance of the culture of violence. This synthesis has not yet been constructed in other studies in this regard. Therefore, this discovery contributes to the peace education literature in the context of protracted clan conflict in Somalia.

8.2.3 A new approach for the reconciliation process in Somalia

The available literature regarding Somali reconciliation mainly focuses on the need for external mediators, as they are considered to be neutral and detached from reality and, thus, fair in their mediation (Menkhaus, 2010; Abdullahi, 2017). From the Western perspective, the neutrality of the mediators can be seen an essential factor. However, the findings of this study argue that the insider knowledge of the Nabadoons and their local means of conflict resolution (xeer) is vital for achieving sustainable peace from the Somali perspective.

As the literature review indicated, the process of reconciliation in Somalia has been mainly dominated by external donors and stakeholders, with primarily the West and regional countries (Menkhaus, 2010; 2011; Harper, 2012) setting the agendas, assigning peace models and roadmaps, as well as paying for peacekeeping. The

participants within this study acknowledged the support of the international community in its effort to help bring peace to Somalia. However, they reiterated that a new paradigm, based on local needs and empowering the local ways of conflict resolution is required. This was encapsulated by one narrative, which suggested that only locals know best the process for peace and that the international community should empower the Nabadoons rather than taking the lead on issues relating to reconciliation. The following narrative sums up the perspectives of the Nabadoons regarding how best to address peace and challenges of reconciliation in Somalia:

“We are grateful for all the support [that] the international community has given us, but we need to ask difficult questions, why peace is not achieved with all the military and financial support? Because they [the international community] have no clue what kind of governance or peace we want, they come with their power-point slides and preach us [Nabadoons] about conflict resolution and reconciliation models which cannot work in Somalia. Peace models are not copy-and-paste, every conflict is different, and it keeps changing, and only us [Nabadoons] know what the real root causes and its solutions are, we need empowerment not lessons and instructions” (Fawsi_Interview9_382-388).

The study also pointed out the importance of incorporating the local *xeer* (Somali traditional legal system into the national law) to emphasise local ownership and legitimacy. This discovery adds to the growing body of research that indicates the need for local ownership as a prerequisite for successful reconciliation among warring parties. This approach calls for the inclusion of all the civil society organisations and, most importantly, the religious figures, as the evidence indicated that this would have *“more legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali people” (Abukar_Interview 11_111-116).*

As the narrative suggests, Nabadoons are more suited to solving clan issues and not religious conflicts, so here the inclusion of religious figures is of particular importance in the reconciliation process as they are seen the preferred candidate for peace-making (Menkhaus, 2010). They are also more equipped to play a better role in delegitimising the ideological claims of the radical groups and their line of reasoning in religious issues in Somalia. This synthesis is of particular significance, as previous studies have failed to recognise the importance of religious figures in taking a leadership role, not merely attending as guests, at peace conferences.

Additionally, the study has identified the complexity of the reconciliation process, regarding thorny issues such as the loss of lives and livelihoods, as well as land and property acquisition during the civil war. From this perspective, it is essential to ask, how is it possible to forgive your opponent or rival who may still live on your land? Is it possible to achieve successful reconciliation without compensating for the loss of lives or property in the conflict? As the study has pointed out, some of these thorny issues are related to social, political, and economic grievances, which led to the creation of cultural violence (Galtung, 1990) that normalises and sustains inequality in how power is shared. According to this study, a good example of this injustice includes the justification of the dominant four tribes in Somalia for claiming the largest share of the power. This study, therefore, highlights the existence of these grievances, historical, and emotional narratives of injustices in Somalia, and necessitates a genuine reconciliation and explicit power-sharing agreement. Combining and synthesising these themes is of particular importance for policymakers and stakeholders, and this also adds to the growing body of a critical approach to peace education research and conflict resolution, which calls for contextualising peace education programmes in

order to empower students to become agents for transformative change (Bajaj and Brantmeier, 2011; Zembylas, and Bekerman, 2013).

8.3 Limitations of the study

The study is limited by the lack of literature about peace education in the Somali context. There are no government policy documents that focus on peace programmes, nor peer-reviewed articles or literature focusing on peace education experiences. In this regards, this study lays the groundwork for future research into the role of education in peacebuilding in general and peace education in the context of the Somali conflict.

Another limitation of this study is that only one of the nineteen participants in this study was female. Somalia is a patriarchal society with men and women having distinct roles in society, although that is gradually changing. However, conflict resolution is still the work of traditional elders who are culturally always men (Harper, 2012). Besides, the scope of this study was limited in terms of geographical location, as the research setting focused only on traditional Somali peacemakers and Somali teachers in the UK. The initial plan was to conduct a field study in Somalia, but this was hindered by a lack of security in the capital of Somalia, as well as lack of time and resources. However, the participants who took part in this study provided in-depth perspectives to the research questions under investigation in this study. The findings of this study could inform policy and practice regarding peace education implementation in Somalia.

8.4 My PhD journey: Reflection on challenges and achievements

After more than two decades of living in the diaspora as a refugee, in 2014, I decided to travel to Somalia for a family visit. During my visit, I visited different schools and

universities and met different people from all aspects of life. They shared with me their experiences of studying in the conflict zone and how they managed to attend university lectures with the knowledge that they might not be back home safely. I met the most resilient students who had big dreams, passion, and who were hopeful of the transformation and impact a good education would have on their livelihoods and social status as well as their career prospects. This energetic and positive perspective on the benefits of higher education made me start thinking about doing a PhD. During my visit, I had always believed that the Somali conflict was political and needed a political solution, but the question I kept asking myself was the impact of the lack of the rule of law, and lack of government regulation on education on those who were born after the collapse of the central state in 1991 (Harper, 2012); what education did they receive? Who provided the education in the absence of the government and who was accountable for it? What content did the schools use and who provided them? Moreover, what historical content and perspective were promoted?

While visiting I met a Swedish peace educator. Having these questions occupying my mind, and, after a long conversation, he convinced me of the importance of education as a tool to fight extreme views and how the peace education programme he was promoting can help the youth become more critical thinkers. This specific encounter with the Swedish peace educator and my observations in Somalia triggered my interest in the idea of using education as a tool to mitigate violent conflict and create awareness of the consequences of war. In the Somali conflict, it is not a secret that many children were exploited in the name of the clan and ideology (Bloom, 2018). In this respect, it made sense to me that education should have a role in conflict mitigation through learning values and the dignity of human beings, and to respect the 'other' regardless of religion, colour, race, ethnicity, and clan association. In particular, I was interested

in the idea of teaching critical skills to evaluate information. After arriving back in the UK, I started reflecting on my experiences in Somalia and started researching the literature on conflict and education to get a better picture of the relationship between education and conflict. I then explored the specific literature about peace education. The literature about peace education was not helpful, it didn't provide me with the silver bullet solution that I was looking for, and I gradually realised that the concept of peace education was contested on many fronts. There were disagreements on how peace education should be defined and what values and principles should be incorporated within the concept (Reardon, 1988; Fountain, 1999; Bajaj, 2008). I wondered how the programme could help mitigate such a complex clan-based conflict with one peace programme that critics regarded as promoting a "universal utopia" (Reardon (1988, p. 4) or "one version of normalising education" (Gur-Ze'ev, 2001, p. 329).

My early exploration of the literature added more confusion and uncertainty about my desire to explore peace education in my PhD study. My limited knowledge of methodology and philosophical underpinnings at the time did not help. As a result, I became vulnerable to difficult questions from previous PhD students on how I planned to carry out the study and who should be the potential stakeholders. One thing that the literature indicated was the lack of peace education study in the Somali context. This was a massive discovery for me as I had identified a gap in the literature and believed that it could be a potential for new knowledge contribution. The journey was full of difficulties and challenges, the process of PhD study was different compared to my other learning experiences and I had to learn to be an independent researcher, new academic skills, and how to balance work, life, raising children, and most importantly, how to survive depression throughout the journey.

My motivation increased when the Research Degrees Board (RDB) panel considered my thesis proposal to be '*an interesting study with the potential for an original contribution to knowledge*'. The feedback from the panel was an emotional boost as it acknowledged the potential for knowledge contribution.

Having clearance from the university panel, I started working on a recommendation they provided. Here the challenge was how to narrow down my research focus and areas of interest and how to make it a realistic and an achievable task. At the beginning of my study, I was reluctant to make the changes that were asked by my supervisors, but as I started to gain more experience of the topic and having been immersed into the complex issues of war and conflict and the meanings of the concept of peace from different perspectives, I had to come to realise that my contributions to knowledge would only be contextual and not one that would change the world.

Another challenge was locating my research participants (traditional Somali peacemakers (Nabadoons) and Somali teachers in the UK. Nevertheless, with my social capital and community networks, I gradually managed to successfully collect all the data and started making sense of what it all meant in relation to my research questions and the wider literature.

In addition, there were also other ethical issues that emerged during some of the interviews. The information sheet I emailed to interviewees clearly addressed issues such as voluntary informed consent, openness and disclosure, right to withdraw, privacy, and disclosure. Nevertheless, there was still some uncertainty in terms of how the data would be used even though all these issues were clarified in the information sheet sent out to participants. Some of the Nabadoons, in particular, questioned the relevance of their participation since their identity would remain anonymous.

Nabadoons are public figures in Somali culture, and some prefer to have their contributions acknowledged, as in other non-academic interviews (Ibrahim, 2018a). I overcame this issue by summarizing the guidelines set by the university's Code of Ethics and Conduct and BERA (2011) Revised Guidelines for Educational Research ethics committee and explained that I was obliged to follow these guidelines. Here, I felt that my insider position as Somali-British was helpful in this context, as I understood the underpinnings and social constructions of the Nabadoons and the rationale behind the request for their names to be published, while also recognising the ethical requirements of a British university.

I hope that my experience interviewing Somali elders will be a good lesson for future researchers, who are interested in exploring Somali related issues, to plan ahead when conducting interviews and not be surprised if asked the central aim of the proposed study and other issues relating the study. It is essential that the researcher does not assume that the participants have read the information sheet that was shared with them, especially if the community involved is predominantly an oral society. Somalis (my participants) tend to communicate orally, and oral dialogue is regarded as a dominant form of cultural expression (Harper, 2012; Leavitt, 2018). Therefore, it is understandable that some Nabadoons wanted to use the interviews as an opportunity to express their views and provide recommendations on issues relating to peace and reconciliation in Somalia. To overcome this, I briefed them about the aims and objectives of the research, its nature, and focus - the role of peace education in the reconciliation process in Somalia.

As one of the researched, I knew that interviewing about sensitive issues such as the dynamics of the Somali conflict and its root causes were likely to open a kind of Pandora's Box in the context of Somali tribal politics, so it was vital that I handled the

situation with care and caution. It was not an easy job to manage the Nabadoons in some of the interviews (Leavitt, 2018). Culturally speaking, Somali elders are known for their storytelling and long narratives (Lewis, 1993). It was challenging to find a balance between maintaining a degree of control and allowing the participants to speak freely throughout the interviews, and it was vital for me to elicit in-depth answers while keeping them relevant to the research question. This was not an easy job, nevertheless, their comprehensive perspectives on the root causes of Somalia's tribal conflict and their understanding of traditional Somali means of conflict resolution were significant in unpacking some of the key issues under study.

Throughout my research, I have learned about the complexity of the Somali conflict, and how a one-size-fits-all solution would not resolve the multifaceted issues fuelled by emotional narratives and long history of injustices and marginalisation. As most the participants pointed out, it makes sense that solutions should be a bottom-up approach, one that recognises local ways of conflict resolutions.

As a researcher, in all honesty, I grappled with balancing my political views, beliefs, and my own experience of conflict in Somalia, and the significance of credibility when undertaking research. By conducting this PhD work, I have become more reflexive and more understanding of other points of view. I am pleased that my PhD journey has come to an end. This PhD was an eye-opener for me. I have learned how worldviews and experience shape our thinking on how to resolve complex issues. I have achieved the main aim of this study, my findings provided new insight into drivers of the Somali conflict and explored challenges of peace education in a clan conflict context. I have also identified policy and practical recommendations, and I am hopeful that they will make a positive contribution to Somali conflict and other countries of similar conflict characteristics.

I am planning to publish articles from my thesis exploring the role of schools in peace and the reconciliation process and on the meaning and perspective of Nabadoons on peace and how to achieve it in a clan context. I cannot claim that I am expert in the issues I set out to explore. However, I am confident that the skills I have learned throughout this journey equipped me with lifelong abilities to be able to see things through a new lens to interpret and make sense of reality and the multifaceted issues of war and conflict that the world is grappling with. I am hoping that the transformational shifts that I have experienced throughout this journey will help make a positive impact on people's lives and promote peace reconciliation, justice, and help create a better world for all of us.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Consent Form

Study Title: UK-Somali Diaspora Perspectives on Peace Education and the National Reconciliation Process in Somalia: An Exploratory Case Study

Question	Please initial box	
	YES	NO
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated () for the above study.		
I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.		
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without any consequences for me.		
I have been informed that the interview will be recorded and I give my consent for this recording to be made.		
I understand that all information I provide will be treated as confidential and will be anonymised.		
I agree to the use of anonymised direct quotes from my interview in publications and presentations arising from this study.		
I agree to take part in the above study		
Name of Participant _____ Signature _____ Date _____ Researcher _____ Date _____		

Name of the researcher: Yahya Moalin

My telephone number: : Yahya.Moalin@Northampton.ac.uk

Appendix 2: Participant Information Sheet

Study Title: Perspectives from the UK Somali Diaspora on How Peace Education May Support the National Reconciliation Process in Somalia: An Exploratory Case Study

My telephone number: 

My email address: Yahya.Moalin@Northampton.ac.uk

Introduction

The purpose of this form is to provide you with information so you can decide whether to participate in this study. I am happy to answer any questions you may have. Once you are familiar with the information on the form and have asked any questions you may have, you can decide whether or not you want to participate. If you agree, please sign this form. Please also indicate whether or not you are willing to allow your contribution to be audio recorded. Please note that this recording will not be made available to anyone other than me and me and, if necessary, the supervisor. It will only be used to transcribe the material.

Your participation is voluntary, and you may decide to leave the study at any time. You may also refuse to answer specific questions that you are uncomfortable with.

Purpose of the Study

You have been asked to participate in a research study exploring the views and perspectives of the Somali diaspora in the UK regarding peace education's role in the reconciliation process in Somalia. The research is for academic purposes only. The findings will be used to form part of my PhD and will potentially be published after completion. If you wish to receive a copy of the final dissertation once completed, I will be happy to provide you with an electronic copy.

Who is the researcher?

The researcher's name, Yahya Moalin, [REDACTED] You can also contact my PhD supervisors, Dr Jane Murray by Email: jane.murray@northampton.ac.uk and Professor Philip Garner: Philip.garner2@northampton.ac.uk.

What does the study involve?

The research team will ask you to agree to participate in a personal interview. I will arrange a time and date, which is convenient for you once you have confirmed your consent. The interview will take no longer than one hour to complete. You may be asked to participate in a follow-up interview if I want to ask further questions, but it is not compulsory.

What are the risks?

There are no foreseeable risks from participating in this study.

What will happen to the information?

The information given will be stored securely in a locked office at the University of Northampton. The identity of each participant will remain anonymous throughout the research process and in the report. We will do this by assigning a number to each participant. From then on, you will be known only by a pseudonym. Once the research is completed, the information will be destroyed. When we write any report of the study, it will not be possible to identify you or anyone else who participated in the study.

The information you give will be for research purposes only. It will not be given to any other party.

You are free to withdraw from the project at any time until 1st March 2018. After this time, I will be writing the final dissertation and will no longer be able to remove quotations. The final thesis resulting from this research project will be publicly available through the University Library.

In the unlikely situation that harmful practices are mentioned, I am obligated to inform the appropriate agencies.

Not sure about participating? Do I have to take part?

If you do not want to participate, that is fine; you have the right not to participate. You can also stop at any time if you do not want to finish the interview. Simply let me know when you are ready to stop.

Who has checked this research?

The research has been checked, and full ethical approval was given by the Ethics Board at the University of Northampton

Thank you for your interest and support. If you would like to participate in the research, please complete and return the consent form and the contact details form in the stamped addressed envelope provided.

Appendix 3: The Pre-Piloting Draft Interview Guide

The interviewees will have already been informed about the nature, topic, and purpose of the research and that the study is conducted according to the University of Northampton ethics code and procedure. He/she will be assured that anonymity and confidentiality will be preserved. Names will be changed. Moreover, the interviewee will be informed that the interview will be recorded via a digital recorder and transcribed into written format. It will be clarified to them that the contents will be available for the researcher's final analysis and then documented in the final thesis. The interview will take approx.30-70minutes.

Personal Information

Name:

Profession:

Nationality:

Where have you previously worked? How long?

Professional experience:

How long have you stayed in the UK?

How often do you travel to Somalia?

Somali Conflict

1. When did you come to the UK?
2. Why did you come to the UK?
3. Can you tell me some reasons why you left Somalia?
4. What type of conflict is taking place in Somalia then and now?
5. What do you consider to be the main cause of Somali conflict?
6. What kind of interventions were put in place to solve this problem?

National reconciliation process in Somalia

7. What mistakes or omissions have been made in the efforts to end the conflict in Somalia?
8. Are there other issues that have led to the continued state of war and lawlessness and prevented the achievement of peace for the past 25 years?

9. Are there interventions that have been made over the years to try and restore peace in Somalia?
10. What is the role of elders in National reconciliation and process in Somalia?

Cultural values related to Peace

11. How is the conflict resolved in the context of Somali culture?

Definitions of Peace Education

12. How would you define peace education?
13. Have you heard of it before?

Policy concerning peace education

14. Are there any educational interventions to resolve violent conflicts in Somalia?
15. What is the educational policy in terms of conflict reduction?
16. Who provides education in Somalia after the collapse of the central government? Is it regulated? By who?
17. Who regulates them? (talk about regulation of education)
18. What is the role of peace education in the quest to restore peace in Somalia?
19. Who should implement the peace education efforts in Somalia?
20. What factors could play a facilitating role in the peace education programme?

What should be included in peace education programmes in Somalia

21. How can the international community play a facilitating role in the peace education efforts in Somalia?
22. What roles can the Somali diaspora, especially those living in Britain play in the peace education process in Somalia?
23. What role can tribal/clan leaders play in peace education programmes design and contents?

Can peace education influence the reconciliation process in Somalia to reduce tribal conflict?

24. What factors could hamper the effectiveness of the peace education initiative?
25. Would you recommend the launch of peace education programmes to reduce violence in Somalia?
26. Would you like to add anything else about peace education in Somalia?

Appendix 4: Final Interview guide

Study Title: Perspectives from the UK Somali Diaspora on How Peace Education May Support the National Reconciliation Process in Somalia: An Exploratory Case Study

My telephone number: [REDACTED]

My email address: Yahya.Moalin@Northampton.ac.uk

Interview Guide

The interviewees will have already been informed about the nature, topic and purpose of the research and that the study is conducted according to the University of Northampton ethics code and procedure. He/she will be assured that anonymity and confidentiality will be preserved. Names will be changed. Moreover, the interviewee will be informed that the interview will be recorded via a digital recorder and transcribed into written format. It will be clarified to them that the contents will be available for the researcher's final analysis and then documented in the final thesis. The interview will take approx.30-60minutes.

Personal Information

An informal chat about the name of the interviewee, length of time spent in the UK, how often their travel to the UK and the reason for their stay in the UK.

Somali Conflict

- The Root Causes of the Somali conflict.
- Historical types of conflict **AND** if the nature of the conflict has changed
- **In what way the conflict has changed?** Asking follow-up questions depending on the answer given by the interviewee.

Ask whether the lack of unified national curriculum and the lack of government regulation of the education system of the education may have contributed the conflict (Follow up questions) if yes, how did it contribute to the ongoing conflict?

If yes, does this mean that the conflict dynamics of the conflict has changed? In what way? What is education to do with it? Follow up questions regarding the imported curricula (is the diversity of the curricula good or not- HOW is it) is it a contributory factor in the conflict and how?

National reconciliation process in Somalia

Why, despite all the many reconciliation conferences, lasting peace has not been achieved in Somalia?

Follow up questions:

27. Are there other issues that have led to the continued state of war and lawlessness and prevented the achievement of peace for the past 25 years?
28. Are there interventions that have been made over the years to try and restore peace in Somalia?
29. What is the role of elders in National reconciliation and process in Somalia?
30. What mistakes or omissions have been made in the efforts to end the conflict in Somalia?

Cultural values related to Peace

Description of how conflict is resolved traditionally in Somalia.

31. How is the conflict resolved in the context of Somali culture?

Follow up questions: the effectiveness of the local means of conflict resolution

Issues: Why local means of conflict resolution has NOT been effective in mitigating the conflict?

The role of education in the conflict? Understanding the term peace in the Somali context.

Follow up on Interviewees' knowledge and experiences on issues peace education, meanings of peace in a local context. What is the role of education in conflict resolution? How would you define peace? Is peace an absence of war? Or the absence of justice and the rule of law) further follow up on what peace Somalia wants

Policy concerning peace education and the role of peace education

Follow up questions: Are there any educational interventions to resolve violent conflicts in Somalia? What is the educational policy in terms of conflict reduction?

What is the role of peace education in the quest to restore peace in Somalia?

32. What factors could play a facilitating role in the peace education programme to make more responsive and inclusive?

Peace Education contents:

Follow up questions

What should be included in peace education programmes in Somalia? Follow up on the suggested contents.

7. What role can tribal/clan leaders play in peace education programmes design and contents? (Further, follow up the basis of the suggested ideas and arguments

The role of peace education on the reconciliation process in Somalia

What factors could hamper the effectiveness of the peace education initiative? **Follow up questions on the factors**

Appendix 5: Themes and Subthemes

S/N	Themes	Subthemes
1	Delegitimising traditional peacemakers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ discrediting the Nabadoons as backward nomads ▪ Denial for recognition ▪ Diminishing role in peace-making efforts ▪ Making their rulings and judgments invalid
2	The return of legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trust in the method of conflict resolution ▪ Knowledge in local means of conflict resolution ▪ Particular knowledge in the reconciliation process
3	Corruption affecting Nabadoons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Receiving bribes ▪ Accepting the status quo ▪ Business broker ▪ The exploitation of Nabadoons' social status
4	Nepotism in the political culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Hiring clan members ▪ Discrimination on other minority clans ▪ Promoting sub-clan interest ▪ Clan-based favouritism

5	Changings conflict dynamics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increasing external political stakeholders ▪ A new dimension of ideological conflict ▪ Competing foreign interests
6	Protracted tribal conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Various internal and external stakeholders ▪ A shift of political views ▪ Failed state ▪ Difficult identifying the real stakeholders ▪ Intractable conflicts ▪ Complex clan issues ▪ Politicised historical narratives
7	Principles of conflict mediation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Neutrality, partiality, justice
8	Poverty affects neutrality in mediation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Poverty ▪ Unemployment ▪ Losing social status
9	Politicising reconciliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The buzzword ▪ Forgiveness ▪ Social healing
10	Ripeness for genuine reconciliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Benefitting from the status quo ▪ Lack of clarity on power-sharing ▪ Fear of losing clans dominance ▪ Fear of justice ▪ How much 'compromise
11	8.4.1 Forgiveness key for reconciliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Involvement of all clan in the conflict ▪ Grievance ▪ Islamic values ▪ Compensation

12	Justice first approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Economic grievances ▪ Land disputes ▪ Return of goods ▪ Unlawful property ownership
13	Lacking complete ownership of the reconciliation process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Local solutions. ▪ Traditional methods of conflict ▪ Taking the lead for reconciliation ▪ Bottom-up approach ▪ Somali-led approach ▪ Under the tree approach
14	Fair power-sharing agreement key for reconciliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Agreeing on who gets what. ▪ Collective decision-making ▪ Protecting minority tribes ▪ Federalism
15	Local conceptions of peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inclusive peace ▪ Peace with job opportunities ▪ A peace that brings prosperity ▪ Tribalism free peace ▪ Peace with good governance ▪ Peace as the absence of poverty

16	8.4.2 Peace as absence of tribalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Peace cannot last while tribalism exists. ▪ Peace and tribalism cannot co-exist in the long run. ▪ Accepting the minority clans as equals ▪ Eradicating clannism ▪ Enabling reconciliation
17	Delegitimising tribalism through Islamic teachings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All equal before Allah ▪ Clan and clannism ▪ The purpose of the tribe ▪ How Islam addressed the issue of tribalism
18	Politicisation of education provision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The collapse of government institutions. ▪ Decentralisation of education ▪ Change in political ideology ▪ Lack of national curriculum ▪ Lack of guidelines ▪ Political Islam
19	8.4.3 Lacking government regulation and vulnerability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Indoctrination ▪ Lack of protection for children ▪ Harsh school discipline strategy
20	8.4.4 Lack of a unified curriculum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Combined subjects ▪ Personalised syllabuses ▪ Contextualised programmes ▪ Belonging

21	8.4.5 Fear of losing Somali national identity and values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Teaching foreign histories ▪ Promoting other values and cultural ▪ Foreign languages as the language of instructions
22	8.4.6 Political ideology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Instilling a set of ethical ideals ▪ Promoting certain foreign principles and values ▪ Different worldviews through education ▪ Politicised contextual education ▪ Regional Proxy war
23	Lack of teacher accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cultural perception of the teacher ▪ Lack of child protection laws ▪ Lack of government supervision ▪ Lack of tailored training
24	<i>Discipline and corrective measures</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Correcting student behaviour ▪ Obedience ▪ Lack of child protection laws ▪ Parental acceptance of harsh disciplining ▪ Legitimising violence as a means of problem-solving
25	Implementation barriers on peace education programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of understanding of peace education ▪ Cultural values ▪ Cultural challenges ▪ Lack of teaching training ▪ Short-term programmes
26	8.4.7 Lacking long term strategy for peace education programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Short-term programmes ▪ Lack of long-term vision ▪ Lacking contextualisation

27	8.4.8 Lack of training for PEP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tailored training ▪ Training on the psychological impact of war ▪ Contextualising peace ▪ Specific skills and experience
28	8.4.9 Corporal punishment as a <u>means</u> of behavioural correction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Teacher power cultural unquestionable</i> ▪ <i>The <u>best</u> interest of the child</i> ▪ <i>Beating and slapping.</i> ▪ <i>A teacher is like a father</i> ▪ <i>Behaviour is important</i> ▪ <i>Fear of consequences</i>
29	8.4.10 Outside cultural influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promoting western values and cultural norms ▪ Human rights ▪ Top-down conflict resolution ▪ Insisting on teaching donors' history

Appendix 6: A section of the Interview coding process

Below is an interview transcript from one of the teachers. The yellow highlighting shows the first stage of analysing the transcripts in which recurring sections were identified.

Interview number 19 with Hassan (pseudonym)

...“Nabadoons used to be neutral, impartial and fair in making judgments. But unfortunately, when it comes to mediating between their own tribe and another tribe I have seen myself some tribal elders abusing this trust and this neutrality as they constantly line with the views of their tribesmen subjectively despite the fact that the evidence is against the perpetrators of the crime (Hassan_ Interview19_19-23).”

The problem is that Nabadoons and they make mistakes, and sometimes, they have to with their emotions.

Behind the scenes, we all support our tribes, but we are on the spot, we try to be more diplomatic and use the buzz words such reconciliation and peace and prosperity, but every clan wants their respect and leave history, and that is why it is important that we come up with policies that ban tribalism. Because it is one of the things that actually destroyed the country and if we don't prepare for it and use all the tools that we have in our possession?

Can you give me some example of what tools can we use to make awareness about the tribalism in our society?

Well, look, my friend, there is nothing with tribes or clan or being English or Scottish, the problem is when you believe that you're your tribe or ethnicity is the best because genetics or some cultural narratives that are baseless and subjective because this creates prejudice and makes you all others as inferior to your stance, I think that is wrong, as you know we have values and they mainly sourced from the Quran and the sayings of the prophet Mohamed (PPH), and coming to your question regarding the tools we can use for is this, is, for example, promoting discussion and getting involved religious figures, in fact, the Somali has the most respect for religious people, and they can talk about the reward for forgiveness and building and sustaining relationships. We cannot accept arguments, debates and examples that are based on Western ideas only, for people to embrace it; it has to be based on our cultural norms and traditions. Tribal issues are complex and require deep reconciliation and a new and fresh approach (Hassan_ Interview19-53-54).

Clannism is basically discrimination in Somalia, if you are one of the minority, don't get protection if a civil war starts again, that is why we need to teach our children about citizenship and values, not clan politics (Hassan_ Interview19-55-57).

Interviewer: Could you please tell me more about the role of the elders and the Nabadoons in conflict mitigation and how it has changed throughout the years.

The role Nabadoons played is very positive in conflict resolution, and we need to look at situation in its context because the Nabadoons are not the same, so we cannot generalise all and put into one category, the problem is allegiance, it is dilemma sometimes because we all belong to tribes and sometimes you tend to get pushed to make certain decisions that are you regret making them,

Interviewer: you said that you are made to make decisions that you regret at the end, you can elaborate a bit more please?

SDT19: you see the issue is that, when you are in a position of power, especially in working in the justice system and you don't have clear guidelines and codes of conducts in Somalia, so because of this you can make mistakes, and not only that, you get pushed from different power levels and positions in the government, and as a result, you make silly mistakes, and these mistakes will stay with you forever, I know some Nabadoons who sided with their tribes on some of the disputes and some are widely known in the Somali community, but in general Nabadoons are known for their neutrality, and before the civil, their ranking in the society was based on how fair the decision and how many correct decisions they make.

Nabadoons are part of the tribe, so even if they are neutral on some occasions, they cannot be perfect. To be honest, they are in difficult situation, it is dilemma, For example, if your uncle commits a crime against another tribe, it's common sense that you support your uncle although you are a peace lover or peace seeker; cannot say no or you cannot reject your relatives demands, because simply they are you line of defence tomorrow, but I agree that this behaviour is not consistent with our Islamic values, in reality in times of war, it is difficult to be objective and natural.

Interviewer: some of the participants of this study blamed the regional states in Somalia for making peace difficult, what do you think of these views?

SDT19: Look, this issue is controversial, but let me make this clear "There is no way we can achieve peace in Somalia as long as we have regional member states dictating their agendas on the central government, these member state leaders portray the government as the barrier for their economic development, and they are there to defend their rights and playing with their emotions (Hassan_ Interview19_97-101)" so I think we cannot say they are wrong to represent their people, but the problem selling false hopes to you people and tribe and creating propaganda, we have leaders that create the problems and tensions within their community and they do it for their own political interest. The people should know about this and ashamed these leaders, this where I believe you question relating the role of education can help, we need education system that enables students to debate without fighting and accept to lose arguments and sometimes win but the most important is that student learn skills to evaluate ideas and policies without attacking the person who has written it, and this is an important skill which only comes through practice and I think, If we provide the enabling environment in the classroom without the fear to be criticised by the teacher, peace programmes can have a positive impact, but we should make it clear the consequence of war and how it destroyed our county and we need to condemn those instil war and fitnah in our country. War is horrible, our people are deeply affected and tired, and our people are ready to let go of the emotions.

“Somalis are tired of conflict, but every time we see peace taking shape, some of the political leaders provoke emotions of hate and revenge, people are ready to forgive each other for the sake of Allah (Hassan_ Interview19_117-119)”.

But you have to remember, we need to make peace, but the term reconciliation is abused

“Reconciliation is a beautiful word, and if you don't say this is a beautiful word, you are not seen as somebody who is peaceful. So you have always to keep saying that we need reconciliation, everybody uses this reconciliation just to justify their political agenda (Hassan_ Interview19_120-123)”.

Interviewer: there have been different attempts to reconcile the warring clans, and still we are talking about reconciliation why have these attempts failed?

These attempts failed for many reasons and but the problem our people know the only winner take all, and the rest are losers and that is dangerous, in tribal society there must be census and dialogue to dial down the hostile tone, but you can look at yourself, there is no clear aim and practical steps to find solutions.

That each regional state uses its own curriculum. How can you have one Somali idea when all the regional states have their own education system? I wonder what they teach in those schools. As a teacher, I remember one time I went to Puntland in Somalia and I saw that they are promoting Puntland education system and the schools are not taught about the real Somali history. They seemed to be promoting only their own version of the story and this created problem. This creates the notion of the other because it creates division; therefore, it must be stopped. The problem of curriculum diversification and the problem of the curriculum decentralisation in Somalia has caused a lot of confusion as you know, as some sheikhs promoted some specific version of Islam and which can educated people should look at the role of Islam and how it can be exploited in a good or bad way. There are religious schools that are promoting Islamic values which is very good because we are all Muslims. But we have to also look at what some schools are promoting, if we don't stop them, only God knows what's gonna have them in the next two decades. Remember we have already lost two decades and a half, yeah, but nobody is talking about it. These schools unregulated the government should do more about it. If the government is not doing more about it means more brainwashing and more indoctrination.

Children are very vulnerable in Somalia, they are scared of the consequences if they try and challenge the teacher, so they have to accept everything that they are told and, and sometimes this can include to carry out acts of terror, that is why the government needs to consider schools as part national security agenda (Hassan_ Interview19_151-155).

“There are no clear goals for reconciliation, what are we resolving? No tribe did not commit crimes in Somalia! We need to forget the past and focus on the future! We can't bring the past back! The only way forward is to genuinely forgive each other about the past wrongdoings and concentrate on not going back to the civil war (Hassan_ Interview19_152-156)”. I think that is the only, making sure that we don't go back to

conflicts again. And this can be only possible if we discuss the difficult things such the completing the federal constitutions and strengthening the judiciary and making sure that decisions are based on merits and objective and reliable facts not on favouritism nepotism as it is the case in our judiciary system at this current time.

The real issues such as genuine reconciliation, power-sharing is difficult, and I think it would require a very honest and strong negotiation between all Somalis. But the essence of the talks one that enables forgiveness and partnerships, remember this, the fact that Somalis with various clan members can be shareholders of a company is a clear evidence that the issue of Somalis is not based on deep animosity and hate but a rather a misunderstanding about issues that are not clearly defined if we can agree on making money which is the most difficult to agree on then surely we must be able to agree terms on how to govern the country and lay down policies that are fair for all. But all this can only if we get leaders that are committed so this power-sharing needs lots of preparation and deeply open and honest negotiations, power-sharing needs strong political decisions and so on, because the country is divided into different states and every region is trying to dominate the region and belittle the other region this needs the political will all leaders.

Interviewer: let's look at the education side again, what were the challenges you came across when you delivered the peace related programme?

"the needs to be trained in classroom management and use other strategies to manage student behaviour, you can use corporal punishment in classroom and at the same time teach students not use force as mean of resolving conflict, beating children in classroom or outside classroom wrong, counter-productive and inhumane, some of the teachers in school used harsh punishment we need to look the issue of training seriously (Hassan_ Interview19_195-200)". "They [government cannot solve all these issues, there is a security problem in Somalia, the resources are not enough, I understand they have to priorities (Hassan_ Interview19_203-205).

Interviewer: you said that corporate punishment in the classroom is seen ok by many family families, what do you think the impact this has on conflict resolution?

SDT19: it is really bad from a conflict perspective, beating in any sense is a bad thing, especially if the intention is to make the student better in for example, in understanding something,

Understanding the solution is important "reconciliation needs a lot before you bring people on the table; you need people to be ready for real reconciliation" (Hassan_ Interview19_209-211). you the main point is that that there something called the hidden curriculum it makes you think that its ok to use violence and as one of the mechanisms of conflict prevention, it sends the wrong message, and that is what makes bating wrong, you see education should make the student able to choose his views openly, and beating is one of the barriers of talking free, I still remember the fear and agony I use to feel in the morning if I know that I was not prepared for dugs I used

to fake some illness just prevent to go to school so in a sense it is emotionally harmful and makes the student feel vulnerable to exploitation and terrorism in our country,

Regarding the rule of law, the courts need to be free from control, and they have to make their decisions without any pressure, but in Somalia, that is a dream anytime soon (Hassan_Interview19_221-222), but you are just fish a chips boy [laugh] and if you really want to understand how issues relating the Xeer works, you should travel home and stay in rural side so you get better understanding of Somali society and its ways of conflict resolution (Hassan_Interview19_229-231),

SDT19: I think I have said enough, can we stop?

Interviewer: yes, of course, we can stop it, thank you so much for coming for the interview. Thank you

Appendix 7: A Section of the coding and thematic process

INTERVIEW 7 with Ahmed (pseudonym)

Below is an example of a section of the coded transcript. After the initial transcript was highlighted in appendix 6, the relevant section of the coding is further highlighted with the specific colour that correspond to the themes in the right column. Themes are underlined. Other themes in the right column that share the same colour are sub-themes identified within it.

- The themes are underlined in the right column.
- The subthemes (in the right column) share same colour but not underlined

Transcript Coded	Themes/Subthemes
<p>SDN7: Tribalism is the issue, not the tribes. Tribalism in Somali is based on discrimination and hate; You cannot change your tribe, but we can change how we see and judge other clans, as I said before, education can play a role, and this includes the informal education, I don't know how this would be possible in the short term?</p> <p>Interviewer: Can you explain why it is not possible in the short term?</p> <p>The government doesn't control the education system, private companies and NGOs run education in Somalia, member states have their system too, so I mean if we don't have one education system, it is difficult to have a national impact. Some of the schools are funded by external NGOs, they teach their history, language and their values, not Somali values, and sometimes these schools deliberately brainwash students, some countries who invest in these schools do this for political reasons not humanitarian as they claim. I mean, I don't see this happening in the short term, because there is still clear division politically in Somalia.</p> <p>Interviewer: Thanks for the clarification, since the conflict started in the 90s there has been several interventions by the international community. Why do you think all these</p>	<p><u>Clannism</u> Clan based discrimination</p> <p>Changing attitude towards others</p> <p>Education provision not under government control</p> <p>Decentralisation of <u>education</u></p> <p>Different curricula</p> <p>Promoting non-Somali values</p> <p><u>Indoctrinisation</u></p>

<p>interventions have failed to bring peace in Somalia?</p> <p>SDN7: Because their approach was not right. They did not involve us (the Nabadoons), and the West did not consider us as important, they thought that warlords could bring peace. We have to find peace ourselves, a peace that is based on the respect of all clans. We also need governance that is not based on the clan political system that divided us. But as I said before, to achieve real peace, we have to sit down under a tree as we used to do in an open space and talk about the real issues such as how we share political and economic power, I think the solution for this conflict is with us, but we need to learn to have a dialogue.</p> <p>Interviewer: And why do you think that Somalis are reluctant to solve their differences?</p> <p>As I said, some people want the situation to stay same because they benefit from conflict, they get contracts, and some clans have more power because of these special arrangements and contracts, so those who have interests don't care about other poor clans. So now, if we have a legitimate government, all people would have the same rights, and if that happens, big clans lose, so that is why they want to keep the situation as it is now. I also think this is why I believe Al-Shabaab numbers are increasing because they make use of this gap and unfairness within the Somali society. If we don't terminate clannism, then there is no real peace in Somalia that is why it is important we need to have more clarity in the constitution and make clannism illegal because it is some sort of discrimination.</p> <p>Interviewer: What role can traditional leaders play in resolving these complex issues?</p> <p>SDN7: it is difficult because some of the Nabadoons are biased and they support their clans irrespective of whether they are right or wrong. I know some Nabadoons who always protect their clan interests only, we need genuine Nabadoons who treat all Somalis equally. We must also include religious people</p>	<p>Wrong approach for the reconciliation process</p> <p>Discrediting Nabadoons</p> <p>Preferring local and traditional means of resolution to find real peace</p> <p><u>Local solutions</u></p> <p>Benefit from the ongoing conflict and a desire to keep the status quo</p> <p>Equal rights and fair power sharing</p> <p>Injustices increase Al-Shabaab membership</p> <p>Terminating and criminalizing clannism is key to peace</p> <p>Clan loyalty and the need for Genuine Nabadoons</p>
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<p>too, Somali people respect their Uluma (religious figures), our role is to help resolve clan-related conflict, not politics, and politicians need to bring a political solution. The Somali people should lead the process from beginning to end, our traditional way of resolving conflict is effective only if we complete the process, bringing real peace take time, maybe months and years, we need to have deep reconciliation, admit the mistakes that were committed against some clans and we must promote forgiveness. But this can only happen if we are serious, there is no point in calling for a reconciliation conference if we are not really ready to compromise and ready to forgive the past unconventionally.</p>	<p>religious figures as stakeholders</p> <p>Owning the process of <u>reconciliation</u></p> <p>Promoting forgiveness and a deep reconciliation</p> <p><u>Ripeness for reconciliation</u></p>
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