Freee produces manifestos and holds group readings of manifestos with the aim of generating discussion. Participants are requested to read the given text and make their own minds up about what they believe. When present at the group reading, the participants only read out the words of the manifesto they agree with. The reading then becomes a collective process in which individuals publicly agree, as well as disagree, and declare their commitment to Freee’s manifesto. While the use of a specific text by Freee is a given, the text itself can be used and reworked by those who read it to formulate their own opinions, just in the same way Freee has reworked it from the original. Freee acknowledges that ideas are developed collectively through the exchange of opinion. In this way, Freee offers a text that they produced but one that then becomes the basis for further critical thinking.

The content of Freee’s manifestos are an explicit call for the transformation of art and society and Freee readily takes and uses existing historical manifestos, speeches and revolutionary documents, such as *The Manifesto for a New Public* (2012) based on Vladimir Tatlin’s *The Initiative Individual in the Creativity of the Collective* (1919), the UNOVIS, Program for the Academy at Vitebsk (1920) and the Freee Art Collective Manifesto for a Counter-Hegemonic Art, based on the *Communist Manifesto* by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848).
Economists are Wrong

Is art an economic activity? Should art be independent of economic pressures? Is the value of art to be determined separately from its value as a commodity? Can we apply the Marxist labour theory of value to art? To consider the question of value in art from a Marxist perspective is, on the face of it, to invoke two kinds of philistinism. Marx tells us that value is twofold, with use-value and exchange-value forming a contradictory unity of value. There is no third kind of value. So, if art is supposed to be useless and priceless, how can a Marxist engage seriously with art with only use-value and exchange-value as tools?

Art and Labour

When an economist says a ‘work of art often arrives on the market because of one of the famous ‘three D’s’ (divorce, death, or debt)’, it is clear that cultural economics places its emphasis on consumption and the secondary market. From a Marxist point of view, it is utterly absurd for a product to ‘arrive’ on the market without being produced. Even if we could press the economist to start an economic analysis of art with its arrival for sale on the primary market, we would have arrived too late. No Marxist could knowingly subscribe to such a belated economic analysis. Artworks themselves cannot be a given, as it is for mainstream economics, but must be identified as the object of economic analysis.

Errors are made by not knowing what precisely Marx’s labour theory of value sets out to explain. Andrew Kliman tells us, ‘Marx’s value theory […] pertains exclusively to commodity production, that is, to cases in which goods and services are ‘produced for the purpose of being exchanged’, or equivalently, produced as commodities’. This is important for a Marxist economic analysis of art because, as he goes on to say, ‘if the products have been produced for a different purpose, that of satisfying the producers’ and others’ needs and wants, they have not been produced as commodities’. Kliman explains:

a key reason for distinguishing between commodity production and non-commodity production is that prices or rates of exchange are determined differently in the two cases. When things are not produced as commodities, the rates at which they exchange may depend exclusively upon the demand
Economists Are Wrong!

for them, or upon normative considerations, or [...] upon customary rules. It is only when products are produced for the purpose of being exchanged that their costs of production become significant determinants of their prices.

Not all production is commodity production. Not all production is production for financial exchange. Not all production is determined by supply and demand. Economics is not the best method of examining non-economic production. Economists give artists bad advice.

If artists increase and decrease production according to demand and alter the production of their work according to market preferences (e.g. halting production of this version of their work and expanding production of that version of their work), they must be in the business of producing commodities. At the same time, of course, we must insist that if artists do not increase and decrease production according to demand and do not alter the production of their work according to the preferences of the market, then they are demonstrably not in the business of producing commodities. If art is produced as a commodity, that is to say produced for the purpose of being exchanged, then it is the kind of product that Marxist economics explains. If art is not produced as a commodity, but rather to satisfy aesthetic and cultural needs and wants, then it is not. There is no shortcut to this kind of economic examination, no general rule, no standard economics of art in the age of consumerism, or the changing economic status of the artwork in the society of the spectacle. We can look at art’s apparent commodification only by asking on a case by case basis whether, as Kliman puts it, ‘their costs of production become significant determinants of their prices.’

Mainstream economists will argue that the labour theory of value is mistaken. This is partly based on the fact that mainstream economists are not interested in the source of value at all (they have no alternative explanation to the Marxist argument). It is also partly based on the fact that mainstream economics takes for granted the key elements of capitalism (supply and demand, prices, profit, wages, etc.), whereas Marxism calls all these into question. Marxism shows us the limits of economic thought and the limits of a social system based on market forces. Marx was right. Capitalism inexorably leads to crisis. Economists tell us, on the contrary, that supply and demand is a self-correcting mechanism.
Economists are fucking wrong!

Following the labour theory of value, we would expect to determine whether art is produced as a commodity from an analysis of artistic production, not by examining the behaviour of its consumers or its systems of distribution and display. If we find that art production does not correspond to the model of commodity production, then no matter how art is subsequently brought into the circulation systems of capitalism, *art is not converted into a commodity in its consumption*. The labour theory of value proceeds from the value of labour, so we need to ask whether the price of artworks are determined by the value of the labour in their production.

The labour theory of value, which explains how value is produced within capitalism, states that *labour* is the source of value. This value is then broken down into three types: the transfer of value, absolute surplus value and relative surplus value. Machines, for instance, transfer their value to the product; labour-power produces absolute surplus value, that is to say, value on top of the wages paid for it. Relative surplus value is produced by the division of labour, automation and so forth, which through increases in productivity and efficiency do not produce value in itself but increases the proportion of surplus-labour in relation to wages.

We can test the question of the price of artworks as determined or not by the cost of labour in production by observing the means of production. In capitalist commodity production, capitalists increase absolute surplus-labour (and thereby surplus value) by attempting to extend the working day, the working week, the numbers of days worked in the year, and the number of years worked in a worker’s life. Second, capitalists increase relative surplus value through the use of technology and supervision, which play an effective part in driving down labour costs through the division of labour, deskilling and increasing productivity.

If the price of artwork is set by the labour that goes into it, then we would expect that the prices of artworks would vary according to the average labour that goes into producing them. When the price of an artist’s work goes up, this is not because the labour producing it has gone up, that the assistants have managed to have their wages increased or their hours reduced. Also, when the price of an artist’s work drops, this is not due to the efficiencies of competitors in the market who have managed to lower their production
costs. No, the prices of artworks does not fluctuate according to the cost of labour, technological efficiencies, or increases in productivity. Art prices are not determined by ‘socially necessary labour-time’. Mainstream economists might argue that art’s high prices disprove the Marxist labour theory of value, but what is shown here is that art is typically not produced as a commodity governed by supply and demand.

Of course, assistants are wage-labourers. But this, in itself, is not proof that artists generate surplus value from them. If assistants do not produce surplus value then they are to be regarded as luxuries, like domestic servants in the nineteenth century. Marx derived the distinction between productive and unproductive labour from Adam Smith. Smith’s definition of unproductive labour still stands today: *labour not exchanged with capital but directly exchanged with revenue*. There is no such thing as productive or unproductive labour in itself. The difference is between labour that produces profits and labour that consumes revenue. In the 19th century, this distinction was clearly illustrated with the contrasting ways in which the capitalist paid two kinds of wages: one to the workers in a business enterprise and the other to domestic servants in their homes. The former was productive because it produced surplus-labour and the latter unproductive because it used up revenue. Another, clearer, way of understanding the distinction between productive and unproductive labour is to examine whether the capitalist or the labourer owns that labour.

If we retain our focus on artistic labour, rather than its products, the test of Smith’s definition of unproductive labour provides clear results. Is artistic labour exchanged with capital or directly exchanged with revenue? Since artists are not wage-labourers employed by capitalists, but own their means of production as well as the products that they produce, we are forced to conclude that *artistic labour is unproductive labour* even if certain capitalists, such as gallerists, dealers and, later in the process, investors, earn a profit from trade in the *products* of artistic labour.

Normally, unproductive labour does not produce products that are luxury goods; normally the unproductive labour is the luxury good itself. Art isn’t usually unproductive labour that is not a luxury in itself but produces luxuries without first producing commodities. Studio assistants are wage-labourers, but if they are unproductive labourers, like domestic servants, then they do not produce surplus value.
Yet, if the value of labour does not determine the price of artworks, what does? The variations of price of an artwork are not due to underpaying or overpaying in relation to the actual value, nor is it due to an increase or decrease in the average cost of the means of production. A collector does not pay less than the value of a work by a young artist only to realise its true value once they become a mature artist. Both the relatively cheap price and the relatively expensive price are the true value of the work at two different points in time. Art appreciates. However, while investments normally appreciate because a firm for which one owns shares is profitable, or is perceived to be so – that is to say, by drawing on or anticipating the production of surplus value in production – this is not the case in the appreciation of artworks. The relative cheapness of a work by a lesser known artist or ‘early work’ is based on the risk that the artist will never develop a significant career; the relative expensiveness of the same work later on is based on the subsequent rarity of ‘early work’ and the price of the mature work, which retrospectively sets the pace for prices of earlier works. Just as skilled workers are paid more than unskilled workers because this kind of labour costs more to reproduce, the cost of reproducing a successful, mature, reputable, established artist with hundreds of important exhibitions and a bibliography to match is expressed in the price of their works.

However, this explanation, which can be found partly in Diederichsen, presents an immediate difficulty, which Diederichsen misses. The reputation of an artist is not a quality that is contained in their labour, is not produced by them, and is not under their control. The reputation of an artist is ascribed to their work by others. So, if we are to explain the high prices of artworks in terms of the reproduction of labour-power that produces them, we need to consider the labour-power of those who contribute to the value of the work’s reputation, namely art critics, theorists, curators and art historians.

**Formal and Real Subsumption**

How might we test, from a Marxist point of view, the common complaint that art has been incorporated into capitalism?

Marx’s distinction between *formal* and *real subsumption* is part of his explanation of the incorporation and transformation of particular spheres of production by the capitalist mode of production. We must remind ourselves
that Marx did not theorise the subsumption of commodities. For Marx, the incorporation and transformation of spheres of production occurs with the formal and real subsumption of labour.

The formal subsumption of labour takes place when the capitalist takes financial control of production – owning the means of production, paying wages for labour-power, extracting surplus labour and surplus value. Before production a market relation is established between the capitalist as a purchaser of labour and the worker as a seller of labour, and within production these same individuals are put in a conflictual relation with each other in which the capitalist struggles against the workers to extend the working day, increase productivity and so forth, while the workers struggle against the capitalist to reduce the working day, improve working conditions and so on.

The real subsumption of labour goes further than this, establishing a capitalist mode of production with the division of labour, the employment of machinery, the centralisation and intensification of production on a large-scale and the transformation of the production process into a conscious application of science and technology. In short, everything that is implied with the idea of industrialisation. Formal subsumption is presupposed by the real subsumption of labour, but only the latter can be described in terms of what Marx calls the continual revolution of the means of production and relations of production in capitalism.

In order to determine whether artistic labour has been subsumed, we need to ask ourselves, therefore, two questions. First, whether artistic labour has been converted into wage-labour, and second, whether the production of art has been transformed by the processes of industrialisation. The producers of art still own their means of production. Unlike in the capitalist mode of production, the product of the production of art is invariably owned by its producer. Artists have not been converted into wage-labourers, employed by a capitalist. Gallerists have nothing to gain from extending the working day of artists and technological developments are not implemented to increase productivity. The gallerist does not establish a relationship with the artist along the lines of the capitalist-worker relationship. There is no labour market separate from the market for artworks produced by artistic labour. Dealers do not employ artists. In addition, since no gallerist takes ownership of the means of production for art or engage individual artists to operate those
means of production, consequently the gallerist, unlike the capitalist, does not own the product. The gallerist enters the marketplace of art with capital and leaves the marketplace with profit, but they do this without formally subsuming artistic labour under capital, but by converting commodity-capital (artworks) into money-capital. This is why there can be no real subsumption of art.

Wake up to the fact: the subsumption of labour can only take place with productive labour, i.e. with labour that is capable of producing surplus value directly for the capitalist.

**The Mainstream Economics of Art**

Hans Abbing proposes that art is economically exceptional because it is ‘sacred’. Abbing says talking about money in relation to art is ‘taboo’: ‘profit motives are not absent, they are merely veiled, and publicly the economic aspect of art is denied’. The reference to taboo is a deliberate strategy to associate the uneconomic in art with irrationality. When he recounts the values of the art community, he frames them in terms of ‘myth’, ‘taboo’, ‘ritual’ and ‘the sacred’. He is convinced of the rationality of the economic, while subscribing to the idea that the arts promote an alternative ‘value system’, ‘the gift sphere’ or ‘the gift economy’, an idea that he derives from the abstruse anthropological ideas of Lewis Hyde. The concept of the ‘gift economy’ allows Abbing to register these so-called irrational values without them coming into conflict with economics and economic value. In fact, this apparent irrationality is a cover for economics. In art, he says, ‘anti-market behaviour can be profitable’. Economic value trumps the values of art every time. This is the precise opposite of the Marxist critique of political economy. From a Marxist point of view (i.e. the critique of political economy), art’s antagonism to economics is not a ‘taboo’ but a clear-headed defence of art’s value from its dangerous liaison with sales, markets and business. Abbing’s economics of art alerts us to the controversial encounter between the values of art and economic value, but it does not analyse this antagonism as an instance of the abiding contradictions of capitalism itself.

Mainstream economics has been developing what it calls Cultural Economics for several decades. From 1966 onwards, with Baumol and Bowen’s pioneering work on the ‘economic dilemma’ of the performing arts,
mainstream economists have increasingly come to think of art as an almost standard economic sector.

If you insist that art is an economic activity like any other, then tell us: is the artist part of the proletariat, producing value through labour, or is the artist the capitalist or entrepreneur who makes artworks specifically for sale, advancing capital to pay the wages of assistants from which the artist makes profit?

The debates on the funding of the arts from the late 1960s through to the 1980s, between Baumol and Bowen, Richard Musgrave, Alan Peacock, William Grampp, Gary Becker, David Throsby and others, has followed a clear pattern in which the case for the public funding for the arts was increasingly shot down by the case against subsidies. We are now feeling the full force of this theoretical shift in the cuts to the arts. In this period, arguments have been presented for art to be regarded as a Veblen good, a luxury good, a public good, a merit good and an information good, among others. The debate has narrowed severely in recent years, resulting in the apparent victory of a neoliberal agenda for the arts. ‘Despite the special position that art occupies in the fabric and culture of societies,’ Clare MacAndrew says,

the reality is that art is produced, bought, and sold by individuals and institutions working within an economic framework inescapable from material and market constraints. The economic case is clear: the market for works of art functions at least as well as many others (albeit imperfectly and with certain special features), as it allows market transactions by voluntary consent, in which buyers and sellers mutually benefit.

It is interesting to note that economists do not agree what kind of good art is. The question of whether art is a public good keeps resurfacing despite neoliberal economists’ best efforts. The persistence of the question has sound economic grounds. Technically speaking, a public good is a good that is non-rival and non-excludable, i.e. that the consumption of it by one person does not prevent others from consuming it and that nobody can be excluded from consuming it. This seems to fit certain patterns of ‘consuming’ artworks (viewing them in galleries, museums, reading about them in books and magazines in libraries, online etc.) but does not adequately account for artworks ‘consumed’ as singular or unique objects by collectors and investors. In some respects, artworks also exhibit the characteristics of information goods,
and in other respects they exhibit the characteristics of a \textit{Veblen good}. On the other end of the scale, Richard Musgrave includes art among his list of \textit{merit goods} – i.e. products that individuals ought to have regardless of their ability to pay for them. As such, for most of us, artworks are distributed and displayed as public goods, not commodities.

It is rare – perhaps unique to art – for a product to have all these economic properties. Art does not belong to one category of good alone. Even the most expensive artwork exists within several distinct economic categories. This means that it is impossible to prevent art from spilling out of these economic categories, even when it seems to be exemplary of that category. This is the case in the relationship between art and luxury goods.

\textbf{Art and the Economics of Luxury Goods}

In mainstream economics, a luxury good is a good for which \textit{demand increases more than proportionally as income rises}. What this refers to is the fact that even if the wealthy buy more expensive and higher quality bread, cheese and other necessities, they do not increase their consumption of bread and cheese \textit{proportionally} to their relative wealth; their consumption of sports cars and designer clothing increases at a greater rate, becoming an increasingly large proportion of their expenditure. The formula seems sound enough, but it leaves out two entire branches of commodities that are not luxuries but which increase more than proportionally as income rises: firstly financial goods (investments, bonds, shares, etc.), and secondly expenditure on labour and machinery by the owners of firms, which also increases disproportionately to income. Nevertheless, the formula is at least good enough to account for certain consumption practices in relation to artwork. Roman Kraeussl makes the standard case: ‘Art is a luxury good. If aggregate levels of wealth are high, the demand for art may also be expected to be high, as investors may spend part of this excess of wealth in the arts. Changes in income are therefore likely to have a significant effect on the demand for art and the prices paid for works of art.’

The art market is indeed a vast luxury trade. But art is not a standard luxury in terms of its production. Unlike \textit{haute cuisine}, \textit{haute couture} or \textit{fine and rare wines}, there need be no high quality within the product. At $15 million, Damien Hirst’s stuffed shark is one of the most expensive artworks by a
living artist, but it is technically inferior to comparably preserved animals. One could purchase a better stuffed shark at a fraction of the price of Hirst’s. Artworks do not have to exhibit any qualities of the luxury trade in their raw materials, skills, technology, or any other intrinsic quality.

Despite the conspicuousness of art’s luxury trade, artworks do not conform in many respects to the conventional economic pattern of consumption of a luxury good. Luxury goods such as sports cars are often purchased, as Thorstein Veblen observed, in part to exhibit them. However, the display aspect of luxury goods means showing off goods that are not normally consumed in their display. Nonetheless, when a non-owner of an artwork looks at it, she consumes it without purchasing it. This is why artwork is naturally seen as a public good as well as a luxury good. Sports cars and jewellery are not public goods or merit goods in addition to being luxury goods. Artwork, on the other hand, even if and when it is a luxury good is often (and, in principle, always!) a public good and a merit good. Even artwork that is a commodity, even artwork that is a luxury good, is never merely a commodity, is never merely a luxury.

Economists are wrong. Artwork is not a commodity and art is not an economic activity. Art hates capitalism even if capitalism loves art. Capitalism loves art because its values are not determined by supply and demand. The reason economists think that art is sacred or artists are ‘perverse’ is simply due to the fact that artwork is not produced as a commodity for economic exchange. If all production followed the logic of artistic production, capitalism would be history and economists would be out of a job!

Homo Economicus is a shit artist, a blind art critic, a moronic art theorist, a witless art historian and a cynical curator. Homo Economicus is also a dumb collector, a worthless gallerist, and an unreliable dealer. Let’s kick the marketplace out of art. And kick the economist up the arse. Are there any economists in the room?