



Exploring the theories, determinants and policy-options of street vending: a demand-side approach

| | |
|--|--|
| Journal: | <i>Urban Studies</i> |
| Manuscript ID | CUS-278-18-03.R3 |
| Manuscript Type: | Article |
| Discipline: Please select a keyword from the following list that best describes the discipline used in your paper.: | Other |
| World Region: Please select the region(s) that best reflect the focus of your paper. Names of individual countries, cities & economic groupings should appear in the title where appropriate.: | Africa |
| Major Topic: Please identify up to 5 topics that best identify the subject of your article.: | Informality, Public Space, Policy, Environment/Sustainability, Employment/Labour |
| You may add up to 2 further relevant keywords of your choosing below:: | vendors, demand-side |
| | |

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

Exploring the theories, determinants and policy-options of street vending: a demand-side approach

Abstract

Street vending has been a common feature of urban centres for several decades, with a relatively high proportion of developing countries' populations depending on it for employment, income or survival. Taking a supply-side approach, studies have shown that urban planners' responses to street vending have followed the modernism **theory**. In this paper, we take a demand-side (buyer-focused) approach to studying street vending, which to date has received little attention from the academic community. Employing data from Lagos state, Nigeria, we report four explanations underpinning the demand-side of street vending: formal economy failures, social/redistributive, financial gains, and multifeature. These are, in turn, explained by individuals' marital status, level of education, and perception. Our findings highlight the need for urban planners to embrace pragmatic policies in addressing these demand-side drivers of street vending and use of urban space, rather than criminalising its actors.

Keywords

Street vending, hawkers, demand-side, emerging market, theories, determinants, policy

Introduction

Street vendors, a major sub-group within the informal economy¹, are individuals or ‘small-business entrepreneurs, generally own-account or self-employed’, who engage in manufacturing and/or street-trading of ‘legal or socially acceptable goods and services’, particularly in mobile forms, fixed or semi-fixed stalls, public/private spaces, whether regulated or otherwise; ‘thus [flouting] either business regulation, planning codes or other legal requirements.’ (Onodugo *et al.*, 2016; Brown *et al.*, 2010:667; Basinski, 2009; Cross, 2000). They play important roles in the urban economy by manufacturing and/or selling essential and unique goods and services at relatively cheap prices and convenience to consumers (Martinez *et al.*, 2017; Wongtada, 2014). In developing countries, street vending constitutes around three-quarters of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), provides employment, income or survival-means for a relatively high proportion of the urban population, it alleviates poverty, and offers flexibility and autonomy to those engaged in it (Onoduga *et al.*, 2016; Maneepong and Walsh, 2013; Brown *et al.*, 2010; Skinner, 2008:30; Cross, 2000). However, corresponding policies are ‘ambivalent’ (Xue and Huang 2015:156), ranging from support for street vendors, accommodation, through to the repression of street vendors. Specific to the latter, street vending has been criminalised in many cities, including Lagos, Nigeria, the subject of this study. Underpinning a repressive policy approach is the modernisation or urbanisation theory. Here, vendors are seen as a nuisance, disrupting urban

¹ The informal economy is defined as having ‘three elements: informal employment (those doing informal-type jobs, regardless of location/enterprise[-type]); employment in the informal economy (those working in informal sector enterprises, regardless of job-type); and all legal activities that contribute to GDP, but not captured by official statistics, for various reasons’ (Igudia *et al.*, 2016:154). Informal employment is ‘divided into two types: informal waged employment and self-employment’ (Huang *et al.*, 2017:3). Street vendors are a type of ‘informal self-employment’ (*ibid*).

1
2
3 planning and traffic, and carrying out criminal activities in the urban centre (Xue and Huang,
4 2015; Crossa, 2008). Thus, accompanying policies focus mostly on deterrence, with harsh
5
6 punishments for street vendors carrying out legitimate economic activities (Crossa, 2008;
7
8 Cross, 2000).

9
10
11
12
13 In recent years, however, crackdowns on vending have started to focus on patrons. For
14
15 example, in 2016, the government of Lagos state, Nigeria started implementing a law that
16
17 prosecutes both vendors *and* their patrons. To date, however, little is known about the
18
19 motives for patronising street vendors, as few studies explore the motives for buying vended
20
21 products – Culiberg and Bajde (2014) and Williams and Martinez-Perez (2014). Specific to
22
23 Nigeria, no such study exists. We contribute to the theoretical and empirical literature by
24
25 employing data collected from Lagos state, Nigeria to investigate, first, the motives for
26
27 patronising street vendors; and, thereafter, respondents' perceptions and socioeconomic-
28
29 demographic attributes relating to these motives.

30
31
32
33
34 The study is underpinned by the assertion that vending thrives only when there are buyers of
35
36 hawked goods/services. Thus, having full information about vendors' patrons is as important
37
38 as information on street vendors. In focusing on the former, this paper undertakes a critical
39
40 analysis of the three main theories on buying from street vendors: financial gains (FG), social
41
42 redistribution (SR), and formal economy failures (FEF). From this we derive our research
43
44 questions: what factors influence the decisions of individuals to buy goods/services from
45
46 street vendors rather than a formal shop? What are the characteristics of these patrons? What
47
48 is the best policy option following the evidence from this study? To answer these questions,
49
50 we set up seven hypotheses based on theory and test them in our specific context.
51
52 Specifically, we employ data collected from 160 individuals in Lagos state, who have bought
53
54 products from street vendors. Throughout this paper, the terms street 'vendors' and 'hawkers'
55
56 or 'hawking and vending' are used interchangeably.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Next, we present the background to the
4 study, then we review the literature analysing the demand-side of street vending. This is
5 followed by methods, results and discussion, and conclusions.
6
7
8
9

10 11 12 13 14 **Background to the study**

15
16
17 The literature is replete with theories explaining street vending and the informal economy
18 (for example, see Huang *et al.*, 2017; Skinner, 2008; Maloney, 2004; Cross, 2000; De Soto,
19 1989; Hart, 1973)². Most, however, focus on the supply-side. To avoid replicating these
20 widely-discussed studies, we focus attention here on the modernism theory. This addresses
21 the repression (or criminalisation) of street vending, hence is particularly relevant to our
22 paper. In the next section, we move on to present a critical review of demand-side theories,
23 this paper's primary focus.
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34 In this paper, modernism (Scott, 1998) explains state/urban planners' hostile response to
35 street vending. Modernism argues that, in relation to vending, an investment-friendly urban
36 centre with a good-looking image is prioritised; consequently, urban planners illegalise and
37 crackdown on vending because vendors are seen as irritants who make the urban centre
38 unattractive to investors (Onodugo *et al.*, 2016; Bromley and Mackie, 2009; Crossa, 2008;
39 Swanson, 2007). Cross (2000:30) sums it up this way, 'Modernism often implied crackdowns
40 on street vendors because of the ideals of public order and state control'.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

54
55 ² The dualist, neo-marxist, legalist, voluntarist, modernisation, structuralist, excessive state
56 regulations, neoliberal and postmodernism theories have been discussed extensively by these
57 authors.
58
59
60

1
2
3 The modernism view underpins policy responses to street vending in many countries. Laws
4 prohibiting street vending have been implemented in Lagos, Nigeria (Roever and Skinner,
5 2016). Similar laws, violent evictions and harassment of vendors have been reported in
6 Zimbabwe, Ghana, Hong Kong, Mexico City, and South Africa (Roever and Skinner, 2016;
7 Tibaijuka, 2005; Cross, 2000). Specific to Lagos, the *street trading and illegal market*
8 *(prohibition) law (1984; 1996; 2003)* prohibits and potentially criminalises street vending.
9 Beyond confiscating vendors' wares, the Law specifies a jail term of between six and twelve
10 months or a fine of between ninety thousand Naira [US\$671.89]³ and one hundred and eighty
11 thousand Naira [US\$1,343.78] for offenders. Street vendors typically do not have money to
12 pay these fines, thus spending up to 12 months in jail becomes the *de facto* penalty for
13 vending on Lagos streets.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

29 Further, the same law potentially criminalises buying from street vendors. Offenders are fined
30 ninety thousand Naira and/or sent to prison for six months. The Lagos state government's
31 justification for implementing these laws is based on the modernism argument: clearing
32 environmental nuisance, security threats to citizens, and projecting a good-looking image of
33 the state (Lawanson and Omoegun, 2018; Xue and Huang, 2015; AFP, 2016). Clearly, in the
34 policy makers' view, street vending is unwanted in the Lagos ultra-modern, megacity project
35 (Lawanson and Omoegun, 2018; Basinski, 2009), because, as nuisance, it distorts the urban
36 centre and violates land use acts, state laws, and labour regulations (Adedeji *et al.*, 2014;
37 Wongtada, 2013; Cross, 2000). Consequently, street vending must be stopped/banned.
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51 Enforcing a ban on street vending has, however, led to violent evictions of, and assaults on,
52 vendors in Lagos. Even so, there are doubts about the success of such policies. Specifically,
53
54
55

56
57 ³ Using average of 2003 daily Naira-US Dollar exchange rate: US\$1.00 to NGN133.95
58 (obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria website)
59
60

1
2
3 readings in Cross (2000), Basinski (2009) and Crossa (2016) show that policies promoting
4
5 violent evictions of street vendors are often unsuccessful. This creates a situation that can
6
7 best be described as a hide and seek game. Street vendors continue to operate, but cautiously,
8
9 to avoid detection by law enforcement officers (sell when the latter are out of sight but
10
11 run/hide when visible). We were told during fieldwork that street vendors now give ‘signals’
12
13 or make telephone calls to each other to avoid capture by law enforcement officers. Thus,
14
15 despite the ban, street vending has not stopped in Lagos (Basinski, 2009). We may find
16
17 explanations in historical, supply, demand and socioeconomic factors. These (except demand,
18
19 discussed in a later section) are discussed next, after we present some facts about Lagos.
20
21
22
23

24
25 With a population of around 15 million people, Lagos state is the largest commercial centre
26
27 in Nigeria and one of the fastest growing cities in the world (Basinski, 2009). Nigeria is the
28
29 most populous country in Africa with over 185 million people, a 2016 urban-population
30
31 growth rate of 4.3 per cent, and arguably Africa’s largest economy with 2014 current GDP of
32
33 US\$568.50 billion (World Bank, 2018). Lagos contributes 32 per cent and 65 per cent to
34
35 Nigeria’s GDP and VAT receipts, respectively. Contributing to Lagos is a significant
36
37 informal economy, which provides employment for about 70 per cent of Nigerians, and
38
39 ‘street vendors are the most visible manifestation’ of this (Basinski, 2009:3).
40
41
42
43

44
45 As for the factors responsible for its importance, historically, street vending in Lagos has
46
47 been influenced by multiple factors: migration, fluctuating income levels, heavy vehicular
48
49 traffic-congestion (which is responsible for a loss of three hours travelling time daily and
50
51 which has entrenched a culture of commuting-shopping), and inadequate urban planning – all
52
53 of which have become synonymous with a densely populated Lagos (AFP, 2016; Basinski,
54
55 2009; Gandy, 2006). As Nigeria’s former capital city, Lagos attracts domestic and foreign
56
57 migrants, but with limited formal-sector jobs available, these immigrants often turn to
58
59 vending to survive (Lawanson and Omoegun, 2018; Basinski, 2009). Also important are
60

1
2
3 Nigeria's economic crises of the 1980s, the resulting structural adjustment programme (SAP)
4 which pushed many into the informal economy, with national policy makers' hoping to
5 stimulate Nigeria's growth through the informal economy (Igudia *et al.*, 2016; Meagher and
6 Yenusa, 1996). However, the three tiers of government tend to pursue different, even
7 conflicting, agendas. While local authorities grant/sell operating-rights to street vendors, the
8 State government, through law enforcement officers, repress and arrest vendors, confiscating
9 their wares (Basinski, 2009). The federal government, meanwhile, views the informal
10 economy as a potential catalyst for economic growth.
11
12

13
14
15 On the supply-side, factors such as migration, limited formal sector job-opportunities, and a
16 high population growth rate are responsible for the growing size of street vending in Lagos
17 (Hyde, 2018; Igudia *et al.*, 2016). Additionally, the government's inconsistent modernisation
18 policies have led to the repeated demolition of existing markets with former owners, priced
19 out of the new stores/markets, turning to street vending (Lawanson and Omoegun, 2018; The
20 Guardian, 2016). As such, Lagos' street vendors, whilst heterogeneous in terms of age,
21 gender, marital status, educational attainment, and product-offerings, share a common
22 denominator in that they engage in street vending because there is no alternative (Hyde,
23 2018; AFP, 2016; Basinski, 2009). Thus, people with(out) formal education, adequate
24 skills/training, unable to find formal-sector jobs or secure a permanent shop location, are left
25 with the option of vending (selling food, non-food, drinks, groceries, mobile phones/data,
26 books, hard-/soft-ware, shoe-shine services, etc) for subsistence returns, to pay rent and their,
27 or their childrens', school fees (The Guardian, 2016; AFP, 2016; Basinski, 2009).
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

52
53 Finally, socioeconomic and demographic factors influence participation in the informal
54 economy, with diverse results reported in the literature. A relatively higher proportion of
55 women, individuals with a low level of education, low skills, low wages/income, and a high
56 level of poverty, operate in the informal economy (Verick, 2006; Becker, 2004; Schneider *et*
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 *al.*, 2001; ILO, 1972). Specifically, more women than men participate on the demand-side
4
5 (Sookram and Watson, 2008); buying from street vendors in the search for lower prices
6
7 (Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014). Conversely, some studies find that higher education
8
9 attainment and higher wages/income lead to higher participation in the informal economy (for
10
11 example, see Sookram and Watson, 2008). Although, Sookram and Watson reported these
12
13 results without offering any explanation, the tax and informal economy literature has shown
14
15 that fiscal knowledge acquired from higher levels of education leads to tax avoidance or
16
17 evasion, hence increased participation in informality (Helhel and Ahmed, 2014). The
18
19 literature is also inconclusive on participants' age (Sookram and Watson, 2008), although
20
21 Williams and Martinez-Perez (2014) find that younger and older people buying from vendors
22
23 are motivated by lower prices and formal economy failures, respectively. Marital status
24
25 influences demand-side participation (Schneider *et al.*, 2001), but cohabiting or divorced
26
27 people with children buy from street vendors for their lower prices (Williams and Martinez-
28
29 Perez, 2014). Specific to Lagos, Basinski (2009) show that street vendors are typically aged
30
31 between twelve and sixty-six, are at least secondary school graduates, largely women,
32
33 married with children, self-employed, work long hours, but earn different levels of wages.
34
35
36
37
38
39

40
41 These mixed results demonstrate that multiple factors explain street vending participation.
42
43 Laws prohibiting and criminalising it are short-term, sub-optimal fixes, which leave root-
44
45 causes unaddressed. There is thus an urgent need for more studies in this area, especially on
46
47 the demand side which has thus far received little attention to determine the full nature of
48
49 those root causes.
50
51

52 53 Explaining street vending – a demand-side approach

54
55
56 Studies on the demand-side of street vending are few, but Williams and Martinez-Perez
57
58 (2014) and Culiberg and Bajde (2014) are among the exceptions. Our paper builds on both
59
60

1
2
3 studies. We explore, apply and extend the three demand-side theories defined by Williams
4 and Martinez-Perez (2014): the financial gains (FG), social/redistributive (SR), and formal
5 economy failures (FEF) explanations. Also, we adapt ‘perception’ from Culiberg and Bajde
6 (2014) and explore its role in furthering our understanding of these theories. Whereas
7 Culiberg and Bajde studied individuals’ personal moral and perception about consumption
8 tax evasion, we take a broader look by exploring the links between motives and perception.
9 Specifically, following Sookram and Watson (2008) and William and Martinex-Perez (2014)
10 we employ theories, perception and (socio)economic variables to investigate the demand-side
11 of street vending.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25 The FG explanation covers buying from vendors on rational grounds. Beyond the low-
26 income population (Martinez *et al.*, 2017) and the rich in poor neighbourhoods (Cross, 2000),
27 FG theory argues that individuals patronise street vendors because of anticipated/calculated
28 financial gains. They carry out a cost-benefit or ‘risk-reward’ analysis of their options, then
29 break ‘the law[, patronise vendors] when the expected penalty and probability of detection
30 are smaller than the profits’ (Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014:803; Sookram and Watson,
31 2008). This plausibly explains the resilience of street vending in Lagos, despite laws
32 criminalising it. Basinski (2009) shows that Lagos vendors are ready to take risks, vend and
33 face the consequences, since they have no alternative source of livelihood. Conversely,
34 people with dependent children buy from vendors to save money (Williams and Martinez-
35 Perez, 2014). Further, following Martinez *et al.* (2017), it appears that people patronise
36 vendors in Lagos because they are poor and earn a low-income⁴. With 87 million Nigerians
37 (44.3% of Nigeria’s population) living in extreme poverty, weak GDP growth (0.8% in
38 2017), rising unemployment (highest among youths and graduates), and wages of less than
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

56
57 ⁴ Meagher and Yunusa’s, 1996, note that working-class income affects the demand-side of
58 the Nigerian informal economy.
59
60

1
2
3 two dollars a day for those in employment (NGN18,000 or US\$59, monthly-minimum wage)⁵
4
5 (WPC, 2018; Kharas *et al.*, 2018), buying cheaper products from street vendors offers most
6
7 Nigerians an opportunity to save.
8
9

10
11 Hypothesis (H1). The financial gain motive drives individuals to buy products from street
12
13 vendors
14

15
16 For its part, the SR rationale follows a post-structuralist perspective of the informal economy.
17
18 It argues that individuals purchase goods/services from street vendors to build or enhance
19
20 social relations and ties such as kin, pursue social and redistributive purposes (Round and
21
22 Williams, 2008), resist anti-social practices (e.g., corruption) and the exploitation of workers
23
24 in the neo-liberal economic system (Biles, 2009; Whitson, 2007), or support environments
25
26 where individuals can transform work identity or discover their true selves (Williams and
27
28 Nadin, 2010). Here, ‘participants in informal markets [are seen] as social actors [and not]
29
30 economic actors’ (Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014:803). For example, during fieldwork
31
32 some participants told us they patronise street vendors out of ‘pity’; to ‘help or support’ them.
33
34 SR is better understood when Nigerian peoples’ culture of close family kinship is considered.
35
36 A popular mantra is ‘be your brother’s keeper’; literally interpreted, care for others. Buying
37
38 products from kin operating as vendors can be a way of showing commitment to kinship,
39
40 even beyond family to include members of the same religion, business associates, and
41
42 friends.
43
44
45
46
47
48

49 Hypothesis (H2). Social/redistributive motives drive individuals to patronise street vendors

50
51
52 According to the FEF explanation, individuals patronise street vendors because of the
53
54 ‘failures of the formal economy’ including delays in the provision, ‘lack of availability and
55
56

57
58
59 ⁵ Using CBN published exchange rate (NGN305.00:US\$1.00) as@20/08/2018
60

1
2
3 reliability', and the 'quality', of formal firms' goods/services (Williams and Martinez-Perez,
4 2014:803; see also Biles, 2009; Maloney, 2004; De Soto, 1989). Typically, vendors make it
5 possible for individuals to have easy and quick access to goods/services, irrespective of
6 location and time. Specific to Lagos, FEF arises from inadequate urban planning and
7 infrastructural development, high population density and regular traffic congestion (Basinski,
8 2009; Gandy, 2006). Commuters have responded to these failures by shopping in traffic
9 which, unlike supermarkets, is available, accessible and convenient (Hyde, 2018; Hanafi,
10 2018; Basinski, 2009). Thus, unlike commuters shopping online in advanced countries,
11 commuters in Lagos do their shopping from street vendors. Further, multinational enterprises
12 (MNEs) in Nigeria's telecommunications industry (e.g., MTN) and food and beverages
13 industry (e.g., UAC foods) have modelled their business around vending, as their products
14 are mostly sold on the street (The Guardian, 2016; Neuwirth, 2011).

15
16
17 Hypothesis (H3). The unavailability of products in the formal market, and/or the informal
18 economy's faster or better-quality service, drives individuals to buy from street vendors.

19
20
21 In a study of the determinants of the informal economy, Sookram and Watson (2008) report
22 the strong influence of *perception*. Similarly, in applying and extending 'Jones's issue
23 contingent model', Culiberg and Bajde (2014) report the strong influence of 'moral
24 philosophy and perception', and that perception influences moral judgement and intentions.
25 Trivedi *et al.*, (2003) observe that individuals' moral reasoning, value orientation, and social
26 and political environments influence their perceptions. We accept these narratives and argue
27 that respondents have formed perceptions based on their moral reasoning, orientation and
28 experiences regarding Lagos street vendors/vending and government policy. This justifies our
29 decision to investigate how their perception relates to their motives for patronising vendors.

30
31
32 Hypothesis (H4-7): The stronger the perception that:
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 H4: ‘hawkers are poor, disadvantaged’, the higher is the incentive to patronise on SR grounds
4
5

6 H4b. ‘hawking is helpful to hawkers’, the higher is the incentive to patronise street vendors
7
8

9 H5. ‘hawkers pay no tax’, the higher the incentive to patronise them on FG grounds.
10
11

12 H6. ‘hawkers pay multiple fees’, the higher the incentive to patronise them on FEF/SR
13 grounds
14
15

16 H7. ‘Government overregulates, disturbs hawkers’, the stronger the incentive to patronise
17 street vendors
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26 **Methods**

27
28
29

30 We employ data collected in a two-stage process between May and August 2017 from
31 vendors’ patrons in Lagos, Nigeria. In addition to gaining empirical support (Reddy *et al.*,
32 2003; William and Round, 2009; Arimah, 2011), our sampling methods are the best,
33 practicable option for this study. First, it ensures the data collected cover a wide range of
34 geographical areas and are representative of the true population, considering the huge cost
35 and time required to cover the entire population. Secondly, considering the spate of
36 kidnappings in Nigeria at the time, it was a realistic and practical way of gaining respondents’
37 trust in collecting the required information. Thirdly, avoiding a house-to-house survey gave
38 respondents additional comfort and reduced any suspicion that they could be traceable (also
39 see footnotes 7, 11).
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

53 In stage one, we employed a ‘street-by-street survey’ (Reddy *et al.*, 2003:137), with a spatial
54 random sampling method (Williams and Round, 2009). The former involves administering a
55 survey instrument to members of the public who cooperate, whilst the latter involves
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 selecting every alternate location and participant for sampling (see Igudia *et al.*, 2016). Thus,
4 we went to business premises/workshops, public places, and bus terminals to select every
5 alternate adult that was willing to complete our questionnaire, and where an individual
6 declines, the next person is sampled and the one after is skipped. We listed in alphabetical
7 order the ‘ten (10) most well-established street vending locations in Lagos state’ (Anetor,
8 2015:36)⁶. Then, we selected randomly for the survey, the following five, starting with the
9 second, then every alternate location: Ajah, Iyana-Ipaya, Mile2, Orile and Yaba. We
10 administered 120 questionnaires at each location, generating 600 completed responses.
11 However, not all were usable.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 In Stage two, we employed other criteria to select from the 600 responses. This involved a
26 purposeful selection, where only participants that answered yes to the question ‘have you
27 ever bought a good or service from a street hawker’ were selected (Williams and Martinez-
28 Perez, 2014 employed a similar question in their study). This yielded a total of 160 (out of
29 600) relevant responses, employed in this study. The extra step was taken to ensure the
30 information used in the study is from respondents who have bought from street vendors, in
31 line with the aim of this study.

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42 To help administer the questionnaire, three indigenous assistants, who recently completed
43 their secondary school education and who spoke the native Yoruba language, were recruited
44 and trained. Training the administrators to avoid leading answers was part of our efforts to
45 reduce interviewer bias. To check their understanding of the process, they administered an
46 early version of the questionnaire to thirty people. Feedback from the pilot study influenced
47 the design of the final questionnaire. For example, we changed some words in the survey

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
⁶ These are Agege, Ajah, Berger, Iyana-Ipaja, Maryland, Mile2, Obalende, Orile, Oshodi, and Yaba

1
2
3 instrument: ‘vendor/(ing)’ to ‘hawker/(ing)’. Further, employing administrators improved the
4 quality and quantity of data we were able to gather, as the assistants helped to debunk
5 suspicion about the survey⁷.
6
7
8
9

10
11 We collected information on respondents’ age, gender, education, marital status, income,
12 employments/business-enterprises, participation in street vending, perception, and reasons for
13 buying from street vendors (but no question on why they sell; this has been addressed in the
14 literature). To ensure response consistency and mitigate problems associated with surveying
15 the informal economy, some questions were repeated, but worded differently. To reduce
16 biases associated with collected opinions, both open- and closed-ended questions were
17 employed (see Huang, *et al.*, 2017; Iyenda, 2005)⁸. For example, we asked ‘why did you
18 patronise street hawkers?’ without offering any suggestion of possible reasons⁹. Interestingly,
19 responses to this question extend the literature, because cited motives for patronising street
20 vendors in Nigeria were not only consistent with literature-defined theories (FEF, FG and
21 SR), but also a new, fourth explanation emerged. We term this the *multifeature motive*.¹⁰
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

37
38 ⁷ Some respondents were suspicious of the purpose of the survey, as they thought that the
39 Lagos state government commissioned it to get information on street vendors and patrons.
40

41
42 ⁸ Reja *et al.*, 2003 & Geer, 1991, note that open-ended questions generate genuine concerns,
43 spontaneous and unbiased responses, and reduce biases arising from researchers’ suggestions.
44
45

46
47 ⁹ Bias may arise from coding and analysing responses to open-ended questions. To reduce
48 this bias we, first, noted all the different words used by respondents, then we grouped the
49 words into similar themes. For the question above, seventeen different words were used, but
50 many of the words mean the same thing: (e.g., ‘save time’, ‘quick’, ‘fast’); (‘reduce cost’,
51 ‘cheaper than shop’, ‘save money’). Through thematic analysis, we were able to give the
52 same code to words/sentences expressing the same meaning. (See Table 3).
53
54
55
56

57
58 ¹⁰ We show in the discussion of Table 3, especially the last paragraph the justification for
59 introducing *multifeature* as a stand-alone motive.
60

1
2
3 Finally, we employ multinomial logistic regression to determine the attributes of these four
4 explanations. Multinomial logistic regression is appropriate for analysing data employed in
5 this study; specifically, a nominal dependent variable, with multiple categorical and ordinal
6 explanatory variables (Williams and Martinez, 2014; Sookram and Watson, 2008). The key
7 question we seek to answer is, what factors, attributes or characteristics relate to motives for
8 buying from street vendors? Our hypotheses, formulated to answer the question, are based on
9 existing theory and literature: H1-H3 follow Williams and Martinez-Perez (2014); H4-H7
10 follow Sookram and Watson (2008) and the evidence from the wider literature on factors
11 influencing vending patronage. Finally, we test for internal consistency, reliability of
12 variables survey instrument and achieve an acceptable Cronbach alpha coefficient of over 0.7
13 (Table 1).
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

32 **Results and Analysis**

33
34
35 Cronbach's reliability test results are presented in Table 1 (for full-detailed results, see
36 extended appendix). Following Field's (2005) suggestions, a Cronbach's alpha of 0.7 or more
37 (as reported here: 0.712 and 0.858) is acceptable. We are therefore confident that the
38 variables used in this study are consistent and reliable.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

49 [Insert Table 1 here]
50
51
52
53
54

55 We present in Table 2, respondents' demographics and some important descriptive statistics.
56 With 51.2 per cent and 48.8 per cent for men and women respectively, both genders are
57 reasonably represented in this study. Although the highest proportion of participants is age
58
59
60

1
2
3 26-30, respondents were drawn across all ages of the active labour force in Nigeria.
4
5 Participants are relatively educated, with the highest proportion (40.6%) having secondary
6
7 school education (SSE), although 12.5 per cent of participants have no formal education at
8
9
10 all.

11
12
13
14
15
16 [Insert Table 2 here]
17
18
19
20
21

22 About half (49.4%) of respondents are self-employed. The rest either own/run a business
23
24 alongside their main employment (13.2%) or in full-time employment (18.1%). The highest
25
26 proportion (41.3%) of respondents carry out home services (gateman, laundry, plumber,
27
28 electrician) or pure services (mechanic, hair dressing, tailoring, repairs). Next is the
29
30 proportion of respondents who trade (36.4%). Comparing genders, the highest proportion
31
32 (33.3%) of female respondents engage in petty/kiosk trade, followed by home/pure service
33
34 (29.5%), then professionals (19.5%). For male participants, the highest proportion (43.9%)
35
36 provides home/pure services, followed by trade (31.7%), then professionals (20.7%). Further,
37
38 about three quarters of respondents whose main jobs/businesses are home/pure services
39
40 provision (74.1%) and sales/trading (76.9%), have been involved in the supply-side of
41
42 hawking, in contrast with a third of professionals (34.4%) who have been involved as
43
44 vendors.
45
46
47
48
49

50
51 Reasons for patronising street hawkers in Nigeria – a demand-side approach

52
53 Responses to the following open-ended question are depicted in Table 3: Why did you
54
55 patronise street hawkers? (This gains empirical support from Huang *et al.*, 2017). With just
56
57 over half (53.3%) of respondents patronising street vendors because they provide accessible,
58
59
60

1
2
3 fast and reliable goods/services, the FEF explanation is clearly the strongest rationale for
4 patronising street vendors in Lagos, Nigeria. This is followed by the FG rationale, with just
5 above one-tenth (12.5%) of respondents; split between 'cheaper than their cost in shop'
6 (10.5%) and 'save on expenses, reduce cost' (2%). Finally, with around one-tenth (9.8%) of
7 respondents (split between 'networking' (2.6%) and 'help hawkers' (7.2%)), the SR rationale
8 is confirmed as the third main motive for patronising vendors in Lagos. These results confirm
9 hypotheses 1-3.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23 [Insert Table 3 here]
24
25
26
27
28

29 However, a unique, fourth motive for patronising street vendors emerged from the results.
30 We call it the *multifeature motive*, with 24.3 per cent of respondents patronising vendors 'to
31 make easy income or sales' (13.8%) and 'to reduce stress, survive or do the only job known'
32 (10.5%) (Table 3). With the *multifeature motive*, respondents patronise street vendors for two
33 reasons: to buy and to sell. They buy from street vendors to build a network of customers,
34 which they in turn 'make quick sales [to, in order to] reduce stress and survive in the only
35 job/business I know' (respondents' words). Further, *multifeature* leverages on the three main
36 motives to build its unique identity: individuals want FG because patronising street vendors
37 provide them with the platform to get quick and reliable money/income; they build a network
38 of people (SR), who in turn become a stream of customers to whom they make quick sales;
39 and they patronise street vendors because there are FEF, which they want to avoid, as this
40 'creates lot of stress' (respondents' words) for them. Thus, *multifeature*-participants reduce
41 the survival-related stress created by FEF, by participating in both the supply- and the
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 demand-side of vending. Further, *multifeature*-participants suggest that the informal
4 economy/street vending is self-sustaining.
5
6

7
8 Finally, the *multifeature* rationale is different from the three-main explanations (FEF, FG,
9 and SR) because of the core-intentions of individuals in this category: ultimately to sell,
10 having started by buying from existing vendors. As depicted in Table 3, the words used by
11 respondents categorised as multifeature relate to the supply-side, whilst words describing the
12 three-main theories relate to the demand-side, of street vending. For example, FEF
13 respondents use such words as 'accessible', 'reliable', 'save time', whilst such words as 'quick
14 money', 'reliable money', 'easy sales' were used for multifeature. Similarly, FG involves
15 words such as 'cheaper', 'better than shop', 'save expenses', 'less costly', whilst multifeature
16 uses 'reduce stress', 'survival', 'only job known'.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30 Attributes explaining the demand-side theories of street vending

31
32 The results in Table 4 show that four perception and two demographic/socioeconomic
33 variables are statistically important. Two perception variables, 'hawkers are
34 poor/disadvantaged' and 'hawking is helpful to hawkers', measure perceptions of street
35 vendors/vending, whilst the other two, 'hawkers pay multiple fees' and 'hawkers pay no tax',
36 measure perceptions of urban policy and tax respectively. Marital status and education level
37 are the relevant demographic/socioeconomic variables, implying gender and age are
38 statistically non-significant¹¹. So too is the variable 'government overregulates, disturbs
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

50
51 ¹¹ Income is excluded from this study, as responses to the income question appear inaccurate
52 and inconsistent. Although, not without precedent (Arima, 2011, observed research
53 participants often do not give accurate answers to questions relating to their income), at the
54 time we conducted the fieldwork, the spate of kidnappings in Nigeria was at an all-time high.
55 Hence, there was a general lack of trust, which limited the quantity and quality of income-
56 related information we were able to gather.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 hawkers', implying that regulatory burden, a key determinant of supply-side and dual (supply
4 and demand) participation in the street vending/informal economy (Sookram and Watson,
5 2008; Maloney, 2004; De Soto, 1989) is not a relevant determinant of demand-side
6 participation. This is consistent with the findings of Sookram and Watson (2008:1541) that
7 'excessive government regulation' does not 'encourage participation' on the demand-side of
8 the informal economy, but it does encourage 'dual participation'.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21 [Insert Table 4 here]
22
23
24
25
26

27 With both the Likelihood ratio (75.8) and Chi-square (114.49) significant at the 1 per cent
28 level, and a Pseudo-R² of 0.80, these six variables capture 80 per cent of the factors
29 explaining respondents' motives for patronising street vendors in Nigeria. The sign of an
30 attribute demonstrates how it explains a theory/motive, relative to the referenced
31 theory/motive. Where positive (negative), the compared theory is more (less) likely than the
32 referenced theory to be plausible. Next, we undertake a detailed presentation of results in
33 Table 4.
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

44 *Formal economy failures (FEF)*: relative to singles, married people are less likely to buy
45 products from vendors for FEF than the FG motive. Compared to those with a degree,
46 individuals with the lowest levels of educational attainment (SSE and below) are less likely to
47 buy from vendors for FEF than the FG motive. Individuals who disagreed with the statements
48 'hawkers are poor and disadvantaged' and 'hawkers pay multiple fees' are more likely to buy
49 from vendors for FEF than the multifeature motive. Conversely, individuals who disagreed
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 with the statement, ‘hawking is helpful to hawkers’ are less likely to buy from street vendors
4
5 for FEF than the multifeature motive.
6
7

8
9 *Social redistributive rationale (SR)*: individuals with an intermediate level of education
10
11 (above SSE but below BSc/degree) are less likely to buy products from street vendors for
12
13 multifeature rather than SR reasons. Also, individuals who disagreed with the statement,
14
15 ‘hawkers pay no tax’ are less likely to buy from vendors for SR than the FG motive.
16
17

18
19 *Financial gains explanation (FG)*: relative to singles, married people are more likely to buy
20
21 products from street vendors for FG than multifeature and FEF motives. Relative to
22
23 BSc/degree, individuals with the lowest levels of educational attainment (SSE and below)
24
25 and intermediate-level educational attainment are respectively less likely to buy from vendors
26
27 for FEF and multifeature motives than the FG motive. Individuals who disagreed with the
28
29 statement ‘hawking is helpful to street hawkers’ are less likely to patronise vendors for FG
30
31 than the multifeature motive. Those who disagreed with the statement ‘hawkers pay no tax’
32
33 are less likely to buy from vendors for SR and multifeature motives than the FG motive.
34
35
36

37
38 *Multifeature explanation (MF)*: Relative to singles, married people are less likely to buy
39
40 products from street vendors on the basis of multifeature than the FG motive. Relative to the
41
42 highest educational levels, individuals with intermediate-level educational attainment are less
43
44 likely to buy from vendors for multifeature than SR and FG motives. Individuals who
45
46 disagreed with the statements ‘hawkers are poor and disadvantaged’ and ‘hawkers pay
47
48 multiple fees’ are less likely to buy from vendors for multifeature than FEF motives.
49
50 Conversely, individuals who disagreed with the statement, ‘hawking is helpful to hawkers’
51
52 are more likely to buy from vendors for multifeature than FG and FEF motives.
53
54
55

56
57 Finally, we present in Table 5, a summary of the unique attributes of these motives. One may
58
59 view the multifeature motive as a reflection of the other three motives since it leverages on
60

1
2
3 them. However, as discussed above results in Table 5 clearly show that multifeature has a
4
5 unique identity.
6
7
8
9

10
11 [Insert Table 5 here]
12
13
14
15

16 17 **Further Discussion** 18 19 20 21

22
23 Individuals who cite FEF as a motive for buying goods/services from street vendors are likely
24
25 to be single and highly educated. The government's failure to plan and solve traffic-
26
27 congestion problems (FEF) cause young professionals to patronise street vendors since
28
29 vendors are available and accessible. For example, to avoid getting to work late, young
30
31 professionals leave for work at least two hours early, and since they work Mondays to
32
33 Fridays, they do not have time to shop at supermarkets. Thus, they patronise street vendors
34
35 for their daily food (e.g., snacks, drinks) and non-food (e.g., mobile phones/data, hard-
36
37 /software) needs, as their only option (Hanafi, 2018; AFP, 2016). Confirming this
38
39 relationship is their perception that, although street vendors are poor/disadvantaged and/or
40
41 pay multiple fees, vending helps vendors escape poverty¹².
42
43
44
45

46
47 Individuals who cite SR as a motive for buying from vendors are likely to have attained mid-
48
49 level education and are plausibly of the opinion that vendors pay tax. Contrasting Culiberg
50
51 and Badge (2014), people who buy for SR motives do not patronise street vendors in Lagos,
52
53 Nigeria to avoid/evade tax, but to build kinship. To speculate, the 'be your brother's keeper'
54
55

56
57 ¹² This assertion was confirmed when we re-ran the multiple logistic model with Agreed and
58
59 Disagreed as dummy and redundant variables respectively. See appendix
60

1
2
3 culture is strong in Nigeria. So, it is common practice for family members, religious/business
4 associates to buy products from a vendor-member to show loyalty and maintain kinship,
5 rather than to buy from outsiders/formal shops.
6
7
8
9

10
11 Individuals who cite FG as a motive for buying from street vendors are likely to be married
12 and to have the lowest levels of formal education. Results confirm the findings of Williams
13 and Martinez-Perez (2014), that people with dependants buy from street vendors for the
14 lower price (FG) motive (Basinski, 2009, reports similar results for married women). Results
15 also support Meagher and Yunusa's (1996) observation that working-class income affects the
16 demand-side of Nigeria's informal economy and Martinez *et al.*'s (2017) argument that
17 people patronise vendors because they are poor and earn a low income, as the low level of
18 educational attainment suggests those who patronise vendors for the FG motive are unlikely
19 to have attained high-paying formal sector jobs – hence they earn low wages (Verick, 2006).
20 With 44.3 per cent of Nigerians living in extreme poverty (WPC, 2018), respondents'
21 perceive vending to provide a poverty escape-route, although vendors are burdened with
22 multiple fees. Thus, for married women, buying from street vendors represents an
23 opportunity to save, and thus escape from poverty.
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

41 Individuals who participate in the demand-side of street vending for multifeature reasons are
42 likely to be single and highly educated. As noted earlier, these individuals have dual
43 objectives for patronising vendors: to buy and to sell. This is confirmed by their perception
44 that vendors are poor/disadvantaged, pay multiple fees, but that vending enables them to
45 escape poverty, as they do not pay tax¹³. These individuals can be MNE representatives who
46 patronise street vendors to make them distributors (Neuwirth, 2011); or traders in their own
47 right, who in the process of going about their business find the need to buy food/water or
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

58
59 ¹³ Results confirmed: see footnote 13; appendix
60

1
2
3 other items from vendors. We reiterate our earlier thesis that multifeature participants suggest
4 street vending is self-sustaining.
5
6
7
8
9

10 11 **Conclusions**

12
13
14
15
16 This study extends the street-vending literature by reporting four motives for which
17 individuals engage on the demand-side of street vending: FEF, SR, FG and multifeature
18 rationales. With over half (53.3%) of respondents, FEF (formal economy failures) is the main
19 motive for patronising street vendors in Nigeria. This contrasts with Williams and Martinez-
20 Perez's (2014) findings that seeking lower prices (FG: financial gains) is the highest-ranked
21 single motive for buying from vendors; but it does support their argument of significant
22 country/regional variation in the main motive for patronising vendors. For Lagos, our
23 findings call into question the ban or criminalisation of street vending, since policy makers
24 are largely responsible for the main trigger, FEF. As explained earlier, the government's
25 failure to address traffic congestions on Lagos roads and consequent loss of daily travelling-
26 time (FEF) underpins individuals/young professionals' patronage of vendors in Lagos.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43 Also reported are six variables relating to these motives: marital status, level of education and
44 four perception variables. Married individuals with low levels of formal education attainment
45 will likely patronise street vendors for FG reasons (lower price/to save), whilst single, highly
46 educated individuals will likely patronise vendors for FEF reasons (accessible, available,
47 convenient) and multifeature reasons (buy and sell). However, significant differences exist in
48 the perception of individuals patronising street vendors for FG and multifeature motives, as
49 explained earlier and confirmed by the results in Table 5. These results confirm Sookram and
50 Watson's (2008) findings that married people participate in the informal economy's demand-
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 side, but they contrast with Williams and Martinez-Perez's (2014) findings that younger and
4
5 older people buying from street vendors are motivated by lower prices and FEF respectively.
6
7 Descriptive analysis shows differences in respondents' gender and main job-/occupation-
8
9 type, but in support of Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah (2008), they are statistically non-
10
11 significant. However, it contrasts with the findings of Williams and Martinez-Perez, (2014)
12
13 and Sookram and Watson (2008), who reported significant differences between men and
14
15 women participating in the informal economy's demand-side.
16
17
18
19

20 The multiple factors reported in this study highlight the need for pragmatic policies to tackle
21
22 street vending in Lagos, Nigeria. Such a one-size-fits-all and extreme policy as
23
24 banning/criminalising vending represents a suboptimal and unstable equilibrium. Therefore,
25
26 as has been recommended elsewhere (Basinski, 2009; Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah 2008; Cross
27
28 2000), policy makers should 'consult' with, rather than 'confront', street vendors,
29
30 accommodating and allowing them to co-exist with the formal sector. One way of doing this
31
32 is to ensure an honest, open and continuous dialogue between policy makers, street vendors
33
34 and their patrons. This is supported by our findings that over half of vendors' patrons have
35
36 cited FEF as their main-motive.
37
38
39
40

41 Finally, policy makers should facilitate an environment that encourages all citizens to achieve
42
43 their full-economic potential, and not criminalise those going about their legitimate business.
44
45 This can be achieved by ensuring policy consistency, redefining or reclassifying what they
46
47 recognise as 'informal activity' (Xue and Huang, 2015), by deregulating the sector to allow
48
49 informal economy/street vending to exist as an 'incubator' for business start-ups (Cross,
50
51 2000) or by creating a vending drive-through market. However policy makers approach this
52
53 challenge, individuals participating in both the demand- and supply-side of vending should
54
55 have the resources and opportunities to achieve their full economic potential.
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 To conclude, we hope this article stimulates further research, as we cannot claim it provides
4 answers to all possible questions relating to the demand-side of street vending. To enhance
5 generalisation, future studies may employ larger samples to reflect Lagos state and Nigeria's
6 population. Findings reported in this study were based on 160 responses, although this figure
7 compares well with those used in the literature.¹⁴ Moreover, efforts were made to achieve
8 high quantity/quality sample¹⁵. In addition, further studies into what social ties mean and how
9 they relate to vending would be helpful. Finally, whilst we have tried to reduce bias¹⁶, we
10 accept that it cannot fully be eliminated. We thus might have omitted from this study a
11 proportion of street vending patrons with uncaptured diverse motives. Nevertheless, to
12 conclude, we restate this paper's contributions: it reports four motives for participating on the
13 demand-side of street vending, including a new *multifeature motive*, which, are, in turn,
14 explained by individuals' marital status, level of education, and perceptions of street vending.
15 Findings highlight the need for urban planners to embrace pragmatic policies in addressing
16 these demand-side drivers of street vending and use of the urban space, rather than
17 criminalising its actors.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43 ¹⁴ Sample employed by Iyenda (2005) and Huang *et al.*, (2017) to study Kinshasa and China
44 were 125 and 200 respondents respectively. Further, we found consistent responses to
45 common questions answered by all 600-respondents in support of the literature that the
46 Nigerian informal economy shares similarities with those of other West Africa countries
47 (Meagher and Yunusa, 1996).
48
49
50
51

52 ¹⁵ Although interviewees were generally suspicious that the state government sponsored the
53 survey, research administrators made extra efforts to refute this, hence the success of 160
54 correctly completed questionnaires.
55
56
57

58 ¹⁶ See methods section.
59
60

References

- Adedeji, J.A., Fadamiro, A.J., and Adeoye, A.O. 2014. Spatial implications of street trading in Osogbo Traditional City Centre, Nigeria. *Architecture Research*, 4(1A), 34–44.
- AFP (Agence-France-Presse), 2016. No hawking. No trading. Lagos bans street selling. The National, available@<https://www.thenational.ae/world/no-hawking-no-trading-lagos-bans-street-selling-1.169735?videoId=5688157736001>
- Anetor, F. 2015. An Investigation into the Value of Street Vending in Nigeria: A Case of Lagos State. *Journal of Marketing and Consumer Research*, 11, 35-41
- Asiedu, A.B. and Agyei-Mensah, S. 2008. Traders on the run: activities of street vendors in the Accra metropolitan area, Ghana. *Norwegian Journal of Geography*, 62(3), 191-202
- Basinski, S. 2009. All fingers are not equal: a report on street vendors in Lagos. CLEEN Foundation: Nigeria.
- Becker, K.F. 2004. The informal economy: Fact finding study. *SIDA*. http://www.sida.se/English/About-us/Publication_database
- Biles, J. 2009. Informal work in Latin America: Competing perspective and recent debates. *Geography Compass*, 3(1), 214-236.
- Bromley, R.D.F. and Mackie, P.K., 2009. Displacement and the new spaces for informal trade in the Latin American city centre. *Urban Studies*. 46(7), 1485–1506.
- Brown, A., Lyons, M. and Dankoco, I. 2010. Street traders and the emerging spaces for urban voice and citizenship in Africa cities. *Urban Studies*, 47(3), 666-663
- Cross, J. 2000. Street vendors, modernity and postmodernity: conflict and compromise in the global economy. *International Journal of Social Policy*, 20(1/2), 29-51

- 1
2
3 Crossa, V. 2016. Reading for difference on the street: De-homogenising street vending in Mexico City, *Urban*
4
5 *Studies*, 53(2), 287-301
6
7
8 Crossa, V., 2008. Resisting the entrepreneurial city: street vendors' struggle in Mexico City's historic center.
9
10 *Int. J. Urban and Regional Research*. 33(1), 43–63.
11
12
13 Culiberg, B. and Bajde, D. 2014. Do you need a receipt? Exploring consumer participation in consumption tax
14
15 evasion as an ethical dilemma, *Journal of Business Ethics*, 124, 271-282
16
17
18 De Soto, H. 1989. *The other path: The invisible revolution in the third world*. New York: HarperCollins Press.
19
20
21 Gandy, M. 2006. Planning, anti-planning and the infrastructure crisis facing metropolitan Lagos. *Urban*
22
23 *Studies*, 43(2), 371-396
24
25
26 Geer, J.G. 1991. Do Open-Ended Questions Measure 'Salient' Issues? *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 55(3), 360–
27
28 70.
29
30
31 Hanafi, A. 2018. Different ways Lagos hawkers trick motorists into buying fake products in traffic. *Punch*
32
33 *Newspapers*, available@[https://punchng.com/different-ways-lagos-hawkers-trick-motorists-into-](https://punchng.com/different-ways-lagos-hawkers-trick-motorists-into-buying-fake-products-in-traffic/)
34
35 [buying-fake-products-in-traffic/](https://punchng.com/different-ways-lagos-hawkers-trick-motorists-into-buying-fake-products-in-traffic/)
36
37
38 Hart, K., 1973. Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana. *Journal of Modern African*
39
40 *Studies*, 11(1), 61-89.
41
42
43 Huang, G., Zhang, H. and Xue, D. 2017. Beyond unemployment: informal employment and heterogeneous
44
45 motivations for participating in street vending in present-day China, *Urban Studies*, 55(12), 2743-
46
47 2761
48
49
50 Helhel, Y. & Ahmed, Y. 2014. Factors affecting tax attitude and tax compliance: a survey study in Yemen,
51
52 *EJBM*, 6(22), 48-58
53
54
55 Hyde, P. 2018. Loud and lonely on the streets – the life of a Lagos hawker.
56
57 available@[https://www.forbesafrica.com/economy/2018/04/16/loud-lonely-streets-life-lagos-](https://www.forbesafrica.com/economy/2018/04/16/loud-lonely-streets-life-lagos-hawker/)
58
59 [hawker/](https://www.forbesafrica.com/economy/2018/04/16/loud-lonely-streets-life-lagos-hawker/)
60

- 1
2
3 Igudia, E., Ackrill, R., Coleman, S. and Dobson, C. (2016) Determinants of the informal economy of an
4 emerging economy: a multiple indicator, multiple causes (MIMIC) approach. *International Journal of*
5 *Entrepreneurship and Small Business.* 28(2/3), 154-177
6
7
8
9
10 ILO, 1972. Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya.
11 Geneva, ILO.
12
13
14
15 Iyenda, G. 2005. Street enterprises, urban livelihoods and poverty in Kinshasa. *Environment & Urbanisation,*
16 *17(2), 55-67.*
17
18
19
20 Kharas, H., Hamel, K., and Hofer, M. 2018. Future development. The start of a new poverty narrative.
21 Brookings publications. Available@[https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/06/19/the-start-of-a-new-poverty-narrative/)
22 [development/2018/06/19/the-start-of-a-new-poverty-narrative/](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/06/19/the-start-of-a-new-poverty-narrative/)
23
24
25
26
27
28 Lawanson, T. and Omoegun, A. 2018. In transiting to Africa's model megacity...where is Lagos for everyday
29 people? Available@[https://ng.boell.org/2018/03/05/transiting-africa%E2%80%99s-model-megacity-](https://ng.boell.org/2018/03/05/transiting-africa%E2%80%99s-model-megacity-where-lagos-everyday-people)
30 [where-lagos-everyday-people](https://ng.boell.org/2018/03/05/transiting-africa%E2%80%99s-model-megacity-where-lagos-everyday-people)
31
32
33
34
35 Maloney, F. 2004. Informality Revisited. *World Development*, 24(10), 1611-1619.
36
37
38 Maneepong, C. and Walsh, J.C. 2013. A new generation of Bangkok street vendors: economic crisis as
39 opportunity and threat. *Cities*, 34, 37-43
40
41
42
43 Martinez, L., Short, J.R. and Estrada, D. 2017. The urban informal economy: street vendors in Cali, Colombia,
44 *Cities*, 66, 34-43
45
46
47
48 Meagher, K. and Yunusa, M. 1996. Passing the buck. Structural adjustment and the Nigerian informal sector.
49 *UNRISD Discussion Papers* 75.
50
51
52
53 Neuwirth, R. 2011. The Shadow Superpower.
54 Available@:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011.../black_market_global_economy
55
56
57
58 Onoduga, V.A., Ezeadichie, N.K., Onwuneme, C.A. and Anosika, A.E. 2016. The dilemma of managing the
59 challenges of street vending in public spaces: the case of Enugu city, Nigeria. *Cities*, 59, 95-101
60

- 1
2
3 Reddy, M., Naidu, V. and Mohanty, M. 2003. The urban informal sector in Fiji: results from a survey. *Fijian*
4
5 *Studies: A Journal of Contemporary Fiji*, 1(1), 127-154. ISSN1728-7456.
6
7
- 8 Reja, U., Manfreda, K.L., Hlebec, V. and Vehovar, V. 2003. Open-ended vs. close-ended questions in web
9
10 questionnaires. *Development in Applied Statistics*, 19, 159-177
11
12
- 13 Roever, S. and Skinner, C. 2016. Street vendors and cities. *Environment and Urbanisation*, 28(2), 359-374.
14
15 <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0956247816653898>
16
17
- 18 Round, J. and Williams, C. 2008. Everyday tactics and spaces of power: The role of informal economy in
19
20 post-Soviet Ukraine. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 9(2), 171-185.
21
22
- 23 Schneider, F., Braithwaite, V. and Reinhart, M. 2001. Individual behaviour in Australia's shadow economy:
24
25 facts, empirical findings and some mysteries. *Working Paper 19*, Australian National University.
26
27
- 28 Scott, J.C., 1998. Seeing like a State: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. Yale
29
30 University Press, New Haven.
31
32
- 33 Skinner, C. 2008. Street trade in Africa: a review. *WIEGO WP 5*, women in informal employment globalizing
34
35 and organisation
36
37
- 38 Sookram, S. and Watson, P.K. 2008. Small-business participation in informal sector of an emerging economy.
39
40 *Journal of Development Studies*, 44(10), 1531-1553
41
42
- 43 Swanson, K. 2007. Revanchist urbanism heads south: the regulation of indigenous beggars and street vendors
44
45 in Ecuador. *Antipode*, 39(4), 708-728.
46
47
- 48 The Guardian, 2016. From hawkers to criminals: how the Lagos ban on street selling hurts the city.
49
50 available@ [https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/aug/03/hawkers-criminals-lagos-ban-street-](https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/aug/03/hawkers-criminals-lagos-ban-street-selling)
51
52 [selling](https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/aug/03/hawkers-criminals-lagos-ban-street-selling)
53
54
- 55 Tibaijuka, A. 2005. Report of the fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and impact of
56
57 operation Murambatsvina by the UN special envoy on human settlements issues in Zimbabwe.
58
59 www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Zimbabwe/Zimbabwe_rpt.pdf
60

- 1
2
3 Trivedi, V.U., Shehata, M. and Lynn, B. 2003. Impact of personal and situational factors on taxpayer
4 compliance: an experimental analysis. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 47, 175-197.
5
6
7
8 Verick, S., 2006. The Impact of Globalisation on the Informal Sector in Africa. Conference Papers, available:
9
10 www.iza.org/conference_files/worldb2006/
11
12
13 Whitson, R. 2007. Hidden struggles: spaces of power and resistance in informal work in urban Argentina.
14
15 *Environment and Planning A*, 19(10), 2916-2934
16
17
18 Williams, C. and Nadin, S. 2010. Entrepreneurship and the informal economy: an overview. *Journal of*
19
20 *Development Entrepreneurship*, 15(4), 361-378
21
22
23 Williams, C.C. and Martinez, A. 2014. Entrepreneurship in the informal economy. a product of too much or
24
25 too little state intervention? *Entrepreneurship and innovation*, 15(4), 227-237
26
27
28 Williams, C.C. and Martinez-Perez, A. 2014. Why do consumers purchase goods and services in the informal
29
30 economy? *Journal of Business Ethics*, 67(5), 802-806.
31
32
33 Wongtada, N. 2014. Street vending phenomena: a literature review and research agenda. *Thunderbird*
34
35 *International Business Review*, 56(1), 55-75
36
37
38 World Bank, 2018. Open data. Nigeria. Available@<https://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria>
39
40
41 WPC (world poverty clock), 2018. Nigeria. Available@<https://worldpoverty.io/>
42
43
44 Xue, D. and Huang, G. 2015. Informality and the state's ambivalence in the regulation of street vending in
45
46 transforming Guangzhou, China. *Geoforum*, 62, 156-165
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Tables

Table 1. Reliability analysis

| | | Number of variables | Cronbach α |
|---|---|---------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | Reliability test for dichotomous variables | 10 | 0.858 |
| 2 | Reliability test for Likert-scale variables | 10 | 0.712 |

Table 2. Respondents' demographics and some important descriptive statistics

| Item | % of Total (N=160) |
|--|--------------------|
| Gender: | |
| Male | 51.3 |
| Female | 48.8 |
| Age: | |
| 16-25 | 14.4 |
| 26-30 | 37.5 |
| 31-35 | 19.4 |
| 36-40 | 13.8 |
| 41-64 | 15.0 |
| Mean: 32; Std. Deviation: 7.5; Mode, Median: 30 | |
| Education: | |
| Non (no formal education) | 12.5 |
| SSE (Senior School Education) | 40.6 |
| HND/OND /NCE* | 25.6 |
| BSc/Degree | 21.3 |
| Employment status: | |
| Employed + run own-business | 13.2 |
| Private/government employee | 18.2 |
| Fully self-employed | 49.7 |
| Don't know | 18.9 |
| Main job/business activity: | |
| Home/pure service | 41.3 |
| Sales/trader | 36.4 |
| Professionals | 22.4 |
| Involved in supply-side street hawking by main job/business activity | |
| Home/pure service | 74.1 |
| Sales/trader | 76.9 |
| Professionals | 34.4 |

Note: *HND: Higher national diploma, OND: ordinary National Diploma, NCE: National Certificate in Education; N: total responses.

Table 3. Respondents reasons for patronising street vendors in Nigeria

| Motive: | % of total |
|---|------------|
| Social redistributive rationale (help hawkers, networking/win customers) | 9.9 |
| Financial gains (cheaper/better than shop, save expenses/less cost) | 12.5 |
| Multifeature (only job known/survival, get quick/reliable money/income, easy sales) | 24.3 |
| Formal economy (accessible, reliable, save time) | 53.3 |

Note: total responses (N): 160; respondents cited words in parenthesis

Table 4. Multinomial logistic model results: motives of street vending & attributes

| Attributes | Rationale | Coefficient @ different reference categories | | | |
|--|-----------|--|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | SR | FG | MF | FEF |
| Gender: Female | SR | 0 | 49.86(.995) | 50.7(.99) | 50(0.993) |
| | FG | -49.86(.99) | 0 | 0.8(.42) | - |
| | MF | -50.7(.99) | -.84(.42) | 0 | 39(0.996) |
| | FEF | -50.6(.99) | -0.7(.49) | .14(.87) | -0.14(.87) |
| | | | | | 0 |
| Marital status: Married | SR | 0 | -38.1(.995) | -36.2(.995) | - |
| | FG | 38.1(.995) | 0 | 1.85(.062) | 35(0.995) |
| | MF | 36.2(.995) | -1.85(.062) | 0 | 2.63(.013) |
| | FEF | 35.4(.995) | -2.63(.013) | -.77(.37) | 0.77(.37) |
| | | | | | 0 |
| Education level: SSE & below | SR | 0 | 16.94(.995) | 35.1(.99) | 36(0.99) |
| | FG | -16.9(.998) | 0 | 18.2(.998) | 19.6(.998) |
| | MF | -18.7(.000) ^a | -16.8(.000) ^a | 0 | 1.43(.36) |
| | FEF | -36.6(.99) | -19.6(.000) | -1.4(.36) | 0 |
| Hawkers are poor, disadvantaged: (Disagreed) | SR | 0 | -34.9(.99) | -33.7(.99) | -36(0.99) |
| | FG | 34.94(.99) | 0 | 1.2(.36) | - |
| | MF | 33.7(.99) | -1.21(.36) | 0 | 1.68(.198) |
| | FEF | 36.6(.99) | 1.68(.198) | 2.89(.011) | - |
| | | | | | 2.89(.011) |
| | | | | | 0 |
| Hawking helpful to hawkers: (Disagreed) | SR | 0 | 18.3(.995) | 15.9(.996) | 19(0.995) |
| | FG | - | 0 | -2.4(.054) | 0.74(.56) |
| | MF | 18.35(.995) | 2.4(.054) | 0 | 3.14(.004) |
| | FEF | -15.9(.996) | -0.74(.56) | -3.14(.004) | 0 |
| | | | | | -19.1(.995) |
| Hawkers pay no tax: (Disagreed) | SR | 0 | -20.1(.000) | -0.5(.79) | 0.5(0.79) |
| | FG | 20.1[.000] | 0 | 19.6[.000] | 20.6[.000] |
| | MF | 0.54(.79) | - | 0 | 1.04(.26) |
| | FEF | -0.5(.79) | 19.59(.000) | -1.04(.257) | 0 |
| | | | | | -20.6[.000] |
| Hawkers pay multiple fees: (Disagreed) | SR | 0 | 20.5(.998) | 2.57(.28) | - |
| | FG | -20.5(.998) | 0 | -17.9(.998) | 0.68(0.72) |
| | MF | -2.57(.28) | 17.94(.998) | 0 | - |
| | FEF | .068(.72) | 21.2(.998) | 3.25(.026) | 21.2(.998) |
| | | | | | - |
| | | | | | 3.25(.026) |
| | | | | | 0 |
| Government overregulates, disturbs hawkers: (Disagreed) | SR | 0 | 65.2(.996) | 70.5(.995) | 50(0.99) |
| | FG | -65.2[.000] | 0 | 5.3[.000] | - |
| | MF | -70.1[.000] | -5.31[.005] | 0 | 15.3[.000] |
| | FEF | -49.87(.99) | 15.3(.999) | 20.59(.998) | - |
| | | | | | 20.6[.000] |
| | | | | | 0 |
| Likelihood Ratio | | 75.8*** | | | |
| Chi-Square | | 114.49*** | | | |
| Pseudo R-Square (Nalckerke): | | 0.80 | | | |

Note: ***, **, & * means 1%, 5%, & 10% levels of significance; p-values in parenthesis; standard errors in [] parenthesis; ^a = educlevel(1); SSE: secondary school education; SR: social redistributive; FG: financial gains, MF: multifeature; FEF: formal economy failures

Table 5. Difference between the rationale of street vending and their attributes

| | Formal Econom y | Social Redistributi ve | Financial Gains | Multifeatu re |
|---|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Marital status | Single | n.s. | Married | Single |
| Education level | Top- level | Mid-level | Lowest level/none | Top-level |
| Perception 1: SH do not pay tax | Agreed | Agreed | n.s. | Agreed |
| Perception 2: SH pay multiple fees | Disagree d | n.s. | Agreed | Agreed |
| Perception 3: SH are poor, disadvantaged | Disagree d | n.s. | n.s. | Agreed |
| Perception 4: SHng helps vendors to escape poverty | Agreed | n.s. | Agreed | Agreed |

Note: SH: street vendors; SHng: street hawking; n.s.: statistically non-significant.

Appendix

Table A shows results of the factors that further explain motives for street vending, with Agreed being the dummy, whilst Disagreed is redundant for perception variables

Table A: multinomial logistic model results: rationale of street vending & attributes

| Attributes | Rational e | Coefficient @ different reference categories | | | |
|---|---------------|--|------------|------------|------------|
| | | SR | FG | MF | FEF |
| Marital status: | SR | | | | |
| Married | FG | | | 1.68(.097) | 2.05(.059) |
| | MF | | - | | |
| | FEF | | 1.68(.097) | | |
| | | | - | | |
| | | | 2.05(.059) | | |
| Hawkers are poor, disadvantaged: (Agreed) | SR | | | | |
| | FG | | | | 3.48(.031) |
| | MF | | | | 3.9(.004) |
| | FEF | | - | -3.9(.004) | |
| | | | 3.48(.031) | | |
| Hawking helpful to hawkers: (Agreed) | SR | | | | |
| | FG | | | | |
| | MF | | | | - |
| | FEF | | | 3.69(.003) | 3.69(.003) |
| Likelihood Ratio | | 68.97*** | | | |
| Chi-Square | | 178.69*** | | | |
| Pseudo R-Square (Nalckerke): | | 0.81 | | | |

Note: only statistically significant results are included; *** means 1% levels of significance; p-values in parenthesis; SSE: secondary school education; SR, FG, MF, FEF, as earlier defined.

Extended appendix

NOTE: the following extended appendix has been added at the request of the referees to aid the review process. However, in order not to exceed the 8500-word limit, the author does not think it should be added to the final version of this paper, except if there is a way of publishing it as a separate document online.

First, it is important to reiterate that the measures/variables analysed in this study were chosen on the basis of existing literature/theory. Specifically, H1-H3 were adopted from Williams and Martinez-Perez (2014), and H4-H7 were adopted from Sookram and Watson (2008), with Culiberg and Bajde (2014) also having a major influence on these choices. However, we still conducted the Cronbach test for additional comfort, with the results depicted in Tables EA1 and EA2. The former depicts results for dichotomous variables; the latter for continuous variables. However, as the attached questionnaire shows, there are over 20 questions in total, with many seeking confirmation of an earlier question. It was designed this way to check if respondents were consistent in their responses.

Cronbach results:

Table EA1: Reliability analysis for dichotomous variables

| Cronbach reliability coefficient (α) = 0.858 | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Variables | Correlated item-total correlation | Cronbach α if item deleted |
| Gender | .04 | .888 |
| Marital status | -.045 | .894 |
| Have you previously worked (or currently work) in the public service? | .639 | .840 |
| Are you employed on the basis of a written contract or agreement? | .636 | .839 |
| Does your employer pay contributions to the pension funds for you? | .872 | .824 |
| Do you benefit from paid annual leave or from compensation instead of it? | .849 | .824 |
| In case of incapacity to work due to health reasons, would you benefit from paid or sick leave? | .881 | .822 |

| | | |
|--|------|------|
| In case of birth of a child, would you be given the opportunity to benefit from maternity leave? | .872 | .824 |
| Unless it is a fault of yours, could you be dismissed by your employer without advance notice? | .783 | .83 |
| Has the ban on street hawking in Lagos affected you? | .375 | .861 |

Table EA2: Reliability analysis for likert-scale variables

| Cronbach reliability coefficient (α) = 0.712 | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Variables | Correlated item-total correlation | Cronbach α if item deleted |
| Street hawkers are poor because they are disadvantaged | .186 | .736 |
| Street hawking helps people that are poor to overcome poverty | .559 | .658 |
| Street hawkers do not pay tax [#] | | |
| Street hawkers pay multiple fees for tickets to operate | .452 | .675 |
| Government disturbance & regulation of street hawkers is too much | .443 | .679 |
| Before they can operate, street hawkers are compelled to give bribe to some-law enforcement agents | .411 | .684 |
| It is very risky for government taskforce to finds people hawking | .205 | .715 |
| There is no government support for street hawkers/hawking | .327 | .697 |
| Government should support street hawking as it is helpful to Lagosians | .303 | .700 |
| Street hawkers sell/(render) essential goods/(services) | .649 | .637 |
| Street hawkers provide convenient goods and services to customer | .270 | .704 |

[#] - included based on theory & evidence from literature

EA3: Research questionnaire

Research questionnaire: This research aims to find out about street hawkers and why people patronise (buy from) them.

YOUR CODE NUMBER:

To ensure your anonymity we do NOT ask for your name but encourage you to choose for yourself a CODE number. Please keep a record of it as part of your right to withdraw. Please answer the questions that follow truthfully as nobody will be able to identify you in any way from your answers.

Focus of the research: we would like you to complete this questionnaire if any of the following describes you/your business (please circle the one/s applicable to you):

1. I use services (e.g., electrical appliances and mobile phone repairs, shoe repairs, etc) provided by one-man or small businesses
2. I have bought (or would buy) a good or service from hawkers or one-man or small-family businesses
3. I buy water, snacks (e.g., gala, groundnut), clothes, recharge cards, books, tapes/CDs etc from street hawkers or vendors under umbrella stand
4. I buy food from local restaurant, food joints, mama-put, street food-hawkers

Special Note:

- A. When I say rank your options, please indicate the order of importance of the options you have taken, starting from one (1) as the most important/strongest
- B. A street hawker – this is anybody that sells anything on the street, whether on wheelbarrow, on tray, in/by hands, in a car, using bicycles etc

Code number:

| Please specify your: | | |
|----------------------|---|--|
| 1 | Age | |
| 2 | Gender | |
| 3 | Marital Status | |
| 4 | State of origin | |
| 5 | Religion | |
| 6 | Please write what you do as main job/business | |

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| 7 | Write what you do as second job/business (if applicable) | |
| 8 | Why do you have a second job/activity? (if applicable) | |
| 9 | What is your level of education? | |

10 Please tick the one that best describes your employment status (tick only one pls):

I work for government, but also have my business[] I work for a private company, but also have my business[] I only work for a private company[] I only work for government[] I am fully self-employed, run my business[]

11 What year did you start this work/business? Please specify.....

12 What type of location do you usually carry out your work or business? (if more than one option applies, please rank as 1=mostly, followed by 2, 3 ...)

No fixed location/on the street[] mobile-Car/bus[] office[] own home[] business premises[] construction site[] workshop[] factory[] shop/kiosk[] street stall[] client's home/workplace[] market/bazaar stall[] footpath/street corner[]

13 How often do you receive income or salary or money from your main work?

Daily[] Weekly[] bi-monthly[] Monthly[] Anytime activity/job is done[] Never[]

13A. Table: money earned - please fill only relevant column – day, week or month

| | On the average, how much: | Per Day Naira | Per Week Naira | Per Month Naira |
|------|---------------------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|
| 13a1 | Total revenue earned | | | |
| 13a2 | Total expenses | | | |
| 13a3 | Total income earned | | | |
| 13a4 | Total money saved | | | |

14. What proportion of your total income is earned from your main work?

All (about 100%)[] about 75%[] about 50%[] about 25%[] none[]

14B. What is the source of your other income? Specify (if applicable).....

Please tick Yes or No for each of questions 15-17

| | | Yes | No. |
|----|--|-----|-----|
| 15 | Has the ban on street hawking in Lagos affected you? | | |
| 16 | Have you ever been involved in street hawking (i.e., sell as street hawker)? | | |
| 17 | Have you ever bought anything from a street hawker? | | |

18 Why did (do) you patronise street hawkers?

19 Please list three bad things about street hawkers/hawking in Lagos

a.....b.....c.....

20 Please list three good things about street hawkers/hawking: a.....

b..... c.....

Please tick Yes or No for each of questions 21-32

| | | Yes | No. |
|----|--|-----|-----|
| 21 | Do you work full time or run your business full time? | | |
| 22 | Is your job or business activity seasonal | | |
| 23 | Have you received any training on doing this job/running this business? | | |
| 24 | Have you previously worked (or currently work) in the public service? | | |
| 25 | Are you employed on the basis of a written contract or agreement? | | |
| 26 | Does your employer pay contributions to the pension funds for you? | | |
| 27 | Do you benefit from paid annual leave or from compensation instead of it? | | |
| 28 | In case of incapacity to work due to health reasons, would you benefit from paid or sick leave? | | |
| 29 | In case of birth of a child, would you be given the opportunity to benefit from maternity leave? | | |
| 30 | Unless it is a fault of yours, could you be dismissed by your employer without advance notice? | | |
| 31 | In case of dismissal, would you receive the benefits and compensation specified in the labour legislation? | | |

| | | | |
|----|--|--|--|
| 32 | Do you belong to a professional body or labour union in your domain of work or business? | | |
|----|--|--|--|

33 If you belong to a union/professional body, for which of these does the body help you? (if more than one option applies, please rank as 1=mostly, followed by 2, 3 ...)

Training[] access to loans[] linkages with government[] interactions with employees/employer[] professional advancement[] none[] not applicable[] other, specify.....

Please find the key to the table below: SA = strongly agree; A = agree; N = neither agree nor disagree; D = disagree; SD = strongly disagree. Please the one that best represents your view

| | | SA | A | N | D | SD |
|----|--|----|---|---|---|----|
| 34 | Street hawkers are poor because they are disadvantaged | | | | | |
| 35 | Street hawking helps people that are poor to overcome poverty | | | | | |
| 36 | If there are good jobs for people, street hawking would end | | | | | |
| 37 | Government should discourage street hawking as it is harmful to the economy | | | | | |
| 38 | Street hawkers do not pay tax | | | | | |
| 39 | Street hawkers pay multiple fees for tickets to operate | | | | | |
| 40 | Government disturbance & regulation of street hawkers is too much | | | | | |
| 41 | Before they can operate, street hawkers are compelled to give bribe to some-law enforcement agents | | | | | |
| 42 | It is very risky for government taskforce to finds people hawking | | | | | |
| 43 | There is no government support for street hawkers/hawking | | | | | |
| 44 | Government should support street hawking as it is helpful to Lagosians | | | | | |
| 45 | Street hawkers sell/(render) essential goods/(services) | | | | | |
| 46 | Street hawkers provide convenient goods and services to customer | | | | | |
| 47 | Street hawkers provide unique and cheap goods and services | | | | | |
| 48 | Despite ban on hawkers in Lagos, street hawking is still prevalent | | | | | |
| 49 | Street hawkers sell fake goods and services | | | | | |
| 50 | Government's policy to ban street hawking in Lagos is good | | | | | |

| | | | |
|---|----|---|------------------|
| 1 2 3 4 5 | 51 | What is the biggest challenge faced by street hawkers in Lagos | |
| 6 7 8 | 52 | Which government agency or agents disturb (regulates) street hawkers? | |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | 53 | Please write two important contributions you think street hawkers/hawking make to Lagos economy | 1..... 2..... |
| 17 18 19 20 | 54 | Why do you think government has banned street hawkers/hawking in Lagos? | |
| 21 22 23 24 25 | 55 | What next do you think government should do about street hawking/hawkers? | 1..... 2..... |

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

THANK YOU